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Preface
This thesis derives from an interest which has matured since my final year as an
undergraduate at the Faculty of Law, University of Manchester. In particular, I refer to
the "Law, Medicine and Ethics" course which provided me with an invaluable
framework in which to develop my interest in medical jurisprudence. Professor
Margaret Brazier delivered a lecture on medical research at the end of the Spring term
(1992) which she drew to a close by stating that, "Seeing as questions of medical
research affect society, they should also be resolved by society". I did not know then
that these words were to form the basis of my thesis. Over the Easter holidays, I came
across the transcripts of the Nuremberg trial at the law library of the Free University of
Brussels and I soon began to ask myself the question which is one of the staples for
medical research involving human subjects: how could doctors commit such terrible
atrocities ? Moreover, how could society allow these terrible things to occur ? How
were the safeguards overridden ? Was the phenomenon of unethical research delimited
by geography, namely, was it solely a German phenomenon ?
This thesis is designed around the comparative method for several reasons. Generally,
the intellectual challenge of forming an understanding of a different legal system is an
end in itself to the extent that it promotes the pursuit of ideas.1 Moreover, it fosters a
greater understanding of the domestic legal system which can be viewed in a wider
perspective. Ultimately, however, comparative method serves a practical function. The
current position in the United Kingdom is that the application of official controls as
regards medical research has been unsystematic and haphazard. Research in Germany,
on the other hand, is severely regulated by the Drugs Code {Arzneimittelgesetz - AMG)2
'"...by the international exchanges which it requires, comparative law procures the gradual
approximation of viewpoints, the abandonment of deadly complacency, and the relaxation of fixed
dogma. It affords us a glimpse into the form and formation of legal institutions which develop in
parallel, possibly in accordance with laws yet to be determined, and permits us to catch sight,
through the differences in detail, of the grand similarities and so to deepen our belief in the
existence of a unitary sense of justice." Zweigert, K and Kotz, H Introduction to Comparative Law
(2nd rev. edn, 1992, Weir, T (tr)) at p. 3.
historical references to Germany are confined to the Federal Republic of Germany prior to
Unification because of the difficulty in obtaining access to materials as regards unethical research
xi
References will also be made to the United States given the advanced development of the
regulation of medical research in that country. The outlook of this work, however, is
inherently European as opposed to Anglo - American. This has less to do with what
some have defined as the "gradual convergence"3 or the "vanishing distinction"4 between
the common and the civil law systems and more to do with the fact that both the United
Kingdom and Germany are part of the European Union. In effect, both England and
Scotland have ceased to be a "legal island" and have joined the mainstream of the
European legal tradition.5 Much can be learned by setting aside national barriers; this
calls for co - operation which goes beyond comity. It is submitted that a degree of
harmonisation of the regulatory measures for medical research is required across the
Union. This would avoid the possibility of pharmaceutical companies indulging in
"forum shopping" for places to conduct their research. The United Kingdom should not
become the sweat shop of the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, both systems will be
viewed as presenting national variations of a common theme, the regulation of medical
research involving human subjects.
The British reader will be familiar with the background to the law in the United Kingdom
but will probably be less at ease with the German legal system. I have therefore precied
an outline ofGerman law in Appendix A.
As part of my research, I sent out questionnaires to research ethics committees in
Scotland, a summary of the results are annexed in Appendix E. I would particularly
like to thank Mr Sheldon, former chairman of the Tayside Committee on Medical Ethics
practices in the former German Democratic Republic. Details concerning the GDR's past are now
beginning to emerge. See Glees, A and Rose. D in The Observer, August 12, 1997 at pp. 1-3.
3Markesinis, B M The Gradual Convergence: Foreign Influences and English Law on the Eve of the
21st Century (1994) and also Markesinis, B M 'Judge, Jurist and the Study and Use of Foreign Law
'
(1993) 109 LQR 622. Contra Legrand, P 'European Legal Systems are not converging' (1996) 45
ICLQ 52.
4Gordley. J 'Common law and civil law: eine uberholte Unterscheidung (1993) 1 ZEuP 498.
5Sir Thomas Bingham in FA Mann lecture 'There is a World Elsewhere' (1992) 41 ICLQ 514,
Zimmerman, R 'Savigny's Legacy. European Legal Science' (1996) 112 LQR 576 and also Birks, P
'Adjudication and Interpretation in the Common Law: a Century of Change' (1994) 14 LS 156 and
also Edwards, D 'The Scottish Reaction - An Epilogue' in Markesinis (1994), fn 3 above at 263.
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in Dundee, and Mr Moore, acting medical adviser to the said committee who both
provided me with invaluable insights into the practices of research ethics committees. I
would also like to thank the members of the Central Manchester Research Ethics
Committee who allowed me to sit in on one of their meetings in March, 1995.
This thesis would not have materialised had it not been for the support and
encouragement of certain people.
A special thanks goes to my family - my parents, in particular, who kept their faith
despite their worries that their daughter had become eine ewige Studentin.
I thank my supervisor Professor J K Mason for his undying patience and support
towards a supervisee who, at times, tried to throw her arms around the world (including
Pontius Pilate!) in trying to write the thesis. His role in loco parentis was much
appreciated especially when his supervisee's nerves were frayed - during prolapses and
otherwise.
I would like also like to thank my second supervisor Professor R A McCall Smith as well
as Professor Margaret Brazier, Professor Neil MacCormick, Jean McHale, Peter Cullen,
Elizabeth Kingdom, Jim Shepticki, Professor Beverley Brown, Chris Himsworth, Colin
Munro, the Angels in Brussels, in Berlin and in Edinburgh who are too many to name but
without whom this would not have been possible. In particular, I would like to thank
Sarah Meckling, Dagmar Rudolph, Felix Oelkers, E.P, Joey, Ali & Mele, Claudio,
Murray, Julie, as well as all those in the post-graduate office and the Hearts of
Midlothian Swimming Club.
The staff at the law library at the University of Edinburgh deserve many medals as do the
staff at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (Preufischer Kulturbesitz) and the law library of
the Free University of Berlin who showed extreme indulgence towards a researcher
whose grasp of library etiquette was perhaps not as correct as it could have been. I am
grateful to the British Federation of Women Graduates for their financial support and
also to Professor Dr. Richard Toellner at the University of Miinster, who provided me
with assistance by way of materials.
Last but not at all least, I thank Matthias Mahlmann whose love, encouragement and
assistance have helped sustain the onslaught on hurdles - disc shaped and otherwise - and
has added to the reserves needed to face what have sometimes been proved to be
overwhelming questions.




Author's note: This thesis follows the Interpretation Act 1978, s 6 in that, unless the
contrary intention appears, words importing the masculine gender include the feminine
and words importing the feminine gender include the masculine.
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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with finding an appropriate legal response to medical research involving
human subjects. The history of the regulation of medical research testifies to the social climate within
which research has been conducted. This includes the evolution of the doctor as scientist which led to
the objectification ofhuman beings as research subjects, the presence of ideologies in times ofwar, for
instance, which took hold of national consciousness and conscience thereby shifting the goal posts of
justification, and the development and nurturing ofmedical careers.
The first section contains Chapter One which consists of an historical account offorms of unethical
research and asks two questions. First, how could such things have been done in the name of research
? Secondly, how could society allow them to take place ? How were the safeguards overridden ? What
was the environment or climate within which unethical research was allowed to flourish ? Chapters
Two, Three and Four comprise section two and deal with the intellectualisation ofquestions ofresearch
at the abstract level of the medico / legal debate. In particular, Chapter Two outlines the terminology
of medical research, the monopoly over which has been secured by scientists through scientific
discourse. Chapter Three considers the legal discourse in relation to the concept of informed consent
and considers the implications of an approach based on medical negligence, in itself a retrospective
'after the fact' approach; it will be argued that medical research should be viewed prospectively within
a framework which is more informed by public than private law. Chapter Four considers the role of
moral discourse in relation to its main protagonists, 'bioethicists', who retain a firm grip on the ethical
implications ofmedical research. An alternative rationale will be suggested which is both universally
applicable and normatively neutral. It will be further argued that moral discourse should involve the
public sphere and should not be confined to the private realms consisting of the educated intuitions of
researchers and other members of the professional elite.
The third section consists ofChapters Five and Six and are concerned with the research debate as seen
in research ethics committees in both the United Kingdom and Germany. In particular, I consider the
overall lack ofaccountability ofresearch ethics committees with reference to the application ofjudicial
review and some of its shortcomings when applied to the decisions of research ethics committees. I
examine, for example, the lack ofprocedural uniformity of the practices of committees, the difficulty in
invoking a remedy in view of the predominantly oral nature of the proceedings, the restrictive
limitation period on judicial review in England and Scotland and so on. These are difficulties, which as
I shall argue, could be curtailed by the introduction of a Statute for medical research. Chapter Seven
considers this issue and others raised in the thesis in the shape ofproposals for reform which include
inter alia a suggestion for an act of parliament which places the medical research process on a
democratic, participatory and transparent footing. Procedures will be discussed which enables the
research debate to be egalitarian at both an abstract and applied level and which minimises the
democratic deficit. Medical research is the responsibility of society; this responsibility can not
continue to be demitted to committees which despite being a necessary element of the regulation of
medical research, should not be used to 'duck the issue'.
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Introduction
'Experimentation' is defined as a pragmatic alternative to accepted treatment. 'Medical
research' by contrast, involves a preordained protocol or plan from which a researcher
cannot deviate. Both involve participants or research subjects. It is, however, the latter
which is the subject of this thesis.
The search for an increased understanding of the human body and the way in which it is
affected by disease is a dynamic process; it also illustrates the power of knowledge. The
greater the knowledge, the greater the understanding of how the fight against disease
can, in some cases, be contained, and in others, be won. To this extent, the history of
human experimentation is as old as medicine itself for research plays a vital role in the
development of medicine.
The quest for a higher standard of care is relentless. Doctors want to give their patients
the best available treatment.1 A doctor's duty, as enshrined in the Hippocratic Oath, is
to prescribe treatment which is for the good of his patient, albeit according to his ability
and judgement. Moreover, he must never do harm to anyone.2 The human body can be
unpredictable despite its dependence on the laws of nature. This is amplified in its
response to illness. Each individual treatment may involve a degree of experimentation.
Medical research alters the doctor / patient equation considerably. There is, in fact, no
such relationship in the case of non-therapeutic research. In both therapeutic and non-
u'Nowhere is the melioristic goal more inherent than in medicine. To the physician, it is not
gratuitous. He is committed to curing and thus to improving the power to cure." Jonas H
'Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects' in Beauchamp, T L and
Walters, L Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (2nd edn, 1982) at p. 527.
2See the Hippocratic Oath as reproduced at p. 429 ofMason, J K and McCall-Smith, R A Law and
Medical Ethics (4th edn, 1994) and further in Beauchamp, T L and Childress, T F Principles of
Biomedical Ethics (3rd edn, 1990) for its modem crystallized form.
1
therapeutic research, however, the health carer becomes a health researcher and the
patient or volunteer moves from the position of a subject to that of an object. Research
involving human subjects may expose the individual to the possibility of harm without, at
the same time, offering him any benefit. The interests of the patient may be measured
against the possible benefit to society as a whole. The medical therapeutic researcher is
wielding a double edged sword in fighting for the good of his patient at the same time as
satisfying his duty towards society.
The Medical ResearchContext
Medical research must not be viewed according to the treatment model given that
different interests are at stake, such as those of science and scientists, of the community,
of the financiers of research, and those of the researched upon. The presence of these
interests give rise to social dynamics which are absent from the treatment model. The
research process is inherently political.3 Thus, a contextual distinction between ordinary
treatment and research must be drawn. Medical research will be analysed in this thesis in
the light of the political - ethical challenges that it poses, which some have referred to as
'Biopolitics'.4
The Concept of Risk
When deciding how to treat his patient, a doctor bears in mind the risks which ordinarily
attach themselves to any type ofmedical intervention ranging from prescribing analgesics
to cardiac surgery. We are living in what Beck has termed the 'risk society'.5 We incur
risks on a daily basis. Every time we cross a road or get into a car we risk serious injury
or even death. Yet risks of this type have come to be accepted as part of everyday life.
3McNeil, P The Ethics and Politics ofHuman Experimentation (1993).
"Heller, A and Riekmann, P (eds) Biopolitics. The Politics ofthe Body, Race and Nature (1994).
5CfBeck. U The Risk Society: Towards a NewModernity (1992, Ritter, M (tr)).
2
In the risk society, however, everyone is at risk.6 Thus, the response to risk must be
democratically based.
The responsibility for supervising research has traditionally been delegated to those
dedicated to the supervision of others, an intellectual elite.7 The present position reflects
and reinforces the existing social stratification.8 A consequence of elitism is that it
restricts the involvement of members of the community in deciding what sort of research
may be carried out.
The Influence of the Professional Elite
Membership of the elite implies the attainment of a position of superiority within society
by virtue of qualities and qualifications of distinction. The inevitable consequence is that
the elite tend to be inward looking.9
The medical research debate provokes competition between different schools of
professional thought, in particular those of scientists, lawyers and moral philosophers or
bioethicists. An appropriate ethical and political response to medical research
necessitates defining the role of these participants who should not monopolise the debate
which should also be both informed by and open to the general public.
This is particularly important when applied to the research ethics committee which
remains the main model for accountability as regards research. Currently, members of
6Beck. fn 5 above at 36-38.
7"Risks are defined as the probabilities of physical harm due to given technological or other
processes. Hence technical experts are given pole position to define agendas and impose bounding
premises a priori on risk discourse." Beck, fn 5 above at 4.
sCf Putnam. R D The Comparative Study ofPolitical Elites (1976) at p. 3.
^'Individuals are not intellectually, morally or physically equal, and society is not homogenous. On
the contrary, it is composed of vastly numerous social groups, mixing in innumerable ways. In any
particular grouping, some people are more capable than others. Those who are most capable in their
peculiar branch of activity, whether this be playing chess or playing the prostitute, thieving or
defending theives in the law courts, writing poetry or governing the country, are le classe elette, the
'select' persons of their particular grouping: in the French tongue, I'elite." Pareto, V in Finer, S E
(ed) Sociological Writings (1966, Mirfin D, (tr)) at p. 51.
3
committees are still chosen from professions giving it an outlook which is inherently
middle class. I do not propose to be anti-elitist in this thesis. I will, however, canvass
the opinion that the medical research process should be structured in such a way as to
allow all those affected to participate in resolving the issues that it raises, while, at the
same time, leaving some issues for specialised and expert treatment.10
I have sought to distance myself from the traditional medico / legal approach in view of
the dominance therein of the fault doctrine, which is a retrospective method of devising
principles. The medical research process should be controlled prospectively and requires
a different approach. Public opinion is sensitive to procedures involving aborted
foetuses, children and the like which should be controlled before they are undertaken
taking into account the views of all those who are likely to be affected. Thus, the medical
research process should involve a greater degree of participatory democracy in order that
questions of research can be resolved by society in the widest sense of the word.
The Medical Research Process; Alternative Models
In the search for a prospective formula, the existing regulatory framework has much to
offer and should certainly not be dismantled. Nonetheless, current thinking is haphazard
and undemocratic;11 what is required is a refinement of the status quo. One such model
is provided in Germany where medical research is closely regulated. The German Drugs
Code (AMG)12 is not as strict as its regulatory nature implies. It is, for example, far
more pragmatic than is the regulation of animal experimentation13 or of embryo
research.14 However, in contrast to the United Kingdom, there is a blanket ban as
10Cf Habermas, J Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (1996) at p. 359-360.
111 shall approach this issue by means of a debate of the theories of Jiirgen Habermas, particularly in
relation to his most recent work, fn 10 above, Ulrich Beck and Neil MacCormick who allow us to
see how societal responsibility can be realised.
12Arzneimittelgesetz of 19. 10. 1994 BGB1. I, 3018 at 3040.
13See the Tierschutzgesetz of 18. 8. 1986 BGB1.1, 1319.
14Embryonenschutzgesetz of 13. 12. 1990, BGB1. I, 2746. For an overview see Riedel, E 'The
Constitution and Scientific and Technical Progress' in Starck, R (ed) New Challenges to the
German Basic Law (1991) at p. 61 et seq.
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regards embryo research in Germany .15 This is a product of the backlash which resulted
from the atrocities committed during the second World War in German concentration
camps. The collective guilt which this engendered still forms part of the national
consciousness.16 The advantage of the German position is that it provides a regulatory
framework within which the principles to be applied are spelled out. As we shall see in
the chapter dealing with research ethics committees, however, the German model is also
inherently elitist.
Other models of decision-making will be suggested which are considered to be more
egalitarian and which allow for increased participation within a constitutionalised
framework. In addition, one has to consider possible parallel contributions to the debate
by, for example, Citizens' Juries. The regulation of medical research is a matter of
responsibility and not of fault.
l5See the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.





The History of the Regulation ofMedical Research
" ' The purest experiment in treatment may still be conscientious: my business is to take care of life,
and to do the best I can think offor it. Science is properly more scrupulous than dogma. Dogma gives
charter to mistake, but the very breath ofscience is a contest with mistake andmust keep the conscience
alive.' Alas ! the scientific conscience had got into the debasing company ofmoney obligation and
selfish respects'
Is there a medical man of them all in Middlemarch who would question himself as I do?' said poor
Lydgate."
George Eliot 1
1.1. The Increasing Importance of Research
There can be no doubt that the research explosion which ensued at the first half of the
twentieth century, and which was catalyzed by both World Wars, was a direct
consequence of an earlier move to improve research methods.2 The end of the 19th
century and the early 1900s bore witness to the quest to legitimate medical hypotheses
by deploying the methodology of the natural sciences. Medical schools encouraged their
students to think like scientists. The superiority of objective experimentation was
formally recognised, primarily through Claude Bernard, whose teachings lay at the centre
of this evolution in medical thought.3 The application of physiological and biochemical
experiments to the individual was gradually accepted. A new breed of practitioner began
to emerge - the scientific physician or, as he now would be described, the medical
researcher.4
'Eliot, GMiddlemarch, Harvey, W J (ed) (1985) at p. 795.
2The main sources for this section are Castiglioni, A A History of Medicine (2nd edn, 1947,
Krunghaar, E B (ed) (tr)) and Dow, D D (ed) The Influence ofScottish Medicine (1988).
3Cf Bernard, C An Introduction to the Study ofExperimental Medicine (1957, Green, H C (tr)).
4See Castiglioni, fn 2 above at 763.
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The practice of medical research had at long last found its way to the laboratory, away
from the clinic and away from the bedside. This shift in emphasis was in direct contrast
to the Boerhaavian tradition which held that the patient ought to be at the centre of
medical attention.5 The 'new scientists', however, adopted a different position. How
was medicine to advance if, as Boerhaave maintained, theoretical discussion was out of
place at the patient's bedside ? Placing the centre of research in the laboratory meant
that theories could be devised and tested through observation. Patients could then be
treated according to principles which had been tested and proved.
1.1.1. Internal Medicine
The scientific clinician in the nineteenth century was essentially a pathologist. This was
particularly apparent in Germany, where a period of great economic prosperity ensured
the development of some exceptionally fine laboratories. Every hospital clinic was
equipped to carry out intricate investigations. The great German clinicians of the time
excelled, more often than not, in both pathology and bacteriology. German universities
prided themselves in regarding laboratory studies as being above bedside observations
and this trend was to dominate German medicine for years to come.6 Even today, it is
true to say that before embarking on a scientific research project, a check should be
made that it had not been done in Germany before the first World War.7
1.1.2. Surgery
The discoveries of anaesthesia and asepsis, by Simpson and Lister respectively, ensured
that surgery did not remain unaffected by the transformation which was taking place.
Surgeons, who had hitherto relied on their knowledge of anatomy as a basis for surgical
intervention, began to train themselves in pathological anatomy in order to gain a proper
5See Castiglioni. fn 2 above at 617.
6See Castiglioni, fn 2 above at 829.
7See Mason, J K review of Clark, M and Crawford, C (eds) Legal Medicine in History (1994) in
(1997) 5 Med L Rev 147.
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scientific basis for the understanding of disease. Moreover, the progress of operating
room techniques as well as the pressure to undertake increasingly severe ablative
operations contributed to the birth of a new era in surgery.
There was, however, resistance to this approach which derived from the tension between
the old learning and the new; in other words, walking the wards versus scientific
experiment.8 Thus, many surgeons sought to undermine the novel techniques and the
'new fangled' inventions. Despite this, the race to be at the forefront of medical
progress was on right across the globe. Medical education had to adapt itself to this new
dimension. Accordingly, great reforms were set to sweep not only across central Europe
but also throughout the United Kingdom and the United States.
1.1.3. Medical Education
1.1.3.1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's response was to some extent shackled by its emphasis on clinical
instruction. Students gained early admission to the wards but received little instruction
in laboratory work, which deprived them of the insight into the way in which a greater
understanding of disease could be gained by research. Indeed, at the University of
Edinburgh, then regarded as one of the best undergraduate courses in the world, the only
laboratory training which students received consisted of testing urine for sugar.
In 1868, a letter appeared in the British Medical Journal by Syme, a distinguished
physician of the time, who wrote that medical education was,
"...a preparation...merely for passing examinations which, for the most part, imply
neither an accurate knowledge of facts nor the possession of sound principles,
being simply affairs ofmemory loaded with dry terminology."9
8Youngson. A The Scientific Revolution in Victorian Medicine (1979) at p. 16.
9(1868) i BMJ 371.
9
George Eliot addresses this point in her novel Middlemarch which is set during the latter
part of the nineteenth century. In the book, the majority of physicians do not question
themselves in the way that Lydgate does because they were not trained to do so.
Lydgate retires to the country in order to pursue a lifelong interest in research, having
completed part of his medical training in France. At first, his methods of treatment are
regarded with some suspicion.
As the story unfolds, we begin to see that this is not the common attitude to any
newcomer and that Lydgate is quite unlike his fellow practitioners to the extent that he
wishes to keep up with the latest in medical thought. He achieves this by dedicating
much time to research, uses a stethoscope and advocates the value of post-mortem
examinations. This is regarded as highly unusual and he is quietly undermined by his
colleagues.10
The medical community was then, as it is now, a small community, operating according
to a closed, village - like mentality. The acceptability of ideas depended on a physician's
personality.11 Lydgate's slightly abstract and remote nature helps to reinforce the way in
which he is mistrusted. In the end, he is defeated by the conservatism which is so
ingrained in the medical establishment of the time.
I0"'Lydgate has lots of ideas, quite new, about ventilation and diet, that sort of thing,' resumed Mr
Brooke, after he had handed out Lady Chettam, and had returned to be civil to a group of
Middlemarchers.
'Hang it, do you think that is quite sound ? - upsetting the old treatment, which had made
Englishmen what they are' said Mr Standish.
'Medical Knowledge is at a low ebb among us,' said Mr Bulstrode, who spoke in a subdued tone,
and had rather a sickly air. 'I, for my part, hail the advent of Mr Lydgate. I hope to find good
reason for confiding the new hospital to his management.'
'That is all very fine,' replied Mr Standish, who was not fond of Mr Bulstrode; 'if you like him to
try experiments on your hospital patients, and kill a few people for charity, I have no objection. But
I am not going to hand out money out ofmy purse to have experiments tried on me. I like treatment
that has been tested a little.'
'Well, you know Standish, every dose you take is an experiment - an experiment, you know,' said
Mr Brooke, nodding towards the lawyer." See Eliot, fn 1 above at 119.
""Findings are not simply findings; they are the findings of someone. The reputation of the author
may affect their credibility; his personality and connections, in a small world, may affect their
acceptability." Youngson, fn 8 above at 219.
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Scotland can be distinguished from England to the extent that the need to further medical
progress by observing patients and by conducting experiments with new drugs had been
recognised.12 This is because of the nature of the intellectual tradition in Scotland which
was, and still is, more broadly based as compared to education in England. As Mason &
McCall Smith pointed out in the first edition of Law andMedical Ethics,
"The fact that Scotland's contribution to medicine around that time was
disproportionately large in relation to its population may have been due to the
wider availability of high quality education in that country." 13
However, Scotland also fell behind despite its great contributions to medical progress.
Simpson's discovery of chloroform, for example, was pioneered elsewhere. Lister's
contribution was that of a "solitary entrepreneur in a Scottish System which was
sluggish." 14 Neither men were products of their time for they were both committed
scientists who refused to languish in the conservative climate of the Anglophone world.
Scientists on the continent, on the other hand, were only too ready to endorse and accept
their discoveries. 15
1.1.3.2. Germany
The experience in the United Kingdom was in direct contrast to the vitality of continental
research and teaching. Medical progress and research teaching in Germany led the
world. Medical instruction was made up of lectures and practical work in laboratories
and wards. The emphasis was placed on clinical investigation as opposed to clinical
observation. Indeed, a professor in Germany was regarded as a lifelong student of his
12"tf the benefits derivable from physiological science are so limited, from what other and better
source is improvement to come? The answer is from accurate observation; in other words
enlightened empiricism." Blane, G Medical Knowledge (1819) in Dow, fn 2 above at chapter eight.
13At p. 9.
14See Dow. fh 2 above at 110.
15"The truth is, that this is a question in science rather than in surgery, and hence, while eagerly
adopted by the scientific Germans, and a little grudgingly by the semi-scientific Scotch [sic], the
antiseptic doctrine has never been in any degree appreciated or understood by the plodding and
practical English surgeon. Happily for his patients, he has for a long time been to a considerable
extent practising a partially antiseptic system, thanks to his cleanly English instincts; but it has been
like the lady who talked prose without knowing it." (1878) i Lancet 36.
11
subject as well as a teacher of future practitioners. But it was the United States which
was to benefit from the experience in the United Kingdom and Germany. For Germany
was but a trustee for a legacy which was finally claimed by the United States, with
interest.
1.1.3.3. The United States
American medical schools contributed little to medical research during the nineteenth
century. This was very much to do with the mood of the time as the United States was
more concerned with achieving greater economic growth in a bid to establish itself as a
major industrial nation. Consequently, research attracted minimal funding in that it was
generally considered too impractical. For example, the funds allocated for medical
education in 1891 totalled only $500,000 as opposed to the sum of $18,000,000 which
was allocated towards study in the well-established discipline of theology.16
American graduates wishing to keep up with the latest in medical innovation opted to
pursue their studies abroad. Until 1820, graduates had tended to favour British and
French medical schools. After the Civil War, however, American physicians headed for
Germany and Austria. Many returned having acquired a solid foundation in research
skills combined with the conviction that the future of medicine lay in the laboratory
relying on innovative tools such as the microscope and extolling the virtues of new forms
of science, such as bacteriology. In short, they had returned as disciples of the
continental pedagogical tradition. It was their influence which helped shape the pattern
of things to come.
Great reforms began to be seen in medical education. American universities began to
provide better premedical training by combining with the best of foreign methods of
instruction within their hospital courses. President Eliot, the then President of Harvard
University and a committed scientist, implemented reforms which secured his position in
l6Duffy. J The Healer; A History ofAmerican Medicine (1979) at p. 229.
12
the history books as a visionary. By the 1870s, teachers in American medical schools
received salaries and by 1892, Harvard medical school had lengthened the course to four
obligatory years. 17 As Allbutt put it,
" this new birth [of medicine] is nothing less than its enlargement from an art of
observation and empiricism to an applied science founded upon research; from a
craft of tradition and sagacity to an applied science of analysis and law, from a
descriptive code of surface phenomena to the discovery of deeper affinities; from a
set of rules and axioms of quality to measurements of quantity." 18
This move was by no means confined to the medical schools. The years spanning 1870
to 1895 saw Harvard Law School virtually transformed under the deanship of Langdell
by the introduction of the so-called 'case' or 'Socratic' method of teaching. Langdell,
who had been personally appointed by Eliot, saw the case-method as an inductive
reasoning process. The instructor and the student were co-researchers whose aim was to
effect the move away from the analysis of a series of concrete cases to the elaboration of
general principles of law;19 law thus became a science governed by logical principles.20
This was very much in tune with the formalist consensus of the time.
The 1890s saw the newly established Johns Hopkins Medical School transformed into a
research centre by William H. Welch, who had recently returned from Germany. He was
also involved in the promotion of scientific work by medical officers at the Army medical
school. By 1900, laboratory training and research were regarded as fundamental to
medical education and most medical schools and universities had set up their own
research laboratories.
l7Castiglioni cites Oliver Wendell Holmes who wrote of President Eliot that he. "...has turned the
whole university over like a flapjack. There never was such a bouleversement in the Medical
Faculty." Castiglioni, fn 2 above at 915.
18Castiglioni, fn 2 above at 915.
l9Chase, A 'The Birth of the Modern Law School' (1979) 23 Amer J Legal Hist 329 and Duxbury, N
Patterns ofAmerican Jurisprudence (1995) at p. 11 et seq.
20For an illustration of the effect that this had see Oliver Wendell Holmes who firmly believed that
jurisprudence ought to include the human element; "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience." Holmes, O W Review of C.C. Langdell, 'Summary of the Law of Contracts'
(1880) 14 Am L Rev 233 at 234.
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Nevertheless, the average American physician still retained a degree of scepticism as
regards medical research. Indeed, although the practice of blood letting had declined by
the end of the nineteenth century, many physicians continued to extol its virtues. 21
Moreover, the results of research still appeared in scientific journals such as Scientific
American and Popular Science Monthly as opposed to medical journals. Even so,
American researchers within the new generation of physicians began to make discoveries
of their own despite the stifling training they had received. The scene was set for an
explosion of research which was to shake medical science to its foundations.
1.2. The Explosion of Research
The advent of antibiotics catalysed an explosion in the search for synthetic analogues.
The effect of each new drug developed could be evaluated only in the medical
therapeutic field. Thus, medicine became strongly influenced by the pharmacologists and
the age of science-based medicine had begun.22
1.3. The Consequences
Doctors themselves were not unaffected by this development. They began to objectify
their patients, viewing them as subjects to be observed and experimented upon rather
than as patients. Was unethical research a direct consequence of this change of balance ?
To say that this was exclusively so would be over-simplistic and difficult to sustain. It
was, however, certainly, a contributory factor. The scientific method which originally
led physicians into the laboratory was based on observing primitive organisms such as
fruit flies and dog-fish. The distinction which arose from the fact that the research
21Fielding H. Garnison writes in 1913 that there is scarcely a physician who "may not suddenly
encounter some circumstances in his experience in which venesection would turn out to be his sheet
anchor and his patient's salvation." Duffy, fn 16 above at 233.
"Castiglioni, fn 2 above at 920 - 921.
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objects in medical research were predominantly human was never specifically drawn.
The scientific method which was adopted by the scientific physicians neither questioned
nor was it qualified.
Arguably, this was a foreseeable consequence. However, leaving aside the benefit of
hindsight, the possibility of unethical research was not anticipated and was accepted as a
phenomenon only when irrefutable evidence of its existence came to light - by which
time the horse had already bolted.
It became clear that society had played both a direct and an indirect role in its growth.
The responsibility of controlling medical research involving human subjects had been
abdicated to the conscience of 'scientific' doctors. The dangers of laissez faire were
appreciated only after the damage had been done. The anti-rational philosophy of self -
expression which formed the basis of Nazism exemplified the dangers of leaving the
control of research to the collective conscience of the professional elite.2. As this next
section will show, however, examples of unethical research are not confined to the
German physicians of the Second World War.
23See Wasserman, R 'Zur Wiederkehr des Niirnberger Prozesses gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher'
(1996) 32 Recht und Politik 34 who cites the twelve concurrent trials to the main Nurnberg trial
which began on November 20, 1945 and where the main protagonists of national socialism who
were prosecuted were members of the leading professional classes (the doctor's trial, the IG Farben
trial (Germany's largest pharmaceutical company), the trial against Siidost - Generale, the trials of
the central economic and administrative authority of the SS and so on). See also Russell, B History
ofWestern Philosophy (2nd edn, 1979) at p. 696 and also Zygmunt Baumann's thesis as outlined in
Modernity and the Holocaust (1990) where he argues that social norms and institutions made the
Holocaust feasible. See p. 87 et seq. See also Healy, M 'The Holocaust. Modernity and the
Enlightenment' (1997) 3 Res Publica 35.
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1.4. Germany
It is commonly assumed that guidelines for research involving human subjects were
developed in Germany only after 1945 but the history of the regulation of human
experimentation in Germany dates from well before then. Germany, was, in fact, the first
country to regulate medical research. We will trace its development through a number
of causes celebres.
1.4.1. Dr Neisser and Others
In 1900 an experiment was conducted by the scientist Albert Neisser, Director of the
Dermatological Clinic in Breslau in which healthy prostitutes were infected with syphilis
in an attempt to find a preventative cure for syphilis. He injected patients who were
admitted for other medical conditions. These patients were not informed about the
experiment nor were they asked for their consent. When some of them contracted
syphilis, Neisser concluded that the "vaccination" did not work. However, he argued
that the women did not contract syphilis as a result of his serum injections but contracted
the disease because they worked as prostitutes. Details of the experiment were
published by a liberal newspaper which triggered a national outcry.24 Neisser was fined
300,- RM by the Royal Disciplinary Court which held that he should have sought the
patient's consent. The only good to come from it was that it provoked discussion of
research involving human subjects.25
Reports began to appear in medical journals exposing more examples of dubious
research practices. A year later, yet more revelations appeared in a book which referred
to the research subjects mentioned as the "victims of science". Vikenty Veressayer, a
Russian physician, wrote about experiments where cancer had been transplanted and
24Schlaudraff, U 'Ethics Committees in Germany' (1992) 80 Bull Med Eth 40.
25See Vollmann, J and Winau, R ' Informed consent in human experimentation before the
Nuremberg code' (1996) 313 BMJ 1445.
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where patients had been exposed to scarlet fever.26 He also dealt with studies on
venereal disease in which human subjects had been used because no suitable animal
model could be found. He cited an example where a physician who, in attempting to
show that a specific micro-organism caused gonorrhoea, inoculated patients without
their knowledge in order to show that infection occurred. The infection which ensued
was painful and, at the time, incurable. 27
The Prussian Government immediately issued a directive to the heads of clinics and
similar establishments prohibiting medical intervention for "purposes other than
diagnosis, therapy and immunisation" unless certain conditions were fulfilled. Informed
consent was needed before such intervention was permissible. Secondly, the use of
minors and the mentally incompetent as research subjects was expressly forbidden. The
directive also provided that an investigator not only needed to seek approval from the
director of a medical institution but that he also had to maintain records which would
prove that the provisions of the directive had been observed.
1.4.2. The Lubeck Case
A second major case involved an experiment which was carried out in Lubeck in 1930
where the Calmette-Guerin vaccine was combined with the bacillus of tuberculosis; this
culminated in the deaths of 14 children. The Reich government issued detailed
"Guidelines for new Therapy and human experimentation" which went into considerable
detail. In summary, a distinction was drawn between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research, scientific experiments could not be carried out on vulnerable human subjects,
the risk and benefit of each experiment had to be weighed, research subjects had to give
their consent and experiments on animals had to be carried out before involving humans.
26Veressayev, V The Memoirs of a Russian Physician (1901, Linden, S (tr) reproduced in part in
Katz, J Experimentation with Human Beings (1972).
27Also see Deutsch, E Das Recht der Klinischen Forschung am Menschen: Zulassigkeit und Folgen
der Versuche am Menschen Dargest. Vergleich zu den Amerikan. Beispeil und die internat.
Regelungen (1979).
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However, the protection of research subjects depended on the conscience of physicians.
The atrocities committed in the name of medical research during the Second World War
and which came to light during the course of the Nuremberg trials indicate that the
regulations were ineffective.28 The guidelines of 1931 were not annulled in Nazi
Germany.
1.4.3. The NurembergTrial (1947)29
In 1947, twenty three defendants stood trial for their part in the atrocities which took
place in concentration camps during the third Reich; all but three of them were doctors.
The prosecution was brought by the victorious Allies. The indictment read that each had
"participated in a common design or conspiracy to commit and did commit war crimes
and crimes against humanity".30 Details of the acts of barbarity which had been
committed under the regime of national socialism emerged as the trial progressed. These
details not only shook the conscience of the world but also forced the German people to
confront and reconcile themselves with their past/1
Details were revealed of the 'high altitude' experiments which had been conducted at
Dachau for the benefit of the German Air Force to investigate the limits of human
physiology. Individuals were exposed to low atmospheric pressure without additional
oxygen. Some died as a result whilst others suffered grave cerebral injury. In
experiments, referred to during the trial as 'freezing experiments', also conducted at
Dachau, individuals were forced to remain in tanks of ice water for periods ofup to three
hours; many died as a result.
28See Deutsch, fn 27 above at 12.
29Note that the trial referred to was one of twelve other trials conducted in conjunction with the
main trial which began on November 20, 1945 and which lasted for almost a year. See Wasserman,
fn 23 above at 32.
30See Finnie, W 'War Crimes' 1990 JR 61 for a useful discussion of the distinction between the
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
3]Die Zeit 8 May, 1995.
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Other experiments involving infectious diseases such as malaria, epidemic jaundice and
typhus as well as those involving poisons and innovative drugs were all listed,
transforming the court room into a chamber of horrors. Fifteen out of the twenty three
defendants were found guilty. Out of these fifteen defendants, seven were hanged, five
were sentenced to life imprisonment, two recieved a sentence of twenty years and the
two remaining were sentenced to fifteen years and ten years imprisonment. Seven
defendants were acquitted and subsequently freed.
The judgment in the case United States v. Karl Brandt32 provided what later came to be
known as the 'Nuremberg Code' which provided the first international declaration
regarding research involving human subjects. The first article of the so-called 'ten
commandments' dealt with consent;
"The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential."
Given the context, it is not surprising that emphasis was placed on the subject's consent
being voluntary and uncoerced."'"' Later international guidelines have, however, reduced
the primacy of the consent requirement.34
A question which was never answered at Nuremberg was this: why was it that doctors so
readily engaged in research of this kind ? As was stated in the opening statement made
by counsel for the prosecution, Brigadier Telford Taylor,
"...most of them are trained physicians and some of them are distinguished
scientists. Yet these defendants, all of whom were fully able to comprehend the
nature of their acts, and most of whom were exceptionally qualified to form a
moral and professional judgment in this respect, are responsible for wholesale
murder and unspeakably cruel tortures."
32Trials ofWar Criminals Before the NurembergMilitary Tribunals. Volumes I and II, The Medical
Case. Washington DC : US Government Printing Office (1948) in Katz, fn 26 above at 292.
33See Beauchamp, T L and Walters. L Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (2nd edn,1982) at p. 506.
33See below.
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Indeed, the experimentation was not perceived as an abuse of medicine by its
perpetrators and it thus became clear that the proper conduct of research involving
human subjects could not be left to the individual conscience of the individual
physician.35 However, the practicalities of such a restriction were also acknowledged.
As the prosecution expert witness Dr Andrew Ivy said,
"
...a state cannot follow a physician around in his daily administration to see that
the moral responsibility inherent therein is properly carried out. This moral
responsibility that controls or should control the conduct of a physician should be
inculcated into the minds of physicians just as moral responsibility of other sorts,
and those principles are clearly depicted or enunciated in the oath of Hippocrates
with which every physician should be acquainted." 36
Thus, the question as to why doctors committed such atrocities provokes further
consideration of the societal climate in which such experiments took place.
1.4.4. Dr Rascher's Case
A German physician, Dr Alexander Mitscherlich, was commissioned by the German
Doctors Medical Association to cover the Nuremberg trial. The book, Das Diktat der
Menschenverachtung or the Dictate of the Contempt for Humanity11 not only provides
an overview of the documentation of the trial, but it also provides an incisive account of
the social dynamics and interaction between National Socialism and the medical research
community within it.
Mitscherlich, for example, includes the correspondence between a medical researcher,
Dr. Sigmund Rascher and Himmler in his book. Rascher had struck up a friendship with
Himmler which was not only a meeting of minds but also a type of patronage. Himmler
had executive control of the concentration camps. Rascher was a doctor in the
35See generally Katz, J 'Human Sacrifice and Human Experimentation: Reflections at Nuremberg'
Yale Law School Occasional Paper (1997).
36Katz, fn 26 above at 300.
37Mitscherlich, A Das Diktat der Menschenverachtung: Aus der deutschen Arztekommission beim
Amerikanischen Militargericht I in Nurnberg: Eine Dokumentation vom Prozess gegen 23 SS Arzte
und Wissenschaftler (1947).
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Luftwaffe and an SS-Untersturmfuhrer and was responsible inter alia for the
hypothermia experiments carried out at Dachau. In the correspondence, he comes
across as ambitious, keen and committed. In a letter to Himmler dated 15 May, 1941,
for example, he asks Himmler for permission to use people incarcerated in concentration
camps as research subjects.38 The letter is a chilling example of how the boundaries
between humanity and inhumanity can merge - he begins by thanking him for
congratulating him on the birth of his son and adds a request for research subjects whilst
confirming at the same time that death will be a certain outcome for the subjects.39
Rascher was not unaware of how his contact with Himmler could further his career.
Himmler could provide funds and facilities. He also had virtually unlimited access to
raw materials in the form of human beings.40 The agreement operated according to the
basic principle of supply and demand.
The impression which one gains of Rascher is not only as a careerist. It is clear that he
was persuaded by the scientific worth of his hypotheses; thus, the experiments were seen
as morally acceptable or justifiable.41 The research subjects were dismissed as
"rassenschanderische Berufsverbrecher-Juden" which translates as a shame to the race,
professional criminal jews.42 The proposals and reports of the observations made are
characterised by the anonymity of the research subjects. It is easy to forget that the
Versuchspersonen, referred to in the letters as 'VP's, are in fact human beings.
"The VPs are placed in the water wearing a full winter and summer pilot's
uniform and a pilot's cap."43
38Doc. No. 1606 - PS in Mitscherlich, fn 37 above at 19-20.
39Doc. No. 1582 - PS in Mitscherlich, fxi 37 above at 21.
40Himmler also, for example, transformed concentration camps such as Sachsenhausen and
Buchenwald into depositories and sources of materials needed by the Reich. See Whyte, I B review
of Pelt, R J van and Dwork, D How Auschwitz was built (1996) in The Times Literary Supplement
January 31, 1996 at p. 5.
41"Personlich wiirde ich diese Versuche besonders in Kriegszeiten, nicht als unmoralish betrachten."
or "Personally speaking, I would not regard these experiments as immoral, especially during War
time." Dr Ruff, director of the Institute for Aerospacialmedicine of the German Research
Organization for Aviation, Berlin; Doc. No. 473. in Mitscherlich, fn 37 above at 29.
42Mitscherlich, fn 37 above at 32.
43"Die VPn werden mit voller Fliegeruniform, Winter - und Sommer - Kombination und
Fliegerhaube bekleidet ins Wasser gebracht."
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And further,
"As soon as the cooling down during these experiments reach 28 °, the VP died
despite all rescue attempts."44
On the whole, the research subjects are dismissed as anonymous or invisible. To be
visible, people have to be aryan as Doc. No. 323 shows where a blonde haired, blue eyed
21 year old woman ("rein nordisch") is about to be used in a cold water experiment
(.Aufwarmungs\'ersuchen). Rascher in fact sees her as a human being and saves her from
being used. He even writes of the possibility of her obtaining ethnic rehabilitation
through work.
Dr Rascher's research activities did not go entirely undetected. A certain Dr Weltz, the
then director of the Aerospatial Institute in Miinchen, tried to have the pressure chamber,
where the experiments were being conducted, removed from Dachau. However, the
strength of Rascher's connection to Himmler ensured that this did not occur. 45
Moreover, despite the fact that there were some physicians who were not convinced of
the scientific merit of the Dachau experiments, protests were, on the whole, muted. The
letter ofDr Hippke to Himmler, for example, dated 10 October 1942, is not so much of
a letter of protest on ethical grounds but of someone who is affected by professional
46
envy.
44"Sobald die Unterkiihlung bei diesem Versuchen 28 ° erreicht hatte, starb die VP mit Sicherheit
trotz aller Versuche zur Rettung." See a letter from Dr Rascher to Himmler, dated September 10,
1942 Doc. No. 1618 - PS in Mitscherlich, fn 37 above at 38-39.
45In a letter to Rascher. Himmler states unequivocally that people who choose to reject the
experiments and would thereby rather see brave soldiers die as a result of the hypothermia are
traitors to their country; the letter also contains a veiled threat of what might happen to such
traitors. "Leute, die heute noch diese Menschenversuche ablehnen, lieber dafiir aber tapfere
deutsche Soldaten an den Folgen dieser Unterkiihlung sterben lassen, sehe ich auch also Hoch - und
Landesverrater an, und ich werde mich nicht scheuen, die Namen dieser Herren an den in Frage
kommenden Stellen zu nennen." or "I regard people, who even today reject these human
experiments would thereby rather that brave German soldiers die as a result of hypothermia, as
traitors to their country and I would not by shy of naming them to the appropriate authorities." Doc.
No. 1609 - PS in Mitscherlich, fn 37 above at 43.
46He concedes that the results are encouraging (ermutigend) but claims that Rascher omitted to
consider certain factors such as cold and goes on to praise the pressure chamber at Tempelhof which
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The medical researcher, the doctor as careerist, ambitious, keen and committed as
encapsulated by Dr Rascher, by Lydgate, and by Dr Mandel in the Hyman case which is
discussed below all serve to indicate the importance of viewing the research ambience as
a whole rather than as a series of protocols to be evaluated individually.
Reading the transcripts from the trial, it would be easy to assume that unethical research
was exclusively a German phenomenon. However, whereas the Germans have been
forced to confront their past, the Allies were able to side-step any searching questions
about their conduct during the second World War which was not so much as a case of
moral and legal immunity as a case of'selective presentation'.47
Nuremberg raised awareness among the German people and introduced the questions
concerning the Holocaust as a matter for national consciousness and conscience. 48 The
Thorotrast case, for example, which arose in 1961, illustrates the sensitivity which the
trials had induced.49 The case arose out of a civil claim by a former German serviceman
who had sustained severe shrapnel wounds and who was referred to a University clinic.
Prior to an operation, the surgeon took an arteriogram of his femoral artery, using the
radioactive substance 'Thorotrast'. He took a further arteriogram a few weeks after the
operation. The plaintiff later developed cirrhosis of the liver and alleged a breach of duty
was then the new Aviationmedical Research Institute of the Reichluftfahrtministerium which had
cooling systems already installed. See Doc. No. 289, dated October 10 1942 in Mitscherlich, fn 37
above at 34. Note that at Nuremberg, Rascher was presumed dead. Dr Weltz was, however,
charged but acquited. The whereabouts of Hippke, who was responsible for the freezing
experiments, was unknown.
47Telford Taylor, who was part of the American prosecution team, wrote in a subsequent book that it
was a mistake to include the Russians on the bench given their role in the atrocities carried out in
Finland and Poland in 1939. He cites further examples such as the legality of air raids carried out
by the Americans and the British on Germany which are still regarded by many people on both sides
as war crimes. See Wasserman, fn 23 above at 34.
48See generally Conze, E and Metzler, G Deutschland nach 1945: Ein Lesebuch zur deutschen
Geschichte von 1946 bis zur Gegenwart (1997) at 248-277. It must be stressed that the German
reconciliation with the past is a contested point. See also pp. 249-254 where it is argued that post -
War Germany was more preoccupied with regaining economic prosperity than repentance and that
blame was seen as belonging exclusively to the National Socialists. See also Rohrich, W 'Die
Unfahigkeit zu trauern' at 259 and Werle, G and Wandres, T 'Auschwitz vor Gericht' at 263-267.
49BGHZ 20, 61 [65] "Thorotrast". See also Deutsch, fn 27 above at 31.
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of care in that he was given the wrong treatment and, in particular, that the Thorotrast
injection was unjustifiable.
The basis of his claim was that the injection had served an experimental purpose, the
results of which were used by the surgeon to further his research work. Indeed, the
injection did give the surgeon an opportunity to monitor the effect of using Thorotrast,
the risks of which were as yet unascertained. Hence, the motivation behind the
experiment was non-therapeutic to the extent that the injections were not given for the
patient's good. The court held in favour of the plaintiff, in a case which exemplified the
fear of individuals being placed in a position in which their ability to consent freely was
substantially impaired. The court was particularly worried about the plaintiffs status as
a soldier and the possibility that he might feel that it was a part of his duty to consent to
the intervention. This case illustrates the German antipathy to using 'captive individuals'
for experimental purposes. It may be that the German response to issues raised by
medical research is too restrictive. This will be discussed in a later chapter. For present
purposes, attention is drawn only to the effect that Nuremberg had on the German
people.50 The self-doubt which arose as a consequence was not experienced by the
Allies.51
Little is said of the Americans who, whilst being aware of the 'research' atrocities which
were conducted in Japanese prisoner of war camps, chose to do nothing, and, instead,
waited to see the outcome so that they could decide whether the results were useful.
Details of the 'hidden Japanese experiments' which consisted of experiments, in
biological warfare, emerged much later.52 The United States agreed to give the Japanese
50See "Strafsache gegen Mulka und andere. Aktenzeichen 4 Ks 2 / 63", the so - called "Auschwitz
trial" which began on December 20, 1963 in Frankfurt on the Main and which continued for 20
months and which was highly publicised. Countless school children from Frankfurt sat in on the
trial which was visited by 20, 000 people. See Werle and Wandres, fn 48 above at 264.
51For example, the question concerning German identity continues to be the source of ongoing
reflection and discussions especially in relation to the so-called 'German-Jewish dialogue' (Deutsch-
Judischen Dialog). See for example Aming, M 'Ihre gebrochene Identitat miissen die Deutschen
wohl hinnehmen' Frankfurter Rundschau January 20, 1997 at p. 1.
52Capron, A 'Human Experimentation' in Childress, J F et al., (eds) Biolaw: A Legal Reporter on
Medicine, Health Care and Bioengineering (1986) at p. 229. See also McNeil, P The Ethics and
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experimenters immunity from prosecution in exchange for the information derived.53
Indeed, as this next section will show, the United States' record in relation to unethical
research is less than 'squeaky clean'; yet it is a record for which they have never had to
accept overt responsibility - as has Germany.
1.5. The United States
During the 1950s, military experiments were conducted in the United States that were
not unlike those conducted by the Nazis54 - the argument of 'military necessity'55 was
advanced in some cases. Examples of the experiments included the exposure of soldiers
to radiation while a nuclear device was exploded in the Nevada desert56 and the secret
administration of dangerous drugs such as LSD to uninformed subjects by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).57 In both cases the subjects were told that they were part of
a study, but they were not informed of its precise nature.58 The ethical norms laid down
Politics ofHuman Experimentation (1993) at pp. 23-26 and generally Williams, P and Wallace, D
Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II (1989).
530n the grounds that trials of the Japanese experimenters would have led to the information
obtained becoming available to other countries; immunity was therefore awarded by United States
officials on the grounds of national security. McNeil, fn 52 above at 25. Unlike the Americans,
however, the USSR prosecuted some of the Japanese involved. In December 1949, a Soviet military
tribunal in Khabarovsk, Siberia charged twelve Japanese army personnel from Unit 731 with
manufacturing and employing bacteriological weapons. Attempts to publicise the findings which
arise during the course of the trial in the West failed, however. See Williams and Wallace, fn 52
above at 231-2.
'"'For a highly informative appraisal of the history of the regulation of medical research involving
human subjects in the United States, see Katz, fn 26 above, Levine, R J Ethics and Regulation of
Clinical Research (1986), and Goldner, J A 'An Overview of Legal Controls on Human
Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously' (1993) 38 St
Louis U L J 63. Note that during 'Operation Paperclip' which spanned the period between 1945-
1955, the US military employed 765 German and Austrian scientists, engineers and technicians.
Moreover, four defendants from the Nuremberg trial were at some point employed by the US
military. See Annas and Grodin, fn 59 below at pp. 106-107.
"See United States v. Karl Brandt in Katz, fn 26 above at 295.
56Jaffee v. United States, 633 F. 2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). See also
Goldner, fn 54 above at 93 et seq.
57Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 162 n.2 (1985).
ssBegay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 997-98 (D. Ariz. 1984), ajf'd, 768 F. 2d 1059 (1985).
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by the Nuremberg Code proved largely ineffective. Indeed, in some cases, American
judges excelled in creatively circumventing the Code by holding it to be inapplicable.59
By 1950, the Soviets exploded their first atomic warhead and the communists had come
to power in mainland China. The foundations for the Cold War had been laid and
America had to be prepared. Herein lay the justification for experiments comparable to
those conducted in concentration camps by the Germans. Theoretically, the accusers at
Nuremberg now stood accused. However, they retained a firm grip on the propaganda
machine which, at the same time, maintained the level of defensive paranoia.60
"The Cold War confrontation provided easy formulas to justify criminal action
abroad and entrenchment of privilege and state power at home. Without the
annoying need for thought or credible evidence, apologists on both sides could
explain reflexively that, however regrettable, the acts were undertaken for reasons
of "national security" in response to the threat of the cruel and menacing
superpower enemy."61
The American administration had stumbled across the perfect tool which would justify
the experiments which they were carrying out. They could be portrayed as being 'in the
national interests'- in other words, a necessary part of the war effort. In other words,
the end could be justified according to the means.
59See Annas, G J 'The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics Versus Expediency' in Annas, G J
and Grodin, M A (eds) The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code (1992) at 201 and 214.
60Examples of Cold War paranoia include the Palmer raids where presumed foreign subversives
were rounded up, imprisoned and expelled and the McCarthyism of the 1950s, "...the most
significant support to the deeply embedded position of the military establishment in the culture of
contentment was the perception that it was the bulwark against Communism, this being, as noted,
the most obtrusive of the seeming threats to contentment. Fear of this was deep and fundamental in
the psyche of the contented. Imperiled freedom, loss of liberty, was much cited; especially acute was
the threat to private property." Galbraith, J K The Culture ofContentment (1995) at 124. See also
Walker, M The Cold War (1993) at pp. 160 et seq.
61 "An ancillary convention comes into play as policy shifts for tactical reasons, or invocation of the
threat is no longer needed, or its absurdity becomes too manifest to conceal. At that stage, the fears
that were whipped up are seen as exaggerated by understandable Cold War passions. Now we will
"change course" and be more realistic - until the next episode requires that the record be replayed.
The routine is familiar to the point of boredom through the Cold War years." Chomsky, N World
Orders, Old and New (1994) at pp 1 - 2.
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In 1960 the National Institutes ofHealth (NIH) awarded Boston University a contract to
conduct a three year study on the practice of clinical research with reference to the legal,
moral and ethical questions involved.62 The results were astonishing. Of fifty two
institutions asked, only two had guidelines for human experimentation and only sixteen
used consent forms. A National Commission for the Protection of Research Subjects
was promptly set up with the task of drafting guidelines for research particularly as
regards experiments on prisoners, children and the mentally ill. However, as has been
suggested by some critics,63 the guidelines which were eventually drawn up had more to
do with the 'power to spend', namely, the practice of granting money subject to
conditions. The concept of power as power over resources had arrived. It was a form
of power with which the medical community, as well as the world community, was going
to have to familiarise itself for years to come.
In 1962, Congress passed legislation which provided that all researchers involved in
studies of new medication and seeking the approval of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) must obtain consent from the research subjects. However, the
provisions contained broad exceptions in the instances where obtaining consent was "wot
feasible" or not in the best interests of the subjects. The requirement for consent proved
to be largely ineffective.64
This was passed unnoticed because public scrutiny was otherwise occupied with the
Cuban missile crisis. Despite the absence of armed combat, the message which pervaded
the national consciousness was that this was a country still at war. The result was that
scientists were left to their own devices. What followed was an accident waiting to
happen.
A year later, headlines such as "Nazi Tactics" and "How Doctors use Patients as Guinea
Pigs" appeared in New York newspapers thereby projected a relatively unknown
62See Levine, fn 54 above at 322-25.
63See Deutsch, E 'Die rechtlichen Grundlagen und die Funktionen der Ethik-Kommission' Vers R
89, 429.
64See Goldner, fn 54 above at 94.
27
institution, the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital into the limelight of public scrutiny.65
The revelations which emerged culminated in a ruling of historical importance.
1.5.1. TheHyman Case66
It had been ascertained previously that, if healthy individuals were injected with cancer
cells from another individual, the healthy person would promptly reject the transplant.
However, rejection of the transplant was delayed when a person who was, himself,
suffering from cancer was injected with the same cells. The doctor involved, Dr
Southam, wanted to ascertain whether the foreign cancer cells survived longer in cancer
patients as the result of the pre-existing cancer or as the result of the patient's general
weakness and debilitation. Dr Southam engaged a young doctor called Dr Mandel, who
agreed to carry out the experiment under his direct supervision. The experiment, which
was funded by the United States Public Health Service and the American Cancer Society,
had received the approval of both the hospital's grievance committee and the hospital's
board of directors.
On the 16th of July 1963, cancer cells were injected into 22 hospitalised patients as part
of a study of the immune system's response to cancer. Consent of the research subjects
was obtained only verbally. Furthermore, they were only told that they would be
receiving some cells; they were not told that these cells would be cancer cells.67 The
doctors defended their actions by asserting that the distinction was of no consequence to
the patients, that it was not a cause of increased risk to the patients and, further, that the
precise nature of the foreign cells was irrelevant to the bodily reactions which could be
expected to occur. Why then were the patients not injected with normal cells ? This
question was seemingly never addressed.
65Langer, E 'Human Experimentation:New York Verdict Affirms Patient's Rights' (1966) 151
Science 663-66 as reproduced in Gorovitz, S, Macklin, R, Jameton, A L, O'Connor, J M, Sherwin,
S (eds) Moral Problems in Medicine (2nd edn, 1983) at p. 626.
"15 N.Y. 2d. 317, 206 N.E. 2d. 338; 258 N.Y. 2d 397 (1965).
67Schlaudraff, fn 24 above at 40.
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It is arguable that, by modern American standards, the experimenters were guilty of
battery for which the hospital would have been liable on the grounds that there was a
lack of consent as to the injection of cancer cells. Furthermore, the members of the
board of directors might also have incurred liability for knowingly permitting such
assaults to take place. However, this scenario never materialised as the case did not
involve a resolution of the propriety or the technical aspects of the tests.
The legal case arose when Mr Hyman, a member of the hospital's own board of
directors, questioned the permissibility of their research practices by asking the court to
determine whether he was entitled, as a matter of law, to inspect the records of the
hospital to investigate allegations of illegal and improper experimentation on patients.
Mr Hyman's application is best understood as a fight to drag research from behind
hospital doors out into the open - away from secrecy and towards greater accountability.
The Court of Appeals ofNew York decided to allow an order for Mr Hyman to inspect
records of a predominantly financial or administrative nature.68 However, the court did
not extend the terms of the order to allow the petitioner to inspect and make copies of
the records of the research subjects, the death certificates of those who died or of their
pathological reports, slides and laboratory data. The court maintained that the
information should not be available to the petitioner for inspection and photocopy since,
as a layman, he was under no legal duty to refrain from disclosing such information to
others.69
In overturning the decision of the Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court granted Mr
Hyman's petition as to the items which he had requested by maintaining that, as a
member of the board of directors, he had a legitimate interest to inspect and copy all
records in the possession or control of the corporation. These records included the
minutes of the board of directors, a report of the executive director, a report of a doctor
68This included copy books of account and fiscal records as well as rules and regulations governing
handling of patients.
6915. N.Y. 2d 317; 206 N.E. 2d 338; 258 N.Y. 2d 397 See in particular the persuasive reasoning by
Morris Ploscowe and Harvey I. Sladkus for the respondent.
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to the medical board and the charts and records of the patients who had submitted to the
tests.
It is interesting to note that whereas no legal action was taken against the doctors70 the
Regents of the University of the State of New York, whose responsibility it was to
license the medical profession,71 held that that the two physicians were guilty of
"unprofessional conduct" and of "fraud and deceit in the practice ofmedicine" insofar as
they had failed to inform the research subjects fully of what they were doing. Despite
their licenses being suspended for the period of one year, both physicians continued to
practice, albeit on probation.72 The case has been described as being a very important
milestone in that the manner of carrying out the experiment was questioned as opposed
to its propriety.7' However, the main significance for present purposes lies in its
illustration of attitudes to the conduct of research at that time.
Much of the testimony, which was introduced during the course of the trial by well
known researchers, was to the effect that the practices of Southam and Mandel did not
differ materially from those employed by their peers. Elinor Langer quotes one of the
lawyers involved in the trial as stating that, "If the whole profession is doing it...how can
you call it 'unprofessional conduct' ?"74 The official party line, which did not deviate
from the spirit behind this remark, was put rather more delicately. The Public Health
Service simply stated that,
"...in supporting extramural clinical investigations, it is the position of the Public
Health Service that proper ethical and moral standards are more effectively
safeguarded by the processes of review and criticism by an investigator's peers
than by regulation."
70For any involvement of the legal process was for the purposes of discovery regarding information
surrounding the experiment only.
7'Langer describes the Board ofRegents as consisting of "... 15 individuals elected by joint resolution
of the two houses of New York's legislature for terms of 15 years. The Regents have jurisdiction
over all education in the state, public and private, and over all licensed professions excluding law.
The three Regents most intimately involved in this decision were the three members of a special
committee on discipline." Langer E. fn 65 above at 626-627.
72Langer, fn 65 above at 627.
73See Beecher, H K Research and the Individual (1970) at p. 170.
74See Langer, fh 65 above at 629.
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In other words; 'members of the scientific community uniteElinor Langer's article,
which appeared shortly afterwards, seemed to criticise the statement by stating that it
was too theoretical. However, she ended up by towing the party line by arguing that,
"...given the tremendous growth and variety of medical research involving human
beings, if it is not done by the scientific community, someone else will start to do
it. The New York Regents may be only the beginning." 75
It was of course not the beginning, as the attempt to draw up guidelines for the conduct
of research involving human subjects had begun far earlier. It was, however, a beginning
to the extent that it began to unveil a code which some heralded as one of honour but
which others damned as one of secrecy.
Could Mandel have refused to take part or was he a modern day Lydgate ? The facts
surrounding the case suggest that he was not acting under duress. Instead, he emerges
as the eager young resident, keen, committed and as ambitious as Dr Rascher. Mandel
was also concerned about what he later referred to as the "insufficient medical attention
to the long term, chronically ill patients"76 and believed that the experiment would
improve their care. As a resident, he also had an eye for an opportunity to bolster his
career. Indeed, as it later emerged at trial, he "looked forward to the possibility of a
more prolonged collaboration with the Sloan-Kettering company which would contribute
to upgrading his own institution.".77 In a vote for the chaplaincy of Middlemarch,
Lydgate backed Mr Tyke, going against his belief that Mr Farebrother would be more
suitable. Mr Tyke was the nominee of the ubiquitous Mr Bulstrode, who had promised
to finance a new hospital. What more could an aspiring young physician wish for ?78
75See Langer, fn 65 above at 630.
76See Langer, fn 65 above at 628.
"ibid.
78Eliot. fn 1 above at 207 et seq.
31
1.5.2. Beecher's Article
In June 1966, Beecher, of the prestigious Harvard Medical School, wrote an article
which influenced the debate in the United States profoundly.79 He cited 22 instances
between 1950-1965 where unethical procedures had been adopted. Many patients were
unaware that they were the subjects of experimentation. Those that had been informed
were not told of the actual risks involved. However, perhaps most alarming of all were
the cases where known effective treatment was, in fact, withheld.
An example of this was a study which was carried out on 109 American Servicemen.
Treatment of streptococcal upper respiratory infection was withheld despite the
knowledge that the consequent development of rheumatic fever might be prevented by
the use of penicillin. One group of servicemen was given placebos while patients in
another group received penicillin. Two patients in the placebo group subsequently
developed acute rheumatic fever and one was diagnosed as having acute nephritis; no
cases occurred in the treated group.80
In another study, 408 patients were divided into separate groups in order to monitor the
relapse rate of typhoid fever when it was treated in two ways. It had been recognised in
a previous study that withholding the known effective treatment was dangerous to life.
Nevertheless, established treatment was withheld, resulting in the deaths of twenty three
patients who would probably not have died had they received specific therapy.81
A further project involved the transplantation of melanoma cells from a girl, who was
dying from the disease, to her mother, "in the hope of gaining a little better
understanding of cancer immunity and in the hope that the production of tumour
antibodies might be helpful in the treatment of cancer patients". The daughter died on
79Beecher. H K ' Ethics and Clinical Research' (1966) 274 New Eng LJ Med 1354.
S0Beecher, fh 79 above at 1356.
8'Beecher, fn 79 above at 1356.
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the day after the transplantation and her mother died fifteen months later from melanoma
that was assumed to have metastasised from the transplanted tumour. 82
Beecher concluded that the best protection for patients lay in the conscience of the
investigator. Research without publication is, however, of little value. Accordingly, he
argued that publishers ought to stress that the proprieties had been observed. He thereby
placed responsibility on the editor as well as on the researcher, hoping that a better
protection would ensue in that a researcher would be deterred from employing unethical
practices for fear of not having his results published;
"Even though suppression of such data (by not publishing it) would constitute a
loss to medicine, in a specific localized sense, this loss, it seems, would be less
important than the far reaching moral loss to medicine if the data thus obtained
were to be published." 83
This statement is as appropriate now as it was in 1966. There can be no doubt that in
the current 'publish or perish' climate, there is substantial pressure on doctors to come
up with original research work in order to further their careers. The tension between the
'scientist' and the 'patient care' doctor was an issue which Beecher had already
anticipated in 1966;
"...medical science has shown how valuable human experimentation can be in
solving problems of disease and its treatment; one can therefore anticipate an
increase in experimentation; and the newly developed concept of clinical research
as a profession ( for example, clinical pharmacology) and this, of course, can lead
to unfortunate separation between the interests of science and the interests of the
patient."84
Increasingly, hospital medicine is moving away from patient care towards the 'You are
what you write' ethos.
82Beecher, fn 79 above at 1358.
83Beecher, fn 79 above at 1359; Although he admits that it might be argued that, because of their
intrinsic value, such data should not be wasted but should be published with stem editorial
comment; he does not, however, share this view.
84Beecher, fn 79 above at 1355.
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However, Beecher failed to take into account the possibility of publication bias whereby
editors of scientific journals publish only research with positively significant results. The
existence of such bias can have consequences which are far reaching; researchers
experience difficulty in getting negative results published. The drawbacks of this are
substantial. If negative results are not published, the hypothesis which led to the
research being carried out in the first place can not be eliminated from that specific area
of inquiry. Thus, the unnecessary duplication of medical research trials is encouraged. A
register of clinical trials might well eliminate such difficulties.
Beecher's article made a major impression. However, it is difficult to see why the impact
was as substantial as some commentators believe.85 Regarding Beecher's article, it has
been stated that it,
"...struck the medical research community in the US like an exploding
fragmentation bomb. All manner of investigators and research projects from the
military and government laboratories were hard hit by his very specific and well
documented illustrations. The reprinted letters to the editor of the New England
Journal ofMedicine indicate the scope of the reaction to it." 86
Whereas it is arguable that the letters indicated the depth of the reaction, it is
questionable whether they indicated the appreciation of the ethical element in research.
Beecher himself pointed out that it was based on the misunderstanding that his paper was
a "sweeping indictment of all human experimentation". This, he argued, was not the
case as he was in favour of promoting the development of research as long as it was
carried out in an ethical manner.87
85McNeil, fn 52 above at 60. This is discussed in further detail below.
86Introduction to Part V'Medical Experimentation on Human Subjects' in Reiser, S J, Arthur, J,
Dyck and Curran, W J (eds) Ethics in Medicine-Historical Perspectives and Contemporary
Concerns (1977) at p. 255.
87 "I should like to affirm that American medicine is sound and most progress in it soundly
attained". Beecher, fn 79 above at 1354.
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At least some of his critics appreciated this;
"It will be particularly unfortunate for patients if physicians are not encouraged to
improve their understanding of disease by properly safeguarded human studies.
What is needed is not less human experimentation but more good investigation in
man." 88
Two traditional attitudes exist concerning the Hyman case and Beecher's article. First,
Hyman is often cited as an example of unethical research. This may be so but its primary
significance is as an illustration of the attitudes to secret research at that time. Secondly,
Beecher's article is widely described as having had an 'incredible impact'. On whom ?
It certainly had an impact on the medical profession; but the general public was largely
untouched by it. The readership of the New England Journal of Medicine is more
selected than some might imagine.
In my opinion, the impact of Beecher and the judgment in Hyman are best understood
when they are seen as cumulative. Each represented an individual strand of rope - that is
circumstantial evidence - which took unethical research out of the closed scientific shop
and into the field of public debate.89 The fact that the evidence was circumstantial does
not detract from its value - in certain cases, circumstantial evidence can be the most
cogent form of evidence.90 Questions arise as to why unethical research had remained
undetected for so long. It is widely accepted that common knowledge is often shared in
silence.91
88
Silverman, W A 'Letters to the editor in Response to Beecher's Essay' (1966) 275 New Eng L J
Med 791.
89"One strand of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three stranded together
may be quite of sufficient strength. Thus it may be in circumstantial evidence - there may be a
combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable conviction or more than a
mere suspicion; but the three taken together may create a conclusion of guilt with as much certainty
as human affairs can require or admit of." Per Pollock CB in R v. Exall (1886) 4 F & F 922 at p.
929.
9u"It is no derogation of evidence to say that it is circumstantial." R v. Taylor, Weaver and Donovan
(1928) 21 Cr App Rep 20 (CA).
91 "In most cases they were things which people do not talk about for fear of exposing themselves to
thoughtless ridicule. I was amazed to see how many people have had experiences of this kind, and
how carefully the secret was guarded." Jung, E The Structure and Dymanics of the Psyche,
Collected Works (Vol. VIII, 1960, Hull, RFC (tr)) at p. 420.
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Antipathy to publication was based on more than the fear of ridicule. The scientific
community is no different from any other community and is subject to the same
unwritten codes of etiquette. A scientist being seen to rock the boat could be labelled a
troublemaker and the potential for damage to his career prospects should not be
underestimated. Beecher was unaffected by such considerations and was able to bring
cases to light by reason of his professional standing; his career had spanned 36 years.92
A comparable example of an individual reaching the decision that something needed to
be written about a certain phenomenon is to be found in the area of child abuse. In
1962, Kempe drew attention to battered child syndrome and its high mortality rate.
So strong was the disbelief that such a situation could exist in a modern society that it
had previously been misdiagnosed, ignored or simply swept under the carpet. 94
The prevailing theme in both examples is that of disbelief. Nobody had believed that
people were doing these things. The reason why it existed was that it was done in
secret. Unethical research could not exist without secrecy. Beecher and Kempe both
fought for openness, for greater transparency.95 This is the motivation behind
establishing research ethics committees96 which ensure that all research is exposed to the
public gaze.
92See Who's Who in Science - From Antiquity to the Present (1968) at p. 142.
93See Kempe. C H et al 'The Battered Child Syndrome' (1962) 181 J Amer Med Ass at 17.
94Caffey. J 'Multiple fractures in the long bones of children suffering from chronic subdural
hematoma' (1946) 56 Amer J Roentgenol 163. The author believed that he was dealing with natural
disease.
95 It is probable that they broke the code of silence in order to restore faith in intellectual integrity
rather than to point the finger at individuals.
96Which I will be discussing in detail in a later chapter.
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1.6. The United Kingdom
1.6.1. Pappworth's Book
A years after Beecher's article in the New England Journal ofMedicine, a book entitled
'Human Guinea Pigs'97 by a General Practitioner, Maurice Pappworth was published in
the United Kingdom; this also contained allegations of unethical research. Despite
Pappworth's reputation as the enfant terrible of the medical establishment the impact of
the book was relatively slight compared to the effect which Beecher's article made in the
United States.98 The book ought to have provoked greater public interest because
experiments were being carried out mainly on hospital patients - that is, the public; and
this was seen as the most ethically disturbing aspect. The public, however, was
uninterested.99 It would have been an entirely different matter had the research subjects
been animals.100
1.7. The Birth of Institutional Review
1.7.1. The Development of Institutional Review Boards (USA)
Gradually, people's awareness increased to the extent that unethical research was not
restricted to the atrocities which came to light during the Nuremberg trials. A body of
opinion had begun to emerge which held that, although both the Nuremberg Code
(1947) and the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) provided clear guidelines as to the
conduct of human experimentation, there was a lack of effective control. Both
97(1967).
98See McNeil, fn 52 above at 66.
"McNeil, fn 52 at 69.
100See further.
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documents emphasised the investigator's duty to safeguard the rights and welfare of the
subjects; however, no reference was made to public or peer review. 101
James Shannon, the then Director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), had
become increasingly uneasy about the implications of the swift changes which were
beginning to shape the development of research. His alarm resulted from the Hyman
case and the unsuccessful transplantation of the kidney of a chimpanzee into a human
being. In this case, the surgeon had not consulted his peers as to the nature or possible
effectiveness of the operation. He had obtained the consent of the patient yet there was
no acceptable evidence to suggest that the operation would be a success or that it would
provide new scientific information. 102 The project had been partially funded by the NIH;
"Since such investigation departs from the conventional patient-physician
relationship, where the patient's good has been substituted for by the need to
develop new knowledge,...the physician is no longer in the same relationship...and
indeed may not be in a position to develop a purely or wholly objective assessment
of the moral nature or the ethical nature of the act which he proposes to perform."
103
Moreover, he was particularly concerned about the way in which the doctor/patient
relationship was being altered. In September 1965 he sought advice from the National
Advisory Health Council (NAHC). The deliberations of the NAHC culminated in a
resolution adopted in December 1965 which provided that the Public Health Service
should support clinical research involving human subjects only where an investigator's
research had been reviewed by his institutional associates.
The recommendations of the NAHC formed the basis of the first federal policy statement
on protection of human subjects which was issued in February 1966 by the Surgeon
General of the United States Public Health Service (USPHS). This policy made prior
101See Levine, fh 54 above at 322.
102McNeill, fn 52 above at 57.
103(NAHC 1965) Reported in Capron, A M ' Human Experimentation' in Veatch, R M (ed)
Medical Ethics (1989) at p. 130.
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review of federally supported research mandatory104 and was later revised in July 1966.
The requirement was extended to cover all USPHS grants. The policy included the
requirement for institution-wide assurances which would cover all grant proposals
emanating from a single institution as opposed to individual assurances. A subsequent
revision in December 1966 upheld the responsibility of such institutions to ensure that
investigations were carried out in a manner which accorded with the laws of the
community in which the investigations were conducted. This would have to include due
consideration to the ethical implications of the investigation.105 Despite this, the effect of
the measures introduced in 1966 was to ensure that the medical research community had
first refusal as to the approval of research protocols with a little help from their friends -
the emphasis being on the word little.
Institutional Review Boards (IRB) were established, whose primary function it would be
to evaluate proposals for medical research. These proposals could only be developed
into actual trials involving human subjects when a researcher had received the approval
of an IRB. The House of Delegates of the American Medical Association echoed this
requirement by endorsing the principles established by the declaration of Helsinki and by
issuing its Ethical Guidelines for Clinical Investigators as part of its Principles of
Medical Ethics.106
Whereas the committees established in pursuance to the USPHS legislation were usually
made up entirely of scientists and physicians, the concept of the research ethics
committee was considered to be wide open to innovation and the phenomenon of 'ethics
by committee' gradually emerged.107 Influenced by the reforms taking place in the
104"No new, renewal, or continuation research or research training grant in support of clinical
research and investigation involving human beings shall be awarded by the Public Health Service
unless the grantee has indicated in the application the manner in which the grantee institution will
provide prior peer review of the judgment of the principal investigator or program director by a
committee of his institutional associates." Febuary 8, 1966. See Levine, fn 54 above at 323.
l05See Levine, fn 54 above at 323.
106See Goldner, fn 54 above at 92.
107"There are several forms of medical decision-making by interdisciplinary committees. These
committees include...institutional ethics committees (IECs) established without any legal obligation
by many hospitals and some nursing homes to help review ethical policies and practices; infant care
review committees (ICRCs) established pursuant to the "Baby Doe" regulations to review the quality
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United States, both the United Kingdom and Germany quickly followed suit. The
practice of submitting proposals for research ethics approval evolved and was later
embodied in the Revised Declaration ofHelsinki (1975-83).
As regards the composition of such committees, further guidelines requiring that
committee membership ought to reflect, "varying backgrounds...[and possess]
competencies...in terms of institutional regulations, relevant law, standards of
professional practice, and community acceptance"108 were issued in 1969; these were
revised in 1974 and mandated specific composition of and numerical requirements for
committee membership.109 The concept of the committee as 'surrogate for the
community' evolved.110
The reforms which were taking place were not unopposed. Jay Katz writes about a
letter from Owen H. Wangensteen to Senator Walter F. Mondale in January 28, 1968111
concerning Mondale's proposal to Congress of creating a commission to adjudicate the
Social and Ethical implications ofHealth Science Research and Development,
"Senator, I would urge you with all the strength I can muster to leave this subject
to the conscionable people in the profession who are struggling valiantly to
advance medicine. We are living through an era in which the innovator is often
of care given to seriously ill newborns under some circumstances; diagnosis committees established
to determine a diagnosis that triggers an ethical and legal consequence (like "terminal illness") has
been properly confirmed; medical-legal malpractice review panels established by state law in some
states and by medical and legal societies in others to provide screening of potential malpractice
actions; the Recombitant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) established by federal law to review
research involving DNA; presidential commissions appointed by the President under acts of
Congress to investigate and help establish national policy on matters of interdisciplinary concern
and parallel state commisions to establish state policy." Furrow, B R, Johnson, S H, Jost, T S,
Schwartz, R L Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems (3rd edn, 1996) at p. 1193.
108See Levine, fn 54 above at 324 (quoting guideline revisions dated May 1, 1969).
109See Levine. fh 54 above at 324.
u0"...the requirement for non-employee members on organizational committees is an essential
protection against the development of insular or parochial committee attitudes, that assists in
maintaining community contacts, and would augment the credibility of the committee's independent
role in protection of the subject...It should be emphasized that the term community is intended to be
applied in the sense of the larger community served by the organization, not necessarily the smaller
community involved in a particular activity or project." 39 Fed. Reg. 18, 915 (1974).
111
Hearings on S.J. Res. 145 before the Subcommittee on Government Research of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations, 90th Congress, 2d Session 98-99 (1968) in Katz, fh 26
above at 310-311.
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under suspicion, being second-guessed by self-appointed arbiters more versed in
the art of criticism than in the subject under scrutiny. We need to care lest the
wells of creativity and the spring of the mind of those who break with tradition are
not manacled by well-intentioned but meddlesome intruders."112
Katz was just such a meddlesome intruder. The revelations which appeared in his book,
Experimentation with Human Beings,113 once again shocked academics and the public
alike. His book included outlines of two studies, which echoed times past. However,
this time there was no regime on which to pin the blame - or was there ?
The experiments conducted in Tuskegee had been going on for some forty years before
they came to light in 1972.114 In a federally sponsored study, some four hundred poor
black males suffering from syphilis were deliberately left untreated for decades in order
to study the natural history of the untreated disease. The research subjects were not
informed of their participation in the study; moreover, most did not know that they had
the disease, believing instead that they were receiving ordinary medical care. Further
experiments outlined included a hepatitis study involving residents of the Willowbrook
State School in New York, which was an institution for mentally disabled children and a
study where either placebos or oral contraceptives were given at random to poor
Mexican-American women who had come to a San Antonio clinic for contraceptive
advice.
It has been argued that it was this book which provided the impetus for the legislation in
the form of the National Research Act 1974.115 But, in fact, the credit should go to
Beecher who had been one of Katz's teachers at Harvard Medical School and had
delivered lectures on anaesthesia and who had made "quite an impression" on Katz.116
Katz contacted Beecher years later having acquired an interest in human experimentation
from a monograph of Beecher's entitled Experimentation in Man. It was this book
112See Levine, fn 54 above at 310. See also Moore v. University ofCalifornia (1988) 51 Cal App 3d
1230 (Cal CA).
113Katz, fn 26 above.
114See Jones, J H BadBlood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (2nd edn, 1993).
115See Goldner, fn 54 above at 94.
116See Katz, J 'Ethics and Clinical Research Revisited: A Tribute to Henry K. Beecher' (1993) 23
Hastings Centre Report 32.
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which was to form the basis of the article which later appeared in the New England
Journal ofMedicine. Beecher had unwittingly found a perfect disciple in Katz, whose
apprenticeship was to culminate in an effect which Beecher's article merely aspired to -
that is, guiding the administrative hand towards the nettle of reform.117
1.7.2. TheNational ResearchAct 1974
The National Research Act 1974 established the National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research. The task of the
Commission was to conduct an investigation into the basic ethical principles governing
the conduct of medical research involving human subjects.118 Thus, in 1979, the
Belmont Report was published 119 As well as providing an ethical basis upon which the
regulation of medical research could be regulated, the Report firmly established the
requirement to obtain the approval of an IRB.120
The current regulatory position in the United States is that, whereas IRB approval is
required before any federally funded research project may proceed, in practice
institutions, such as medical schools and research hospitals, have undertaken to conform
to the regulations and have further implemented these regulations to apply to all forms of
research, irrespective of the source of funding. Supplementing these rules are
requirements issued by the Food and Drug Administration which provide that IRB
U7See Katz, fn 116 above at 31-39.
11Supported by the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare. See Goldner, fn 53 above
at 96.
U9The National Commission for the Protection ofHuman Subjects ofBiomedical and Behavioural
Research, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare, Pub. No. (OS) 78-0012, The Belmont Report:
Ethical Principles and Guidelinesfor the Protection ofHuman Subjects ofResearch (1978).
120Revisions of the regulations were proposed in 1979 which predated hearings which were held by
the Department ofHealth, Education and Welfare and later by the President's Commission. Further
regulations were implemented in 1981 which were then extended in 1991 to apply to research
funded by most other federal agencies, "...each entity which applies for a grant or contract which
involves the conduct of biomedical or behavioral research involving human subjects
submit...assurances satisfactory to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare that it has
established a board (to be known as an Institutional Review Board) to review biomedical and
behavioral research involving human subjects conducted or sponsored by the institution in order to
protect the rights of the human subjects of research." 42 U.S.C § 289 (a) (1988) cited in Goldner, fn
53 above at 98.
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review must be sought for all research related to the marketing of drugs and medical
devices.121
Approval by research ethics committees is now commonly regarded as essential for
research conducted not only in the United States but throughout most of the European
Union as well. Despite the fact that this practice has become widely accepted and
standardised, some questions remain. 122
1.7.3. The Development of ResearchEthics Committees in
the United Kingdom
The historical development of research ethics committees in the United Kingdom began
with guidelines for the conduct of research which were issued by the Medical Research
Council (MRC) in 1963.123 The report does not, in fact, refer to committee review of
research, but its importance lies in its having formed the basis for later discussions on
research involving human subjects. The MRC guidelines were reconsidered in 1967 by
the Royal College of Physicians which recommended that all research carried out in
medical institutions ought to receive the approval of an ethics committee. However, in
similar vein to the development in the United States, the recommendation stipulated that
ethics committees should be composed solely of independent doctors; the foundation for
monopolising the review process were put firmly in place.124
A formal attempt to regulate experimentation was introduced by the Medicines Act
1968.125 The Act provides inter alia that clinical trials on patients may progress only
12121 C.F.R. § 46. 103 (1992) See Goldner, fn 54 above at 99.
122See Chapter Five.
'^'Responsibility in investigations on human subjects' (1963) 177 BMJ 177 which has now been
replaced by Medical Research Council, Responsibility in Investigations on Human Participants and
Material and on Personal Information (1992).
124'Report of the Committee Appointed by the Royal College, Supervision of the ethics of clinical
investigations in institutions' (1967) 3 BMJ 429-30. Also see Dodds-Smith, I ' Clinical Research'
(1992) in Dyer C (ed) Doctors, Patients and the Law (1992) at p. 153.
125This provides that clinical trials involving patients may proceed once a Clinical Trial Certificate
(CTC) is obtained. In applying for such a licence, a company must disclose the results of
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once the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM), which was established under s.4 of
the Act, gives its approval.126 Two observations may be drawn from the implementation
of the Medicines Act. First, it is unfortunate that, although the Act provides a statutory
framework for the regulation of clinical trials of new drugs, it does not allow for research
on innovative medical procedures within that framework.127 Secondly, whereas the 1968
Act recognises the existence of research ethics committees, it makes no actual provision
for them.
In 1973, the Royal College of Physicians released further recommendations concerning
the composition and function of research ethics committees, the consequence of which
was that the Department of Health issued a circular which implemented most of the
College's proposals.128 The Royal College released detailed guidelines in 1984129 which
laid down the constitution and the functions of research ethics committees. These
guidelines were further revised in 1990130 and these, in conjunction with the 1975
Department of Health guidelines, set the standard for ethics committees in the United
Kingdom. The 1975 guidelines were, however replaced by a Department of Health
circular issued in 1991.131 The United Kingdom has passed the Medicines (Applications
preliminary research and those acquired through tests on animals. In practice, most applicants for
CTCs are pharmaceutical companies, being responsible for sponsoring the majority of research;
individual physicians may apply for CTCs but the procedure is for them to apply for a certificate
under the Doctors and Dentists Exemption Scheme (DDX). Note: a CTC is not required for studies
in healthy volunteers. Also, see Wiffen, P 'A Guide to the Licensing System for Medicines
(Medicines Act 1968 and Amendments)' in Kennedy, I (ed) The Manual for Research Ethics
Committees (1992).
,26A new scheme was introduced in 1981 under the provisions of the Medicines (Exemption from
Licences) Order 1981 (SI 1981 no. 1964) which in effect speeds up the process whereby researchers
may obtain a response as to whether their requests for certificates will be granted allowing them to
carry out the research.
127See Brazier, MMedicine, Patients and the Law (2nd edn, 1992) at p. 429.
128HSC (15) 153 (1975).
129Royal College of Physicians Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical
Research, (1984).
130Royal College of Physicians Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical
Research involving Human Subjects (2nd edn, 1990) and Royal College of Physicians Research
Involving Patients (1990). Note that the RCP guidelines were revised again in 1996. See Royal
College of Physicians Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical Research
involving Human Subjects (3rd edn, 1996).
131For an analysis of the practical effect of the guidelines see the Chapter Five.
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for Grant of Product Licences - Products for Human Use) Regulations132 which
implements E. C. Directive 91 / 507 / EEC. This provides that all phases of clinical
investigations must be undertaken "in accordance with good clinical practice". A
working definition of "good clinical practice" is provided by the European Guidelines on
Good Clinical Practice133 which go into considerable detail as regards the practice of
clinical research.
Whereas there is no statute regulating medical research on human subjects in the United
Kingdom, there are specific guidelines which govern the establishment, role and
functions of Local Research Ethics Committees (LRECs) in the NHS.134 These state
that each LREC ought to invite any drug companies involved to submit their research
proposals to them; but there is no obligation to accept this invitation.135 It is stated
additionally that,
"By agreement, an LREC may also advise on the ethics of studies not involving
NHS patients, records or premises, carried out for example by private sector
companies, the Medical Research Council or universities."136
It should be noted that a number of 'informal' ethics committees have been established;
these include those set up by universities, private hospitals and the pharmaceutical
companies. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish medical research carried out within
the NHS from that undertaken elsewhere.
1.7.3.1. Research within the NHS
132S I 1993 No. 2538.
133Notes for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice for Trials on Medicinal Products in The European
Community (E.C.) 1990 III / 3676 / 88 - EN. [Approved July 1990; effective July 1991], Also
published in Pharmacology & Toxicology (1990) 67 at pp. 361-372.
134Local Research Ethics Committees, Department of Health (1991) replacing HSC (15) 153 (1975).
135"Even where there is no NHS involvement the body conducting the research should be
encouraged to submit its proposals to the LREC for advice." Local Research Ethics Committees,
Department of Health (1991) at p. 10. Note that there are also guidelines concerning multi-centre
research which establish regional multi-centre RECs in England and Wales (see HSG (1997) 23)
and a national multi-centre REC in Scotland (see NHS MEL (1997) 8). A personal inquiry
indicates that Northern Ireland does not, as yet, have any provisions concerning such committees.
See Chapter Five at Section 5.6.1.
136See fn 135 above at 6.
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The Department ofHealth 1991 circular applies solely to the NHS in England and Wales
and provides that all Health Authorities in the NHS must set up LRECs to which all
NHS trials must be submitted. In Scotland, the position is governed by the Scottish
Office Home & Health Department guidelines.137
The obligation on a Health Authority to set up a research ethics committee to monitor
research on human subjects is not a legal requirement per se.138 The 1991 guidelines are
in the form of a circular only. Guidelines which have been produced by an authority
which has been established by specific legislation139 have the force of law. In the
absence, however, of legislation directly referring to research ethics committees, the
1991 guidelines can only be regarded as persuasive.140
1.7.3.2. Research in thePrivate Sector
As I have already stated, the 1991 circular provides that pharmaceutical companies in the
private sector may be invited to submit their research proposals to research ethics
committees set up by district health authorities. However, for the most part, these
companies tend to prefer submitting their proposals to their own ethics committees.
There is no central governing body which is responsible for the regulation of medical
research carried out in the private sector; in particular, there is no central committee to
whom private sector RECs are accountable. A direct consequence of this is that there is
no official body which scrutinises experimental treatment in the private sector.
However, the position in relation to clinical trials is markedly different. The Association
of British Pharmaceutical Companies (ABPI) together with the Association of
Independent Clinical Research Contractors (AICRC) have drafted a series of voluntary
137Local Research Ethics Committees; Edinburgh 1992 (GEN) 3 replacing 1976 (GEN) 38.
138See Kennedy, I 'Research Committees and the Law', fn 125 above.
139E.g. the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority established by the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act 1990.
u°cf Qanz g Quasi-Legisation (1987) at p. 75 et seq.
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codes of practice which govern the conduct of clinical trials and the use of volunteers
therein. The essential elements of the code of practice is that a written contract must be
drawn up for the research subject which sets out the nature of the medication as well as
the renumeration which they will receive. The code also stipulates that a no-fault
compensation scheme should be set up so that, in the event of mishap, subjects are
spared having to surmount the causal hurdle in proving negligence at trial.141 The irony
of the situation is that research subjects are less well protected within the NHS where
such schemes are by no means standard. However, no-fault compensation schemes
appear to represent the norm for most commercial clinics. In effect, the code of conduct
provides a contractual obligation on behalf of a pharmaceutical company to set up an
insurance scheme.
Pharmaceutical companies regulate themselves very strictly. Since their role of drug
companies is to produce better and safer medicines as well as to make a profit, the last
thing that they would want would be to cause harm and, co-incidentally, to receive bad
publicity. The average cost of obtaining a licence for a new drug amounts to over
£200M; it is unlikely that a drug company would wish to risk its investment by
sponsoring dubious research practices.142
In practice, however, there is cause for concern as to whether the system is watertight.
It has been argued that the APBI code in particular, has not acted as an effective
deterrent.143 In maintaining this position, some writers have cited examples of
companies who, having fallen foul of the codes of conduct by offering financial
inducements to doctors and by allowing promotional trials devoid of scientific merit to
go ahead, have only been moderately rebuked.144 In 1986, Bayer UK were suspended
for a year following allegations that it encouraged its sales representatives to induce
141 The Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry, Clinical Trial Compensation Guidelines
(1991).
M2Dr Tim Madd of Guys Drugs Research Unit, Radio 4, October 1993.
M3Herxheimer, A and Collier, J 'Promotion by the British Pharmaceutical Industry, 1983-8; A
Critical Analysis of Self-Regulation' (1990) 300 BMJ 3.
H4Teff, H 'The Law and Ethics ofMedical Experimentation' (1987) PN184.
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doctors by offering them money and gifts to prescribe its heart drug Adalat Retard and
for not disclosing adverse data. It has been argued that the threat of being reported to
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to determine whether the law prohibiting the
restriction, prevention or distortion of competition had been breached would be a greater
deterrent than being reported to the APBI because of the greater risk of extensive
adverse publicity and because the OFT is not a trade association specific to
pharmaceuticals.145
In 1994 it was alleged that a pharmaceutical company (Upjohn) had fraudulently
withheld adverse data obtained from clinical trials. Central to the case was Protocol 321,
a trial of Halcion which was carried out in healthy prisoners in a US jail in 1972.
Professor Oswald had acted as an expert witness in US litigation against Upjohn; it was
during this time that he discovered that that side effects were underreported to the
Federal Drugs Administration (FDA) in the United States. The manufacturers, together
with one of its senior employees, sued the BBC and Professor Ian Oswald for libel in a
Panorama television programme and an article in the New York Times .146 Despite the
fact that an irregularity was proven, Upjohn were awarded a total of £ 85 000 in libel
damages; this, however, resulted from the method of publication in the popular media
rather than from an absence of fault. These are by no means isolated cases as a recent
article in the Washington Post indicates where results of research, which showed that a
thyroid drug was no better than its competitors' cheap generic versions, were withheld
for seven years at a cost of $ 350 M a year to the American nation.147
Generally speaking, both within and outwith the NHS, the experience on which the
success of research ethics committees can be judged is limited by their short history.
However, the death of Janet Wigley, an elderly cancer patient, who was entered into a
145Teff, fn 144 above.
146See Brahams, D'Upjohn (Halcion) and libel actions' (1994) 343 Lancet 1422, 'Memo suggests
Upjohn concealed Halcion effects' (1994) 308 BMJ 677. See The Guardian, September 10, 1986.
147'Thyroid Drug Study Reveals Tug of War Over Privately Financed Research' The Washington
Post April 16, 1997. Wise, J 'Research suppressed for seven years by drug company (1997) 314
BMJ 1145. See generally Friedman, P J 'Mistakes and Fraud in Medical Research' (1992) 20 Law,
Medicine & Health Care 17.
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trial without her knowledge but with the agreement of eleven research ethics committee
serves as a reminder that the review process is not infallible - the research committees
thought it inappropriate to seek informed consent from elderly patients who were,
anyway, close to death.148
1.7.3.3. The Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986
Thus, despite the calls for reform from some quarters, the current position in the United
Kingdom is that there is no legislation governing the regulation of medical research
involving human subjects. We could call this the 'Man's best friend paradox'; as a result
of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 animals are far better protected as
research subjects than are human beings.149 This is not to argue from a "speciesist"
standpoint but illustrates the spirit of an animal loving nation which has traditionally
donated more to animal welfare charities than any other, including those concerning child
welfare.150 Animal rights activists are now amongst the most violent protest
organisations in the United Kingdom. The use of the human beings in medical research
does not have the same political impact. Consequently, there is no compelling pressure
on a government to legislate as to the latter. The current position in the United Kingdom
can be seen as amounting to an abdication of direct responsibility by the Government in
favour of departmental 'advice'.151
1.7.4. The Regulation ofMedical Research inGermany
The overall regulatory framework for medical research in Germany is provided by two
articles of the Basic Law, the right to life and bodily integrity and the right to conduct
148See Brazier, fn 127 above at 412 and Phillips, M and Dawson, J Doctors' Dilemmas. Medical
Ethics and Contemporary Science (1985) at p. 63-64.
149The use of animals in medical research has been controlled by law since 1876.
150See the editorial by Richard Nicholson in (1995) 149 Bull Med Eth 1.
151This will be explored in Chapter Six.
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research. The right to conduct research is provided by article 5 (3) of the Basic Law and
states that,
"Art and scholarship, research and teaching shall be free. Freedom of teaching
shall not absolve anybody from loyalty to the constitution."152
The State has a duty to ensure that financial and organisational measures are in place so
that the right to research is uninhibited.153 This duty is both objective and subjective. It
is objective to the extent that the relationship between science, research and education
and the state is normatively based. It is subjective inasmuch as an individual involved in
research has a right to conduct research.154 The state thereby not only undertakes not to
interfere with the conduct of science but it also has to act in such a way as to safeguard
the right. The emphasis of article 5 (3) is protective as between the medical researcher
and the state and the medical researcher and university bodies.155 This is amplified for
doctors engaging in medical research by the right to a vocation as provided by article 12
of the Basic Law.156
Generally speaking, article 5 (3) has been criticised for being vague in its terms.157 A
further conflict, which has been described as a collision,158 arises between articles 5 (3)
and 2 (2) of the Basic Law. The latter provides that,
"Everybody has the right to life and physical integrity. Personal freedom is
inviolable. These rights may not be encroached upon save pursuant to a law."159
152See in The Basic Law for the Federal Republic ofGermany (Version in effect since 15 November
1994) at p. 15.
153Von Munch I / Kunig P Grundgesetz-Kommentar (4th edn, 1992), Rn. 104 zu Art. 5 (3) GG. See
also Stein, E Staatsrecht (14th edn, 1993).
154BVerfGE 35, 79 [112ff.]-Nieders. VorschaltG.
155OVG Berlin, JZ 1973, 210.
156Article 12 (1) "All Germans have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, their
place of work, study or training. The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or
pursuant to a law." See fh 152 above.
157Von Munch / Kunig, fn 152 above at Rn. 116 zu Art. 5 (3) GG.
158Classen, C D 'Ethikkommissionen zur Beurteilung von Menschen am Menschen: Neuer Rahmen,
neue Rolle' MedR 1995 149.
159Art. 2 Abs. 2 GG which is part of the Right to Liberty contained in Art 2. See fh 151 above.
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Thus, it might be more appropriate to speak in terms of a balance rather than a
conflict.160 Article 2 (2) of the Basic Law emphasised the interests of the individual.161
Indeed, a particular characteristic of the German legal approach lies in its aim to uphold
the right to self-determination.162 The underlying rationale is to be found in the history
of the Third Reich which continues to underpin most, if not all, of the discussions
concerning medical ethics.16" For example, the position in Germany as regards
randomised clinical trials (RCTs) as provided by the drugs code (AMG) is unequivocal -
known effective treatment may never be withheld when a new drug is being tested.164
The position in practice is that such research may be conducted under strict conditions
but subjects must be told of the design of the trial when a placebo group is being used.165
They do not, however, have to be told to which group they actually belong.
1.7.4.1 .The Development of Research Ethics Committees in Germany (Ethik-
Kommissionen)
Most of the Ethik-Kommissionen in Germany were established between 1979 and 1982.
Although the declaration of Helsinki (1964) had alerted the medical profession to the
need to introduce committee review, the impetus to set up such committees derived, in
the main, from a recommendation from the German Research Community (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft).166 The legislature, however, continued to rely on its policy of
160 ".. .the freedom of professions and of science are worthy of protection, making it a constant task
to balance those rights with human dignity, the rights to life, physical integrity, and family
protection." Riedel, e 'The Constitution and Scientific and Technical Progress' in Starck, R (ed)
New Challenges to the German Basic Law (1991) at p. 85.
161See Fischer, G Medizinische Versuche am Menschen (1979) p. 3.
162 "When the framers devoted the first nineteen articles of the Basic Law to guaranteed rights and
liberties, they consciously set out to underscore the priority of individual freedom." Kommers, D P
The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic ofGermany (1989) at p. 245. See also fh
159 above at p. 16.
163See also the response to the treatment of cystic fibrosis by artificial insemination which was
dismissed in Germany as an exercise in eugenics. See "Throwing Away ill Embryos?" ("Kranke
Embryos wegwerfenT). Frankfurter Rundschau, January 21, 1997 at p. 26. See also 'Embryo -
Zerstorung ein Horror' Frankfurter Rundschau July 31, 1996 at p. 1. For an outline of the reactions
to cloning see 'Germans on their high horse over cloned sheep' The Guardian March 6, 1997 at p.
11.
164See Liedtke njw 1977 2133.
165See also fn 233 below.
166,'Comparable to the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom.
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leaving the regulation of medical research involving human subjects up to the self-
regulation of the medical profession.167 Accordingly, the move to impose tighter
controls on research originated from within the medical profession.
1.7.4.1.1. Guidelines
On January 12, 1979 the German Federal Medical Convention recommended that state
medical councils should provide for the establishment of ethics committees which would
be responsible for advising researchers on ethical and legal issues of clinical research
involving human subjects; this, however, was merely a recommendation168 and not
legally binding.169 The Convention went on to include in its 1985 draft professional code
that,
"The physician before conducting any clinical experiments involving humans, or
research with vital human gametes or living embryonic tissue, or epidemiological
research with person-related data, should call upon an ethics committee
constituted by the medical council of the medical faculty to give advice about the
professional ethical and legal questions associated with his or her project. The
advice to be given to the physician should be based on the Declaration of the
World Medical Assembly of 1964 (Helsinki) in its revision of 1975." 170
In view of the independence of the regional or "land" medical chambers
(Landesarztekammern) from the federal medical chamber (Bundesarztekammex), the
1985 recommendation was implemented differently throughout the regions.171 For
example, in respect of submission of protocols to research ethics committees, the word
"ought" was replaced by "must" in the regional guidelines of Bayern, Hessen,
Niedersachsen, Nord-rhein, Westfalen-Lippe and Schleswig-Holstein.172
167Wiesling, U 'Zur Geschichte der Ethik-Kommissionen in Deutschland' in Ach, J S, Gaidt, A
(eds) Herausforderung der Bioethik (1995) pp 235-241.
168There were several issues which the German Medical Convention's recommendation did not
clarify one ofwhich related to the composition of research ethics committees. See Chapter Six.
169There is however legislation in the form of the German Drugs Code (Arts 40-42) which provides
for the "protection of persons in a clinical trial" in relation to the development and introduction of
new drugs; it does not however, include innovative surgical procedures.
'"Translation provided in Schlaudraff, fn 24 above at 42.
171
Furthermore, it did not apply to the private Ethik-Kommissionen which had begun to emerge.
See Chapter Six at Section 6.1.1.2.
172See Wiesling, fn 167 above at 236.
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An official working party, Arbeitskreis medizinischer Ethik-Kommissionen in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland was established in 1983 and was entrusted with overseeing
the work of the Ethik-Kommissionen of the Landesarztekammern, the medical faculties
and the National Department of Health (Bundesgesundheitsamts); private Ethik-
Kommissionen were not included.173 The working party developed yet more guidelines,
together with a check list to be used when considering a research proposal, in an attempt
to unify research practices.'74 The move towards the American concept of research
ethics by committee was further shown by the establishment of specialised committees
such as that for reproductive technology and embryo research, which was set up by the
federal physicians's chamber (BAK).175
Eventually, in 1988, the federal Convention replaced the word "should" in respect of the
use of ethics committees in section 1 (4)176 to a "must", the effect of which was to
compel all doctors involved in clinical research on human subjects to submit research
proposals to ethics committees and to abide by their decisions.177 It will be noted that
measures for reform originated from the periphery rather than being dictated from the
centre.
The AMG was amended in August 1994 to provide that a clinical trial for a new drug
may only commence once it has been approved by an independent Ethik-Kommission
I73See the distinction between public and private Ethik-Kommissionen in chapter seven.
l74They also included recommendations as to the number ofmembers which committees should have
together with proposals for their selection. See Wiesling, fn 167 above at 237.
175Thus, in 1985, the Zentrale Kommission zur Wahrung ethischer Grundstitze in der
Reproduktionsmedizin, Forschung an menschlichen Embrvonen und Gentherapie controlled all
research on human embryos until it was disbanded pursuant to the introduction of the code, the
Embryonenschutzgesetz (1991) 13. 12. 1990 BGB1. I, 2746.
l76See fn 24 above at 42.
1 7The section now reads as follows; "Der Arzt-gemeint ist der Arzt der einen klinischen Versuch zu
verantworten beabsichtigt-wim sich vor dessen Durchfuhrung von einer bei seiner zustandigen
Landesarztekammer oder einer medizinischer Fakultat gebildeten Ethik-Kommissionen iiber die
damit verbundenen berufsethischen und berufsrechtlichen Fragen beraten lassen." [own emphasis
added].
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established under state law.178 It is now federal law that a researcher must seek the
approval of a research ethics committee.179
Whereas the AMG appears to be restrictive, it is, in effect, quite flexible - so flexible in
fact that it has been referred to as "soft law".180 Indeed, it is less restrictive than is the
code which protects research involving animals181 or the codes which regulate
biotechnology182 and the protection of embryos.183 First, it does not apply to freie
Kommissionen - or private committees - which remain exempt from regulation.184 More
importantly, however, the researcher can, technically speaking, still go ahead should the
committee decline to approve the protocol. The final competence to adjudicate on the
matter is retained by a supervisory body established at Federal level,185 the Bundesinstitut
fur Arzneimittel undMedizinprodukte (BfArM). This is the final appellate division, so to
speak, as the trial may only go ahead once the BfArM gives its approval. The
supervisory body may authorise a research program even if the research committee did
not give its approval. In these circumstances, the supervisory body has 60 days in which
to give the final go ahead.186
1.7.4.3. The German Drugs Code (Arzneimittelgesetz:AMG)
Pharmacological research is strictly regulated in Germany. The AMG, which was first
introduced in 1961, regulates all pharmaceutical experiments involving human and animal
1785 Novelle des Arzneimittelgesetzes (AMG) vom 19. 10. 94 BGB1. 1994 I. 3018 ff. which
implemented an EU guideline 91/507/EWG v. 19. 7. 91. See L 170/32.
179See Classen, fn 158 above at 148 and also generally Sobota, K 'Die Ethik-Kommission - Ein
neues Institut des Verwaltungsrechts' AoR (1996) 121, at p. 229.
180See Sobota. fn 179 above at 234. See Appendix D for §§ 40 and 41 of the AMG. Author's
translation included.
181See Tierschutzgesetz of 18. 8. 1986 BGB1.1, 1319.
182Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der Gentechnik of 20.6.1990 BGB1. I, 1080.
183Embryonenschutzgesetz, fn 175 above at 2746.
184In May 1994, the German parliament attempted to amend the law to include private committees
but the amendment failed because of the success of the representation of the States (Bundesrat) via
the parliamentary arbitration committee. See (1994) 344 Lancet 398.
185See § 67 AMG.
186Ibid. para 3.
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subjects conducted by doctors and dentists.187 The introduction of the Code was
catalysed from the commercial sector - the pharmaceutical industry itself188- rather than
by way of an appeal to history. The stated aim of the AMG has always been to supervise
the circulation of medications, ranging from how the products are distributed, tested,
packaged and stored.189 It implements the Good Clinical Practice Guidelines of the
European Union.190
The provisions of the AMG include the establishment of a compulsory insurance scheme
financed by those responsible for the research - the advantage being that the cost of
protection is spread amongst those with the deepest pockets. Moreover, research
subjects are guaranteed a right to information. This right applies to the protocol only; it
does not extend to the financing of the research191 or to other research being undertaken
in the field. Thus, there is no database for ongoing research, a provision which is
advocated later in this thesis. The German model goes some way towards eroding
opacity which traditionally affects medical research. However, several questions remain
unanswered. Is the medical research process in Germany really as transparent as it
appears on paper ? Is the influence of the past disproportionate ? Is the German model
too restrictive or prohibitive ?
In effect, the AMG seeks to protect all human research subjects including volunteers and
patients. The law is that it prescribes the nature and the scope of clinical trials by
providing legally binding provisions. It does not apply to innovative treatment; thus, the
trial must be a planned systematic study of a medicinal product.192 Moreover, research
into surgical techniques is not regulated by the AMG which aims to provide research
l87See the provision for dentists at § 21 [22] (2) Nr. 3 AMG.
188Hugel, H, Fischer, J, Kohm, B Pharmazeutische Gesetzeskunde (28th edn 1990) at p. 175 et seq.
189189See the 12th section of the AMG in §§ 64-69 AMG. And also Lippert, H D & Strobel, E-S
'Die Uberwachung klinischer Prufungen nach dem AMG' VersR 95, 637.
190See fn 233 below.
191This might be of considerable interest to some subjects who would not wish to co-operate with
companies whose ethics were suspect. See fn 146 above.
192See § 64 Abs. 1. 2 AMG and §§ 40 ffAMG.
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subjects with legal protection by way of imposing criminal liability in the event of non¬
compliance with the code.193
(a). Therapeutic and Non-Therapeutic Research
The AMG distinguishes between therapeutic (§41) and non-therapeutic (§40) research.
In respect of the former, the medication to be used must have a therapeutic effect which
must be proved by reference to current medical knowledge.194 Essentially, § 41 provides
that such research is permissible if the patient's symptoms are such that a new
medication is likely to have a positive effect and will also contribute to research. The
test has two limbs. First, the positive effect must be judged in relation to a patient in a
similar position ("/'« seine Lage"), the 'reasonable patient'. A subjective strand is
introduced by way of the reference to the illness and the way in which the it affects that
particular patient (individuelle Krankheitsbild).
Regulations for non-therapeutic research rely on the same tests save, of course, that
there is no requirement for a therapeutic effect.
(b). The Design of the Trial
A trial involving human subjects may only proceed when sufficient pharmacological and
toxicological trials have been carried out on animals.195 Furthermore, the physician
193§ 38 AMG.
194The exception being at the early stages of the trial. This would include, say, the testing of
antidotes of cancer drugs which could not permissibly be tested on healthy volunteers.
195§ 40 (5) AMG.
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conducting the trial must have a minimum of two years of practical experience in this
area.196 This applies to both therapeutic and to non-therapeutic research.
As in the United Kingdom, there are four phases of a clinical trial. Phase I involves in
the region of 10-50 subjects and comprises the first tests after those carried out on
animals; these are usually in the form of dose finding studies (Vertraglichkeit der
Substanz). Phase II usually takes place in hospitals and may involve controlled clinical
trials (RCTs) with up to 200 research subjects. Phase III is conducted in either a clinic
or a medical practice, and often includes multicentre trials and other observational
experiments197; the number of research subjects may reach the figure of 1000. Lastly,
phase IV is in the form of controlled studies - including blind or double blind trials.198
The protective emphasis of the Code is illustrated by phases I-III of a trial which are
covered by a no-fault liability provision as contained in § 823 of the Civil Code (BGB)199
and the duty to provide insurance in § 94 of the AMG. The pharmaceutical company
which markets that particular drug is criminally liable in the event of harm. The company
will also be liable for the damages which results from altering the product during the
trial.200
(c) The Risk / Benefit Analysis
1S6§ 40(l)Nr4 AMG.
197These trials are designed to test for side effects as well as to ascertain therapeutic value.
198The distinction is the same throughout the world; the research subjects in a blind trial are not told
whether they are in the placebo group. In a double blind trial, the doctors also do not know.
'"See § 84 AMG.
200This is carried out in accordance with the principle of nihil nocere. See § 84 AMG and also §
823 of the Civil Code
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A clinical trial may only go ahead if the risks involved are justified by the possible
benefit.201 The researcher is responsible for the weighing up of interests,
(iGiiterabwdgung), before and during the trial. Controversially, it is the decision of the
researcher, rather than of the clinician in charge of the patients, to decide whether the
trial is justified in the expectation of significant danger.202 It is important to note that the
only opportunity for the risk / benefit analysis to be appraised outside the mind of a
researcher is during the deliberations of research ethics committees. In neither
circumstance do openness, or public accountability, feature prominently.
(d). Consent
The subjects must understand the nature, the meaning and the effect of the clinical trial
with particular reference to the possible risks involved {"...Wesen, Bedeutung und
Tragweite der klinischen Priifung, insbesondere iiber die mit ihr verbundenen
Risiken... ").203 Only then, can consent be described as being free and informed. Case
law has interpreted the conditions for obtaining consent as including full and frank
disclosure;204 as regards innovative or experimental therapy, the more untested the
method is, the more stringent the duty is for informed consent.205 The commentary
(.Kommentar) for the AMG states that informed consent must be full and frank,
especially as regards non-therapeutic research, and that the risks must be fully explained
to the research subject.206
(e). Research Subjects
201See the KohlhammerAMG Kommentar (1996) at p. 13 and also § 38 (40) (1) Nr 1.
202This is of course at a primary level as the research ethics committee becomes involved at a
secondary level.
203
§ 40 (1) Nr 1 (2) AMG.
204BGHZ 20, 61 [65] 'Thorotrast'.
205See for example 'Wenn Arzte pfuschen' Interview with Professor Dr. Dieter Giesen in Die Zeit
September 3, 1993.
206Kohlhammer, fh 201 above at 17.
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Research on children and the mentally incapacitated is strictly forbidden with the
exception of therapeutic research which is permitted in exceptional circumstances. To
this extent, the AMG is a product of its historical context207 in seeking to protect those
who are particularly vulnerable. This position can be contrasted with the more flexible
position in the United Kingdom.
(I) Children
It is permissible to involve children in diagnostic research and research into preventive
medicine (Vorbeugungsmittel).208 Children should not be used if the product can be
tested on adults; they are, thereby, afforded special protection. Written as well as verbal
consent must be obtained by a legal guardian, who can be the child's parents209 or a
guardian entrusted to look after the child. It is important that the child has a sufficient
understanding and ability to form a judgment (Verstandnis und Urteilsvermogeri) - a
condition which can be assumed in a minor of 16 years or over.210
(ii) Mentally Incapacitated
Clinical research may be carried out on those who are incapable of giving effective
consent (Geschaftsunfahig) which includes those who are mentally handicapped.
However, such research may only be carried out if an individual can form an
understanding of the broad nature of the procedure involved (Lage, Wesen, Bedeutung
und Tragweite). Further protection is provided by the stipulation that he or she may only
become a research subject with the agreement of his legal guardian or care assistant.
(f). Insurance
207See fn 188 above.
208§ 41 (4) Nr2 AMG.
209§ 1626 (2) of the Civil Code (BGB).
210See the Kohlhammer, fn 201 above at 25. The point of comparison in the United Kingdom is
Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, [1985] 3 All ER 402,
HL.
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The insurance provision in the German Drugs Code is innovative. In effect, it spreads
the cost of protection to those who can afford the substantial premiums. According to
paragraph 40 (1) Nr 8, a clinical trial of a new medication involving human subjects may
only proceed once an insurance scheme has been set up enabling research subjects or
their dependants to be compensated in the event of physical harm or death resulting from
the trial. The scheme must be based on a contract of insurance thus absolving the
research subject from the need to prove fault. A causal link must, however, be shown
between the injury or the death and the participation in the trial.211 The nature of the
agreement is that of a third party insurance contract which enables the research subject
to seek a claim from the insurance company.212 Recourse to the scheme is activated if no
other party will pay for the damage.21j Paragraph 41 AMG further provides that this
scheme also applies to innovative treatment (Heilversuche).214 The scheme must total at
least 500, 000 DM.215 Legal sanctions may be invoked if such a scheme is not set up.
Paragraph 823 (2) of the Civil Code (BGB) provides that those responsible for running
the trial, including the doctor, may be liable to pay damages according to the principles
of delict.216
21'See Kohlhammer, fn 200 above at 23-24. It was held in a special hearing
(Sachverstandigenanhdrung) by the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Versicherungswesen (National
Supervisory Body for Insurance) on October 11 1977 and by the Bundesfinanzministerium (the
Treasury) on October 17, 1977 that the Insurance company may pay even if the claim under delict
against those who are responsible for the conduct of the trial of the doctor is not sustainable.
212"...es handelt sich um einen (Versicherungs) Vertrag zugunsten Dritter, da der Proband oder
Patient einen unmittelbaren Anspruch gegen den Versicherer erhalt." See Kohlhammer, fn 201
above at 24. The contract must also conform with § 2 VAG and there are further guidelines which
are published by the Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie und dem Verband der
Haftpflicht-, Unfall-und kraftverkehrs-Versicherer 'Allgemeine Bedingungen fur die Versicherung
der klinischen Priifung von Arzneimittelm (Probandenversicherung)' See Kohlhammer, fn 201
above at appendix II. (Comparable to the APBI guidelines in the United Kingdom).
213Many pharmaceutical companies for example have their own no-fault compensation schemes.
214Namely, where the research subject is a patient. See the distinction drawn above between § 40
and § 41 AMG.
215§ 40 (1). Nr 8 AMG. This must be in the form of accident insurance (Unfallversicherung) or
insurance against damage (Schadenversicherung)215 If the risks are particularly high, those
financing the trial must insure accordingly, even if the premium extends beyond 500, 000 DM. If
the high degree of risk was foreseeable and a company failed to insure as such, it is liable under §
823 (2) of the Civil Code as well as under § 40 (1) Nr 8 and Abs 3 AMG.
216See Kohlhammer, fn 201 above at 23.
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(g). A Right to Information
Research subjects have a right to information217 and it is the duty of the doctor to
provide them with information regarding the insurance provisions of the experiment.218
It is suggested that this duty could be extended. For example, a regrettable omission is
that the same duty does not apply to those responsible for funding the research.
Furthermore, the right could be extended to researchers by providing them with a
database detailing ongoing medical research. This would be particularly useful as a way
of avoiding unnecessary duplication of research results.
(h). Sanctions for Breach ofParas 40 and 41
The protective nature of the Code is amplified by the strict sanctions which may be
invoked in the event of non-compliance with the provisions. If a researcher violates the
code in any way, he may be liable for a prison sentence of up to one year or a fine of up
to 50, 000 DM.219 The Code thereby emphasises the researcher's responsibility,
particularly as regards his duty to weigh up the risks of the proposed research. The
director of the premises where the doctor carried out the research may also be held liable
in view of his position of responsibility.
Despite the strict regulation of the research involving human subjects, the position in
Germany is similar to that in the United Kingdom and the United States to the extent that
research is regulated by committees which derive their conceptual and their 'legal' basis
from guidelines drawn up by the medical profession, the revised declaration of Helsinki.
220
21 As well as that relating to informed consent. See above.
2,8Laufs A & Uhlenbruck W, Handbuch desArztrechts (1992) § 130, 35.
219See § 96 Nr 10 AMG which applies to Nrs 1 - 5, 8 of § 41 Nr 1 and (4) of § 97 (1) Nrs 6 and 7 for
§41 AMG which provides for sanctions by way ofBujigeldvorschriften. It is of interest to note that
this is not an instrument of criminal law (Strafrecht) but that it is a public order offence
(Ordnungswidrigkeit).
220See Wiesling, fn 167 above at 228.
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1.8. International Guidelines: The Declaration of Helsinki
(1964) 221
International guidelines were drawn up by the World Medical Association in 1964 in the
form of the Declaration of Helsinki. The informed consent requirement was gradually
displaced from the pole position it occupied in the Nuremberg Code. However, the
declaration ofHelsinki provided an altogether new element in the form of the submitting
of research proposals for committee review.
Paragraph III 3 a 222 provides that,
"The design and performance of each experimental procedure involving human
subjects should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol which should be
transmitted to a specifically appointed independent committee for consideration,
comments, and guidance." 223
This has since been extended in the declaration of Helsinki in Hong Kong in September
1989 which further provides that experimental protocols ought to be transmitted for
consideration, comment and guidance to a,
". . .specially appointed committee independent of the investigator and the sponsor
provided that this independent committee is in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the country in which the research experiment is performed." 224
The guidelines illustrate the international community's concern as regards unethical
research; they represent a form of international control, even though the ambit of that
control is limited. The national controls in the United Kingdom, Germany and the
United States are based on these guidelines. One might ask whether they represent a
vehicle for the emotions and the aspirations of the international community, or are they
221Also in its revised forms.
222And subsequently para i 9 of the revised declaration of Tokyo 1975.
223[1.2]An additional form of protection is provided by Principle 1.8 which stipulates that the results
of research conducted in violation of Helsinki's requirements ought not to be published.
224See Klingmann, i, Kori-Lindner, C and Witte, P U Ethik in der Klinischen Prtifung; Ethik
Kommissionen-Funktion undArbeitsweise (1991) at p. 191.
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simply, "...a restatement of the aims ofmedicine... supplement[ing] the doctor's ethical
commitments as expressed in the Hippocratic Oath ."? 225
1.8.1. Status of the International Guidelines
The prevailing presumption is that international guidelines provide a legitimate basis
on which to establish legal authority.226 This argument is, however, of limited
applicability as it assumes that the dilemmas surrounding the regulation of medical
research involving human subjects are to be resolved from within the medical
community alone.227 Furthermore, sole reliance on international guidelines assumes
that international codes relating to such a specific area express all the relevant
principles and rules.228
International guidelines, such as the Declaration of Helsinki provide only part of the
theoretical framework for human experimentation as opposed to a complete basis for
control;
"...the device of international agreements and commitments can provide only the
theoretical framework which may assist medicine in its search for a philosophical
basis for overall assessment of its aims and practices. At a more practical level,
however, it cannot achieve rational control of experiments. This is so not simply
because of the lack of sanctions which can be applied in the event of breach of any
such agreements, but also because they are stated in a general rather than a
specific way." 229
225McLean, S and Maher, G, Medicine, Morals and the Law (1983) at p. 104. [own emphasis].
226"At regional level and international levels, professional bodies have adopted ethical guidelines
intended to reflect regional or universal values and which embody an ethical consensus. They
therefore have a powerful moral force if not legal enforceability." British Medical Association,
Medicine Betrayed: The Participation ofDoctors in Human Rights Abuses (Report of a Working
Party 1992) at p. 12.
227Wiesling, fn 167 above at 240.
228"ProfeSsional codes are beneficial if they effectively incorporate defensible moral principles and
rules in the relationship they govern. Unfortunately, some professional codes oversimplify moral
requirements or claim more completeness and authority than they are entitled to claim. As a
consequence, professionals may suppose that they have satisfied all moral requirements if they have
obediently followed the rules of the code, just as many people believe that they have discharged all
their obligations when they have met the relevant legal requirements." See Beauchamp, T L and
Childress, J F Principles ofBiomedical Ethics (1989) at p. 12.
229McLean and Maher, fn 225 at 106.
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The benefit of guidelines is that they form the base on which legislation is founded - and
this is borne out by the regulatory models in the United Kingdom and in Germany.230
These national controls have been criticised for being dominated by the medical
profession, whose opinions, certainly in the United Kingdom, continue to govern the
standard by which physicians are judged.231 The Declaration of Helsinki deals with
issues which lie close to the heart of the medical profession. Moreover, the bulk of
the way in which research is controlled is left up to the conscience of the researcher.
This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four dealing with moral reasoning in the
medical research debate. The emphasis on the researcher's conscience has been
followed by subsequent guidelines for research.
1.9. European Guidelines: Good Clinical Practice (GCP)
According to an European Community Directive, all phases of clinical investigations
must be undertaken "in accordance with good clinical practice"232 which is defined in the
Good Clinical Practice Guidelines.2""' Whereas the GCP does involve some important
provisions for the protection of the rights of human subjects involved in research they
should also be seen as a set of management procedures devised to prevent mistakes and
fraud. The GCP incorporate important ethical principles such as the patient's informed
consent to experimental procedures and overview by a research ethics committee.
230Though arguably not in the United States, who were not represented at the Helsinki conference.
231 "This means that such controls as do exist may serve to reflect a purely, or substantially, medical
view of the aims and morality of experiments with little weight atttached to the competing claims of
community based morality or perceptions." McLean and Maher, fn 225 above at 113.
23291/507/EEC. The United Kingdom has implemented the EC directive through the Medicines
(Applications for Grant of Product Licences - Products for Human Use) Regulations SI 1993 No.
2538 which provides that all phases of clinical investigations must be undertaken "in accordance
with good clinical practice".
233Notes for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice for Trials on Medicinal Products in The European
Community (EC) 1990 III / 3976 / 88 - EN. [Approved July 1990; effective July 1991], Also
published in Pharmacology & Toxicology (1990) 67 at pp. 361-372.
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The GCP marks a great step forward and should reduce the piecemeal development in
which trials are conducted in member states of the European Union. The essence of the
GCP is the complete verification of data. Thus, for example, there is monitoring of the
study throughout by the sponsor and there is an audit of investigator's systems and
records are made by a Quality Assurance (QA) unit independent of the company Medical
Department which also performs some repeat checks. There may also be a further
inspection and audit on behalf of governmental regulatory authorities. At the heart of
the provisions is the passage of information;
"Information should be given in both oral and written form wherever possible. No
subject should be obliged to participate in the trial. Subjects, their relatives,
guardians, or if necessary, legal representatives must be given ample opportunity
to enquire about details of the trial. The information must make clear that refusal
to participate or withdrawal from the trial at any stage is without any disadvantage
for the subject's subsequent care. Subjects must be allowed enough time to decide
whether or not they wish to participate."234
The legal requirement applies to both the public and private sector when developing data
for submission to any European Regulatory Agency235 in support of a new product.
Further guidelines have been issued by the Council of Europe in the form of the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Chapter V, arts. 15 - 18.236 The
Convention, however, as still to be ratified by both the United Kingdom and Germany.237
1.10. Conclusion
2341.9 GCP (1990), & 233 above.
235As, for example, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (set up by the
European Council) through Council Regulation No. 2309 / 93 of July 22, 1993. OJ 24 / 8 / 93, L
214 pp. 1-21.
236DIR/ JUR (96) 14.
237Szt Das Parlament, July 18.25, 1997 at p. 13.
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It would be incorrect to say that questions as regards medical research are not being
asked. Rather, these questions are being posed but within spheres which are private and
virtually impenetrable by the public sphere. This is a drawback of using committees as
the main model of controlling research as questions raised by medical research are being
intellectualised within professionalised closed groups.
The professional elite both in Germany and the United States played a vital role in
upholding the justification for conducting certain forms of research. The German legal
system, for example, was not a victim of national socialism but was an accomplice; both
lawyers and judges actively promoted the ideology of national socialism.238 The same
can also be said of some American judges during the height of the Cold War.239 As
regards medical research, the professions retain most of the responsibility for controlling
research. They should, in my opinion, continue to do so. The trust we vest in them,
however, must be qualified. First, their role in the regulation of medical research must
be clarified. Secondly, the public have a right to be represented, through Citizens' Juries
or otherwise. This is addressed in the next two sections.
238Miiller, I Furchtbare Juristen (1989) and also Rottleuthner, H 'Substantieller Dezionismus zur
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Chapter Two
Medical Research and Scientific Reasoning : Definitions and
Risks
"These terms, nevertheless, are beset with numerous ambiguities: their meaning, instead of being
simple, is extremely complex: and every debate which embraces Law as a whole, shouldpoint distinctly
at those ambiguities, and should sever that complex meaning into the simpler notions which compose
it. Many of those who have written upon Law, have defined these expressions. But most of their
definitions are so constructed that, instead ofshedding light upon the thing defined, they involve it in
thicker obscurity. In most attempts to define the terms in question, there is all the pedantry without the
reality of logic: the form and husk, without the substance. The pretended definitions are purely




The essential question in medical research - and, perhaps, the central pivot of this thesis
- is how, and by whom, the underlying normative principles should be defined. There
are three main protagonists in the field - the research workers themselves, the research
subjects and the general public who are, at the moment, objective observers but who
may, at any time, be required in a subjective role.
The expertise of the medical scientists is paramount within these groups. Their
understanding of a given project must be far above that of the others and this gives them
the 'God's eye vantage'. The danger of such a vantage point is that it can be used as
one from which to view the scene as a whole despite the relatively narrow base on which
the observer stands. To allocate the solution of the many social and moral questions
'in Campbell, R (ed) Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of positive law Vol II (5th edn,
1885) at p. 1075.
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raised by research to the scientists is potentially dangerous in that they will be resolved
by the select few whose expertise is, in fact, limited to the understanding of the scientific
merits.
If society is to play a role in ascertaining the principles for research, it must learn to
come to terms with and accept the scientific premises behind medical research.2
Scientific reasoning must also, however, learn to come to terms with the down to earth
attitudes of society. Symbiosis, rather than parasitism - in which one group gains at the
expense of the other - must be an integral characteristic of the relationship. Only an
informed public can contribute usefully to the medical research debate and, to this end,
acceptable definitions are vital to public understanding of the issues. The public can give
rational answers to the questions raised by research only if it understands them; and it is
only if it understands them that it can contribute usefully to the political debate. '
We have, then, something of an ethical schism. The scientists, spurred on by the
statisticians with their probability tests, are concerned to demonstrate the validity of a
scientific hypothesis. They can, then, easily forget that they are using human subjects
because the same human subjects have now been reduced to case numbers - and this
attitude was imported into medicine itself with the introduction of laboratory-based
medicine in the nineteenth century.
2This has been also argued by Professsor Sheila McLean in relation to the Human Genome Project. See
McLean, SAM 'Law, Ethics and the Human Genome Project' (1994, Edinburgh: Society of Solicitors
in the Supreme Courts of Scotland Biennial Lecture) at p. 7.
3A concept which lies at the heart of Habermas' theory of discursive democracy which is based on the
principle of universality. In essence, he argues that consensus can be achieved through communication.
Real dialogue, however, is dependent on democratic structures which enable a consensus to be achieved
in the light of the public sphere. See Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Debate Theory of
Law and Democracy (1996, Rehg, W (tr» at p. 359. I am indebted to Dr Gerard Delanty whose paper,
'New Conceptions of Radical Democracy: Habermas on Social Protest, The Public Sphere and the Law'
given at the Centre for Law & Society, Faculty of Law Edinburgh University on November 28, 1997
helped me to further my understanding of Habermas.
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Research subjects are, however, autonomous human beings4 and it was, particularly, the
disregard of this fact which made Nazi concentration camp experiments,5 Tuskegee and
Hyman so repellent. The search for scientific accuracy and statistical significance cannot
go uncontrolled without consideration for the research subject's human dignity. It is at
this point that public supervision - or the expressed wishes of the research subjects
themselves - must exert its influence on the understanding that modern medicine, as we
know it, cannot progress in the absence of modern medical research.6
2.1. The Importance of Terminology
A major development of intellectual thought during the twentieth century must
certainly be the growing awareness of the power of language.7 Resorting to
definitions, does not signify a move towards 'arid semantic debate'8 but it
acknowledges the role of language as a tool; it is an instrument which we shape for our
own purposes.9
The distinction between the various forms of research define the extent of the risks to
which individuals are allowed to subject themselves. The art of definition has direct
implications as regards to what a patient will consent and as to what the researcher's
peers will accept. Research ethics committees are charged with the duty of assessing
the risk / benefit analysis and whether the calculus points towards the worth of the
""Scientific method provides for experiments conducted on models. Medicine, however, experiments
not on models but on the subjects themselves." Illich, I Limits to Medicine. Medical Nemesis: The
Expropriation ofHealth (1977) at 254. See also p. 225
5A lesson learned from Alexander Mitscherlich's book, Das Diktat der Menschenverachtung (1947)in
which the documentation exhibited at the Nuremberg trial is characterised by the invisibility of the
research subjects. It was easy to forget, for example, that the 'VPs' (Versuchspersonen) referred to in
the letters cited by Mitscherlich were in fact humans. See Chapter One above at section 1.4.4.
6See Habermas on the role of the public sphere as a warning system. Fn 3 above at 359.
7CfHacking, I Why does Language Matter to Philosophy ? (1975).
8per Lord Bridge in Re B [1987] 2 WLR 1213, 1217 albeit in another context.
9See Orwell. G The Penguin Essays ofGeorge Orwell (1994) at 348.
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objective. Definitions provide a key which enables a committee to unlock the mystery
of how to assess the ethical and the legal validity of a research proposal.
In the case ofmedical research, ideas and concepts are expressed which cannot be easily
understood by those without the necessary expertise. As a result, these experts have
considerable power. Consider the power exercised by someone who explains but whom
you can not understand. Consider also the way in which language can be used to
influence people. The ability to define an illness gives people power. This power
influences the way we perceive illness as well as those who are affected by it. An illness
which is defined has a name which accords it recognition and legitimacy. This means
that people with recognised symptoms are not automatically dismissed as malingerers.10
There are also consequences for medical research; it is at least unlikely that research into
a 'pseudo illness' would be funded.
Be that as it may, definitions used in medical research are derived from the terminology
used in standard scientific enquiry.
2.2. Science
Scientia, meaning knowledge, is at the origin of the word 'science'.11 It refers to the
activity of controlled or designed observations based on a specific plan. Scientific
reasoning has traditionally been defined as being based on ordered, deductive thought as
opposed to inductive knowledge acquired through belief or hearsay.12 The implication is
that scientists deal with the hard currency of facts as opposed to the loose change of
opinions. The word "science" carries considerable weight; it has an aura bordering on
the mystic. Moreover, it encourages people to believe that science is absolute;
10Consider the controversy surrounding, inter alia, myelo encephalopathy (ME) or pre-menstrual
tension.
"This is cited as it primary definition in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (7th edn, 1982).
12See Medawar, P The Limits ofScience (1986) at p. 3. See also Gee, D J and Mason, J K The Courts
and the Doctor (1990) at p. 87 et seq.
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"There is an abundance of evidence from every day life that science is held in high
regard, in spite of some disenchantment with science because of consequences for
which some hold it responsible, such as the hydrogen bombs and pollution.
Advertisements frequently assert that a particular product has been scientifically
shown to be whiter, more potent, more sexually appealing or in some way
preferable to rival products. By doing so, they hope to imply that their claim is
particularly well-founded and perhaps beyond dispute. In a similar vein, a recent
newspaper advertisement advocating Christian Science was headed, "Science
speaks and says the Christian Bible is provedly true", and went on to tell us that
"even scientists themselves believe it these days".13
'Scientific' medicine increasingly impinges on all aspects of life in the western world and
has become the yellow brick road to immortality. We want to live forever and expect
the medical profession to deliver14 in what has been termed by some as the 'war on
death'.15 The importance of primary medicine or preventative medicine is undervalued in
a culture which increasingly resorts to curative solutions to illness. Writing about the
treatment of diabetes, cancer or heart disease, Ulrich Beck argues that,
"These illnesses could be fought where they originate: by reducing the stresses of
work or the pollution of the environment, or through a healthy way of life and a
nutritious diet. Or the symptoms can be alleviated through chemical preparations.
The different schools of fighting illness do not of course exclude one another, but
one cannot actually speak of a cure through the second method. Nonetheless, we
have so far generally opted for the medical and chemical 'solution'".16
Many improvements in health care have been effected by primary measures such as
better sanitation, water purification, and education;
"To this extent experimentation on human subjects may be the result of the
predominance of the marketing interests of these companies whose profit margins
have shown them to have a fine business sense and a considerable control over the
prescribing habits of doctors. Thus, the need for certain types of human
experimentation is the result of the interests of drug companies in producing new
products will be both useful and profitable."17
13Chalmers, A F What is this thing called Science ? (2nd edn, 1982) p. xv.
14"The general public has been led to expect too much from curative medicine and from medical
progress." Giesen, D International Medical Malpractice Law (1988) at 704.
15Herman, J 'The ethics of prevention: old twists and new' (1996) 46 Br J Gen Pract 547 and also
Cairns, J 'The Costs of Prevention' (1995) 311 BMJ 1520.
16Beck, U The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992, Ritter, M (tr)) at p. 176.
nMcLean, S and Maher, G Medicine, Morals and the Law (1981) at 108.
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The pharmaceutical industry has vested interests in the secondary problems and is able
to present its case selectively.18 In acting for the good of society, it has the perfect
cover to safeguard its own interests. The "contented and comfortable" not only enjoy
the product of personal virtue, intelligence and effort19 but are able to live off society's
fixation with treatment as opposed to prevention.
Treatment is simple, it removes responsibility and provides a short term remedy whilst
prevention necessitates self-discipline and continuing dedication to the task. If we take
AIDS as an example, millions of pounds have been spent on research which has proved
fruitless from the point of therapy. Nonetheless, the threatened pandemic has been
contained by a combination of public education and responsible behaviour.20
The true scientist seeks the truth - we might, however, echo Pontius Pilate in asking
'what is truth?' The scientific researcher will answer: 'that which is shown to be true by
way of scientific reasoning.21 In discussing the basis of preference, Berlin has written:
"All these schools of thought, differing and indeed sharply opposed as they may be
on many other crucial issues of principle, have at least one thing in common: they
clearly favour one type of proposition or statement before all others; they treat it as
possessing a virtue which other types conspicuously lack."22
Berlin was concerned specifically with schools of philosophical thought.23 The same
concepts, however, can be applied to medical research given the tensions between the
l8lbid.
19Term coined by Galbraith, J K The Culture of Contentment (1995) at p. 18. The emphasis of his
theory is that certain groups, the "contented", monopolise and influence the political franchise in order
to ensure that their interests are safeguarded. See p. 18.
20See the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 'Aids
Policy of the Community and the Member States in the Developing World' COM (93) 479 final at p. 4.
And also Institut pour la Cooperation Medicale (IMC) Evaluation du Programme de Lutte contre le
Sida de la CCE: Rapport Final (1992). Biomedical and Health Research Programme (BIOMED
1)'AIDS: Ethics, Justice and European Policy' (The Commission of the European Communities,
Directorate General XII 1995).
21Or as Medawar refers to it, the preference of deduction over induction. Medawar, fn 12 above at 16.
22Berlin, I Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays (1980) at 57.
23He goes on to give examples of 'good' propositions and how each school of thought verifies them.
"The selected ideal model of what a 'good' proposition should be will naturally differ according to the
philosophical outlook of the logician and his school: Cartesians, after a formal bow to theology and
ethics, inclined to place those of mathematics and mathematical physics fore most; Locke, Berkeley,
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parties involved which the subject generates. Essentially speaking, the professionals -
that is to say, lawyers, researchers, philosophers - in the medical research debate are in a
continuous fight for legitimacy; it is a territorial 'tug ofwar' or a battle for 'turf;
"The difference between the 'unenlightened mob' and 'enlightened citizens' or, in
more modern terms, between lay people and experts, shrivels and transforms itself
into competition between different experts. In practically all social subsystems the
internalization of norms and values is replaced by reflection in the light of
competing components of systematic knowledge."24
Medical researchers appear to claim a right to dominate the debate, by virtue of their
knowledge. The implication follows that only those who possess this right can be
responsible for the underlying principles of practice.
Consider, for example a response by a prominent physician, Baum to an article written
by a lay person, Mrs Thornton, concerning consent and randomised controlled clinical
trials in breast cancer.25 He states that,
"Most of the lay public and sadly many of our political leaders have never been
exposed to the open windows of science and thus have never been shaken out of
their complacent beliefs in the myths of received wisdom."
And further,
"I share Mrs Thorntons's view that most consent within clinical trials conducted
in the politically correct manner is ill-informed consent, yet until now few have
had the courage to state this in public. In this respect, Mrs Thornton and I are
allies but our responses to this challenge are diametrically opposed, which is no
surprise as we emerge from two distinct cultures of our society, with differing
backgrounds in the liberal arts and the biological sciences. Mrs Thornton's
response is a plea for less science and a more open and honest dialogue with our
Hume, Mill, Russell, and modern empiricists pursue the ideal of empirical propositions, purified of
everything which could make them erroneous, as being alone immediate, incorrigible, and simple, and
for this reason 'fundamental'" Berlin, fn 22 above at 59.
24See BonC, W and Hartmann, H 'Konstruierte Gesellschaft , rationale Deutung. Zum Wirklichkeits
charakter soziologischer Diskurse' in BonB, W and Hartmann, H (eds) Entzauberte Wissenschaft. Zur
Relativitdt und Geltung soziologischer Forschung (Special Issue 3 of Soziale Welt 1985) p. 16.
Translation reproduced in Beck, fn 16 above at 168.
25Thornton, H 'Clinical Trials - a brave new partnership ?' (1994) 20 J Med Eth 19.
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partners (the patients) in our search for better treatments for patients with
„„„ "26
cancer.
By referring to "two distinct cultures", Baum is in effect pulling rank on Mrs
Thornton.27 Implicit in this superiority is the assumption that only those who are party
to scientific rationality may criticise it. Thus, science retains the exclusive capacity to
criticise its own reasoning. Consider, for example, critical scientific traditions such as
the theories of Karl Popper28 and Thomas Kuhn.29 Both have a characteristic in
common, namely, that resistance to scientific hypotheses may be exercised by those
within the scientific domain - almost like reserving the right to criticise one's own family
whilst resisting criticisms offered by others.
Karl Popper's principle of falsification, for example, characterises the logic of science.
It is a form of critical rationalism which maintains that science must be methodically self-
critical because it is constrained by the fact that the pursuit of knowledge can never be
completed as it is forever open to falsification. The key feature of Kuhn's theory is the
revolutionary character of scientific progress. A revolution involves the abandonment of
one theoretical structure in favour of another. Hence, there is no 'grand design'
accompanying the development of science; instead, it develops by piecemeal engineering
through paradigm shifts. Both theories operate through the application of fallibility. It
is arguable that they cancel themselves out to the extent that the continued application
of scientific research often contradicts what was once claimed to be the truth.30
More importantly, both critiques operate within the scientific community31 with the
consequence that the scientific community is both a participant and a legitimating agency
for establishing the objective criteria for its practice. Not only is access to self-criticism
26Baum, M 'Clinical Trials - A brave new partnership: a response to Mrs Thornton' (1994) 20 J Med
Eth 23 - 25.
2,One is reminded of Beck's reference to "primary scientization" in which scientists rely on superiority
by virtue of their claims to scientific rationality. Beck, fn 16 above at 158.
28Popper, K The Logic ofScientific Discovery (1972).
29Kuhn, T The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (1970).
30Beck, fn 16 above at 36 - 38.
31Kuhn, fn 29 above at 66 et seq.
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denied to those who do not have the necessary scientific expertise but science is not
compelled to enter into a critical, reflective relationship with the object of its research -
human beings. Scientists are unlikely to take the public sphere into account; they are
too busy trying to salvage a form of "core rationality" of the scientific enterprise to
reflect upon the foundation itself.32 This is part and parcel of standard scientific enquiry.
Thomas Kuhn's theory, for example, has been summarised in these terms;
"A normal scientist must be uncritical of the paradigm in which he works. It is
only by being so that he is able to concentrate his efforts on the detailed
articulation of the paradigm and to perform the esoteric work necessary to probe
nature in depth. It is the lack of disagreement over fundamentals that
distinguishes mature, normal science from the relatively disorganized activity of
immature pre-sciences".33
And further,
"It is through their confidence in the adequacy of a paradigm that scientists are
able to devote their energies to attempts to solve the detailed puzzles presented to
them within the paradigm, rather than engage in disputes about the legitimacy of
their fundamental assumptions and methods. It is necessary for normal science to
be to a large extent uncritical. If all scientists were critical of all parts of the
framework in which they worked all of the time then no detailed work would ever
get done".34
This may be all very well for standard scientific research but is inappropriate as regards
medical research involving human subjects. It is a far cry from Jay Katz's collective call
for a 'persistent educational effort' for medical researchers.35 There is nothing wrong
with his pedagogical solution per se but for the fact that it is applied to a model of
scientific reasoning, a characteristic ofwhich is to encourage scientists to be unreflective
about the overall research paradigm. What, however, if the paradigm or "disciplinary
32Thus, for example, the basis of Popper's theory of falsification is self-defeating. Beck, fn 16 above at
166.
"Chalmers, fn 13 above at 92.
"Chalmers, fn 13 above at 98.
35"Only a thoughtful and persistent educational effort...can bring about real change in long-standing
practices and thereby give some meaning to the suffering of those who were harmed by human
experimentation." See Katz, J Experimentation with Human Beings (2nd edn, 1973) at p. 4.
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matrix", as Kuhn later referred to it,36 endorses withholding treatment from individuals
suffering from syphilis ?
The professions are taught or indoctrinated to think along certain lines; in short, they are
trained to adopt and gradually internalise a method of reasoning or 'thought
collective'.37 Thus, for example, doctors and other professionals are trained to think in a
certain way; they are taught to rationalise according to certain conditions, traditions and
precepts. The thought collective of standard scientific enquiry, along with standard
scientific reasoning, has also been imported into medical research. Thus, the parameters
within which medical researchers analyse are institutionally defined.
According to standard scientific enquiry upon which medical research is based, the
thought collective does not encourage dialogue with the objects of research - probably
because there is no need for standard scientists to enter into a dialogue with the objects
of their research.
Consider the exchange between the researcher, Dr Baum, and a potential research
subject, Mrs Thornton, to which we have already referred.
Mrs Thornton expressed her opposition to entering the trial in the following way;
"I felt isolated, selfish, let down, ill-prepared for considering the options for this
unknown disease of DCIS which would obviously affect my life and health. The
impersonality of this trial proposition seemed to be attempting to deprive me of
one of the most important factors of healing, continued confidence in 'my' team,
whilst accentuating negative aspects of chance rather than choice."38
36In the general sense of the word as referred to in the Postscript to the 1970 edition of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions where Kuhn distinguished between a general sense of the word (disciplinary
matrix) and a narrow sense of the word {exemplar).
37The social anthropologist Mary Douglas describes a professional collective as one which 'leads
perception and trains it and produces a stock of knowledge'. This includes drawing up and maintaining
criteria as regards what constitutes a reasonable question and a true or false answer. In short, it
provides the context and sets the limits for any evaluative judgment about what is objective. See
Douglas, M How Institutions Think (1987) at p. 12 et seq.
38Thornton, fn 25 above at 19.
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The reason for this lies in the difficulty of explanation or the efficient use of language.
Baum expresses this when he writes,
"I therefore absolutely agree with Mrs Thornton that achieving 'informed consent'
within two weeks of the diagnosis of DCIS in a woman who thought herself well
until submitting a screening mammography, is an absurdity !"39
He cannot bridge the gap between scientists and subjects in the time available in practice.
He is enlightened to the extent that he applauds Mrs Thornton's decision to speak up for
herself and others in her position and he proudly acknowledges the fact that he and some
other colleagues encouraged Mrs Thornton to air her views.40 His approach fails,
however, in that Mrs Thornton was invited to air her views. The dialogue thus provides
the classic model for the subject of this thesis. Rather than rely on the permission or the
arbitrary good will of Baum and his like, research subjects as well as the rest of the
community should have an opportunity as of right to air their views in the medical
research debate, including questions regarding the design of clinical trials. As Mrs
Thornton says, little is known about the attitudes of patients as compared to the doctor,
the lawyer and the ethicist as regards controlled clinical trials,41 the exception being, as
discussed in the following chapter, is when the threat of litigation arises. The public,
however, have a right to inform and be informed by the medical research debate.42 This
necessarily involves participation, which, as MacCormick has written, lies at the core of
a viable definition of democracy;
"It is not enough that all should decide; it is important that each is the equal of
every other when it comes to deliberating and deciding. At least, each adult
citizen (or perhaps each adult resident) of a state should have, in principle, an
equal opportunity with every other to participate in political processes."43
39Baum, fn 26 above at 23-24.
40Baum, fn 26 above at 23.
""Thornton, fn 25 above at 19.
42See Habermas on the role of the public sphere, fn 3 above at 359.
43MacCormick, N 'Constitutionalism and democracy' in Bellamy R (ed) Theories and concepts of
politics: An introduction (1993) at p. 142.
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In essence, there is a role for the public sphere in the medical research process, namely,
as a warning system which, despite being unspecialised, is sensitive throughout society.44
It represents public opinion as opposed to providing decisions. Hence, it does not bear
the responsibility of building a consensus; rather it is a network of communicating
information and points of view which are then filtered and synthesised so that they
constitute the distillate of public opinion.45
2.4. Medical Research Involving Human Subjects
A working definition for medical research is that it is a planned study which has a well
defined objective. A researcher may not divert from the agreed protocol as to do so is
to undermine the project.46 The knowledge gained as a result of research is designed to
contribute to existing medical knowledge. It may or may not involve human subjects.
For current purposes, the term 'research' refers exclusively to research involving human
subjects, unless otherwise stated.
Experimentation differs from research to the extent that it is empirical and is subject to
no pre-arranged plan.47 Every medical intervention involves a degree of
experimentation. One must depart from standard practice for methods of treatment to
advance. This is what is meant by 'innovation'. Trying out new procedures over
established practice does not in itself constitute a basis for negligence; the problem
remains as to how far a physician may depart from standard practice and his conduct can
still qualify as an acceptable innovative attempt.
44"From the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure
of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially
thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are
taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes." Habermas, fn 3 above at 359.
45Habermas, fn 3 above at 360.
46Mason, J K and McCall Smith, R A Law andMedical Ethics (4th edn, 1994) at 350.
47See Dickens, B M 'What is a medical experiment?' (1975) 113 Can Med Ass J 635.
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Innovation implies a renewal of attitudes. A modern example would be laporascopic
surgery, or keyhole surgery, as it is more commonly known. This surgery constitutes an
advance in existing technique and is a model of innovation. Experimentation refers to
the use of a completely new process which has not been subject to appraisal but which
might be acceptable as a last ditch attempt.48 What, then, if the attitudes of the time are
unable to accommodate such an idea ? New ideas in medicine, as we saw in Chapter
One, have met with considerable resistance.49 One wonders sometimes whether it is not
a miracle that progress in medicine has been achieved at all, given the intellectual
straightjackets within which it has been confined.
This question arose in one of the first English cases on human experimentation which
still provides the legal standard for experimentation50 - a position which is, as the
following section will show, erroneous.
In Slater v. Baker and Staple ton^ an English surgeon treated the plaintiffs broken leg
by breaking it and disuniting the callous from the leg after it had been set by another
surgeon. In so doing, Dr Baker decided to try a device which he had recently developed
and which he believed would extend the leg. The plaintiffs leg failed to heal and he
sued for breach of contract. In upholding the plaintiffs claim, the court held that,
"For anything that appears to the Court, this was the first experiment made
possible with this new instrument; and if it was, it was a rash action, and he who
acts rashly acts ignorantly: and although the defendants in general may be as
skilful in their respective professions as any two gentlemen in England, yet the
Court cannot help saying, that in this particular case they acted ignorantly and
unskilfully, contrary to the known rule and usage of surgeons."52
48The Declaration of Helsinki which approves of "...saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating
suffering." See (1992) 339 Lancet 15.
49Indeed such an attitude was inherent in the ethics of early Egyptian medicine. See Mason and McCall
Smith, fn 46 above at p. 4. See also Chapter One, Section 1.1.1.3.
50Nelson-Jones, R and Burton, FMedical Negligence Case Law (2nd edn, 1995) at p. 65.
51(1797) 95 ER 860.
52(1797) 95 ER at 863.
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The court's reasoning, however, is flawed; it is based on paralogic and it is invalid. The
conclusion does not follow to the extent that it relies on the consequences. The court's
reasoning can be summarised thus;
(i) If you do something rashly, you may get a bad result.
(ii) If you do something for the first time, you may get a bad result.
(iii) Therefore if you do something for the first time, you are acting rashly.
The error lies in the assumption that because the consequences are the same, the
antecedents are the same. However, you could do something for the first time and still
get a bad result even though you had considered it very fully and were in no sense
'rash'.
A further question arises; was Dr Baker's method a minor deviation from customary
practice or was it a 180 ° turn ? The accepted method at the time, as a host of surgeons
testified at the trial, involved applying compression until the broken bone knitted
together.53 However, Dr Baker's method was the first recorded instance of the use of
modern treatment. It is common accepted practice in modern medicine to treat a broken
leg by putting it in traction, not compression.
In essence, Dr Slater was unfairly done by. The standard set out in the judgment,
"ignorantly, and unskilfully, contrary to the known rule and usage of surgeons" is not
only false but one is also reminded of Lydgate's adversaries in Middlemarch who were
wary of anything remotely "new fangled", including, the need to conduct research.54
This too, is reflected in the judgment. Dr Baker, is referred to earlier on in the
judgment in the most reverential of terms;
53( 1797) 95 ER at 861.
54See Eliot, G Middlemarch Harvey, W J (ed) (1985) at p. 119. It must be remembered that the main
reason why Lydgate moved to Middlemarch was to conduct research; "He went to study in Paris with
the determination that when he came home again he would settle in some provincial town as a general
practitioner, and resist the irrational severage between medical and surgical knowledge in the interest of
his own scientific pursuits, as well as the general advance". See p. 174.
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"...Baker has been above 20 years the first surgeon in St Bartholomew's Hospital,
reads lectures in surgery and anatomy, and is celebrated for his knowledge in his
profession as well as his humanity; and to charge such a man with ignorance and
unskilfulness upon the records of this Court is most dreadful."55
However, the attitudes of the time come through a few lines down;
"When we consider the good character of Baker, we cannot well conceive why he
acted in the manner he did but many men very skilful in their profession have
frequently acted out of the common way for the sake of trying experimentation".56
It is arguable that Slater v. Baker and Stapleton was a cornerstone for medical
malpractice claims;57 the principles laid down in it should, however, never have been
applied to experimentation. Innovation demands an outlook which is inherently
prospective, something which the judges and the surgeons in the case regarded with
both distaste and caution.
2.4.1. TheObjectification of the Research Subject
Generally speaking, medical progress could not be achieved without the participation of
both human and animal research subjects.58 Conflict arises when the subjects become
objects of organised research. For a doctor engaging in medical research, the distinction
between an animate and an inanimate object may become blurred particularly through the
influence of the rest of the scientific community, whose research is object based.
55(1797) 95 ER at 862.
56(1797) 95 ER at 862.
57Terry, N 'The Malpractice Crisis in the United States: A Dispatch from the Trenches' (1986) 2 PN
145 in Kennedy, I and Gmbb, AMedical Law: Text & Materials (1994) at 90.
58This work is dedicated to the study of research involving human subjects only; however, it is
submitted that both categories of research subjects are worthy of legal protection. Many of the works of
Peter Singer are devoted to the expression of animal rights.
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Objective statements and criteria are the staples of scientific rationality. They form an
integral part of what has been referred to above as the 'thought collective' of the
scientific profession.59 Scientists are trained to report their findings in a particular
manner; specialised terminology and structure are tools of the trade. They conduct
experiments according to criteria which guide what constitutes a reasonable question
and a true or false answer.60 As Gee and Mason point out, "The scientist is accustomed
to the rules of scientific enquiry, to making observations, forming hypotheses from them,
conducting experiments to check the hypotheses and, thus, formulating theories. The
object is to establish truth - there are no compromises."61 No compromises entails that
the thought collective of scientists provides the context and sets the limits for any
evaluative judgment about what is objective.62 No compromises, however, has sinister
undertones ifwe remind ourselves of the experiments conducted during the Third Reich.
The reports which Dr Rascher sent Himmler, for example,63 are structured in a way
which would be acceptable to modern medical writing. The letters are written in a
passive tense and symptoms are recognised and listed in the order in which individual
body parts are affected.64 Indeed, reading through the documentation set out in
Alexander Mitscherlich's book, Das Diktat der Menschenverachtung65 it is easy to
forget that the research subjects (Versuchspersonen) referred to in the letters as 'VP's,
are in fact human beings.66 The abbreviation militates against being aware of the
59See generally Fleck, L The Genesis and Development ofa Scientific Fact (1935, (tr) 1979).
60Douglas, fn 37 above at 13.
61Gee and Mason, fn 12 above at 87.
62Ibid.
63See Chapter One at Section 1.4.4.
64For example see Doc. No. 428 in Mitscherlich, fn 5 above at 40.
65Mitscherlich, fn 5 above.
66"Die VPn werden mit voller Fliegeruniform, Winter - und Sommer - {Combination und Fliegerhaube
bekleidet ins Wasser gebracht." Which translates as, "The VPs are placed in the water wearing a full
winter and summer pilot's uniform and a pilot's cap". Mitscherlich, fn 5 above at 37.
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humanity of the objects of research.67 The research subjects had to be aryan or "rein
nordisch" for Rascher to recognise their humanity.68
In the case of the Tuskegee experiment, the subjects' humanity was also overridden on
the grounds of race. Indeed, the experiment was viewed by some as an act of genocide
on a par with Nazi Germany. An editorial which appeared in the Los Angeles Times
qualified the accusation that Public Health Service (PHS) officials had persuaded black
men to become human guinea pigs by adding: "Well, perhaps not quite that [human
guinea pigs] because the doctors obviously did not regard their subjects as completely
human".69
In the Hyman70 case, where patients were injected with cancer cells as part of a study of
the immune system's response to cancer,71 the humanity of the patients was qualified
with reference to the fact that they were terminally ill. The patients represented an ideal
opportunity for Dr Southam to test a hypothesis concerning cancer,72 the rationale being
that they were going to die anyway. Dr Mandel, who actually carried out the research
opted, for a slightly different interpretation of the rationale, justifying the research given
the "insufficient medical attention to the long term, chronically ill patients."73 His
Hippocratic aspirations, however, did not extend to telling the patients that they were
being used as research subjects.
67"Sobald die Unterkuhlung bei diesem Versuchen minus 28° erreicht hatte, starb die VP mit Sicherheit
trotz aller Versuche zur Rettung.", or, "As soon as the temperature sunk to minus 28°, the VP died
despite all rescue attempts." See a letter from Dr Rascher to Himmler, dated September 10, 1942 Doc.
No. 1618 - PS in Mitscherlich, fn 5 above at 38-39.
68See Doc. No. 323 in Mitscherlich, fh 8 above at 44.
69See Jones, J H Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (2nd edn, 1993) at p. 12.
70 15 N. Y. 2d. 317, 206 N. E. 2d. 338: N. Y. 2d 397 (1965).
'The case is discussed in detail in Chapter One above at section 1.5.1.
72That the rejection of cancerous cells transplanted to a person suffering from cancer was delayed as
compared to a healthy person.
73Langer, E 'Human Experimentation: New York Verdict Affirms Patient's Rights' in Gorovitz S,
Macklin R, Jameton, A L, O'Connor, J M, Sherwin. S (eds) Moral Problems in Medicine (2nd edn,
1983) at 628.
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Objective experimentation, as formally introduced by Claude Bernard,74 was never
qualified in relation to the context of medical research involving human beings. As a
consequence, the reasoning behind standard scientific enquiry was extended without
adequate consideration of the changed circumstances.
Objective statements used in medical research are impersonal by definition. Language
which is impersonal reduces individuals to objects as opposed to rational human beings
capable of making choices. The choices available to an individual engaged in research
are translated into what Alderson refers to as matters of function and manipulation
instead of identity and relationship.75 We must not lose sight of the identity of research
subjects; it is an essential element of the research process;
"Whatever the rights and wrongs of any experimentation on any patient in the one
case, at least that residue of identification is left him that it is his own affliction by
which he can contribute to the conquest of that affliction, his own kind of suffering
which he helps to alleviate in others; and so in a sense it is his own cause. It is
totally indefensible to rob the unfortunate of this intimacy with the purpose and
make his misfortune a convenience for the furtherance of alien concerns."76
Moreover, we cannot afford to overlook the relationship between objective terminology
used in medical research and its effect on research subjects.
2.4.2. Therapeutic Research
In an effort to distinguish the various categories of medical research, it has become
customary to divide research into therapeutic and non-therapeutic categories. The
distinction is implicit in the Declaration of Helsinki (1964), the introduction of which
states that,
74Bernard, C An Introduction to the Study ofExperimental Medicine (Copley Green, H(tr) 1957).
75Alderson. P 'Did Children Change, or the guidelines?' (1992) 80 Bull Med Eth 22.
76Hans Jonas in Beauchamp, T L and Walters, L Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (1982) at 532. It
must be added, however that Personalisation, however, ignores the concept of anonymised research as
in the case of randomised clinical trials (RCTs), for instance; a consequence of research by numbers is
that it does not have to be personalised.
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"In the field of biomedical research a fundamental distinction must be recognised
between medical research in which the aim is essentially diagnostic or therapeutic
for a patient, and medical research the essential object of which is purely scientific
and without direct diagnostic or therapeutic value to the person subjected to the
research."77
Therapeutic research is, thus, defined as that which is "essentially diagnostic or
therapeutic for a patient"; this is reinforced by paragraph II 6 which provides that a
physician can combine research with professional care to the extent that the research
includes "potential diagnostic or therapeutic value for the patient". Any other research
is purely scientific and is commonly referred to as non-therapeutic.
Objective terminology can be subliminally persuasive - or, as George Orwell put it,
certain words add an "air of scientific impartiality to biased judgements".78 By
definition, the category of therapeutic research incorporates a notion of treatment,79
which is somewhat weighted with the hope of recovery;
"'Therapeutic' is an oddly fuzzy, unscientific word; it expresses possibly
unfounded hopes for the future as if they were present realities, it confuses the aim
of research with the activity. The word offers a licence for researchers to claim
good intentions. Yet scientific rigour would assess research in terms of outcome,
effectiveness and efficiency."80
Thus, the term 'therapeutic' implies that the research will benefit the individual, an
outcome which is by no means clear, in view of the very nature of research. It may
benefit or harm the individual or it may have no effect whatsoever. The outcome is not
known yet the category of therapeutic research lays claims to certainty which may only
be established once the research is completed. Hence,
"A new drug being tested could not strictly be described as therapeutic until its
benefits and risks are known. For these reasons, all research is in a sense 'non-
therapeutic".81
The Declaration of Helsinki (1964) as reprinted in Appendix B in its revised form.
78Words such as such as, phenomenon, element, objective, categorical, effective, virtual, basic, exhibit,
See Orwell, fn 9 above at 352.
79Kennedy and Grubb, fn 58 above at 1031.
80Alderson, fn 75 above at 23.
81 Ibid.
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In short, whilst the terminology used in medical research appears to be objective, neutral
and unbiased, the way in which it is defined and exercised involves the use of value
judgments. Instead of abolishing the term 'therapeutic research' to clarity such
uncertainty, as some have suggested,82 the role of rhetoric in the medical research
process must be understood.
2.4.3. Rhetoric and thePolitical Use of Language
Language can be used to express ideas as well as to conceal or prevent thought.83 It can
be used to present a case selectively. Persuasion plays a central role in the medical
research process. A researcher must persuade a person to become his research subject.
He or she must persuade a funding body to finance the project, must persuade a research
ethics committee to approve the proposal and must persuade a journal to publish the
findings. Persuasion is reinforced by the use of metaphors which influence the way in
which we see regard illness. The prevailing metaphor for illness is based in the language
ofwar;
"Punitive notions of disease have a long history, and such notions are particularly
active with cancer. There is the 'fight' or 'crusade' against cancer; cancer is the
'killer' disease; people who have cancer are 'cancer victims'...[T]he understanding
of cancer supports quite different avowedly brutal notions of treatment...there can
be no question of pampering the patient. With the patient's body considered to be
under attack ('invasion'), the only treatment is counter-attack."84
Disease is seen as being provoked by alien organisms to which the body must respond
by invoking its own military forces.85
Rhetoric helps to justify medical research. Thus,
82See Kennedy and Gmbb, fn 57 above at 24 who suggest that part of a physician's duty would be to
make it clear to the patients that the prime beneficiary of the research is the researcher and not the
patient.
830rwell, fn 9 above at 359.
84See Sontag, S Illness asMetaphor andAids and itsMetaphors (1991) inter alia at 59-65.
85Sontag, fn 84 above at 95.
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"One can reduce the strategy to a formula: first detach your agenda from its
partisan origins, from its history, and then present it as a universal imperative, as
a call to moral arms so perspicuous that only the irrational or the godless (two
categories often conflated) could refuse it. You can do this in many ways, but one
way, tried and true, is to appropriate vocabulary that is already an honoured one
and then "spin" it so that it will generate the conclusions - the marching orders -
that are the content of your politics."86
A good illustration of rhetoric in the medical research debate is to be found in Carolyn
Faulder's book, Whose Body is it ?87 Her analysis is concerning the use of RCTs in
medical research is both well researched and well argued, her main thesis being that
people must know whether they are being entered into clinical research trials. She
begins by stating that "...too often we allow our priorities in health care to be
determined by emotional appeal rather than by a cooler appraisal of the total needs of
the population".88 Admirable sentiments which are, however, undone by the opening
lines of her book; "In August 1981, an eighty-three year old widow, Mrs Margaret
Wigley, following an operation for bowel cancer...".89 Or "Doctors are invariably
middle class...".90 Her treatise is both polemical and rhetorical and illustrates how
information can be presented or manipulated to toe a particular party line. This is a
universal charge which can be levied at other participants in the medical research debate.
Be that as it may, a consequence is that there is a danger that selective presentation can
contribute to framing an ideology which can be used to rationalise almost any end. This
is particularly appropriate as regards the use of scientific terminology which can be used
to fit a requisite agenda whilst appearing to be neutral. Language can be tailored to
meet a particular end. This is an issue which has been addressed in relation to language,
medicine and the law.
86Fish, S There's no such thing asfree speech and it's a good thing too. (1994) at 8.
87( 1985).
88See ffi 87 above at 31.
89See fn 87 above at 9.
90See fn 87 above at 35.
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The relationship between language and the law is one which is characterised by the art
of persuasion. Gee and Mason suggest that this is because the language of law blurs the
distinction between logic and rhetoric, the former concerning the formulation of
argument and the latter the art of persuasion.91 How else is the strategy which lawyers
employ when examining and cross examining witnesses to be viewed ? The sequence of
questions is a product of legal training.92 It also, however, forms part of medical
training as, for instance, in the making of a diagnosis.
Gee and Mason, however, write about the 'chain of reasoning' in relation to lawyers
involved in litigation only. They compare the legal and the medical profession by
drawing a distinction between deduction and induction. Lawyers are concerned with the
former, that is to say, the rules of good argument whilst scientists are concerned with
the latter;
"The scientist is accustomed to the rules of scientific inquiry, to making
observations, forming hypotheses from them, conducting experiments to check the
hypotheses and, thus, formulating theories. The object is to establish the truth -
there are no compromises. The court, on the other hand, is there to resolve a
dispute between two parties, either between two persons in a civil action or
between an individual and the state in a criminal action. There may be an
absolute answer to the dispute, with clear facts supporting one side only but more
often, the issues are clouded - there are views in favour of both sides and facts
which can be adduced in support of either point of view. The court procedure then
takes the form of debate, in which the opposing points of view are espoused by the
lawyers for each side who try to present their client's case in the most favourable
light."93
An implication is that lawyers deal in the deductive currency of validity whereas
scientists deal in the inductive currency of truth. The type of thinking which scientists
use in reaching conclusions results in "an opinion...which, while not being absolutely
certain, is the best possible explanation for the known facts."94 In short, lawyers are
concerned with versions of the truth whereas scientists deal with truth.
91Gee and Mason, fh 12 above at 88.
92Ibid.
93Gee and Mason, fh 12 above at 87.
94Gee and Mason, fh 12 at 89.
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It is arguable that the party with the greater understanding, and who is best able to make
its description stick,95 is able to influence the medical research debate disproportionately.
Thus, the party whose selective presentation is the most convincing wins.
Understanding the rhetoric of research involves a consideration of the individuals in the
process and being aware of issues such as the benefit to society, careers of researchers,
investments by pharmaceutical companies and so on. In short, terminology must be
used in such a way as to clarify and not to obfuscate the socio-political dynamics of the
process.
The reflective use of language ascribes dignity to the individual by involving him as a
research subject as opposed to an anonymous, disenfranchised research object.
Research subjects are thereby accorded their full status as human beings capable of
making autonomous choices. This further avoids casting them as victims, a role which
opens the door to a paternalistic offer of protection for their 'best interests'. Research
subjects must be protected but not at such a price. As will be examined later on, the
best interests test lames and erodes the identity of research subjects. Pressed to its
extreme, it does no more than move the research subject from the frying pan of
uncertainty into the fire of overprotection.96
2.4.3. Non-Therapeutic Research
The intention in carrying out non-therapeutic research is to acquire scientific
knowledge.97 The term non-therapeutic research refers to research which will not
immediately benefit the subjects involved; these can be subdivided into healthy
volunteers and captive patients subjects. Is this form of research to be regarded as
'purely scientific' ? Is it possible to dissociate the subjective from the objective result ?
Is there such a thing as the "additional attention" effect ? The unexpected or untoward
95Through money, connections though arguable in the present context, through the position of power
which the medical community occupy
96See Chapter Three.
97Mason and McCall Smith, fn 46 above at 351.
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effect which some research subjects experience on receiving medical attention must not
be underestimated. This is particularly relevant as regards patient volunteers, who
despite having been told that the medical attention they receive will be of no benefit to
them, may instinctively believe that it will be so.
By definition, non-therapeutic research incorporates the notion of helping a future
generation, an idea with which we are not entirely at ease. Traditional ethical principles,
such as those within Kantian moral theory, stress the autonomy of moral reason and the
responsibility towards those in our immediate proximity but not necessarily towards
future generations.98 A definition of proximity is needed for the medical research
process which acknowledges both the long and short term. The tension between short
and long termism is particularly noticeable if we question the effectiveness of the
distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research.
2.4.4. Is theDistinction Effective ?
The distinction between therapeutic research and non-therapeutic research is not as
neatly polarised as some of the literature might suggest. For example, treatment in the
context of a research project may amount to testing various new procedures in order to
determine which is superior. There may be occasions when a physician continues with
tests, even after he has gained the information required to answer his research
hypothesis.99 This curiosity is driven by the enthusiasm of the researcher but on the face
of things is of no additional advantage to the subjects. It could, however, be suggested
that such testing is legitimate. How else is a physician / researcher to test the relapse
rate of the condition ? There may still be genuine doubt as to the best method of
treatment. The researching physician would, arguably, still be acting in the totality of
the patient's best interests as opposed to his immediate needs. He would also be
98"The ethical universe is composed of contemporaries, and its horizon to the future is confined by the
foreseeable span of their lives." Jonas, H 'Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Task
of Ethics' in Jonas, H Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to TechnologicalMan (1974) at 7.
"Fried, C 'Informed Consent and Medical Experimentation' in Beauchamp and Walters, fh 76 above at
541.
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considering the needs of future generations. Our current views of research, however, do
not take this into account explicitly, but, instead, encourage analysis which is rooted in
the short term. To what extent is this approach encouraged by those who have vested
interests to protect ? One is reminded of Galbraith's "culture of contentment" insofar as
a short term approach is a tactic of the contented majority to retain their position of
authority. This takes us back to the discussion above concerning pharmaceutical
companies and vested interests.100
The impact of the categories of therapeutic and non-therapeutic on the law has been
discussed traditionally in terms of negligence which is, in itself, a restrictive short term
approach. It is argued that the standards of disclosure required differ according to
which category of research is being conducted.101 Under both English and Scottish law,
for example, the treatment of a patient without his or her consent requires specific
justification.102 Yet there is still evidence that patients are recruited who are unaware
that their treatment forms part of a research project.103 An action in battery or
negligence might arise were a patient not told that this is the case; an explanation of the
broad nature of the procedure intended requires that a patient be told that it forms part
of a trial.104 The shortcomings of this approach, however, are that it is anchored in an
interpretation of the duty of care as restricted to the individual harmed, in itself, a
cornerstone of the English law of tort and the Scottish law of delict.
Consider, for example, the "neighbour" principle as articulated by Lord Atkin in
Donoghue v. Stevenson-,
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure
your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour ? receives a
restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then,
in law is my neighbour ? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and
100See Galbraith, fn 19 above at 20.
101 See Brazier, fn 11 at 416 et seq. This issue is discussed in further detail in Chapter Three.
102 See Sidaway v. Board ofGovernors of the Bethlem Royal and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 All
ER 643 and also Hunter v. Hanley 1955 SC 200.
103 Brahams. D 'Clinical Trials and the Consent of the Patient' (1982) 226 Practitioner 1829.
l04Kennedy and Grubb, fn 57 above at 1045.
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directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation
as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which
are called in question".105
Lord Atkins's dictum is not the ratio decidendi of the case and was never intended to be
an exact comprehensive statement of the law.106 Be that as it may, Lord Atkin was not
speaking about the law as a whole but about negligence; in other words, he was asking
to whom do I owe a duty of care ? A restrictive response such as the one given by Lord
Atkin then becomes inappropriate as regards medical research. My neighbour in medical
research includes future generations which necessitates an extension of the neighbour
principle. How can we make these decisions, given the complexity of the knowledge
required ? Generally speaking, the knowledge is not available to the individual but is a
matter of science.107 Foreseeability requires mental expertise. Nowhere is expertise
more vital than in relation to the assimilation of risks - and this forms an integral part of
the medical research debate.
2.5. Risks: The Justification forResearch
2.5.1. The Risk / Benefit Analysis
2.5.1.1. General Principles
The risk / benefit analysis refers to the balancing exercise which weighs the extent to
which risks may be justified in order to achieve the overall benefit. It provides that
research or experiments are justifiable only when related to the anticipated scientific or
clinical benefit. The risk / benefit analysis is enshrined at both an international and
national level.
105[1932] AC 562, HL at 580.
106Brazier, M The Law ofTorts (2 edn, 1992) at 173.
107Delanty, fn 3 above at 11.
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2.5.1.2. International Level
Paragraph I. 4 of the Revised Declaration ofHelsinki (1975)108 insists that,
"Biomedical research involving human subjects cannot legitimately be carried out
unless the importance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent risk to the
subject."
Paragraph I. 5 further provides that,
"Every biomedical research project involving human subjects should be preceded
by careful assessment of predictable risks in comparison with foreseeable benefits
to the subject or to others. Concern for the interests of the subject must always
prevail over the interest of science and society."
2.5.1.1.3. National Level
2.5.1.1.3. (I) The United Kingdom
At a national level, the Royal College of Physicians Guidelines109 provide a basis for the
risk / benefit analysis. In particular, paragraph 5.8 of the Royal College of Physicians
guidelines establishes the duty of a research ethics committee to conduct such an
analysis when considering a research protocol:
"A key decision in the assessment of proposed research is whether the risk or
inconvenience caused to the patient is justifiable in relation to the value of the
information sought. This process is sometimes referred to as risk / benefit
analysis. We believe that it assists Committees to arrive at good decisions if they
are provided with as precise an estimate as possible of both risk and the benefits
inherent in research." 110
108Reproduced in Appendix B.




Section 1(1) § 40 of the German Drugs Code (AMG) provides that a trial involving non-
therapeutic research may go ahead only if the risks involved can be justified by the
possible benefit which the new medication has to offer.111 Therapeutic research involves
a different assessment of risks. § 41 (1) alters the risk / benefit parameter to encompass
the condition of the likelihood, according to current medical knowledge, that the trial
will save the patient's life, cure the patient or relieve the symptoms of his illness.112 A
clinical trial may only go ahead if the risks involved are justifiable in accordance with
their possible benefit.11"'
2.5.1.1.3 .(iii). The United States
The Food and Drug Administration guidelines include the risk / benefit analysis as part
of the criteria for IRB approval of research. The guidelines expressly provide that the
risks to the research subjects must be minimised by using procedures which are
consistent with "sound research design".114
As regards the definition of'risk', the guidelines state that,
"Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to
subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to
result. In evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB should consider only those risks
and benefits that may result from the research (as distinguished from risks and
benefits or therapies subjects would receive even if not participating in the
research)."115
There are, however, different gradations of risk; it is not a static property.
luSee Appendix D.
112See Appendix D.
113See the KohlhammerAMG Kommentar (1994) at p. 13 and also § 38 (40) (1) Nr 1 AMG.
I14§ 46.111 (a) (1) (i) 45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46: Protection of Human Subjects (Revised
as of October 1, 1989 as reproduced (selectively) in van den Dael, W and Muller-Salomon, H Die
Kontrolle der Forschung am Menschen durch Ethik-Kommissionen (1990) at 141.
115§ 46. Ill (2) in van den Dael and Muller-Salomon, fn 114 above at 142.
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2.5.1.4.1. Risk
The Royal College of Physicians guidelines for therapeutic research, for example,
distinguish between research involving 'less than minimal risk' (e.g. giving a urine
sample)116 and that involving ' minimal risk' (e.g. chance of a mild reaction such as a
headache but also includes the remote chance of serious injury or death).117 It is
recommended that a minimal risk should only be undertaken if the risk is comparatively
small in relation to the risks which the patient has incurred during the course of his
illness, if the disease is serious, where the knowledge gained from the research is likely
to be of great practical benefit, where there are no other means of obtaining the same
knowledge and where the patient gives fully informed consent. However, in the case of
non-therapeutic research, it could be argued that a patient should not be subjected to a
minimal risk just because one in two hundred might benefit.
Let us say that a scientist came up with a hypothesis as to the cause of Alzheimers
which necessitated performing a brain biopsy. This of course would be non-therapeutic
research as the motivation on behalf of the scientist is purely scientific and demonstrates
the distinction between benefit to the present and to future patients. Could the risk to
the patient be justified in view of the fact that no benefit will accrue to him ? Suppose
the answer depended upon the results of a lumbar puncture ? This process might well
involve considerable discomfort and is certainly not without risk but does not carry the
same hazards as an invasion of the brain. Yet again, suppose the scientist could test his
hypothesis by taking a blood sample ? An intervention of this minimally invasive nature
could easily be justified. However, what about the grey area in-between the first
example and the third ? Are the risks which attach themselves to performing a lumbar
puncture reconcilable with what still only amounts to a hypothesis towards trying to find
a cause rather than the cure of a disease ? Clearly the risks have changed and with this,
the justification has changed irrespective of the scientific value of the research. Where
should the line be drawn ? Furthermore, by whom should it be drawn ?
116See para 5.10 of Royal College of Physicians, fn 109 above at 9.
117See para 5. 11 ofRoyal College of Physicians, fn 109 above at 9.
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The Declaration ofHelsinki provides that as regards non-therapeutic research,
"The investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the research if in
his / her judgment it may, if continued, be harmful to the individual".118
and further at paragraph III.4 that
"...the interest of science and society should never take precedence over
considerations related to the wellbeing of the subject".
If the guidelines were followed literally, research involving the possibility of serious risks
would rule out the use of volunteers.119 A question would then arise as to whether such
research were ever justified other than by using the researchers themselves as subjects.120
As a consequence, research which might benefit humanity might be stultified or worse, it
might drive such research underground thus putting the subjects in double jeopardy.
The medical researcher is responsible for the weighing up of risks which must be done
both before and during the clinical trial. In attempting to test the foreseeablility of the
possible risks and benefit, he must consider the results of the tests carried out on animals
before the start of the trial. If the risk / benefit analysis suggests significant danger, the
decision as to whether it is justifiable is one for the researcher to make. The only
opportunity for his assessment to be appraised lies in its submission for evaluation by a
research ethics committee. The decisions of the committee, however, are reached on the
basis of consensus of a select class of individuals. The nature of this consensus
regarding the principles for medical research affects the justification for its practice. It is
vital that the justification invoked is the product of pluralistic deliberation. In essence,
we need to know what the general public think. We need to know, for example,
whether they think that it is justifiable to allow patients with Alzheimer's disease to take
I18Para III. 3.
119See Mason and McCall Smith, fn 46 above at 352.
120Though, even then, would the head of department be justified in allowing it to go forward ? Almost
certainly not if the risk were a serious one.
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part in non-therapeutic research on behalf of others. The common good is a matter for
the common man, albeit not exclusively so. The common good, however, is hard to
define.
2.5.1.5.2. Benefit
Historically, the concept of utilitarianism has faltered on the uncertain conception of
what is meant by the common good despite standard definitions such as the 'greatest
happiness of the greatest number'. It has been argued that this definition is not only
conceptually vague but also practically insignificant in view of the uncertainty in
measuring it.121 This is despite the fact that contemporary utilitarians have remodelled
the concept by asserting the common good is to maximise overall happiness by realising
the satisfaction of choices made by autonomous individuals. This attempts to take into
account the individual's interests, their desire for autonomy and their different
perceptions of what it is to flourish. 122 However, the risk / benefit calculus in medical
research sometimes operates in such a way as to override the interests of the individual,
especially as regards non-therapeutic research;
"Thus if overall maximisation of welfare is the supreme moral objective the
individual seems to be in permanent jeopardy before the overriding interests of
society. The ordinary intuitive deontological moral principles that govern our
relationships, such as respect for the integrity of each other's persons, for each
other's autonomy, for promise keeping, honesty, and openness, for fairness and
justice are disposable whenever overall maximisation of welfare requires us to
123
ignore them."
In its modern form and in the context of medical research, the common good refers to
the greater good of humanity. Measuring risks informs us as to whether a research
protocol is justifiable or not - thus, statements of risk are unavoidably evaluative. As
Beck points out,
121Gillon, R Philosophical Medical Ethics (4th, edn 1991) at 23-24 and also Singer, P Practical Ethics
(1979) at p. 79.
'"Singer at p. 80 and Gillon at p. 25, fh 121 above.
123Gillon, fn 121 above at 25.
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"The prevailing theoretical self-concept of science implies that the sciences cannot
make value judgments with the authority of their rationality. They deliver so-
called 'neutral' figures, information, or explanations which are to serve as the
'unbiased' basis for decisions on the broadest variety of interests. Which interests
they select, however, on whom or what sort of potential solutions they bring into
view - these are anything but neutral decisions. In other words: the sciences have
developed their steering abilities independently of and beyond explicit value
statements. Their possibilities of exerting practical influence lie in how they
design scientific results. Thus the 'purely objective' interpretation of 'need' and
'risk' in the various field of action provides a cloak behind which the directions of
future developments are negotiated."124
More importantly, however, is the fact that the shortcomings of the utilitarian model is
that is presupposes a consensus as to what is both "common" and what is "good".
We need scientists to facilitate the medical research debate by informing us of the
likelihood of harm and so on. We do not, however, require them to decide what is to be
done as a result. The medical research debate should also be structured in such as way
as to enable a wider audience to inform research workers of what is and what is not
acceptable. A consensus ofwhat is the common good must be derived from a consensus
of all those affected - that is, the community.
2.5.1.5.3. Risks: Calculability v. Estimability
In one sense, risks can be understood only by those with the necessary mathematical and
physiological expertise. Not everyone, for example, will understand what is meant by a
5 % risk of incontinence following the administration of an epidural injection during the
course of a clinical trial. Thus, the expression of risk depends on a certain level of
understanding in the audience. The danger is that this enables those with the requisite
knowledge and training to monopolise the debate; Beck refers to this as 'primary
scientization' which leads to dominance by experts.125 Future perspectives and
possibilities are discussed within the scientific community; external or public influence is
absent.126 The monopoly of scientific rationality as regards risks can be qualified by, for
124Beck, fn 16 above at 174.
125Beck, fn 16 above at 158.
126Beck, fn 16 above at 171.
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example, altering the basis of definition of risks from that of calculability to that of what
has been translated as estimability (Abschatzbarkeit). An alternative and equally
plausible translation ofAbschatzbarkeit would be foreseeability. In other words, we are
looking at the difference between what we might reasonably expect to happen and what
we fear might happen. The distinction is a real one. Scientists provide a key to
understanding the probable risks which a research proposal entails. Thus, they play a
crucial role in informing the consensus so that the principles ascertained for medical
research are the product of informed reasoning. However, to consider foreseeability is
to move from scientific calculation and to enter the realm of possibility. This, in turn,
opens the assessment of risks to those without training, thus enabling the public to
participate in the process of deciding what is justifiable and what is not.
This means that those involved in widely differing spheres of influence - for example, in
politics, business and the professions - can contribute to the medical research debate.127
Thus, the debate moves to being based on a collaborative model of well-informed
dialogue as opposed to an adversarial contest between the experts and their subjects;
this demands a substantial change of attitude. The result is that the public as a whole
has to grow out of its sense of insecurity towards expertise and to accept it on the basis
of relative equality. This includes the attitudes of the legal profession.
For example, in the case ofR v. Adams,128 which involved an accusation of rape, it was
held that evidence of a statistical method of analysis in a criminal trial plunged the jury
into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory and complexity deflecting them in
their proper task. The prosecution case rested entirely on expert evidence in relation to
the DNA profile obtained from semen on a high vaginal swab taken from the
complainant. At trial, the defence were not permitted to apply the Bayes Theorem of
probability to the statistical evaluation of the DNA profile.129 The rationale was that the
evidence trespassed on an area peculiarly and exclusively within the jury's province,
127Beck, fn 16 above at 172.
128[1996] 2 Cr App R 467.
129For an explanation of the Bayes Theorem see Kaye, D H 'What is Bayesianism: A Guide for the
Perplexed' (1988) 28 Jurimetrics: Journal of Law, Science and Technology 161.
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namely, the way in which they evaluated the relationship between one piece of evidence
and another. Although the theorem was an appropriate tool for statisticians, it was
inappropriate for use injury trials or as a means to assist the jury in their task.130
"More fundamentally, the attempt to determine guilt or innocence on the basis
of a mathematical formula, applied to each separate piece of evidence was
simply inappropriate to the jury's task. Jurors evaluated evidence and reached
conclusions not by means of a formula, mathematical or otherwise, but by the
joint application of their individual common sense and knowledge of the
world to the evidence before them."131
The argument is rooted in a certain view of the division of labour, one in which it is the
role ofjudges to assist the jury. In effect, Lord Justice Rose was putting experts in their
place. Note that he first states that the Bayes Theorem might be an "appropriate and
useful tool for statisticians, but inappropriate for jury trials and then deflects from this
contentious statement by making his main point by starting off with, "more
fundamentally.." and so on. According to Rose LJ, the courts were perfectly capable of
judging the evidence given in the individual case without being forced to accept the
views of "scientific" experts; this type ofbacklash is not an uncommon occurrence in the
law.
Consider, for example, the Australian medical negligence case, F v. R132 where King CJ
stated that whereas much assistance could be derived from statistical evidence as to
whether a doctor acted reasonably in the exercise of his professional skill and judgment,
such evidence would not be decisive in all circumstances. He relied on the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Reibl v. Hughes:
"To allow expert evidence to determine what risks are material and, hence, should
be disclosed and, correlatively, what risks are not material is to hand over to the
medical profession the entire question of the scope of the duty of disclosure,
including the question whether there has been a breach of that duty. Expert
130The theorem's methodology required that items of evidence be assessed separately according to their
bearing on the guilt of the accused, before being combined in the overall formula. In their Lordships
view, this approach was too rigid in relation to evidence of the nature which a jury characteristically
had to assess.
131
[1996] 2 Cr App R 467 at 481 E.
I32[1983] 33 SASRat 193-194.
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medical evidence is, of course, relevant to findings as to the risks that reside in or
are a result of recommended surgery or other treatment. It will also have a
bearing on their materiality but this is not a question that is to be concluded on the
basis of expert medical evidence alone. The issue under consideration is a
different issue from that involved where the question is whether the doctor carried
out his professional activities by applicable professional standards. What is under
consideration here is the patient's right to know what risks are involved in
undergoing or foregoing certain surgery or other treatment."133
In other words, the courts will judge what a patient has a right to know. All three cases
discussed above can be interpreted as a claim to 'turf by judges, or alternatively, a
restatement of the division of labour as regards medical negligence litigation. Expert
testimony is indispensable in cases of medical negligence. A judge needs to know what
the risks are. He also needs to be informed as to the likelihood of those risks occurring.
Unless he is blessed with divine inspiration, it is doubtful whether a judge would have
this sort of knowledge at his fingertips. To say that allowing expert medical evidence to
determine the materiality of risks would be handing over to the medical profession the
entire scope of the duty of disclosure displays an understanding of the role of experts in
a democratic society which can be regarded as both poor and outdated. The issues
raised by modern medicine are complex and inevitably those raised by modern medical
research must be equally difficult to unravel. They cannot, however, be viewed in
isolation.
"As economic and public operations become more complex, it is necessary to unite
varying skills, different experience, different education, resulting specialization
and different degrees of intelligence, or, at a minimum, its confident outward
expression." 134
2.9. Conclusion
133(1980) 114 DLR (3d) at 13.
134See Galbraith, fn 19 above at 65.
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Whereas applying the methodology of the natural sciences to medicine met with great
resistance,135 there was no stopping the 'new scientists' once the resistance was
overcome. Standard scientific reasoning was imported into the medical sciences lock,
stock and barrel. The shortcomings of the model, where medical research is concerned,
is that it does not encourage scientists to recognise the humanity of the objects of
research; it does not encourage them to enter into a dialogue with the research subjects
or even those outside the scientific community.
Research subjects as well as the rest of the community must have the opportunity to
participate in the medical research debate as of right instead of on an ad hoc basis.
Public dialogue must be institutionalised within democratic structures. The medical
research process should be structured in such a way as to ensure the 'fair equality of
involvement' or at least equality of opportunity to get oneself involved in the politics of
the medical research process if one so chooses.136 Experts and the public must co¬
operate in ascertaining principles for medical research.137 The medical research debate
should be constituted of individuals who, as Thomas Paine envisaged, operate on the
basis of a compact with each other.138 This entails dispensing with traditional prejudices
which exist among the professions and the public in favour of dialogue. The law has a
part to play in facilitating dialogue. The question with which we are faced is whether
legal reasoning in the medical research debate should be based on confrontation or
mediation.
135"...[the] struggle between the new science and the old learning was the general background to the
controversies over anaesthesia, even as late as the 1870s, antisepsis. But the practice of medicine was
only gradually affected by new scientific ideas and scientific ways of thinking; after all, the leading
members of the profession in the 1830s had received their education in the eighteenth century and few
of those who were most prominent in the 1870s had graduated later than 1840. Most doctors before
1850, and many as late as 1870, it would seem, simply did not observe or think scientifically". See
Youngson, A J The Scientific Revolution in Victorian Medicine (1979) at pp 16-17.
l36See, for example, MacCormick, fn 43 above at 142.
137See, for example, Habermas, fti 3 above at 351.
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38Paine T Rights ofMan (1985) at p. 70.
Chapter Three
Medical Research and Legal Reasoning: Informed Consent
"...analysis of legal and moral reasoning cannot be pursued in terms of stable and fixed conceptual
standards. Such analysis requires constant reassessment not only of the subject matter of analysis -
legal and moral reasoning - but also of the fluctuating standards in terms ofwhich investigation must
necessarily proceed. It is though we were trying to measure an object which changes size by
employing a shrinking or expanding yardstick. This state of affairs evidently requires that equal
attention be given both to theories of reasoning and to concepts of logic and rationality in terms of
which they are discussed. We might otherwise be employing obsolete critical standards. "
Gidon Gottlieb 1
Introduction
The legal reasoning which lies behind the control of medical treatment has been
extrapolated to medical research involving human subjects. This may be inappropriate
given that the former is based on the medical negligence model, an "after the fact"
approach. Medical research should be looked at prospectively. Tort actions are based
on obligation. Consent based actions, on the other hand have evolved as a rights issue.
While it is true to say that this applies to all three legal systems under consideration, they
are, however, based on different principles, a subject to which we will return later. A
feature which the systems share is that research subjects only have a voice in the event
of injury thereby amplifying the prevailing view of them as victims.2 This is a
consequence of medical negligence being fault based. The purpose of this chapter is to
consider alternative approaches.
Achieving a consensus view of medical research implies involving all the parties in the
research process to take part in the discussion. However, a common denominator of the
1 The Logic ofChoice (1968) at 15.
2See for example, Vikenty Veressayer's book which referred to the research subjects mentioned as the
"victims of science". Memoirs of a Russian Physician (1901 Linden (tr)). As reproduced in part in
Katz, J Experimentation with Human Beings (1972).
105
process in all three jurisdictions under examination, is that certain parties are protected
at the expense of others. It has been argued, for example, that research subjects do not
have a voice;'11 do not believe that this is entirely true. The researched upon do have a
voice but it is the voice of the law as articulated through the language of rights,4 the
current application of which, as has already been said, means that their voice is heard
only when things go wrong. To this extent, the language of rights is multifocussed as,
whilst appearing to empower the patient, it serves the ends of other groups such as
insurance and pharmaceutical companies - and lawyers.
3.1. Consent - International Codes
The Nuremberg Code (1947) provides that, "The voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential." The absolutist nature of the Code is understandable
given the historical context in which it was developed;5 it is, however, detrimental to
furthering a consensus for it gives rights to the research subject over and above other
parties - and this could paralyse or atrophy the research process. The pragmatism
which was introduced by the Declaration of Helsinki was inescapable in view of the
overpowering need to carry out research. However, it gives rise to a tug of war
between the professions - in this case, between doctors and lawyers. Helsinki, it must be
remembered, is made up of guidelines prepared by and for the medical research
profession.6 The Nuremberg Code arose from the judgment of the Nuremberg trials;7 it
is judge made - and so too is the doctrine of informed consent.
3See, for example, Faulder, C Whose Body is It ? (1985).
4See Herxheimer, A 'The Rights of the Patient in Clinical Research' (1988) Lancet 1128.
5See Annas, G J and Grodin, M A (eds) The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in
Human Experimentation (1992).
6See Herxheimer, fh 4 above at 1128.
1
Trials ofWar Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council law 10, Vol.
1 (Washington, D. C.: Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950);
Military Tribunal, Case 1, United States v. Karl Brandt et al., October 1946 - April 1949, pp. 27 - 74.
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3.2. Informed Consent
The greatest modern change in medical practice has been founded on the doctrine of
informed consent which many physicians like to think is a myth.8 This is probably
because the concept was not introduced by the medical profession. The school of law
was responsible for its implantation and it was the lawyer, both practitioner and
academic, who nurtured its gestation. It is arguable that the concept has been hijacked
by the lawyers as a means of retaliation for what is seen as decades of hegemony by the
medical profession.9 To this extent, informed consent is a battleground on which the
law and the doctor confront each other.10
Several consequences have been identified which include the erosion of trust, the
alienation of the parties involved,11 the use of consent as a defence weapon12 and so on.
8See Beecher, H 'Consent in Clinical Experimentation-Myth and Reality' (1966) 195 JAMA pp. 34-35.
and also Silverman, W A 'The myth of informed consent: in daily practice and in clinical trials.' (1989)
15 J Med Eth at 6.
9 Indeed, the "law is currently making its presence felt" as the health care delivery system in the United
Kingdom is reorganised within a legislative framework over tighter management and greater medical
accountability. The use of declarations has increased as has the recourse to litigation which has
engendered a climate of distrust. See Teff, H Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives on the Doctor /
Patient Relationship (1994) at p. 33. Some commentators believe that the law in fact entrenches the
medical hegemony. See Montgomery, J 'Medicine, Accountability, and Professionalism' (1989) 16 J
Law & Soc 318.
10"...it should not be surprising that on the battlefield of informed consent, law and medicine glare at
each other over barricades of suspicion and misunderstanding." See Piper, A 'Truce on the Battlefield:
A Proposal for a Different Approach to Medical Informed Consent' (1994) 22 J Med Eth at 301.
"Although see the report of pilot mediation schemes being introduced in two English regions for
medical negligence actions in (1995) 109 Bull Med Eth 2. See also Hansard, 18. 5. 95, Col 344.
Mediation schemes (Gutachterkommissionen / Schlichtungsstelleri) are widely used in Germany in
relation to medical litigation. See Giesen, D 'Gutachterkommissionen und Schlichtungsstellen,
Anspruch, Praxis, Perspektiven" in Arbeitsgemeinschaft Rechtsanwalte im Medizinrecht (ed)
Gutachterkommissionen und Schlichtungsstellen (1990) at p. 77 and also LG Dortmund, 3 Feb 1987 JZ
1988, 255.
12
"...by analysing the doctor's need to obtain consent solely as a mechanism by which the doctor
obtains her or his defence to an action for assault or trespass to the person. But that surely cannot be
right. The effect of consent is indeed to provide a defence, but that is not its purpose. Its purpose is to
protect the patient's right of choice, or as it might be put, the patient's autonomy. The only point in a
doctor asking a patient to consent to proposed treatment is to give the patient the opportunity to say no,
that is to refuse." See McK Norrie, K 'Medical Treatment of Children and Young Persons' (1994) 57
Arch Recht-und Sozialph/Beiheft 109 at 113.
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These, however, are negative results which do not ask the question - who benefits ? It is
my opinion that while neither the patients nor the doctors nor medical practice are the
beneficiaries, lawyers do not do too badly out of the consequences. The drug
companies also remain conveniently out of the 'big picture'; doctors are convenient
scapegoats.1" This is also the case in medical research. The blame for experiments
carried out during the Third Reich has, more often than not, been allocated to the
physicians who conducted the research without regard to the institutional framework
which enabled and, indeed, encouraged research of this nature to be undertaken.
However, as has been stated by one commentator, the Holocaust,
"...did not just, mysteriously, avoid clash with the social norms and institutions of
modernity. It was these norms and institutions that made the Holocaust
feasible."14
In the American case of Tuskegee, for example, attempts were also made to shift full
responsibility to the physician who directed the experiment. Even so the government
was conducting these experiments rather than protecting the citizens against them.15
3.3. The Patient: Rights - A Comparative View
The development of patient rights was an American phenomenon, yet one which has
been transplanted into both the United Kingdom and Germany. However, whereas
measurement of the accountability of the medical profession by way of the rights
discourse has been accepted universally, there are differing contexts in which these
rights have been exercised; these contexts must be distinguished. In so doing, it is
13This is in tune with the NHS indemnity scheme as introduced in 1991 in Britain which provides
economic advantages to the NHS but does not allow doctors to clear their name. See Brazier, M 'NHS
Indemnity: The Implications for Medical Litigation' (1990) 6 PN 88.
14See Baumann, ZModernity and the Holocaust (1990) at p. 87.
15See the remarks cited by Jones, J H Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (2dn edn, 1993)
which include those of a Public Heath Service (PHS) official who was reported to have said that,
"Whoever was director of the VD section at that time, in 1946 or 1947, would be the most logical
candidate if you had to pin it down." See p. 8 et seq.
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helpful to distinguish the systems by applying three models of rights; consumerist
(USA), welfare / consumerist (UK) and self-determining / Sozialstaat (Germany). It
follows that different outcomes arise from the models. The context of health care
systems provide an invaluable insight as to the way patient rights are interpreted and
qualified; a factor which deserves closer examination.
3.3.1. The United States (Consumerist)
Informed consent is a product of the American constitution which explains why it is
framed within the parameters of rights. The decision in Cobbs v. Grant,16 in which the
patient's right to know was considered to override professional privilege to withhold
information, illustrates the adversarial mood of the time which was fuelled by the
consumer, civil and women's rights movements which flourished during the Sixties.17
Informed consent was first referred to, as a concept, in a 1957 Californian decision,
Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., University Board of Trustees.18 The court also referred
to what it termed as "intelligent consent". It is unclear why "informed" replaced the
word "intelligent" and some commentators have found this regrettable.19 Perhaps
"informed" was perceived to be more egalitarian and to be free from any elitist
connotations that the word "intelligent" might have. If this is the case, the hidden
assumption is that intelligence is linked to an institutionalised, professional benchmark.
This is a recurring issue; it may, for example, explain why it is that lay members of
research ethics committees are traditionally chosen from 'the professions'20 and why we
16502 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
17Annas, G Jand Miller, F 'The Empire of Death: How Culture and Economics Affect Informed
Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan.' (1992) 20 Am J L & Med at 363. See also Veatch, R A
Theory ofMedical Ethics (1981) at 47-49.
1 gSalgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560; 317 P. 2d 170
(1957).
19See Mason. J K and McCall Smith, R A Law andMedical Ethics (4th edn. 1994) at 237 - 238.
20This is discussed in Chapter Five in relation to the selection of lay members of research ethics
committees.
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appeal to the intuitions of the professional classes.21 The preferred position is that a
person does not need a university degree to be classified as intelligent.
The doctor / patient relationship in the United States is index linked to market forces
which has turned patients into consumers;
"Historically, most Americans treated health care as a private commodity
whose price, and therefore availability, is primarily determined by market
forces. In such a context, the law not unsurprisingly places a high premium
on information disclosure by physicians. Personal autonomy-an individual's
power to choose among medical options-enjoys its most zealous protection
under U.S. jurisprudence. The dominant U.S. version of informed consent is
grounded on principles of patient/consumer autonomy, and seems to enhance
market choice."22
The standard for disclosure is high - it must be full and frank. This requirement is
reinforced by a greater awareness of patient rights in which the media play an important
part - witness the furore which was caused by revelations concerning experiments
conducted during the Cold War. Similar disclosures in the United Kingdom have met
with a relatively muted response.23
3.3.2. The United Kingdom (Welfare / Consumerist)
Patients' rights in the United Kingdom are not anchored in the constitution;24 they
evolved from the common law so as to remain in tune with the consumerist and
women's movements of the late sixties.25 The scale of these movements, however, is
not comparable to that in the United States. It is also arguable that the impact of an
American export, was limited; despite the introduction of the citizens and patient's
charters, which supposedly uphold the rights of patients,26 the doctrine of informed
21This is dealt with in further detail in Chapter Four at Section 4.2.1.
"Annas and Miller, fh 17 above at 358.
23See Pappworth, M Human Guinea Pigs (1967).
24See McLean, S A MA Patient's Right to Know (1989) at 22 - 25.
25Faulder, fn 3 above at 19.
26Although the point has been made that the Citizens' Charter has redefined the citizen as a customer
which, "... implies that members of the public should be content to choose from products or services
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consent has no place in either English or Scots law.27 This has led to the criticism by
some commentators that the so-called rights are rhetorical rather than real.28
The majority of health care in the United Kingdom is publicly financed; there is no
contract between the doctor and the patient. As outlined above, the requirements
governing disclosure are less explicit.29 Patient rights have been developed alongside
the evolution of the welfare state which has transformed the doctor / patient relationship
into a partnership in the health care enterprise.30 It is, however, an unequal partnership,
the nature of which is dictated by the way the health care service is provided. Despite
the appearance to the contrary, an element of gratitude is inherent in British medicine
which, until 1948, had been concentrated in voluntary hospitals which had charitable
status. This promoted an element of gratitude on the part of patients. The integration
of these voluntary hospitals with teaching hospitals meant that many of the caring
doctors were also academics. This gave rise to the opportunity for patients to be used
as teaching or research material; in short, they were "willingly captive". The
circumstances surrounding patients' care provided fertile ground upon which patients
might want to give something in return for the care they were receiving, a quidpro quo,
so to speak. The major consequence of the social revolution of 1948 was that patients
were now being hospitalised as of right - and this altered the whole concept of the
delivery of health care. The social dimension to health care was, however, still anchored
in the harbour of gratitude.31
provided by others, and have no role in determining what those products and services should be or how
they should be delivered." See Stewart, J, Kendall, E, Coote, A Citizens' Juries (1994) at 3.
21Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1984] QB 493 per Dunn LJ at 517.
See also Re T [1992] 3 Med L R. 306 at 313 and Moyes v. Lothian Health Board, 1990 SLT 444 at 449.
The standard for disclosure is provided by current accepted practice. See Bolam v. Friern Hospital
Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118, [1957] 1 WLR 582.
28See Teff, fh 9 above at 237.
29See Robertson, G 'Informed Consent to Medical Treatment' (1980) 97 LQR 102 and Annas and
Miller, fn 15 above at 359.
30Kennedy, I ' The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus' in Kennedy, I (ed) Treat me right: Essays in
Medical Law and Ethics (1988) at 175.
31Which some have suggested is to do with the concept of original sin which is inherent in British
society. See Klein, R 'Rationing Health Care' (1984) 289 BMJ 143 who argues that we regard
ourselves as fallen angels and feel that we do not deserve perfection. This is in direct contrast to the
'perfection of man' society which exists in the United States.
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3.3.3. Germany (Self-determining /Sozialstaat)
The influence of a written constitution in the development of patient rights can be seen
in Germany.32 Generally, the Basic Law enshrines the principle of the rule of law
(Rechtstaatf3 and the principle of Waffengleichheit der Prozefiparteien or due
process/4 A case of vital importance arose in 195835 and was decided on the basis of
the moral and legal right to self-determination as provided by Art 2 (2) of the Basic
Law. It was held that information disclosure must be full and frank and must include an
explanation of the risks which typically attach themselves to the proposed treatment.
The German model is based on universal health insurance which is indexed to
employment; it is generally referred to as a compulsory insurance scheme.36 The doctor
/ patient relationship is one of partnership and equality based in contract.37 Patients, for
their part, have followed the trend in becoming more critical.38 Accordingly, medical
litigation has increased which may have contributed to a greater level of accountability in
the medical profession.39 What distinguishes the German position is the framework
within which the rights operate. Given the existence of a written constitution, the
German position is, at first glance, comparable to the position in the United States. It
32See Giesen, D 'Civil Liability of Physicians for New Methods of Treatment and Experimentation: A
Comparative Examination' (1995) 3 Med L Rev 22.
33Article 20 (1) of the basic law provides that the Federal Republic is a state based on the rule of law
(Rechtsstaat) which is to be exercised within the parameters of the welfare state (Sozialstaat). See
Stein, E Staatsrecht (14 edn, 1993) at § 24 IV at p. 204 et seq and also Appendix A. The concept of the
Rechtsstaat has also been translated as a 'law-state'. See MacCormick, N 'Liberalism, Nationalism and
the Post-sovereign State' (1996) 44 Political Studies 553 at p. 557.
34BVerfG, 25. 7. 1979 2 B v R 878 / 74 BVerfGE 52, 131 (144). Generally, the right to a fair trial is
guaranteed by Arts 2 Abs (1), (3), Abs. 1, 20 Abs. 3 of the Basic Law (GG ).
35VIZR 203 / 57 BGHZ 29, 46. There is a translation of this case in Markesinis, B The German Law of
Torts (3rd edn, 1994) at 457-466.
36See Moran, M and Wood. B States, Regulation and the Medical Profession (1993) at 10 and Webber,
D 'The Politics of Regulatory Change in the German Health Sector' in Dyson, K (ed) The Politics of
German Regulation (1992) at 209 and Hassenteufel, P 'The medical profession and health insurance
policies: a Franco-German comparison' (1996) 3 Journal of European Public Policy 461.
37See Giesen, D Arzthaftungsrecht (4th edn, 1995) at 2.
38See Die Zeit September 3, 1993 at p. 38; 'Wenn Arzte pfuschen.'.
39Although this has, to a limited extent, contained by the presence of the expert and conciliation panels
(Gutachterkommissionen undSchlichtungsstellen). See Giesen D, fn 11 above at 28-34.
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differs, however, in that the Basic Law is committed to the concept of a Sozialstaat
which gives a social dimension to the individualistic rights set out in the first nineteen
articles.40 The Sozialstaat is prescriptive to the extent that it implies legal obligations of
the government.41 The system in Germany is more attuned to social justice, given the
flexible and abstract nature of the concept of the Sozialstaat which enables it to operate
in accordance with the ideology of a social market economy.42 The social justice
ideology is, however, fighting for its survival as the true costs of reunification begin to
mount up and Germany prepares itself to qualify for the stringent Maastricht criteria for
monetary union.43
Be that as it may, rights and obligations are vital as complementary within the medical
research process. To avoid them atrophying into rhetoric, it is suggested that they are
framed within a constitutional framework. This entails challenging the current model of
legal reasoning, a consequence of which is that questions of medical research are
umbilically tied to the concept of negligence.
3.4. The Collapse ofAnalogical Reasoning44
Conflicts in research have consistently been based on medical treatment. The analogy is,
however, inappropriate in view of the additional issues and interests which arise in
research and which the treatment analogy hides from us.
40For this section see generally Johnson, N State and Government in the Federal Republic ofGermany
(2nd edn, 1983) and Ogus, A The Federal Republic ofGermany as Sozialstaat: A British Perspective
(University ofManchester Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 3 June 1990).
41 See arts 20 and 28 of the Basic Law.
42"As the dominant ideology of the new Federal Republic became that of a "social market economy", so
the Sozialstaat could be identified as a corrective to the market processes, enabling the fruits of that
process to be used for the protection of those unable adequately to prosper by it." Ogus, fn 38 above at 6.
43See for example Der Spiegel August 26, 1996 pp 26 - 28 and pp 78 - 84.
44Term borrowed from Kingdom, E '"Lawyers will Draft Anything": Attitudes to Cohabitation
Contracts' (Occasional Paper No. 5 Issues in Sociology and Social Policy, University of Liverpool
1994) at 20.
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The concern of this thesis is that the ethical issues raised by medical research are being
debated within the restricted field of cause and effect. Their interpretation is largely in
the hands of civil lawyers who are traditionally obsessed by the dual concepts of fault
and the sanctity of property. As to the first, the general response to questions of
consent within medical research is to apply the principles of the torts of battery and
negligence in respect to disclosure. Proper disclosure is generally held to be "...a matter
of law for the courts".45 lSidaway Consent' has been applied to medical research of
necessity - the reason being that there is no case law directly concerning research in the
United Kingdom.46 The trend can be seen in the main case governing consent to medical
research - the Canadian case Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan - the ratio of
which is also based on the treatment analogy despite the fact that that it was clearly a
non-therapeutic situation. Thus,
"There can be no exceptions to the ordinary requirements of disclosure in the
case of research as there may well be in ordinary medical practice."47
The judge's basis for saying this is unclear. Whatever its basis, however, it is a
retrospective analysis. In short, it is the product of a method of thought which revolves
around problem solving based on past cases in which things have gone wrong.
Questions of research, however, should also be considered prospectively,48 The
application of principles governing ordinary treatment is of limited use to the medical
research model for the following reasons. First, litigation is adversarial and antagonistic;
principles which govern medical research should result from mediation between the
parties rather than confrontation. Secondly, it is questionable whether legal reasoning in
the medical research debate is the appropriate standard given the restrictive view that it
provides of the dynamics of research. The medical research process is characterised by
45Kennedy, I and Grubb, A Medical Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn, 1994) at p. 1046. See also
Giesen, fn 32 above.
45See McHale, J 'Guidelines for Medical Research' (1993) 1 Med L Rev 180.
47(1965) 53 DLR (2d) 431.
48"...though the methods of casuistry have far more value than the common peijorative use of the term
indicates, they are, none the less, radically limited so far as determining or questioning what those basic
principles and their relative importance should be." Gillon, R Philosphical Medical Ethics (1991) at
19.
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social and relational change which the law, as it is applied, fails both to recognise and to
accommodate.
A brief case-study of a leading medical research case, the Moore case49 illustrates the
shortcomings of the current model of legal reasoning used in the debate. The main issue
arising in the Moore case can be summarised in the question - to what extent, if at all,
should donors of tissue be entitled to a part of the profit of a biotechnological product
which has been engineered from the donor's tissue ? The relevant legal academic debate
has concentrated on the law of property,50 at the expense of an analysis of the wider
implications of the case. The fact that a patient's doctor set up his own company to
manufacture pharmaceuticals using his patient's cells51 does not appear to have greatly
concerned the protagonists of the main 'body as property' argument. This issue must,
however, be addressed as it illustrates how the doctor / patient relationship alters within
the context of research from that accepted as the norm in medical treatment. Medical
research calls upon doctors to exercise numerous roles which include inter alia that of a
healer, scientist, entrepreneur and politician; professional multiple personality disorder
goes with the job !52
Moore was really about the influence of the pharmaceutical lobby. Had the legal
community drawn a parallel with the 'Tobacco War' which has been raging in the
United States for years,53 they might have been able to see the wider rationale behind the
case. Taking on tobacco barons is as difficult as taking on the 'drug barons' of the
pharmaceutical industry, both of whom are loath to part with profits. Given the link
which has been proved between cancer and tobacco, and the responsibility which has
49Moore v. University ofCalifornia (1990) 793 P.2d479 (Cal.Sup.Ct.)
50See Dworkin, G and Kennedy, I 'Human Tissue: Rights in the Body and Its Parts' (1993) 1 Med Law
Rev 311, Dickens, B M 'The Control of Living Body Materials '(1977) 27 U Toronto LJ 142 and
Magnusson, R 'Proprietary Rights in Human Tissue' in Palmer and McKendrick (eds) Interests in
Goods (1993), Smith, A T H 'Stealing the Body and its Parts' [1976] Crim L R 622 and Skegg, P
'Human Corpses, Medical Specimens and the Law of Property' (1976) 4 Anglo-Am L Rev 412.
51 As was aptly summarised by an article in the The Washington Post Magazine August 18th 1996 at p.
30.
52This point in relation to the role of doctors has been made by Moran and Wood. See fn 36 above at 1.
53See Kluger, R Ashes to Ashes; America's Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the
Unabashed Triumph ofPhilip Morris (1996).
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been accepted by the giant tobacco companies for their 'killer' product, the Tobacco
industry will lose millions.54
The reason behind drawing a parallel between the negotiations surrounding the Tobacco
War and the medical research debate is two-fold. First, both the tobacco and the
pharmaceutical industry come under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) which has regulatory powers. Secondly, and more importantly, is
the fact that the tobacco negotiations, like the medical research debate, are dominated by
certain groups that do not necessarily have society's best interests at heart: the industry
and plaintiffs' lawyers;55
"Rather than focusing on the regulation of tobacco, these players have put the bulk
of their energy into developing a $250 billion to $300 billion fund that would
compensate the industry's alleged victims. It's clear what they find appealing
about such a deal: Plaintiffs' lawyers stand to make hundreds of millions; the
industry wants to limit its liability and stabilize its stock valuations; and the state
Ags will be able to crow about the billions they have won for their states."56
Moreover, the parties who are at the negotiating table share a strong financial interest in
striking a deal that focuses on compensating people for past loss as opposed to
regulating the industry in the future. As we saw in Chapter Two, this short termist
approach triumphs over long term preventive measures. Like the pharmaceutical
industry, the tobacco giants will go a long way in order to secure their vested interests.57
Had Mr Moore's claim succeeded, the pharmaceutical industry's generation of wealth
would have had to have been spread to those without whom the enterprise would not
54Under the agreement brokered between the industry and US states, cigarette makers will pay out
$368.5bn (£223bn) in compensation over the next 25 years in exchange for immunity from litigation -
this excludes potentially ruinous punitive damages. Despite appearances to the contrary, however, the
war has not been won. Profits will not suffer too greatly in view of the envisaged increase in cigarette
prices. Indeed, the settlement has generated an increase in the tobacco companies' stock prices by up to
20 % and is set to rise higher, not least because the big three - Phillip Morris, RJR Nabisco and British
American Tobacco - are enjoying strong growth overseas. See The Financial Times 21 June, 1997 and
also The Independent on Sunday 22 June, 1997 at p. 12.
55As regards the tobacco negotiations, the groups also include attorney's general from 24 states that
have sued the manufacturers.
56See Business Weekly, May 12, 1997 at p. 110.
57 See Chapter Two at Section 2.2.
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have been possible - namely, the research subjects. The profits would have had to have
been shared, although not necessarily equally. Mr Moore was little more likely to get
money out of the company than to get blood out of a stone.
3.4.1. MrMoore's Spleen
Mr Moore, who was diagnosed as having leukaemia, was a patient at the University of
California Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Centre. In the course of his treatment, his
doctor and his medical research colleagues developed a unique cell line using tissue
obtained from his spleen. The University then patented and licensed the cell line
together with the methods used to refine it, to several pharmaceutical and biotechnical
firms. This was done without the knowledge ofMr Moore himself; he did not know
that the research was being carried out and that specimens (e.g. blood), which were
taken from him during the course of several hospital visits were used almost entirely for
research purposes. Moore sought to bring an action for conversion of his spleen; the
issue which had to be resolved was whether a donor of tissue is entitled to a part of the
profit of a biotechnological product which has been engineered from a donor's tissue for
commercial gain.
The Californian Court of Appeal held that Moore's action must succeed on the basis
that;
"Plaintiff's spleen, which contained certain cells, was something over which
plaintiff enjoyed the unrestricted right to use, control and disposition. The right
of dominion over one's own body and the interests one has therein, are recognised
in many cases. These rights and the interests are so akin to property interests that
it would be subterfuge to call them something else ,"58
Furthermore;
58249 Cal. Rptr 494 (1988) (Court of Appeal) at page 505.
117
"A patient must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her
tissues. To hold otherwise would open the door to a massive invasion of
human privacy and dignity in the name of medical progress."59
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California held that Moore's cause of action for
conversion of his spleen must fail but that he did have a personal remedy for breach of
the physician's fiduciary duty and for lack of informed consent. Thus, the plaintiffwas
held not to have anyproprietary rights but he did have a right to information.
The rationale behind the Supreme Court judgment upholds the principle that once a
body part has been removed, it is obsolete and that accordingly, no property rights may
be attributed to the origin of that property; nevertheless, it seems to be tempered by the
Court's apparent reluctance to extend the tort of conversion. It is apparent that the sale
of human tissue was regarded by the court as being politically sensitive and that any
extension to the doctrine ought to be effected by the legislature as a matter of public
policy.
The majority of the Supreme Court also attached a great deal of weight to the possible
impact that the judgment might have on the scientific community. In considering the
community's arguments that research and development in biotechnology would be
hampered in the event of people having proprietary rights in their tissue,
the court held;
" unencumbered access to human tissue for research is essential to progress
and public health;...these sources must remain unencumbered, and medical
researchers to be free to both combine materials with tissue taken from others,
and dispose of the tissues, without answering to the person from whom the
tissue was taken...[If the] plaintiff is permitted to have decision making
authority and a financial interest in the cell-line, he would then have the
unlimited power to inhibit medical research that could potentially benefit
humanity. He could conceivably go from institution to institution seeking the
highest bid and, if dissatisfied, claim the right simply to prohibit the research
entirely."60
59Ibid at page 508.
60(1988) 51 Cal App..3d 1230 (Cal.C.A.). See also Dworkin and Kennedy, fn 50 above at 311.
118
The use of the word "unencumbered" is chilling and strikes a chord reminiscent of the
bygone days of Nazi Germany. Broussard J, dissenting on the question of conversion,
stated that;
"... the majority analysis cannot rest on the broad proposition that a removed
body part is not property but on the proposition that a patient retains no
ownership interest in a body part once the body part has been removed."61
From which the implication would appear to be that, whereas a donor of tissue might
not have a right to a part of the profit in a biotechnological product, he might have an
interest. This interest would not however, be a full entitlement to the financial profit,
the justification being that Mr Moore was not entitled to a share in the profits since he
had nothing to do with the actual work which was carried out on his cell line.
This reasoning is based on the doctrine of the labour theory of value which provides that
the value of a product depends on the labour expended on it. The doctrine is attributed
to the philosopher John Locke who stated that, "[t]he "labour" of [a man's] body and the
"work" of his hands...are properly his."62 It is not possible nor, indeed, necessary to
consider the minutae of Locke's so-called 'labour theory' of appropriation. In essence,
however, the doctrine contains two elements.
The first is ethical in that it stipulates that the value of a product ought to be proportional
to the labour expended on it. The second element is economic and provides that the
labour should regulate the price. In conclusion, it is the labour which puts the difference
of value on everything. Thus, scientists earn the property right by virtue of their labour
and more importantly their knowledge. By implication, however, emanations of the
mind are regarded as being worthy of property rights whilst the interests of the origins of
the intellectual property are conveniently ignored. This is arguably yet another example
of how the medical research process favours the professional elite and enables it to
safeguard its interests at the expense of others.
S1793 p . 2d (1990) 479 (Supreme Court) at page 501
62Locke, J Two Treatises ofGovernment (1924) [1690]), Book II, eh v, § 27.
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Moore illustrates the lengths to which a "contented majority", to use Galbraith's term,
will go to in order to protect what they see as rightfully theirs by recourse to a
justification based on personal virtue, intelligence and effort. Thus,
"The first and most general expression of the contented majority is its affirmation
that those who compose it are receiving their just deserts. What the individual
member aspires to have and enjoy is the product of his or her personal virtue,
intelligence and effort. Good fortune being earned or the reward of merit, there is
no equitable justification for any action that impairs it - that subtracts from what is
enjoyed or might be enjoyed. The normal response to such action is indignation
or, as suggested, anger at anything infringing on what is clearly deserved."63
Thus, the wider rationale in Moore is based on the social justification based on expertise
which was invoked to justify the pursuit and possession of wealth. The market for
genetically engineered products is considerable. According to a forecast of the
Commerce Department in the United States, the North American market is likely to
amount to tens of billions of dollars by the 1990s.64 In the European Union, it has been
predicted that the expected turnover for biotechnology should reach 170 million DM as
well as procure 2 million new jobs.65 Claims by donors asserting a right to share in the
profits gained from research and development using their cells could cost the industry
millions of dollars. Several similar claims were brought afterMoore but were settled out
of court.66
As well illustrating the fear of floodgates, Moore reaffirmed the political
disenfranchisement of research subjects in the medical research process, an issue which
has been taken up by Andrew Herxheimer;
"...clinical trials are planned, conducted, regulated, and used largely by medical
and paramedical scientists in academic institutions, industry and government, with
virtually no input from ordinary people."67
63Galbraith, J K The Culture ofContentment (1995)at 18-19.
64See Danforth, M T 'Cells, Sales and Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits' (1988)
6 Yale L & Pol'y Rev 179 at 180.
65Meichsner, I 'Die Claims werden abgesteckt' Die Zeit May 19, 1995 at 33.
f>6Sec Danforth, fn 64 above at 180.
6'Herxheimer, fn 4 above at 1129.
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To reiterate the point made in Chapter Two, research subjects should have the right to
participate in the politics of the medical research process if they so choose. It is
necessary to secure political rights for research subjects as well as the rest of the
community. A research subject, for example, should know what his rights are, should
have a right to adequate information, a right to refuse information, to withdraw from the
study at any time, a right to confidentiality and a right to a copy of the final report.68 A
Bill of Rights contains hopes and aspirations; it has the advantage of being prospective
instead of after the fact. Moreover, it protects against the abuse of power and arbitrary
decision-making. It sets standards of legitimacy and provides a framework within which
socio/political dynamics can be resolved. As regards medical research, it is submitted
that rights are only really effective if placed on a constitutional footing.69
Moore says a lot about the medical research process. Not, however, if one concentrates
on the emphasis on property rights as emphasised by the judges and commentators
alike70 which illustrates the fixation with civil law which pervades the legal reasoning in
the medical research debate. It is submitted that a model of legal reasoning is needed
which enables the interests which arise such as the power of knowledge, expertise,
resources and language to be examined; the recognition and analysis of the power
differentials demands close attention.71 Legal reasoning in the medical research debate
58Ibid.
69Concerning the issue of prospectivity, it is submitted that it should not, as it has been suggested, act as
a substitute for ethical reasoning. See Fulford, K W M and Howse, K 'Ethics of research with
psychiatric patients: principles, problems and the primary responsibilities of researchers' (1993) 19 J
Med Eth 85 at 89. Regarding the point about constitutionalism see Preufi, U K 'Der Begriff der
Verfassung und ihre Beziehung zur Politik' in PreuJI, U K (ed) Zum Begriff der Verfassung. Die
Ordnung des Politischen (Fischer: Frankfurt am Main, 1994) at p. 5 et seq for a modern interpretation
of a concept over which much ink has been spilt in political theory. Rousseau, for example, writes in
the Social Contract (Penguin: London, 1968), "Since no man has any natural authority over his fellows,
and since force alone bestows no right, all legitimate authority among men must be based on
covenants." (at p. 53).
70Dworkin and Kennedy, fn 50 above.
71 It is suggested that these forms must not be separated into different spheres in terms of importance but
must be seen as a whole. See Bertrand Russell: "Like energy, power has many forms such as wealth,
armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion. No one of these can be regarded as subordinate to any
other, and there is no one form from which the others are derivative." See Russell, B Power (1938).
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must be sensitive to the dynamics between the parties in the medical research process.72
Power is internal to the dynamics of the research process. It is an oversimplification to
suggest that it is a static property which is held or exercised by individuals or groups;73 it
is, however, developed through interaction in a variety of relationships. The principles
for medical research must not be discussed as though these relationships did not exist.
As Simmonds has written;
"Moral and Political values cannot and should not be discussed in isolation from
the institutions and social histories that shape them. What is required is a
sensitive historical reconstruction,...which is itself a form of conceptual
analysis".74
The legal reasoning in the medical research debate must be developed beyond its current
state of suspended animation which entails freeing it from the intellectual shackles within
which it has been restrained. In short, the medical research debate must come of age.75
3.5. Determinism and the Medico - legal Debate
72This is an adaptation of Habermas' early ideas in which he argues in favour of the need for law to
emphasise the intersubjectivity of human action is. See Habermas, J Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit
(1962) and Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (1976). Similar arguments in favour of
contextualisation are made by feminist legal theorists. In particular, see Gilligan, C A Different Voice
(1982).
73"...the major difficulty arises from the prevailing view that power in medical settings is a social fact,
established a priori by the differential position of individuals or groups within social structures (e. g.,
patients and physicians). More like actors who have memorized and rehearsed their lines before a
performance, participants are seen as bringing power with them to the health care encounter:
differences in rights, duties, and obligations are known in advance. Any change in the script - for
example, a physician's attempt to be primarily a listener or a patient's attempt to ask many questions -
is viewed as exceptional and deviant." See Treichler. P A, Frankel, R M, Kramarae, C, Zoppi, K and
Beckman, H B 'Problems and Problems: Power Relationships in a Medical Encounter' in Kramarae, C,
Schulz, M, O'Barr, W M (eds) Language and Power (1984) at p. 63.
74Simmonds, N The Decline ofJuridical Reason (1984) at p. 13.
75Note that the same point has been made in relation to Medical Law, which, as it has been argued,
should not remain polarised between civil, criminal and public law but should be developed along
'intergrationist' or interdisciplinary lines. In keeping with this position, the appropriateness of courts
as the forum for matters of medical law has been questioned. See Taupitz, J 'Medizinrecht vor dem
Gerichten - Ein Blick in die feme Zukunft' ZRP 1997, 161.
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In his Reith lectures in 1980, the aspiring Ian Kennedy laid the foundations of what
might be called the 'let's get the doctors' ideology' In effect, his invective took a
possible consequence of medical paternalism and remoulded it into the definition of the
concept.76 This is not only unscientific but it involves disguising the polemicist in the
seductive role of the scientist. By taking an inductive stance, Kennedy reached a
determinist conclusion; moreover, he was advocating the law as an alternative model of
expertise.77 Kennedy's approach - which is, essentially, that by claiming the scientific
high ground, the medical profession can, and does, manipulate its patients to the point of
exploitation - fails to provide a framework within which the complexities of the doctor /
patient relationship can be analysed fairly and understood properly. It is analogous to
the belief that unethical research must necessarily follow from the practice of research; it
may be part of the spectrum of medical research but it is not a necessary consequence.
Kennedy's deterministic stance is shared by other commentators.78 The "true function"
of the law has been described as protecting " the vital interests of vulnerable patients";79
"...the common law, existing first for the protection of our liberties, is also the
protector of an ethics of medicine grounded in the concept of duty: the duty of care
required of one professing - that is, offering to patients in their vulnerability - the
skills ofmedicine."80
76Kennedy, I The Unmasking ofMedicine (1981).
77This is a phenomenon also recognised by Ulrich Beck; "Forms of 'alternative' and 'advocacy' science
come into being that relate the entire 'hocus - pocus of science' to different principles and different
interests - and therefore reach exactly the opposite conclusions. In short, in the course of the
scientization ofprotest against science, science forces itself to run its own gauntlet. New public-
orientated scientific experts emerge, the dubious aspects of the foundations of scientific argumentation
are exposed with counter - scientific thoroughness, and many sciences are subjected through their
applied practices to a 'politization test' of a previously unknown extent." See Beck, U Risk Society:
Towards a NewModernity (1992, Ritter, M (tr)) at p. 161.
78"The potential for medical paternalism is increased by the growing informational imbalance that
exists between doctor and patient, extending the power of the former and the dependency and
vulnerability of the latter. In the medical context, where individuals often make the most significant
decisions of their lives, professional tradition and technological progress have combined to frustrate any
notion of patient control." See Giesen, D 'From Paternalism to Self-Determination to Shared Decision
Making in the Field ofMedical Law and Ethics' in Westerhall, L and Phillips, C(eds) Patient's Rights -
Informed Consent, Access and Equality (1991) at 20. See also generally Giesen, D 'Legal
Accountability for the provision of medical care: a comparative view' (1993) 86 Journal of the Royal
Society of Medicine at 648.
79Giesen, D 'Vindicating the Patient's Rights: A Comparative Perspective' (1993) 9 J Contemp Health
L & Pol'y at 277.
80Dunston, G R review essay in (1993) 19 J Med Eth 56 of Kennedy I, fh 76 above.
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As a consequence, the patient is designated the role of a victim, an assessment which has
been transplanted to the medical research debate;
"They [patients] are still mostly passive participants in trials, unwitting
beneficiaries of the results, ignorant victims of the mistakes."81
Victimology has a tendency to promote protective measures which may be self-
defeating. In the current climate, those who seek to protect the research subject could
well be accused of paternalism in that they not only seek to tell patients what they ought
to feel but, in so doing, also credit them with little enough intelligence.82
My position as regards medical research - and it is this which lies at the centre of my
thesis - is that democratic structures are needed which will help us to ascertain the
normative principles for medical research. This position is an application of Habermas'
theory of discursive democracy.8"
Rights and obligations which arise in medical research must not be exclusively
interpreted within the framework of the civil law but must be placed on a constitutional
footing, as in the case of California, where rights for research subjects are enshrined in
statute.84 The statute provides that research subjects are given the opportunity to sign
the 'Experimental Subject's Bill ofRights' before clinical research can take place. The
individual must,
a) Be informed of the nature and purpose of the experiment.
b) Be given an explanation of the procedures to be followed in the medical
experiment, and any drug or device to be utilized.
c) Be given a description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably
to be expected from the experiment.
81Herxheimer, fn 4 above at 1128.
82Although the tide may be changing. See Campbell, A V 'Dependency: the foundational value in
medical ethics' in Fulford, KVM, Gillett, G J M (ed) Medicine and Moral Reasoning (1994) at 184-
205.
83As outlined in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Debate Theory ofLaw and Democracy
(1996, Rehg, W (tr)).
84Calif. Health & Safety Code § 24172 (1978) in Myers, D The Human Body and the Law (2nd edn,
1990) at 247.
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d) Be given an explanation of any benefits to the subject reasonably to be
expected from the experiment, if applicable.
e) Be given a disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures, drugs or
devices that might be advantageous to the subject, and their relative risks
and benefits.
f) Be informed of the avenues ofmedical treatment, if any, available to the
subject after the experiment if complications should arise.
g) Be given an opportunity to ask any questions concerning the experiment
of the procedures involved.
h) Be instructed that consent to participate in the medical experiment may
be withdrawn at any time and the subject may discontinue participation
in the medical experiment without prejudice.85
Research subjects must also be given a signed and dated copy of the consent form after
the nature of the procedure has been explained to them and they have given their
consent. The Californian statute further provides what information the consent has to
include in order for it to be valid.86 Disclosure resembles the standards set by the federal
Food and Drug Administration which require inter alia,
1) An explanation of the procedures to be followed in the medical
experiment and any drug or device to be utilized, including the purposes
of such procedures, drugs, or device. If a placebo is to be administered
or dispensed to a portion of the subjects involved in a medical
experiment, all subjects of such experiment shall be informed as to
whether they will actually be administered or dispensed a placebo.
2) A description of any attendant discomfort and risks to the subject
reasonably to be expected.
3) An explanation of any benefits to the subject reasonably to be expected, if
applicable.
4) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures, drugs or devices
that might be advantageous to the subject, and their relative risks and
benefits.
5) An estimate of the expected recovery time of the subject after the
experiment.
6) An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the experiment or the
procedures involved.
7) An instruction to the subject that he or she is free to withdraw his prior
consent to the medical experiment and discontinue participation in the
medical experiment at any time, without prejudice to the subject.
8) The name, institutional affiliation, if any, and address of the person or
persons actually performing and primarily responsible for the conduct of
the experiment.
9) The name of the sponsors or funding source, if any, or manufacturer if
the experiment involves a drug or device, and the organization, if any
85Ibid.
86Calif. Health & Safety Code § 24173 (c) (1978) in Myers, fn 84 above at 247-248.
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under whose general aegis the experiment, to whom the subject may
address complaints about the experiment.8
While the Californian model comes many steps closer to providing a democratic
framework for medical research, it does so only in the sense of establishing an obligation
to inform research subjects regarding matters restricted to the trial and in particular
matters relating to consent. Thus, the right to information is interpreted in an
individualistic manner. A collective model for rights would, however, entail an emphasis
on information being based on an exchange of ideas where research subjects as well as
representatives of the community are consulted for their opinions, suggestions or
complaints concerning the trial. An example of such a model is provided by the Renault
cases, which concerned the closure of a plant in Vilvord, Belgium.
In this case, judges in both Belgium and France annulled the unilateral decision of the
directors to close the factory on the grounds that they had failed to consult
representatives of the workers before reaching the decision. In so doing, the judges
were in fact applying a European Community directive which establishes an obligation
to create a European Work Council or a "procedure in business with a community
dimension and groups of business with a community dimension for informing and
consulting workers".88 Renault had in fact implemented the directive before it was
implemented into French law. The judge in the Belgian case cancelled the decision and
held that the employers must start negotiations with the Work Council.89 In particular,
the Council must be given the opportunity to give an opinion regarding re-employment
and retraining. The judge in the French case went even further by ordering an interdict
forbidding closure of the plant until conciliatory and consultatory meetings had been
held with the Work Council.90 A plethora of issues arise as a result of the decision
which can not be discussed here; however, for the purposes of the present discussion,
the Renault cases illustrate the importance of providing the opportunity to participate in
8740 Fed. Reg. 11, 854, § 46. 3 (c) (1975) in Myers, fn 84 above at 245-246.
88See 94/45/CE of 22nd September 1994.
89Case 18/97, Decision of the 3rd of April (unreported).
90Case 97 / 00992, Decision of the 4th of April (unreported).
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decision-making processes. It is an example of how procedural safeguards which are
inclusive as opposed to exclusive can influence the substance of decisions.91 It is
probably fair to say that the application of such a principle is now the norm in medical,
therapeutic decision-making. The question then arises as to whether there is such a
norm in relation to research. Since the answer in respect of the United Kingdom is
almost certainly 'not in a universal context', we must, then, ask what should be the
remedy ? The purpose of this next section is to illustrate the merits of a structural - or
what I refer to as a procedural - approach by considering the German model of care
assistantship (Betreuung). I am interested not so much in the concept of the care
assistant as in the framework within which he / she operates as the underlying rationale
for the existence of the office.
3.6. Decision-Making and Real Dialogue
Whilst the need for involving more parties in the medical-decision-making process has
been acknowledged and promoted, little attention has been given to providing an
adequate procedural framework in which these decisions operate. For example, the
need to involve third parties, such as the family and friends, has been acknowledged in
respect of those who are incapable of giving consent. Whereas the increasing trend to
include more parties in the decision-making process is to be applauded, concern must be
felt at our neglecting to consider what weight these opinions ought to have. We are
failing to provide any procedural safeguards through which to realise a participatory
ideal in medical decision-making.
As regards the regulation ofmedical research, the position in the United Kingdom in this
respect is informal; the procedures used to regulate research are not the product of
91 In the Belgian case, for example, the judge held that the Works Council must be consulted with regard
to the impact of the decision on the level of the employment of personnel and the organisation of work
which included considering revising the number of redundancies.
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statute but are arise by way of official guidance.92 By contrast, the position in Germany
is that research is strictly regulated by the Drugs Code (Arzneimittelgesetz - AMG).
This has the effect that not only are research committees are thereby established by
statute, but that in some cases, it is mandatory to consult third parties in relation to
consent to clinical trials.
An advantage of the German model is that it provides a procedure according to which
issues of consent can be resolved which includes the question ofwho should be involved
in the decision-making process. In Germany, consent may be obtained from a third
party in restricted circumstances. There are, however, drawbacks which include, for
example, the fact that the final decision rests with the judge, which is, arguably, one of
the model's weaknesses. We can look at the mechanisms available by way of the
management of mental incapacity. The minutae of the position in the United Kingdom
will be given in outline only because of the present "legal near-vacuum" which exists in
relation to the regulation of medical research on mentally incapable people.93 The
position in Germany, by contrast, will be detailed given the presence of an intricate array
of procedures as regards medical research and incapacity.
3.6.1. Mental Incapacity
It does not necessarily follow that mental incapacity renders people incapable of making
choices. There is, however, a real danger that it is not always certain that they would be
making the choices in their own interests.94 Hence, there is a need to involve others in
the decision-making process.
92See Local Research Ethics Committees. Department of Health (1991) replacing HSC (15) 153 (1975)
for England and Wales and Local Research Ethics Committees; Edinburgh (1992) replacing No. 1976
(GEN) 38.
93Scot Law Com No. 151 at para 5.65.
94McLean, S and Maher, GMedicine, Morals and the Law (1981) at 95.
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3.6.1.1. The United Kingdom
The position in England before the enactment of the Mental Health Act 1983 was that
legislation allowed a guardian to be appointed to care for a mentally handicapped adult
to consent to treatment on behalf of a patient just as a parent does on behalf of their
child.95 Section 8 of the Mental Health Act 1983 restricted the powers of guardians to
such an extent that a guardian is now unable to consent to treatment of his 'adult ward'
for any physical illness. Indeed, there is no such power available even to the court since
1959 when the parens patriae jurisdiction was withdrawn. In fact, it appears that adult
guardianship was never widely used in England.96
Be that as it may, the need to involve third parties in medical decision-making in relation
to medical research has been recognised in the United Kingdom. Thus,
"...it would be good practice in most cases for the research worker to discuss the
research with one or more close relatives, and discover their views. If there is no
relative or the patient expresses the wish that his relative should not be consulted,
it may be appropriate to consult an independent person who knows the patient well
and will protect his wishes (for example a nurse). The choice of such a person
should be approved by the Ethics of Research Committee. These people should
attempt to form a judgment based on the patient's known previous opinions about
research and on his recent behaviour, as to whether the patient would be likely to
consent were he able to do so. Any patient who indicates refusal either in words
or in actions should be excluded from the research whatever opinion is voiced by
the others who have been consulted." 97
The contribution of relatives has also been held to be desirable by the courts98 as well as
by the Law Commission.99 Furthermore, the Mental Health Commission100 has
published a position paper101 concerning research involving patients detained under any
95S. 34 (1) Mental Health Act 1959.
96See Brazier, fn 11 at 95 and also Hoggett, B MMental Health Law (3rd edn, 1990) at p. 280.
97Royal College of Psychiatrists Guidelines for Psychiatric Research Involving Human Subjects (1990)
14 Psychiatric Bulletin 48.
98See Lord Donaldson MR in both Re J [1992] Fam 33, 41 and Re T [1992] 3 WLR 782, 787.
"See Law Com No. 129 at para 3.59 et seq.
100The function of which is to monitor and to advise on the Code of Practice that the Mental Health Act
1983 required to be written.
101(January 1997) reproduced in (1997) 129 Bull Med Eth 8.
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section of the Mental Health Act 1983.102 Its recommendations include inter alia that
advice should be sought from third parties. Thus, for example, they argue in favour of
seeking approval in writing of the patient's Responsible Medical Officer (RMO),103 the
desirability of consultation with the patient's nearest relative,104 and the desirability of
consultation with the patient's Approved Social Worker (ASW) and other members of
the multi-disciplinary team.105
Little attention, however, has been paid to the weight to be given to these ancillary
opinions. The response of the Law Commission in England, for example, has been to
focus on the definition of capacity. It has been proposed that the legal test for capacity
should be clarified through legislation which would provide, inter alia, for supervision
by a judicial forum.106 The establishment of a supervisory body is a good idea but one
may still ask - why must it be a judicial forum ?
More recently, the English Law Commission recommended that non-therapeutic
research involving the mentally incapacitated should be permissible subject to certain
criteria. Thus, research into the incapacitating condition with which the participant is or
may be affected could be lawful given that it has been approved by a Mental Incapacity
Research Committee.107 Two observations may be drawn from this. First, the proposed
framework provides the individual affected with only a limited opportunity to have a
say. Secondly, it does not allow the rest of us to have a say as to whether incapacitated
individuals as a group ought to be included in medical research whether it be in general
or in specific circumstances. It can, of course, be said that the committee is
representative of the public and that, therefore, the committee model is a democratic
model; procedures could be devised to ensure that it was speaking on behalf of the
I02This includes patients liable to be detained.
103See fn 101 above at para 7.2 (ii).
'^Subject always to the patient's consent. See fh 101 above at para 7.2 (iv).
105See fn 101 above at para 7.2 (v).
106"There should be a judicial forum with a statutory jurisdiction: (1) to make orders approving or
disapproving the medical treatment of incapacitated patients; and (2) to make declarations as to the
patient's capacity or the scope of validity of the patient's own decisions." See Law Com No. 129 at
para 4.4.
107Law Com No. 231 at p. 228. See Draft Bill, clause 11 subsections (1) and (2).
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public and that its concerns were not limited to those of a select elite. However, as will
be outlined in Chapters Five and Six, experience shows that research ethics committees
fall short of this ideal - and do so extensively. It is suggested that the Mental Incapacity
Research Committee, were it ever to be introduced, would be subject to the same
limitations as are research ethics committees.
3.6.1.1. (a) Scotland and the Tutor-Dative
The Scottish Law Commission has proposed that written consent must be given by the
research subject's nearest relative which includes husband or wife, an adult child, a
parent or a brother or sister.108 It also considered the notion of an "independent other"
- such as a senior nurse of social worker - as being appropriate.109
In addition a mechanism is in place in Scotland whereby decisions can be taken on behalf
of the mentally handicapped through the office of the tutor dative. This office is,
admittedly, rarely used but, given its recent revival110 there is no reason why it should
not be applied to therapeutic research. In the early case ofDick v. Douglas, the parents
of a handicapped man were appointed tutors dative to their son and were given a list of
express powers which included the right to consent to any health care that was in their
son's best interests.111 Thus, the ability to provide consent to treatment on behalf of
handicapped adults exists in relation to treatment112 and, by definition, therapeutic
research is to be included under treatment. It is, however, very doubtful that the courts
would extend the powers of the tutors dative to cover consent to non-therapeutic
108Scot Law Com No. 151 para 5.67 (d). Note that the Law Commission decided that the longer list of
relatives used in s 53(1) of the Mental Health (Scotand) Act 1984 which includes inter alia
grandparent, grandchild, uncle or aunt, and niece or nephew.
109Scot Law Com No. 151 para 5.72. See also Scot Law Discussion Paper No. 94 paras. 3.16-3.21.
U0See 1992 SLT 325 commenting on Usher's CB Petitioner (1989, unreported) and also Queen's
Petitioner (1992, unreported). The use of the office has been confirmed in in Law Hospital NHS Trust
v. LordAdvocate 1996 SLT 848.
1111924 SC 787. See also Ward, A 'Revival of Tutors Dative' 1987 SLT (News) 69.
112"...in Scotland, as in Canada, there is not the doubt that exists in England as to the powers to provide
consent to treatment of handicapped adults." See McK Norrie, K 'Wrongful Life in Scots Law: No
Right, No Remedy' 1990 JR 205 at 392.
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research.113 By contrast, this would be possible in the more formal ambience ofGerman
practice.
3.6.1.2. Germany
Reconciliation with the past is an ongoing phenomenon in Germany.114 It has yielded
concrete results which include the introduction of the concept of legal care
assistantship.115 Applied to medical research, for example, incapacitated individuals may
become involved in therapeutic research provided it is conducted with the agreement of
a person's legal care assistant.
The benefits of this approach are, however, not as great as might appear at first sight.
First, the final decision rests with a judge. Secondly, the concept was developed in the
light ofGermany's past and in relation to the issue of sterilisation.116
3.6.1.2.1. The Concept ofBetreuung (Care / Maintenance)117
The Betreuungsgesetz entered into force on 1.1.1992 and provided that consent can be
given on behalf of a person incapable of giving consent through a care assistant
113See Scottish Law Discussion Paper No. 94 para 3.57.
luSee for example Sattler, K-0 'Aus der Geschichte miissen auch die Arzte Grundsatze erwachsen'
Frankfurter Rundschau October 21, 1996 and 'Das Gesprach: Das Dilemma der Medizin und der
Umgang mit der Ratlosigkeit' Frankfurter Rundschau October 25, 1996 at 14 - 15 and Emmrich, M
'Die neue Arzte-Generation bricht die Tradition des Schweigens Frankfurter Rundschau October 26,
1996 at 1.
I15See below.
u6In Germany, the undertones of the past influence the ideological framework within which medical
research is regulated. Non-therapeutic research involving the 'mentally incapable', for example, is
treated with dogmatic revulsion. A perusal of the regulations which were enacted during the period of
the Third Reich provide an informative background to this position. A 1933 regulation, for example,
justified the sterilisation of individuals including schizophrenics, people suffering from manic
depression, people who were bom blind and deaf, people with severe physical and mental handicap and
people who were bom with Huntingdon's Chorea and alcoholics, the rationale being that these inferior
CMinderwertig) or hereditary tainted (erbliche Belastete) individuals represented a burden to the rest of
the population and would lead to the downfall of the German people Gesetz zur Verhiitung erbkranken
Nachwuchses (Vom 14. Juli 1933, Reichs-Gesundheits-Blatt 8 Jhrg. 1933 at p.622-624).
117All translations of the German terms from hereon are my own.
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(Betreuer) where the individual can not deal with his own affairs. The reason for
reforming the existing legal framework is that, as it stood, it placed a great emphasis on
protection which, it was felt, undermined both the will and the identity of the individual.
The concept of guardianship and curatorship did not give the incapax an opportunity to
articulate his wishes, his concerns and his choices. It was therefore decided that the new
law ought to promote minimal interference with the right to freedom and dignity of the
individual and should uphold his right to have his say. It was further recognised that the
language of the statutory scheme needed to be altered in order to incorporate and give
effect to the policy change.118 Thus, the German model moved away from the concept
of legal guardianship, with all of its over - protective connotations, towards an
emancipatory concept of care assistance.119
In effect, the law places the care assistant in the position of a representative entrusted
with, inter alia, the determination of residence, questions of property and medical
treatment. The assistant's duties are divided into legal and quasi-legal duties; he is a
judicial and an extra-judicial representative.120 The input of people close to the
individual who can testify as to his wishes, such as family and friends, is vital; the care




The Drugs Code (AMG) provides that an incapacitated individual may be involved in
cases of therapeutic research with the consent of the care assistant. The benchmark for
the decision, relates to decisions concerning medical treatment, which a care assistant
UiBetreuung was favoured above other concepts in the Civil Code such as Beistandschaft which refers
to aid, assistance, support (§ 1685 BGB).
119An interesting parallel is the recent decision to change the name of the charity from "Scottish
Council for Spastics" to "Capability Scotland". Capability Scotland was launched on April 25th, 1996.
See Holmes George, D 'What's in a Name ?' in (1996) 10 Catch-Up at 16.
120§ 1902 BGB.
121This is not clear from the text of the Act as Betreuung is often used in conjunction with the adjective
persdnlich, or personal which gives it a semblance of subjectivity which was not intended by the
legislature. See FamRZ 1988 at p. 904.
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may consent to according to criteria122 which include factors such as that the assistant
must orientate himself according to the wishes of the individual and with regard to his
welfare,123 he must represent the wishes of the individual124 and the treatment must
contribute to the individual's condition or situation.125
Generally, examinations, treatment and interventions may only take place with the
individual's consent. The validity of the consent is not based on legal competence but
varies according to his capacity for understanding. Certain measures can and must be
invoked if the individual is incapable of consenting. He may consent if he has reached an
agreement with his care assistant; if no agreement can be reached, the doctor must
decide whether he is capable of understanding the nature of the procedure involved.
Moreover, the permission of the Guardianship Court is needed for health examinations,
medical treatment and medical interventions where there is a danger that the individual
could die or suffer serious and long lasting medical damage.126
Two comments follow. First of all, the involvement of the Guardianship Court suggests
that the protective tenor of the regulations has not been entirely erased. Secondly, the
danger referred to above is assessed both subjectively and objectively, using a provision
of the Criminal Code as a benchmark.127 There is a degree of pragmatism, however.
Whereas heart surgery would necessitate seeking permission from the court, a mere
tooth extraction would not. In the event of doubt, a physician can get advice from the
court128 or can obtain precautionary permission which is analogous to the use of
declarations in England and Scotland.
122§ 1904 BGB.
123§ 1901 BGB. See also 0 Palandt Kommentar Diedrichson, U (ed) (54th edn, 1995) Rn. 7 zu § 1901
BGB.
124§ 1901 II 1 BGB.
125§ 1901 III BGB.
126§ 1904 S. 1 BGB.
127§ 224 StBG.
128§ 1908 i i. V. mit § 1837 I BGB.
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The new law also reformed the procedure relating to care assistantships129 as well as
providing for supervisory bodies entrusted with the supervision of the procedure.
(.Betreuungsbehorden).130
3.6.1.2.3. Procedure
A care assistant can be applied for or he can be ordered by a court. An application can
be made in respect of physical handicap only if this handicap prevents him from
exercising his will131 but can be made in respect of any person who is mentally
incapacitated.1,2 The application must satisfy certain conditions133 which include inter
alia that the subject must have reached his majority and must be suffering from a
psychological, mental or physical handicap. The degree of invalidity is not prescribed.
It is enough to show that the individual cannot deal with his affairs in their entirety or
partiality and this is assessed in accordance with the principle of necessity
(Erforderlichkeit).134
There are different forms of carer which include honorary carers (ehrenamtlich
Betreuer), who are unpaid,135 carers from welfare organisations (Vereinsbetreuer),136
and carers who work for the care authorities (Behordenbetreuer).137 Generally,
however, care is free of charge. The court can, however, grant a maintenance order if
the individual has sufficient funds.138
l29FGG (§§ 65-69 "Betreuungssachen" and § 70-70n "Untersuchungssachen").
130Article 8 of the Betreuungsbehordengesetz (BtG).
131§ 1896 I S. 3.
132§ 1896 I S. 2.
133§ 1896 - 1908 i BGB.
134§ 1896 II S. 1.
135§ 1897 I BGB.
136§ 1897 II1 BGB.
137§ 1897 II 2 BGB. Welfare organisations and care authorities can also undertake to represent the
individual. See §§ 1900 I BGB and 1900 IV BGB respectively.
138§ 1836 I 2, 3 BGB. A professional carer must be paid a fee or approximately 20 DM per hour; in
some cases, he may even receive a sum of up to 100 DM (§§ 1908 i i.V. mit 1836 II BGB i. V. mit § 2
II 1 Zu SEG). If the individual is without funds, the State pays (§§ 1836 II 4 i. V. mit 1835 IV BGB).
Expenses may be reimbursed for a sum of up to 300 DM a year(§ 1836 a BGB i. V. mit § 2 Zu SEG).
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The notion that the wishes of the individual are paramount is of major importance.
Procedural safeguards are provided whereby he may propose a particular care
assistant.139 Furthermore, his wishes must be respected by his care assistant provided
they do not conflict with his overall well-being.140 The emphasis on the individual's
right to self-determination is further illustrated by the right to apply for a reversal for the
need for a care assistant, and the right to change the care assistant.141
The procedural safeguards as set out in the Gesetz iiber die Angelegenheiten der
frerwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (FGG)142 provide that the court must hear from the person
affected. The final decision as to whether he or she is capable of giving consent,
however, rests with the judge. His decision is aided by expert testimony
(,Sachverstandigengutachten)14' regarding the need for the intervention, the alternatives
and the likelihood of damage. Furthermore, the spouse, parents, children, as well as any
confidants must be consulted as regards the wishes of the individual.144 The tenor of
self-determination can also be seen in relation to provisions which apply if the patient is
unconscious.145 It has also been argued that documentary evidence will be accepted as
to the nature of the individual's wishes.146 The final decision always rests with one
party. In practice, this is usually the doctor but the judge decides once the court
becomes involved.
139§ 1897 IVBGB.
140§ 1901 II 1 BGB.
141
§§§§ 1896 I, II, 1897 IV, III la, 1908 d II and 1908 b III respectively. Note that care comes to and
end when the conditions become obsolete. See § 1908 d I 1 BGB.
142§ 69 d I 3 FGG.
143Note that the doctor and the expert witness must not be the same person.
144§ 69d II 3 i. V. mit § 68a S. 3. 4 FGG.
145Consent must be, if possible, obtained from the family or a carer must be ordered. If the intervention
is urgent, then the defence of necessity may be relied upon. The wishes of the patient must be guaged
which may be done by referring to the patient's will, discussions with his family and confidants. They
may only offer advice; the final decision rests with the doctor. If the patient will be unconscious for
some time, a carer must be ordered by the guardianship court. See § 69 f I FGG.
146Thus, paragraph 1896 II 2 BGB - which provides that a care assistant need not be selected if the
wishes of the person affected can be ascertained in an alternative manner - could be used. See NJW
1994, 753 (757).
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In effect, the legal provisions establish and uphold the voices of those who are incapable
of giving consent. Thus, an individual can take an active part in the care procedure
despite his mental incapacity.147 Moreover, the court must gain an impression of the
individual148 who can appear in court or may be visited at home. The court must appoint
a procedural care assistant both to advise and to represent the individual throughout the
course of the proceedings (Verfahrenspfleger)u9 This care assistant is independent
insofar as he is not there to act as the court's mouthpiece.
While the German model is designed to give individuals affected by incapacity the
opportunity to express their opinions, the court also gives other persons the opportunity
to be heard. Thus, the spouse, the parents, children, and confidants may represent their
views by way of written pleadings within two weeks of the decision.150 Once the care
assistant is selected, his duties must be outlined for a set period of time which may not
exceed 5 years. An order can be made that the decision take an immediate effect if there
is danger in the inevitable delays in the process.151 The procedure may take up to one
month but can be speeded up in certain situations. The decision of the court may be
appealed;152 the appellate court is the regional Court (Land Gericht) 153 where the
individual must be heard again and evidence on the points of appeal must be gathered
and assessed as necessary.154
Supervising the entire procedure are the so-called care authorities which were
established by article 8 of the Betreuungsbehordengesetz. They are both created by and
are the responsibility of the Lander;155 in practice, they are the local magistrates' court
l47§ 66 FGG.
148§ 68 I 1 FGG.
149§ 67 FGG. Although this is not necessary if the individual is represented by a lawyer or a social
worker.
150§ 68 I 1 FGG.
151§ 69a III 2 FGG. The decision usually comes into force once the guardian is informed (§ 69 a III 1
FGG.).
152§ 19, 20 FGG.
153§§ 19 II, 30 FGG.
154Expert testimony, however, does not need to be obtained again. Appeal from this court is heard by a
further instance, the Ober Land Gericht. See §§ 27, 28 FGG.
155§ 1 BtBG
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or the juvenile court .156 The duties of the authorities include advice and support for the
care assistant as well as the Guardianship Court.157 They also have the power to
propose a person as a care assistant on application by the court.158
There is some overlap between the duties of the care assistant and those who must be
consulted in order to ascertain the will of the patient and this may lead to tension;
professional medical opinion may also be at odds with either or both parties. The
imposed dichotomous responsibility is only acceptable if all parties work together.
A mechanism must be in place to resolve any difficulties and, since the framework is part
of a legal construct, the final decision must rest with the judge. This can be seen as a
substantial drawback of the German model. Why, when we are increasingly persuaded
to mistrust doctors, should we trust the courts ? Is this an endorsement of the view that
"Judges know best" ? There is no doubt that senior judges with dominant personalities
can and have influenced the overall relationship between law and medical practice - and
they may well continue to do so. As Ronald Dworkin has written concerning the
relationship between judges and democracy;
"Democracy does not insist on judges having the last word, but it does not insist
that they must not have it."159
Hence, the question is whether the influence judges exert over medical practice is
disproportionate.160 Anyone with a sense of history will know that we need to be wary
of judges. The German experience teaches us that the German legal system was not a
victim of national socialism but an accomplice.161 Lawyers and judges actively sought to
156See Schwab, FamRZ 1990 at p. 684.
157It is entrusted with the provision of advice and support of the carer (§ 4 BtBG), the provision of
information and training (§5 BtBG), the suggestion and promotion of activities for the individuals cared
for i.e. by charities and organisations (§6 BtBG) and it must support the Guardianship Court (§ 7 I, II, §
8 BtBG).
158§ 8 S. 3 BtBG.
159Dworkin is not specifically referring to judges and medical litigation. See Dworkin, G Freedom's
Law: The Moral Reading ofthe American Constitution (1996) at p. 7.
160See for example Mason, J K ' Master of the Balancers' 1993 JR 115.
161 See for example Wapler, F, Knobelsdorf, A 'Funktion und Umwandlung der Justiz im
Nationalsozialismus' (1996) 3 Forum Recht at 76-78.
138
promote the ideology of national socialism.162 Moreover, American judges engaged in
similar activity in relation to experiments conducted during the middle of the Twentieth
century, albeit, toeing another party line.163 This is not to deny that both the German
and the American medical professions were happy to co-operate in purifying the race in
one way or another. In effect, we must be wary of not only of the law but of
professionalism as a whole.
3.8. Conclusion
The model upon which the decision-making process of the research process is based
ought to be egalitarian. This involves changing the point of departure so that principles
are not established in relation to things going wrong; the result of this is that research
subjects are only heard in a court of law or in the newspapers when unethical research
comes to light. What is needed is prospective guidance on both sides so that the process
is reviewed not just when things go wrong but, also, when things go right. This entails a
change in attitudes which depends upon the generation of information which is relevant
to the parties concerned; this should be readily available on a continuous basis - it could
be realised by, for example, providing a data base for researchers and research
subjects.164 There would, of course, be relatively high set up costs which could well be
met by the pharmaceutical companies themselves.
In summary: the research process needs an injection with democracy - a system is
needed which gives people the opportunity to be involved. For example, rather than
have a process which is based on absolutisms - such as blanket bans on certain forms of
162See Miiller, I Furchtbare Juristen (1989).
163See Goldner, J A 'An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regulatory
Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously' (1993) 38 St Louis U L J at 63-134.
164This has been done in the United States in the shape of the Cochrane Centre in Baltimore which,
together with the National Institutes of Health (NIH), is co-ordinating the creation of a register of
randomised controlled trials. See Munro, A J 'Publishing the findings of clinical research' (1993) 307
BMJ 1340 and also Herxheimer, A 'Publishing the results of sponsored clinical research' (1993) 307
BMJ 1296.
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research - a system is needed which involves the people who can decide which forms of
research are desirable and which are not. Procedures must be created which allow
society to reflect again and again on these issues, a process which has been referred to as
the 'self-referential character of democracy'.165 The medical research debate must be
based upon a model of reflective constitutionalism166 under which the normative
principles for medical research can be ascertained continuously as opposed to once and
for all decision-making. A moral code for medical research is not envisaged. Instead, a
method of reasoning which will facilitate ascertaining the principles for research is
needed. Moreover, the medical research debate must be structured in the
complementary fashion which Habermas has referred to as democratic
institutionalisation, a concept which lies at the heart of his most recent social theory.167
There are general issues to be resolved. First, we must decide who is to take part in the
medical-decision making process and how much weight should be attached to their
views. Secondly, the conceptual model needs to be developed which includes a
contextual analysis and in which paternalism is redefined as having a spectrum of
consequences, positive as well as negative. Thirdly, we need an appropriate forum
within an institutionalised framework for the discussion to take place. Procedures
ought to be devised whereby the questions raised by medical research are brought into
the public sphere; we need a sounding board which includes developing networks of
communication which will enable access to information and different points of view - by
this, I mean an outlook which embraces diversity and does not dismiss it. Public
dialogue must be institutionalised so that it can operate from within the medical research
debate. The ethics of medical research is a realm over which the philosophers have
165MacCormick, N 'Constitutionalism and Democracy' in Bellamy, R (ed) Theories and Concepts of
Politics: An Introduction (1993) at p. 144.
166Cf PreuB, U K Revolution, Vortschritt und Verfassung (1992) and also Preuh, U K 'The Political
Meaning of Constitutionalism' in Bellamy, R (ed) Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty:
American and European Perspectives (1996) at 11.
167I am indebted to Dr Gerard Delanty whose paper, 'New Conceptions of Radical Democracy:
Habermas on Social Protest, The Public Sphere and Law' which he gave at the Faculty of Law at
Edinburgh University on November 28, 1997 helped me to further my understanding of Habermas'
theory of discursive democracy.
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traditionally asserted sovereignty. The question which will be considered in the next
chapter is whether this sovereignty should be lost or should it be pooled ?
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Chapter Four
Medical Research andMoral Reasoning
"Jm praktischen aber fangt die Beurteilungskraft denn eben allererst an, sich recht vorteilhaft zu
zeigen, wenn der gemeine Verstand alle sinnliche Triebfedern von praktischen Gesetzen ausschlieftt.
Er wird alsdenn so gar subtil, es mag sein, daft er mit seinem Gewissen, oder anderen Anspriichen in
Beziehung auf das, was recht heifien soil, schikanieren, oder auch Wert der Handlungen zu seiner
eigenen Belehrung aufrichtig bestimmen will, und, was das meiste ist, er kann im letzteren Falle sich
eben so gut Hoffnung machen, es recht zu treffen, als es sich immer ein Philosoph versprechen mag, ja
ist beinahe noch sicherer hierin als selbst der letztere, weil dieser doch kein anderes Prinzip als jener
haben, sein Urteil aber, durch eine Menge fremder, nicht zur Sache gehoriger Erwagungen, leicht
verwirren und von der geraden Richtung abweichend machen kann. "
Immanuel Kant1
"It is incumbent on moral theory to explain and ground the moral point of view. What moral theory
can do and should be trusted to do is to clarify the universal core ofourmoral intuitions and thereby to
refute value skepticism. What it cannot do is make any kind of substantive contribution. By singling
out a procedure of decision-making, it seeks to make room for those involved, who must then find
answers on their own to the moral-practical issues that come at them, or are imposed on them, with
objective historical force. Moral philosophy does not have privileged access to particular moral
truths. Philosophy can't absolve anyone ofmoral responsibility in the face of moral and practical




The moral reasoning behind medical research is caught in the tension between abstract
principles and concrete practice. This entails a clash of values and the question arises -
can clashes be resolved by finding universals ? Universality is a contentious issue
whether we are speaking generally or in relation to medical research.3 The main
xGrundlegung zurMetaphysik der Sitten, Weischedel. W (ed) (1996) at 31. See below for translation.
2Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990, Lenhardt, C and Nicholson, S W (tr)) at 211.
3See Macklin, R 'Universality of the Nuremberg Code' in Annas, G J and Grodin, M A (eds) The Nazi
Doctors and the Nuremberg Code (1992) at 240 - 257.
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argument which is made against universality by the communitarians for example, is that
the principles advocated are a reflection of western cultural values; thus, they can only
have particular or relative value.4 In other words, universal validity is imperialism
"dressed up as humanity".5 Another criticism is that universal principles can not
presume to cater for all eventualities, that they are blind to context and are the result of
sterile formalism. In the light of these criticisms, how can there be any norms which
have universal legitimacy ?
If we argue that medical research is the responsibility of society, it is imperative that a
universal position is adopted; this is the way to the abolition of privilege and
discrimination in the medical research process. Moral reasoning must, therefore, be
concerned with proceedings rather than with consequences - or alternatively, with
procedure rather than with substance.6 The role of philosophers in the research debate is
not to provide the public with answers but, rather, to develop a method whereby
questions raised by research can be addressed by looking at the underlying principles.
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is not so much to provide a moral code by
which medical research should be undertaken as to consider the ethics of decision¬
making. The aim is to establish norms that can be universalised; this can only be
achieved if the consequences of the general observance satisfy the interests of all those
affected.7
4See Selznick, P 'Personhood and Moral Obligation' in Etzioni, A (ed) New Communitarian Thinking:
Persons, Virtues, Institutions and Communities (1995) at p. 110.
5Alexy, R 'Debate Theory and Human Rights' (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 210.
6Whilst procedure is a universal, substance is subject to modification at a grass roots level.
'"Valid are exactly those action norms to which all those possibly affected could agree as participants in
rational debates." See Habermas, J Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law andDemocracy (1996) at 12.
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4.1. Principles
It is widely agreed that the practice of medicine is based on principles of which the four
cornerstones are respect for autonomy, nonmalficence, beneficence and justice.8
Medical research has similarly been based on principles running from the codes of
Thomas Percival (1803) and William Beaumont (1883) to the treatise of Claude Bernard
(1865).9 A modern day principled approach has been encapsulated in both the
Nuremberg Code (1947) and the declaration ofHelsinki (1964). The role of principles is
to guide decision-making; sometimes, however, principles, or their interpretation, clash.
How ought conflicts to be resolved ?
A plethora of ethical issues arise as regards the ethics of medical research involving
human subjects which include, inter alia, recognition of the end point of research,10 the
use of randomised controlled trials,11 the exclusion of women as research subjects, and
whether the results obtained by unethical research practices ought to be used.12 The way
in which these questions are answered differs according to the standpoint adopted. For
example, as regards the first issue, a scientist might maintain that research ought to be
carried out until such time as it becomes statistically significant. A doctor, however,
might maintain that the end point should be as soon as harm or good is intuitively
evident, while a pharmaceutical company may wish to complete the trial as soon as the
8Cf Beauchamp, T L and Childress, J F Principles ofBiomedical Ethics (3rd edn, 1989).
9See the code of Thomas Percival written in 1803 by an English physician, cited in Beecher, H K
Research and the Individual (1970) at 218. See also Reiser A, Dyck A, Curran W (eds) Ethics in
Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns (1977) at 18-25 and also Percival, T
Medical Ethics (3rd edn, 1949) at 27-68. See also the code by William Beaumont in 1833 which is the
oldest American document dealing with the ethics of human experimentation which is reproduced in
part in Beecher (1970) at 219 and also Claude Bernard's principles laid down in 1865 in his
Introduction to the Study ofExperimental Medicine (1927 Copley, H (tr)) at 101-102.
]0See 'Early announcements' (1993) 342 Lancet 1001 and 'On Stopping a trial before its time' (1993)
342 Lancet 1311.
11 See generally Faulder, C Whose Body is it ? (1985) Difficulties arise in relation to the question of
consent and as regards the control group to whom the placebo is administered. See the public reaction
to the use of RCTs in 1983 in trials involving women who were at risk of conceiving children with
spina bifida. See Brazier, M Medicine, Patients and the Law (2nd edn, 1992) at 424-425. See also
Mason, J K and McCall Smith, R A Law andMedical Ethics (4th edn, 1994) at p. 358.
12See Post, S G 'The Echo of Nuremberg: Nazi Data and Ethics' (1991) 17 J Med Eth 42 and
Godlovitch, S 'Forbidding Nasty Knowledge: On the Use of Ill-gotten Information' (1997) 14 Journal of
Applied Philosophy 1.
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drug can be released into the market without fear of litigation. The purpose of this next
section is to discuss the extent to which different standpoints are reconcilable.
Contemporary approaches to health care ethics have an impact on the practice of health
care professionals; there are, however, differences in the underlying professional
objectives or standpoints.13 In a study conducted in a psychiatry ward, Robertson found
that the doctors' main concern was how to solve clinical problems, to maximise the
organic functioning of patients and to conduct research whereas nurses tended to be
more concerned to maintain the daily care and to foster their independence. Hence, the
doctors and nurses differed in the emphasis and interpretation as regards the principle of
beneficence. This was also seen concerning the shared commitment to respect patients'
autonomy; nurses, for example, tended to include the notion of independent abilities
(eating, shaving and washing in patients with dementia) in their definition of autonomy.
A different approach to resolving conflicts of principle was also detected. Nurses were
more likely to emphasise the respect for patients' autonomy at the expense of
beneficence while doctors were more likely to emphasise beneficence over and above
respect for autonomy. Different experiences lead to different priorities; but what
happens when priorities conflict ? There is clearly a need to develop a framework within
which conflicts can be resolved and a consensus can be reached.14 Traditionally,
conflicts between doctors and nurses would have been decided in conformity with
established hierarchies within medicine. In the wake ofProject 2000, however, and with
the increasing recognition of involving nurses in medical decision-making,15 the
hierarchical boundaries have shifted.
13Robertson, D W 'Ethical Theory, ethnography, and differences between doctors and nurses in
approaches to patient care' (1996) 22 J Med Eth 290.
u"The whole issue of how to "balance" or "harmonise" or otherwise prioritise conflicting moral
principles or values in particular cases - the moral meat of casuistry - is one that requires far more study
than it is currently obtaining, either philosophically or empirically." See Gillon, R editorial (1996) 22 J
Med Eth at 260.
15Re C (a minorj (1989) 2 All ER 782, per Lord Donaldson MR.
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The implementation of 'Project 2000' which was regarded as a creative alternative to
traditional nurse training, provides a useful illustration of how a decision-making process
can become almost unworkable. Launched in 1991, the programme emphasised the
importance of academic study as well as of clinical experience.16 In particular, one of
Project 2000's pedagogical aims is to encourage nurses to question proposed treatments
which may include the practices of medical practitioners - doctors are well as nurses. In
practice, however, the experience has been that the theory has a number of
shortcomings. Some Project 2000 nurses have tended to question doctors' decisions in
the presence of the patient. There can be no doubt that the most worrying consequence
of this is that the patient's confidence in the doctor may be affected, thereby
undermining the doctor's authority. Essentially, however, the problem is that someone
has to decide.
A consequence of the 'clawback' on professional autocracy which occurred in the
United Kingdom during the 1980's is that there was a failure to implement
commensurate procedural measures to ensure effective decision-making. The absence of
procedures has undoubtedly hampered medical decision-making. Be that as it may,
much time and effort was spent on making nurses or members of a patient's family feel
that they were participating. But, whilst appearing to be inclusive, the effect of the
change in rationale has been, in effect, exclusive.
The ethos ofmedical research is generally believed to be the 'turf ofmoral philosophers
or 'bio' or 'clinical ethicists'. Medical ethics arguably saved some strands of philosophy
in that, with the birth of the medico-legal debate, philosophy suddenly became 'useful'.
Its participants could claim that they did not fritter away their time and public money in
wondering how many fairies can dance on the head of a pin but could serve a 'real' or
'practical' purpose.17 It is the distinction between 'phoenix' and 'useful' philosophy, or
'systematic abstract speculation for its own sake as against applicable techniques of
16See Jowett, S, Walton, I and Payne, S Challenges and Change in Nurse Education - A Study of the
Implementation ofProject 2000 (1994) at 7.
17This is entirely in keeping with the current climate of inter-University competition where research
ratings mean money and academics having to justify their existence almost continuously.
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critical thinking'.18 The market for applicable techniques is considerable, as the plethora
of Institutes for medical ethics19 and the proliferation of 'ethics by committee', such as
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, testifies.20 But, whereas the role of
these committees is invaluable, they do not involve the general public.
4.2. Method: Philosophical Traditions
4.2.1. The Philosopher Kings
There is a tendency among philosophers to view themselves as possessing a divine right
to considering questions of ethics; this accords with the traditions of some schools of
philosophy which hold that not all of us are qualified to participate in substantive
discussions on norms. Take this section from the Republic, for instance where Socrates
is talking to Glaucon.
'"Well then,' I said, 'is there any form of knowledge to be found among any of the
citizens in the state we've just founded which is exercised not on behalf of any
particular interest but on behalf of the city as a whole, in such a way as to benefit
the state both in its internal and external relations ?'
'There is.'
'What is it, and where shall we find it ?' I asked.
'It is the Guardians' knowledge,' he answered, 'and is to be found with those we
called Guardians in the full sense.'
'And how do you describe the state because of it ?'
'I say it has good judgement and wisdom.'
'And do you think that there will be more metal - workers in our state or
Guardians in this sense ?'
'Many more metal workers,' he said.
'Won't the Guardians, in fact, be far fewer in number than any other group with
special knowledge and name ?'
'Yes.'
18Haldane, J review essay in (1990) 16 J Med Eth 52.
19These include the Institute of Law and Ethics in Medicine (University of Glasgow), the Centre for
Medical Law and Ethics (King's College, University of London) and the Institute of Law, Medicine and
Bioethics (University of Manchester and University of Liverpool). In Germany there is the Centre for
Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (Eberhard-Karls-Universitat, Tubingen).
Established by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.
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'So the state founded on natural principles is wise as a whole in virtue of the
knowledge inherent in its smallest constituent part or class, which exercises
authority over the rest. And it appears further that the naturally smallest class is
the one which is endowed with that form of knowledge which alone of all others
deserves the title of wisdom."21
The role of the Guardians as having 'good judgement and wisdom' and the reference to
the class which exercises authority over the rest and which 'alone of all the others
deserves the title of wisdom' assumes that certain people are blessed with higher
insights. One is reminded of Brecht's play, The Life of Galileo in which the main
protagonist, Galileo Galilei battles almost continuously against the tendency of scholars
to dismiss the common man from debates regarding questions about the nature of the
universe;
PHILOSOPHER: ...as a philosopher I ask this question - are such stars necessary ?
Aristotelis divini universum.
GALILEO: Can't we speak in the vernacular? My Colleague, Signor Federzoni,
doesn't understand Latin.
PHILOSOPHER: Forgive me. I thought that he was your lens grinder.
ANDREA: Signor Federzoni is a lens grinder and a scholar.
PHILOSOPHER: Thank you my child. If Signor Federzoni insists -
GALILEO: I insist.
PHILOSOPHER: The argument will lose elegance. But it's your house.22
This attitude still prevails. Consider, for example, two modern schools of philosophical
thought, namely, positivism and deontology. The former provides that values are
subjective and that therefore only instrumental rationality counts. In essence, norms can
not be derived from facts. Take, for instance the early writings ofWittgenstein;
"I once wanted to include in the preface the statement that my book consists of
two parts: of what is presented here, and of all that which I have not written
down. And it is this second part that is important. For through my book, the
ethical is circumscribed as it were from within; and I am convinced that it can
only be strictly circumscribed in this manner. In short, I believe that by
23
remaining silent I have defined what many people today babble about"
21Plato The Republic (2nd edn, 1982) Part Five [Book Four] 428 d-e at 198-199.
22Brecht. B The Life ofGalileo (1982, Brenton, H (tr)) at Scene Four at p. 28.
23Quoted from von Wright, G H's historical introduction to the Prototractatus (1971) at p. 15 cited in
Apel, K-0 Towards a Transformation ofPhilosophy (1980. Adey, G and Frisby, D (tr)) at 234.
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The aim of positivism, which is to develop an ethos which is scientific in the sense of
being free of values, in effect, relies on a culture of experts.
"In general, one can assert that in all sectors of public life in Western industrial
societies, moral justifications of praxis are being replaced by pragmatic arguments
that can be provided by 'experts' on the basis of objectifiable, scientific-
technological rules. The instrumental, technical part and the strategic part of
praxis can be grounded by objective if-then rules that can be regarded as logical
transformations of scientific law-like knowledge."24
The reliance on experts is also illustrated by the deontological school of thought which is
defined as being based on the "...common moral convictions that most of us have."25
'Most ofus' is, however, selectively defined;
"convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics."26
The emphasis on 'thoughtful' refers to the intuitive method upon which deontology is
based. The introduction of'well-educated' is, however, troubling as it suggests that only
well educated people have the ability to think about ethics. However, examples from
both the Third Reich and from America exemplify the failure of the professional elites in
this respect.
The importance of the intuitions of the educated can also be seen as applying to medical
research. Henry Beecher concluded that the main method of the control of research
should be anchored in the intuitions and the conscience of the medical researcher. His
position as regards the ethics of research is characterised by excluding the public from
the debate. For example,
"Complexities abound; these entail, not only scientific, but moral, ethical, and
sometimes legal problems. The confidence of the public in those who engage
in such experimental pursuits is indispensable. Only if the public can be
assured that self-discipline and ethical study are the rule will the necessary
confidence be maintained. Careless or misunderstood investigations can do
24Apel, fn 23 above at 235.
:5Nicholson, R Research Involving Children (1991) at 64.
26Nicholson, fn 25 above at 64.
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incalculable harm to medical progress. It is our collective obligation as a
profession to see that this does not take place."27
He believed that research subjects could be protected by the doctrine of informed
consent in conjunction with research carried out by an "intelligent, informed,
conscientious, compassionate, responsible investigator,"28 This assumes that the
investigator has received the necessary training on which to base these qualities.29 Jay
Katz developed this theory in terms of what he refers to as a 'persistent educational
effort'.
"Only a thoughtful and persistent educational effort, for which this volume seeks
to furnish a set of materials, can bring about real change in long-standing
practices and thereby give some meaning to the suffering of those who were
harmed by human experimentation." 30
Several observations may be made. First, both writers'reforms take place within the
medical community. It is, for example, arguable that Katz is blurring the distinction
between education and information - simply adding a course in medical ethics to a
medical school curriculum is not necessarily going to bring about a revolution in the
ethical insight of medical students. Principles for medical research ought to be the
product of reflection and not merely handed down through student generations.
"Professional codes of ethics are devices to which lipservice is paid in any number
of cases while practice creates discretionary exceptions which are capable of
swallowing the ethical principles say, of the Revised Declaration of Helsinki when
the physician / researcher decides the occasion requires it." 31
27Beecher, fn 9 above at 119.
28Beecher, H K 'Ethics and Clinical Research' (1966) 274 New Eng LJ Med 1354 at 1360. [emphasis
added].
29"As I became increasingly involved in the world of law, I learned much that was new to me from my
colleagues and students about such complex issues as the right to self-determination and privacy and the
extent of the authority of governmental, professional, and other institutions to intrude into private
life....These issues...had rarely been discussed in my medical education. Instead it had been all too
uncritically assumed that they could be resolved by fidelity to such undefined principles as primum non
nocere or to visionary codes of ethics." see Katz, J Experimentation with Human Beings (1972) at ix
and also Beauchamp and Childress, fh 8 above at 13.
30Katz, fn 29 above at 4.
31Giesen, D International MedicalMalpractice Law (1988) at 578.
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Secondly, and more importantly, to leave the emphasis of the regulation of medical
research to the conscience of medical researchers is to prohibit, or at least considerably
restrict, the access of other parties to the decision-making process concerning principles
for medical research.
This is amplified in the debate concerning the use of results of unethical research.32
Strictly speaking, the concept of deterrence dictates that the results ought never to be
published. The results may, however, be of scientific value. Would it then be a case of
the end justifying the means ? Without wishing to become embroiled in a substantive
discussion, the issue has been largely resolved in favour of the value of knowledge.
Henry Beecher, for example, argued that such data could be published with stern
editorial comment despite expressly stating that he did not share this view. 33 A letter by
Jay Katz appeared in the same issue of the Journal in which he favoured the publication
of data "improperly obtained", arguing that,
"Such an editorial policy would maintain the low visibility of 'unethical
experimentation' and preclude not only review but also careful and constant
appraisal of the conflicting values inherent in experimentation. Indeed, to make
these problems even more visible and subject to our collective scrutiny, all clinical
research papers submitted for publication should include in the section on methods
a clear statement of how consent was obtained." 34
The references to 'careful and constant appraisal' and 'collective scrutiny' hint at a
regulatory model for medical research which is self-corrective - that is, control is
exercised by the peers of the researcher. Thus, medical researchers are both participants
and a legitimating agency for establishing objective criteria for its practice, an assessment
32See Godlovitch, fn 12 above and also Angell, M 'Editorial Responsibility: Protecting Human Rights
by Restricting Publication of Unethical Research' in Armas, G J and Grodin M A (eds) The Nazi
Doctors and the Nuremberg Code (1992) at p. 277.
33Beecher, fn 28 above at 1320. And further, "It is debatable whether such publication should or should
not be carried out. I at least have the support of the parallel case of the United States Supreme Court in
which the Mapp Decision held that evidence inconstitutionally obtained shall not be used in any judicial
decision, however important it may be to the ends of justice." Letters to the Editor in Reponse to
Beecher's Essay (1966) 275 New Eng LJ Med at 791. See also the concession offered by Mason and
Mc Call Smith, fn 11 above at 364-365; "...the fact that children do not, for instance, now die from
certain forms of hypothermia is best regarded as a monument to those who suffered and died to make it
possible; if the material is used, they will, at least, not have done so in vain".
34See Katz, fh 33 above at 791.
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that is advanced in Chapter Two.35 The only critical, reflective relationship which
aspiring medical researchers are encouraged to enter into is with their teachers.
However, leaving the ethics of research to the foro interno of researchers themselves is
not only exclusive but it is also too opaque. In other words, the ethical principles for
medical research should not be the product of the researchers' private metaphysical
deliberations. There is a lack of transparency which renders the deliberations virtually
unexaminable. Moreover, we can not be certain of our intuitions.
As Onora O'Neill states,
"we are opaque to ourselves (as also to others) and may be unsure which principles
govern our actions in any situation. We may hope that we are fundamentally
honest, but be well aware that situations we have faced have been ones in which,
as luck would have it, honesty was the best policy, so that we were never put to the
test. All that we can do is try to ensure that we are honest on principle rather than
by luck is to align our outward actions with those that would express a maxim of
honesty in ways appropriate to each situation we face."36
Thus, a criterion for identifying morally worthy actions is needed in view of our ability to
present a case selectively;
"If we are unsure what the maxim of a given act is, we cannot be sure whether it is
morally worthy. Despite their best efforts at principled and self-conscious action,
agents are prey to self-deception and selective perception. This is not rare or
exotic but commonplace - we are repeatedly tempted to ascribe maxims that place
37
acts and agents in a more flattering or a more lurid light".
It is important to stress that I do not seek to undermine the importance of intuitions,
which are, after all, the data ofmoral agency.38 The ethos of medical research, however,
anchors or abdicates, depending on whichever way you want to look at it, most of the
responsibility to the consciences of a select few.
35See Section 2.2.
360'Neill, O Constructions ofReason: Explorations ofKant's Practical Philosophy (1989) at 130.
370'Neill, fn 36 above at 130.
38As McCall Smith has pointed out, "A moral intuition may be a useful signpost to the good and right,
but moral action is most likely to ensue in circumstances where there has been some effort to engage in
moral analysis". McCall Smith R A 'Committee Ethics ? Clinical Ethics Committees and their
Introduction in the United Kingdom' (1990) 17 J Law & Soc 124.
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"...the intuitive 'simple conscience' approach has its pitfalls; the right of each
person to an opinion on any moral question is not being disputed. What is
being disputed is the extent to which that opinion may be based on a just
balancing of the various factors involved. Everybody has a right to express an
opinion on a moral issue (such as the involuntary post-mortem harvesting of
organs) but the moral weight of that opinion is surely going to depend on the
extent to which its holder is aware of some of the sensitive issues involved
(such as religious sensibilities, family feelings, and so on).39
Individual moral responses are not being rejected; there should, however, be a process
whereby moral responses can, as Mc Call Smith puts it, be "attuned to the situation".40
Moreover, there is a need for a wider base of intuitions for ethical decision-making
beyond the intuitions of philosophers.
The difficulty is that such an elite group is able to hide its evaluative statements
concerning research under a veil of assumed neutrality, the influence of which can be far
reaching. Whilst principles for medical research appear to be neutral, they are in fact the
product of or, at least influenced by, the evaluative perspective of the participants in the
debate. The purpose of the next section is to consider the model of affected impartiality
as a foundation for the ethics of medical research with the aim of advocating an
alternative approach.
4.2.2. Considered Impartiality Reconsidered
InMedical Research with Children: Ethics, Law and Practice, Nicholson proposes two
levels of moral or ethical thinking. The first level is based on the 'practical',
deontological school of thought whilst the latter is based on a 'higher, critical' level of
thinking which is utilitarian. Thus,
"We should have, and teach, and cultivate in ourselves, those intuitions and
those intuitive principles whose general acceptance in the profession and
39McCall Smith, fn 38 above at 127.
40Ibid.
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outside it will do the best, all in all, for those affected, considered
impartiality."41
We must, however, question how impartiality or neutrality is defined. In particular, is it
the case that neutrality is defined with reference to the affected neutrality of the educated
?
The emphasis on 'considered impartiality' represents a strand of moral theory which in
its modern format as been espoused by philosophers such as John Rawls whose theory of
justice remains a basis for much medical ethical thought.42 Gillon has, for example,
stated that,
"This process of dynamic moral "reflective equilibrium"...requires both
philosophical reflection and theory on the one hand, and empirical
observation of the facts - the facts of people's considered moral judgments,
attitudes and actions - on the other. Neither is supreme, both are essential. In
the pursuit of such reflective equilibrium empirical studies into what people's
considered moral attitudes, actions and judgments are and their justifications
for them, are of importance not just to health care ethics but to ethics in
general."43
According to Rawls,44 principles of justice are devised from a hypothetical original
position in which individuals must imagine themselves as rational abstract, free and
neutral beings - it is an exercise in "point of viewlessness" and intended to avoid any
interest based decisions being reached. He advances the notion of people in the 'original
position', or 'POP's, who are caught in a state of neutrality. These people do not know
anything about themselves; they can not make any judgements in connection with how
their decisions will affect them.
Rawls has been criticised from many quarters, notably by feminists and communitarians
who argue that the original position is a typically masculine way of looking at the world
"'Nicholson, fh 25 above at 70
"2Gillon, fn 14 above at 261.
"3Gillon, fn 14 above at 260.
^Theory ofJustice (1971).
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as separate from context, concreteness and relations to others.45 Certain groups of
people have been traditionally excluded as potential research subjects.46 This arises, for
example, in the predominant use of white males as research subjects who have been
assumed to represent society as a whole.47 Accordingly,
"Members of the dominant group making decisions in reliance on this norm may
discount or be oblivious to the influence of their particular perspective. To the
contrary, they see themselves as "objective," and the existing social structure as
"natural."48
According to Dresser, medical researchers have defined the white male as the normal,
representative human being.49 She suggests that physical differences between males and
females or between whites and people of colour remain unacknowledged. Others who
support this view further argue that this is due to the fact that the participants in the
medical research debate is dominated by the white, middle class professional elites.
At the same time, one might ask whether this analysis is, itself strictly neutral - and there
are good reasons to doubt its accuracy. In the first place, any research results which
would be influenced by differing physiological responses would be condemned as useless
by reviewers if it did not involve a mix ofmale and female subjects. Alternatively, it may
well be that white, male volunteers are the easiest group to obtain. If, therefore, the end-
point of the research was independent of such factors, the choice of subjects would not
be exclusionary but would, rather, represent the fastest and most economical route to a
result - which would be a laudable objective. In short, while it may be arguable that the
dominance of white males within the research elite influences the choice of subjects, it
may be, equally, the result of pragmatic and well considered selection.
45Brown, B 'Feminism' in Bellamy, R (ed) Theories and Concepts ofPolitics (1993) at 166 and also
McHale, J, Fox, M and Murphy, J Health Care Law: Text, Cases andMaterials (1997) at pp. 119-130.
See also Kymlicka, W "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality" in Avineri, S and De-Shalit, A
Communitarianism and Individualism (1992) at p. 165.
46A phenomenon which has been described as "Tuskegee Fallout". See Dresser, R 'Single, White Male
for Medical Research' (1992) Hastings Centre Report at 27.
47Dresser, fn 46 above at 27.
48Dresser, fn 46 above at 27-28.
49Ibid.
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Even so, there is little doubt that research into conditions which affect women only or
predominantly - such as anorexia or osteoporosis - suffer in comparison with their
counterparts in men whilst investigations into illnesses such as heart disease have been
carried out almost exclusively on men on the assumption that women respond to
treatment in the same way as do men.50
As regards the role of female volunteers in medical research, for example, the prevailing
hypothesis as regards drug trials provides that research into conditions which affect
women more than men, such as anorexia and osteoporosis, has lagged behind whilst
investigations into illnesses such as heart disease have been carried out almost
exclusively on men; this is based on the assumption that women respond the same way to
treatment as men. The FDA implemented a 'Womens' Health Initiative' which lifted the
16 year ban on including women of 'child bearing potential' in early drug trials.51 The
new rules require drug companies to include a sufficient number of women subjects in
their drug safety tests to assess whether drugs affect women differently from men.52
Moreover, there have been reports which have suggested that cancer funding favours
women.53 Be that as it may, the committee at the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in the
United States which was commissioned to investigate the issue of the inclusion of
women in clinical studies, comprised, the "usual melange of biostatisticians and
bioethicists, pharmaceutical executives and behavioural scientists, academics from
medicine and law, experts in public health and in the clinical evaluative sciences, the
50But those who accept the alternative argument outlined above would see this as a responsible
distribution of resources in that men constitute the great majority of cardiac patients.
51To which advocatus diaboli might respond - why should researchers be compulsorily exposed to
another thalidomide scandal ?
52See the FDA Guideline for the Study and Evaluation ofGender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation
ofDrugs 58 Fed. Reg. 39, 406 ( July 22, 1993) which was followed by the passage of the so-called
"Revitalization Act of 1993" NIH Revitalization Act 42 U. S. C. A § 201 (West Supp. 1993) and the
NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research 59 Fed.
Reg. 14508 (March 28, 1994) originally published at 59 Fed. Reg. 11146 (March 9, 1994). See also
The Times August 2, 1993 at 4, 6 and 8.
53Mihill, C 'Cancer funding favours women, says doctor' The Guardian October 6, 1994. It is as
wrong, however, to disregard men in certain circumstances as it is to disregard women.
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former director of the NIH Office for Protection from Research Risks, and the current
director of Johns Hopkins' Centre for Clinical Trials."54
The Tuskegee experiments illustrates this selectivity in the reverse way. Certainly black
people were used as subjects but we can see them, here, as being selected as a group
who were not 'normal' insofar as they were expendable. Tuskegee shook the trust of the
black community, so much so that when the first reports of AIDS emerged in the 1980s,
the community thought of is as part of a conspiracy to wipe out the black race;
"For forty years their government had withheld treatment from men with syphilis
so science could learn more about the disease. Many of the men had died from
syphilis, while others had gone blind or insane. Confronted with the experiment's
moral bankruptcy, many blacks lost faith in the government and no longer
believed health officials who spoke on matters of public concern. Consequently,
when a terrifying new plague swept the land in the 1980s and 1990s, the Tuskegee
Study predisposed many blacks to distrust health authorities, a fact many whites
had difficulty understanding."55
Several members believed that AIDS was a form of genocide whilst some believed that it
was deliberately created in a laboratory in order to infect black people. Such beliefs
were not limited to the lay public; many black health workers refused to dismiss these
fears out of hand.56 The consequences of this paranoia were tragic. Many black
sufferers avoided medical treatment, ignored the advice to use condoms (believed to be
part of a population control scheme) and refused the offers of clean needles (believed to
be a plot by the government to encourage drug abuse among the black community). The
policy makers either ignored or underestimated the impact which Tuskegee had had. It is
hard to believe that Tuskegee would have occurred if the black community had taken
part in the initial discussions concerning the experiments.
These examples - ofwomen and the black community - show that even the most creative
minds of the 'great and the good' cannot embrace all the intricacies which arise in a
54Merton, V 'Review Essay: Women and Health Research' (1994) 22 The Journal of Law, Medicine &
Ethics 272.
55Jones, J H Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (2nd edn, 1993) at 221-222.
56See Jones, fh 55 above at 222 et seq.
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pluralistic society.57 Decision-making by disengaged atomists is ethically unacceptable.
Moreover, we are quite unable to blot out the influence of experience.58 Principles for
medical research must incorporate experience; any attempt to reject it out of hand is
illusory.
Impartiality per se is an acceptable concept - what matters is the way in which it is
exercised and by whom. Impartiality must be exercised so as to give due regard to the
needs of all those affected. This can only be achieved through a process of practical
deliberation.59 Illness is a great leveller; it touches upon people's lives in many spheres -
including the 'micro domain' (family, marriage, neighbourhood), the 'meso-domain'
(national politics) and the 'macro domain' (mankind).60 The development of medical
science belongs to humanity's common interests;
"...the results of science present a moral challenge for mankind. Scientific-
technical civilization has confronted all nations, races and cultures, regardless of
their group-specific, culturally relative moral traditions, with a common ethical
problem. For the first time in the history of the human species, human beings are
faced with the task of accepting collective responsibility for the consequences of
their actions on a world-wide scale. One might expect that this obligatory
collective responsibility corresponds to the intersubjective validity of norms or at
least to the basic principle of an ethics of responsibility."61
A forum is needed in which researchers can be schooled to become self-critical as
Beecher and Katz suggest but one also in which the intuitions of researchers can be
informed by the public so that they, together with policy makers, are not blind to the
experience of others. What we need is to uncover the correct approach. Kantian
philosophy, as transformed in the light of the last centuries, can provide a basis for the
search for universals in medical research - that is, universals as abstracted from the
5 Rebecca Dresser, for example, cites a case of a researcher who asked investigators about the exclusion
of Afro-Americans from clinical trials and received the response that they had never thought about the
matter. See Dresser, fn 46 above at 28.
58See. for example, Taylor, C Sources ofthe Self{ 1989).
59See Habermas, J Justification andApplication (1992) at 12.
60Categories used by Gronewold, H 'Science and Macroethics on a Finite Earth' cited in Apel, fn 23
above at 227.
61
Apel, fn 23 above at 228.
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plurality of experience.62 Kant, however, is an inadequate authority without
modification. The purpose of the next section is to outline Kant's theory63 and to show
how Habermas has transformed it.
4.2.6. Kant
4.2.6.1. The Categorical Imperative (CI)
The categorical imperative as set out in The Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals64
consists of the formula of universal law which provides that one should act only on a
maxim which one believes should be a universal law.65 In other words, do not unto
others which you would not do to yourself. The formula of the end-in-itself provides
that one should act in such a way that humanity is treated as a means and not as a means
to an end.66 Lastly, the formula of the kingdom of ends provides rational beings with a
share in the making of universal law.67
It is arguable that the maxim of the end-in-itself renders the conduct of research
involving human subjects impossible if one accepts the basic tenets of Kantian
philosophy.68 Kant, however, cannot be dismissed so lightly;
"...there is nothing of itself objectionable in using others as a means to our ends.
We do this all the time quite ethically and legitimately. The blood transfusion
service is a good example. All blood donors are used by recipients as means to
their ends. The ethic that requires us not to use people as means is derived from
the Kantian principle that we should treat people not merely as means but always
as ends in themselves. I am not sure precisely what this means but I suppose that
it is that we should not in our relations with others deny their personhood."69
620'Neill, fn 36 above at 126-144 and also Korner, S Kant (1955) at Chapter Six.
63See the Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals (23rd edn, 1989 Paton, H J (tr)).
64Kant, fn 63 above. Hereinafter cited as G, IV, etc.
65Kant, fn 63 above at G, IV, 421.
^Kant, fn 63 above at G, IV, 429.
67Kant, fn 63 above at G, IV, 434, G, IV, 433 and G, IV, 436.
68Wulff, H R 'The ethics of animal and human experimentation' (1995) 346 Lancet.
69Harris, J Wonderwoman and Superman (1992) at 123.
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However, one interpretation of the CI is that it provides a basis for the conduct of
research ifwe presume that it demands that we strive to adopt morally worthy maxims.70
Thus, for example, the maxim that research subjects must not be used as a means to an
end is not an absolute but rather that researchers should strive not to use research
subjects as a means to an end as much as it is possible. This interpretation relies on the
definition of a maxim as being a rule which is more or less consistent with the way you
live your life.71 Thus, maxims delineate subjective practical principles - in other words,
they allow principles to be modified by circumstances at any given time. This position
allows for a degree of flexibility; maxims are not unchangeable dispositions.72
Researchers can therefore use research subjects the limit being set by unacceptable
impairment of the subjects' autonomy. In short, Kant does not say that we should not
treat people as means in any respect but that people should not be treated merely as
means to an end.
A further criticism of Kantian philosophy is that it is too formalist73 and the product of
abstract universalism; it is consequently insensitive to context. The CI is regarded as
being ruled by the terrorism of pure conviction whereby even immoral deeds can be
sanctioned if they satisfy higher ends.74
Kantian philosophy has also been questioned as being an appropriate basis for rights.75
Campbell, for instance, argues that Kant places too much emphasis on the concept of
autonomy and that his theory is both too individualistic and absolutist. This is a major
disquiet, which has been taken up by contemporary feminist theorists who stress the
importance of assessing moral questions within the social dimension.76 Campbell
proposes an alternative model for patients' rights by arguing that dependency, or need, is
70O'Neill, fn 36 above at 131.
71 See Habermas, fn 59 above at 6-7.
720'Neill, fn 36 above at 129.
73Gillon. fn 14 above at 17.
74See Habermas, fn 2 above at 196-197.
"Campbell, A V 'Dependency: the foundational value in medical ethics' in Fulford, K V M and Gillett,
G J M (eds) Medicine andMoral Reasoning (1994) at 189.
76See for example, Gilligan, C A Different Voice (1982), Brown, fn 45 above at 165 et seq and also
McHale, J, Fox, M and Murphy, J, fn 45 above.
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an integral facet of our autonomy. In effect, we can only realise our autonomy within
the framework provided by society, a concept which is rooted in Aristotelian and
Hegelian philosophy.
Be that as it may, the legitimacy of using human beings in medical research addresses the
ultimate dilemma of balancing the interests of the patient as against those of society, an
issue which is of the utmost importance, not least because, as liberalists would hold, the
differing interests are irreconcilable. Applying Campbell's position, research could be
justified with an appeal to society, namely, that there is a duty to engage in research in
the sense of an obligation towards the community. Communitarians would support this
position in the sense that their world is framed by a social compact which acknowledges
the relationship to our fellow man, stretching between and beyond generations.77
The categorical imperative is not a moral code or a moral algorithm; it can, however,
demand morality as well as legality. As regards the medical research process, it is better
suited as a procedural step by which principles for medical research can be ascertained
on a continuing basis. Thus, it can be used to enable all those affected to take part in the
medical research debate.
The use of Kantian philosophy as a basis for the moral reasoning underlying medical
research can be defended on four counts. First, the provision concerning universality -
or the formula of universal law - lies at the heart of the categorical imperative. In effect,
this supports the notion that all interests must be afforded recognition. Secondly, the
formula of the end in itself upholds the recognition of personhood. Thirdly, the formula
of the kingdom of ends provides that everyone's will must be recognised; this qualifies
them as being part of the kingdom of ends. Hence, there is no exclusion. There is no
black will, no female will but only human will. Lastly, Kant is firmly anti-elitist to the
extent that he explicitly states that no privileges accrue to philosophers;
77See Elshthain, J B 'The Communitarian Individual' in fn 4 above at 99.
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"On the practical side, however, the power of judgement first begins to show what
advantages it has in itself when the ordinary mind excludes all sensuous motives
from its practical laws. Then ordinary intelligence becomes even subtle-it may be
in juggling with conscience or with other claims as to what is most important, it
can in the latter case have as good hope of hitting the mark as any that a
philosopher can promise himself. Indeed it is almost surer in this than even a
philosopher, because he can have no principle different from that of ordinary
intelligence, but may easily confuse his judgement with a mass of alien and
irrelevant considerations and cause it to swerve from the straight path. Might it
not then be more advisable in moral questions to abide by the judgement or
ordinary reason and, at the most, to bring in philosophy only in order to set forth
the system of morals more fully and intelligibly and to present its rules in a form
more convenient for use (though still more so for disputation)-but not in order to
lead ordinary human intelligence away from its happy simplicity in respect of
action and to set it by means of philosophy on a new path of enquiry and
instruction ?"78
A case of too much abstract thought leading to intellectual vertigo ? Kant was not being
elitist; he refers to the categorical imperative as an exercise in practical reason. Not
everything can be grasped by the sciences. One is reminded ofMary Wollstonecraft,
"...I must add that I do not believe that a private education can work wonders
which some sanguine writers have attributed to it. Men and women must be
educated, in a great degree, by the opinions and manners of the society they live
in. every age there has been a stream of popular opinion that has carried all
before it, and given a family character, as it were, to the century. It may then
fairly be inferred, that, till society be differently constituted, much cannot be
expected from education. It is, however, sufficient for my present purpose to
assert that, whatever effect circumstances have on the abilities, every being may
become virtuous by the exercise of its own reason."79
Or as William Hazlitt summarises eloquently out it in his essay, 'The Ignorance of the
Learned;
"Learning is, in too many cases, but a foil to common sense; a substitute for true
knowledge. Books are less often made use of as 'spectacles' to look at nature with,
than as blinds to keep out its strong light and shifting scenery from weak eyes and
indolent dispositions. The book-worm wraps himself up in his web of verbal
generalities and sees only the glimmering shadows of things reflected from the
minds of others."
And further,
78Kant, fn 63 above at G, IV, 404.
79.4 Vindication ofthe Rights ofWoman (1992) at 102-103.
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"He clings to it [his book] for his intellectual support; and his dread ofbeing left to
himself is like the horror of a vacuum. He can only breathe a learned atmosphere,
as other men breathe common air. He is a borrower of sense. He has no ideas of
his own, and must live on those of other people."80
This is an issue which has been taken up more recently by Isaiah Berlin;
"For, as Tolstoy taught us long ago, the particles are too minute, too
heterogeneous, succeed each other too rapidly, occur in combinations of too great a
complexity, are too much part and parcel of what we are and do, to be capable of
submitting to the required degree of abstraction, that minimum of generalization
and formalization-idealization-which any science must exact."81
In essence, Berlin argues that practical wisdom or reason is the ability to synthesise the
"...fleeting, broken, infinitely various wisps and fragments that make up life at any level,
just as every human being, to some extent, must integrate them (if he is to survive at all),
without stopping to analyse how he does what he does, and whether there is a theoretical
justification for his activity."82 Hence,
"Sciences, theories no doubt do sometimes help, but they cannot be even a partial
substitute for a perceptual gift, for a capacity for taking in the total pattern of a
83
human situation."
The central point is that there is an over reliance on theory in the sciences.84 This leads
to, among other things, trying to alter facts to fit a theory. Thinking by analogy is
limited in view of its foundation in induction; it cannot take into account the variety and
variability of human experience. Each particular situation is constituted by a unique
combination of characteristics.
S0Hazlitt, W Table-Talk. Essays on Men andManners (1901) at pp. 92-93.
81Isaiah Berlin 'On Political Judgment' (1996) XLIII The New York Review ofBooks 27 at 29.
82Berlin, fn 81 above at 28.
83Berlin, fn 81 above at 29.
84"Utopianism, lack of realism, bad judgment here consist not in failing to apply methods of natural
science, but on the contrary, in over applying them. Here failure comes from resisting that which works
best in each field, from ignoring or opposing it either in favor of some systematic method or principle
claiming universal validity - say the methods of natural science (as Comte did), or of historical theology
or social development (as Marx did) - or else from a wish to defy all principles, all methods as such,
from simply advocating trust in a lucky star or personal inspiration: that is, mere irrationalism".
Berlin, fn 81 above at 29.
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Berlin's position can be summarised thus: human experience as well as 'pure' logic must
be valued notwithstanding the fact that the boundaries are not as clear cut as it is often
assumed. How then can the method of analysis be sensitive to the plurality of experience
and not to the restricted experiences of the professional elite ? How can the professional
elite be sensitive to the general public ? How can the public operate within the medical
research process ? In short: how can we enable all those affected to take part in the
medical research debate ? The categorical imperative takes us some way towards doing
this but not far enough. To lead us the rest of the way we need to look to Jtirgen
Habermas who has developed his social theory of debate ethics by placing Kantian ethics
on a pragmatic footing.
4.2.7. Habermas and Debate Ethics
The importance of debate ethics is its stress on intersubjectivity; it does not use the
atomistic, individual reflective subject, as Kant did, as its line of departure. In essence, it
recognises that how one should live is not just an individual problem. We must not be
egocentric but must look to the needs of others.
Debate ethics replaces the Kantian CI with a procedure of moral argumentation.85 It
provides that a norm is correct and valid if it is the result of a certain procedure of
discussion and it meets with the consent of all affected.
Thus,
1. Everyone who can speak may take part in debate.
2. (a) Everyone may question any assertion.
(b) Everyone may introduce any assertion into the debate.
(c) Everyone may express his or her attitudes, wishes, and needs.
3. No speaker may be prevented from exercising the rights laid down in (1)
and (2) by any kind of coercion internal or external to the debate.86
85Habermas, fn 2 above at 197. See also generally Habermas, fn 59 above at 43-115 and also Apel K-
O, fn 23 above at 136 et seq. Alexy, R 'Debate Theory and Human Rights' (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 211.
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Debate ethics necessarily entails freedom and equality of argument; it rests on the 'ideal
speech situation' which incorporates the notion of consensus under ideal conditions of
discourse. For example, a reason given for an assertion must be a good reason for
everyone and a person making an assertion must be able to defend it against anyone.
Habermas recognises that people have opinions on everything. One only has to take a
look at forum television or listen to radio phone-ins to know that the concept that the
public are passive in relation to issues of importance is based on a sweeping and
erroneous generalisation. This is especially relevant concerning questions raised by
medical ethics. For example, the controversy sparked by the case of Mandy Allwood in
Britain which concerned whether it was morally acceptable for her to impose a financial
liability on the National Health Service for what was a futile attempt to carry octuplets,
seized the national consciousness; much of the debate was carried out in the press,
tabloids and broadsheets alike. The case was covered in medical journals such as The
Lancef1 and the British Medical Journal™as well as the popular press such as the Daily
Telegraph which referred to the case in the emotive terms 'The Death ofBabies'.89
Another example, is the case of Diane Blood,90 whom the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority had banned from using the sperm taken from her husband when
he lay dying in a coma because he had not given written consent; what is noticeable is
that issues of medical ethics are becoming a matter of public consciousness and
conscience with the media playing a central role. This kind of inclusion is the basis of
legitimacy for democracy. The need to argue is part and parcel of human nature.
Habermas argues that the employment of reason must be three-fold. First, it must be
pragmatic where the agent takes his own goals as a line of departure. He then applies it
86Alexy, R/l Theory ofLegalArgumentation (1989 Adler, R and MacCormick, N (tr)) at 193. To enter
into the debate, an assertion must be made; this is referred to as a speech act which raises a claim to
truth / correctness to which there is an obligation to provide a justification.
87See Dean, M 'British octuplet pregnancy upsets the medical applecart' (1996) 348 Lancet 605.
88Dyer, C 'Selective Abortions in the Headlines'(1996) 313 BMJ 380.
"The Daily Telegraph October 4, 1996 at p. 25.
90R v. Human Fertilisation and EmbryologyAuthority, ex p Blood (1996) 35 BMLR 1.
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to possible contexts of application thereby achieving a reflective distance from his own
life. This enables him to become an impartial critic and to ascertain generalizable
knowledge to shared experience.91
Secondly, it must be ethical to the extent that it is good for you, all things considered.
This decision is reached by using the T, the context of your experience from which you
can not distance yourself as a line of departure. This is in tune with the person you are
and the person you would like to be; thus your identity is responsive and at the mercy of
self-understanding.92
Thirdly, it must be moral to the extent that the answer to the question 'What should I do
?' must not conflict with the interests of others. The agent must be able to will the result
of his reasoning to be a general law ?93 This approach enables the incorporation of a
higher level of intersubjectivity and intermeshed perspectives.94 Habermas' theory is not
anti-individualistic despite appearances to the contrary. It is, however, based on a
rejection of neo-aristotelianism.95 In his opinion, both Aristotle and Hegel subordinate
the individual to an encompassing communal life; in effect, the individual is a hostage to
the custom and traditions of society. This is, however, too vague and transcendental. A
moral order which is linked to communal goals is not viable in the society we live in.
First, where are the benchmarks which illustrate what these goals are ? Secondly, it does
not tell us how we are to get a consensus or how to co-ordinate social action. We can
no longer count on a shared ethos. We cannot, using widely adopted terminology, agree
on the definition of the good to the extent that it refers to personal preferences of ways
of life. We can, however, agree on the definition of the right to the extent that it refers
to general procedures in which plans for our lives unfold.
Habermas, fn 59 above at 11.
92Habermas, fn 59 above at 12.
93
94
Habermas, fh 59 above at 7.
Akin to Carol Gilligan's connection thesis. See Gilligan, fh 76 above.
95For a definition of neoaristotelianism see Schnadelbach, H 'What is Neoaristotelianism ?' (1987/88) 7
Praxis International at 225.
166
Debate ethics is a break with the egocentric character. Thus,
"Pragmatic debates point to the necessity of compromise as soon as one's own
interests have to be brought into harmony with those of others. Ethical-political
debates have as their goal the clarification of a collective identity that must leave
room for the pursuit of diverse individual life projects."96
The outcome of this position is that norms for medical research are universal. Secondly,
the moral reasoning for the debate centres on application. Application needs a new
discursive procedure governed by the principle of appropriateness (Angemessenheit)91
The reason why this approach is concretely better for the medical research debate is that
it allows for the inclusion of different view points which include, inter alia, the views of
women and the black community. Moreover, as both Kant and Berlin testify no-one has
a privilege in deciding the norms for medical research; there is no 'higher' viewpoint.
Debate ethics has, however, several drawbacks; it is by no means, a perfect solution. In
particular, two problems with the ideal speech situation arise.98 The first concerns the
difficulty of attributing weight to opinions. This was an issue which was raised in the
previous chapter. The second concerns the need for procedures for conflict resolution.
One is reminded of the dialogue between Baum and Thornton, in which the latter was
merely invited to air her views as opposed to stating her views as of right. Thus,
"Encouraged by myself and other clinical scientists she suddenly finds that she is
invited to scientific meetings to express her views, is offered privileged space in
such learned journals as the Lancet and has had the opportunity to sit down and
discuss these issues with some of the finest brains in the business. This alone
demonstrates the openness of the scientific process that welcomes dissenting
voices, as without dissent there can be no progress."99
97Habermas, fn 59 above at 16.
97Cf Giinther, K Der Sinn fur Angemessenheit (1988) and also Giinther, K 'Impartial Application of
Moral and Legal Norms: A Contribution to Debate Ethics' in Rasmussen, D (ed) Universalism vs.
Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics (1990) at 199.
98See Section 4.2.7. above.
"Baum, M 'Clinical Trials - A brave new partnership: a response to Mrs Thornton' (1994) 20 J Med
Eth at p. 23.
167
The difficulties of the ideal speech situation are illustrated by Dorothea's views of Mr
Causaubon as a listener in Middlemarch. Thus,
"...she found in Mr Causaubon a listener who understood her at once, who could
assure her of his own agreement with that view when duly tempered with wise
conformity, and could mention historical examples before unknown to her."100
Dorothea's view of herself is, by comparison, servile, to say the least. Moreover, it is
apparent from a later exchange involving Sir James Chettam, who wishes to experiment
with patterns of farming among his tenants, and whom Dorothea defends, just how little
weight her views carried in the Middlemarch society, including Causaubon. The
exchange between Chettam, Brooke and Dorothea is interesting for a further reason.
Chettam wants to experiment with farming after having read a textbook on the
subject,101 a move to which Mr Brooke dismisses as unwise;
"A great mistake, Chettam,' interposed Mr Brooke, 'going into electrifying your
land and that kind of thing, and making a parlour of your cow-house. It won't do.
I went into science a great deal myself at one time; but I saw it would not do. It
leads to everything; you can't let nothing alone."102
Dorothea defends him;
"'Surely,' said Dorothea, 'it is better to spend money in finding out how men can
make the most of the land which supports them all, than in keeping dogs and
horses only to gallop over it. It is not a sin to make yourself poor in performing
experiments for the good of all.'"103
To which Mr Brooke replies,
"'Young ladies don't understand political economy, you know,' said Mr Brooke,
smiling towards Mr Causabon."104
100"'He thinks with me,' said Dorothea to herself, 'or rather, he thinks a whole world of which my
thought is but a poor two-penny mirror. And his feelings too, his whole experience - what a lake
compared with my little pool !' Eliot, G Middlemarch Harvey, W J (ed) (1985) at p. 47.
101Davy, H Elements ofAgricultural Chemistry (1814). See Note 1 in Eliot, fn 100 above at 898.




Despite the fact that Dorothea is included in the discussion, it is apparent that Mr
Brooke does not take Dorothea seriously.105
4.3. Conclusion
A debate theoretical approach demands that we need to go beyond theory as regards
ethical speculations concerning questions ofjustice and thereby need to enter into a real
process of argumentation under certain conditions and with a variety of agents. Thus,
philosophers have a role in the medical research debate, they are experts who should
take part in the planning and the decision-making of medical research.106 Their role,
however, must be qualified and this can best be achieved by adopting an approach based
on debate ethics. This depends on institutionalising democratic procedures. Thus,
"...[t]he unity of practical reason can be realized in an unequivocal manner
only within a network of public forms of communication and practices in
which the conditions of rational collective will formation have taken on
concrete institutional form."107
And further,
"From the perspective of a theory of debate, the problem of agreement among
parties whose wills and interests clash is shifted to the plane of
institutionalized procedures and communicative presuppositions of processes
108
of argumentation and negotiation that must be actually carried out."
The first problem with which we must concern ourselves is what these principles look
like in their concrete form. Secondly, there are difficulties with the ideal speech situation
in respect of the weight of opinion in the resolution of conflict. For this, we need to get
105"It is not enough to extract universalistic principles from communicative structures and then assume
that one can engage in a normative discourse free of power." Delanty, G 'Habermas and Occidental
Rationalism: The Politics of Identity, Social Learning and the Cultural Limits of Moral Universalism'
(1997) 15 Sociological Theory at p. 56.
106Habermas, fn 7 above at 351.
107Habermas, fn 59 above at 17.
108Habermas, fn 59 above at 16.
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a clearer view of the medical research process and, to this extent, we need an
interdisciplinary approach. As we shall see, these issues come into their own in the
dynamics of research ethics committees; the purpose of the next section is to see to what
extent, the practice of research ethics committees illustrate the deficiencies of the
medical research debate. Two questions arise. To what extent, do they represent an
outlook which is that of the professionalised elite ? And secondly, to what extent are
these committees able to embody the principles of democratic institutionalisation ?
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Chapter Five
Research Ethics Committees in the United Kingdom
"The often equally aggressive and impotent resistance of lay people is replaced by the opportunities
sciences have for resistance: counter - criticism, methodological critique, as well as a clubbish
'obstructive behavior' in all the fields ofprofessional competition for resources. "
Ulrich Beck1
Introduction
The research ethics committee (REC) is central to the control of medical research
involving human subjects. It provides a forum within which individuals can scrutinise
proposals and decide on their validity. Public scrutiny lay at the heart of the stated aims
of the 1991 guidelines issued by the Department of Health (DoH)2 which were seen as
forming part of the Citizen's Charter. Greater accountability of researchers towards the
public as a whole rather than to the medical establishment alone was held to be
paramount. At their launch in August 1991, the then UK Minister for Health, Virginia
Bottomley said,
" Research is the lifeblood of medical science and the NHS is at the leading
edge. These changes will further improve the public scrutiny of medical
research."3
To what extent, however, is the public scrutiny referred to by Mrs Bottomley limited or
even mythical ? The experience of research ethics committees in practice has provoked a
number of criticisms. These include, first, the absence of a supervisory body entrusted
'Beck, U Risk Society: Towards a NewModernity (Trans. Ritter M 1992) at p. 160.
2Local Research Ethics Committees, Department of Health (DoH) (1991) replacing HSC (15) 153
(1975).
3Reported in (1991) 17 J Med Eth at p. 217.
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with monitoring the practices of committees; there is, as yet, no body which is
responsible for auditing the work of the RECs although this role has been filled in the
commercial sector by a number of consultancies.4 Secondly, information concerning
RECs and their practices is not, as a rule, made readily available to the general public.
For example, information concerning membership, frequency of meetings, the number of
proposals dealt with each year, the nature of the proposals considered and objections
raised are not thought to be a matter for public concern. Such information is,
admittedly, contained in annual reports which most committees now publish.5 The
standards of annual reports, however, vary greatly, as was discovered by Nicholson in
his study of research ethics committees.6 Some of the reports which I obtained through
field research conducted in Scotland in 1993-1994 were clearly inadequate and did not
provide an overall picture of the committees' function and practices.7 There is, as yet,
no official register of RECs in the United Kingdom and it has, again, been the
commercial sector which has led the field.8 Thirdly, the practices ofRECs practices vary
greatly and are haphazard. They are also undemocratic. The introduction of the
research ethics committee by the declaration of Helsinki in 1964 has the 'compelling
cover of democracy'9 - but what lies behind this cover ? Study of the medical research
committees reveals that the professional elite are over-represented in their current
constitution; even a majority of lay members are selected from the professions. This, in
4As in the case of Til Occam, for instance. See fn 8 below.
5The DoH guidelines provides that, "Each year the LREC should submit a report to the DHA [district
health authority], and copies should be sent to all the NHS bodies which the LREC exists to advise, and
to the CHC [community health council]. The names of committee members, the number of meetings
held and a list of proposals considered (including whether they were approved, approved after
amendment, rejected or withdrawn) should be included. This report should be available for public
inspection." DoH, fn 2 above at para 2.16.
6See Nicholson, R 'What do they get up to ? LREC annual reports' (1997) 129 Bull Med Eth 13.
7See Appendix E. Despite every effort made, only 12 Committees Responded Out of a Total of 21 as
regards Composition and 7 Committees out of 21 as regards Practices. This small sample does nothing
more than show a general tendency. References to RECs in practice will be made in relation to
fieldresearch and to the study undertaken by Nicholson, fti 6 above.
8A database of research ethics comittees has been maintained during the last two years by Til Occam
Limited in conjunction with the Royal College of Physicians. Note that many drug companies often
want a list of the membership of the LREC but more often than not, are denied access to such
information. In the United States on the other hand, the guidelines in relation to Institutional Review
Boards (IRB) are far more stricter and IRBs are audited by force of law; the idea of providing a list of
the membership of the IRB was in response to the concerns ofmany drug companies that the researcher
might be on the Board.
9Galbraith, J K The Culture ofContentment (1995) at 10.
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effect, both reflects and reinforces existing social stratification.10 Pluralism is defined
narrowly with the result that REC decisions are the product of a particular kind of
"common sense". Lay members of research ethics committees are not selected from a
wide cross section of the community and, as a result, proposals for research are not
assessed by a diversity of opinion; the input of the community is restricted. To this
extent, the decisions ofRECs can be seen as lacking the support of a wider majority.
The fundamental question with which we are faced is: does society want to entrust the
scrutiny and control of research to experts ? If this is the case, then the status quo in
respect of research ethics committees in the United Kingdom could be described as
satisfactory and proposals for reform could be limited to a few perfunctory remarks. If,
on the other hand, it is felt that those who are responsible for scrutinising and controlling
medical research ought to be representative of society as a whole, then the position of
RECs in the United Kingdom falls short of the ideal - and comprehensively so.
The medical research debate, as outlined in the preceding chapters, is flooded by the
professions. The forum of the research ethics committee is pervaded by the knowledge
derived from several disciplines - scientific, legal and moral and, to some extent,
theological. None of these discourses is unitary; none of them is a complete master of
empirical reality. They are fragmented and contradictory; they are also partial. The
difficulty lies in distinguishing those competing insights and assessing their relative claims
to truth. A method is needed by which differing claims to knowledge can be reconciled.
It must be determined whether everybody is equally able or whether some are better than
others in determining questions about value - this dilemma lies at the heart of this thesis.
The research ethics committee is a forum in which competing schools of thought meet
head to head.11 Indeed, questions involving medical research have been intellectualised
to such an extent that the debate is, perforce, monopolised by the professions12 each of
10Putnam, R D The Comparative Study ofPolitical Elites (1976) at 3.
"See Douglas, M How Institutions Think (1987).
12Beck, fn 1 above at 168.
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which has its own method of reasoning, its own vocabulary,13 its own 'thought
collective'.14 Essentially, the parameters within which the professions analyse are
institutionally defined because each school of thought favours one form of proposition
over and above all others.15 These institutionalised ways of thinking clash within the
forum of the research ethics committee.
It is arguable that this clash is inescapable when professions are seeking normative
principles by way of a debate in which the discussants are products of varied forms of
professional conditioning. The influence of professional conditioning is considerable if
not overwhelming. Indeed, the institutions from which the professionals come have been
described as having encompassing tendencies.16 The training which medical researchers,
lawyers and philosophers receive is the product of institutions, each of which shares
common characteristics or a 'family of attributes'. Institutions are ingrained with a sense
of common purpose usually articulated, for example, in company policy. Good team
players are called for; by implication, dissent or resistance are seen as being adverse to
the cooperative effort. More critically, however, is the surrendering of thought or
mental effort to the organization. "[t]hose serving it", as J K Galbraith writes, "have a
powerful commitment to established belief and thus to established action".17 Not only
does this involve a degree of powerful conditioning18 but it arguably dimishes the role of
13See Chapter Two, Section 2.2.
14The social anthropologist Maiy Douglas describes a professional collective as one which 'leads
perception and trains it and produces a stock of knowledge'. See Douglas, fn 11 above at 12 et seq.
15One is reminded of Berlin's remark concerning philosophical schools of thought. Berlin, I Concepts
and Categories: Philosophical Essays (1980) at 57. See Chapter Two, Section 2.2.
16I base my analysis on Erwin Goffman's book Asylums; Essays on the Social Situation ofMental
Patients and Other Inmates (1961). His findings are not specific. What we learn about some
institutions will teach us about others. "Every institution captures something of the time and interests of
its members and provides something of a world for them; in brief, every institution has encompassing
tendencies." See Goffman, at p. 15.
1 'Galbraith, fn 9 above at 68.
18"The organization man is happy with what exists. As this mood controls his private life, so it controls
his public attitude. Nothing so breeds acquiescence in, or indifference to, social shortcomings as daily
exposure to the misjudgments, eccentricities and inanities of private organization." Galbraith, fn 9 above
at 68.
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thought itself. In the higher echelons of the organisation, thought is something which is
delegated as opposed to being confronted.19
These ideologies or shared categories of thought which tie the individuals to the
institution20 have a common denominator. Scientists, lawyers and philosophers are
taught to win over their opponents by force of argument; they are schooled according to
adversarial precepts - they are not taught to mediate.
A further issue which distorts the concept of democratic control of research ethics
committees is that of language. As was argued in Chapter Two, power is asserted
through language. Very often, it is a case of the survival of the fittest - the party with
the greater understanding is able to exercise disproportionate influence over the medical
research debate.21 Those who control language, control rationality. The task with which
lay members are faced is coming to terms with the language in which research proposals
are discussed. Those who can understand what is involved can also participate in
rational discussion.
Questions of ethics lead to conflicts; this calls for conflict resolution;
"Ethical debates are extremely unlikely to result in unanimity. Though rational
discussion is possible, personal values and innate feelings will often prove
resistant to change and may remain persistently polarised among members of a
society. In this context there is a need to develop democratic systems of
decision-making in order to resolve conflicts."22
19"Encountering a problem, an organization man turns naturally, automatically, to a subordinate. The
latter is told to get on with it. This he then does by turning to an assistant, and the delegation continues.
The culture of organization runs strongly to the shifting or problems to others-to an escape from
personal mental effort and responsibility. This, in turn, becomes the larger public attitude. It is for
others to do the worrying, take the action. In the world of the great organization, problems are not
solved but passed on." Galbraith, fn 9 above at 69.
20Goffman, fn 16 above at 159.
21 See Chapter Two, Section 2.4.3.
22New, B on behalf of the Rationing Agenda Group 'The rationing agenda in the NHS' (1996) 312 BMJ
1593 at 1596-1597.
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Two models for the regulation of medical research can be distinguished. The first is
adversarial which, inevitably, entails a confontation of institutionalised affiliations and
ways of thinking. In a model based on mediation, however, there is room for everyone is
the decision-making process. Thus, successful mediation evolved into a process of
collective mediation and the inclusion of the general public in the debate is, thereby,
rationalised.
The arguments underlying the next section can be summarised as follows. We need
experts. We also, however, need lay members on research ethics committees who are
selected from a wide section of the community. A comparison will be made with
Childrens' Panels which operate in Scotland and whose members are representative of
the communities which they serve. The implementation of parallel structures, such as
Citizens' Juries for instance, will also be advocated so that representatives of public
opinion may have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process
especially concerning the wider implications raised by medical research proposals. This
calls for a refinement of the existing regulatory framework along pluralistic lines which
can be achieved through procedural reform. The existing structure, including its
shortcomings will be investigated in the light of this suggestion.
5.1. The Practices of Research Ethics Committees
5.1.1. Remit and Composition
The research ethics committee as a model of decision-making is an American export.
Institutional Review Boards (IRB), as they are referred to there were established during
the sixties as a way of introducing peer review for researchers. IRBs, however, must be
distinguished from hospital ethics committees which are concerned with the ethical
validity of methods of treatment. Even in the United Kingdom we must establish the
level ofwhich we are speaking. A research ethics committee can be formed, at its lowest
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level within a ward or department but, commonly each hospital has its own committee
which is responsible for the management. To rely upon such committees would,
however, be to fragment control to an unreasonable extent and the establishment of
research ethics committees at a local level (LRECs) is now common place. Throughout
this thesis, unless it is stated to the contrary, this is the form of REC which is under
discussion.
The Department of Health guidelines23 and those provided by the Royal College of
Physicians24 provide, inter alia, that membership of research ethics committees should
include both sexes as well as a range of age groups. Furthermore, hospital medical staff,
nursing staff, general practitioners and at least two lay members must be represented.25
The number of committee members should range from eight to twelve members.
5,2.1. Expertise and the Layperson
Committees depend on individuals with expertise; indeed, expertise is essential to the
review process and in practice, RECs are dominated by the professional elite. This is,
however, not without its problems.
The compulsory introduction of laypersons is intended as a counterbalance but the role
of the lay members may be more symbolic than of practical value. Lay members must
depend largely on experts in order to form an understanding of what a given proposal
entails. The fundamental difficulty of the committee therefore lies not so much in the
constitutional balance of experts and lay people but, rather, in the formers' expertise in
imparting the necessary information to the latter.
23See fn 2 above at paras 2.4. and 2.5.
24RoyaI College of Physicians Guidelines on the Practice ofEthics Committees in Medical Research
involving Human Subjects (3rd edn, 1996).
25See Appendix E.
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Medical researchers will, for example, understand what is meant by a risk of 5 % chance
that incontinence will ensue as a result of an epidural anaesthetic administered during the
course of a clinical research trial. The difficulty arises when they have to explain this risk
to individuals who have not had the benefit of medical training. The problem is one of
language;
"...every individual is bound by language. She internalizes the rules of the
language games, especially in the native language. People develop (alter) the
language but they cannot escape it. Everybody living in a certain linguistic
community is a prisoner of the language. It is the basis for social behaviour."26
A difficulty of imparting knowledge gained through expertise to lay people will come
within the ambit ofwhat has been referred to as the 'gap between persons'.27 In essence,
this gap is amplified where the expertise of the parties is unequal and this in turn gives
rise to inequalities of language. It highlights the nature and the roles of the social
relationships which exist in the medical research process. The party who commands
language commands the situation.
The medical research process contains many language forms. Consider, for example, the
language used in research proposals, that which is used during the deliberations of
research ethics committees and that used in obtaining consent from research subjects.
Consider also the language used in applying for funding and the language used in the
submission of the results of research for publication. In each example, the use of
language involves a 'translation' of ideas.
Any exercise in translation necessarily involves a degree of interpretation;
"Everybody who has done some translating, and who has thought about it,
knows that there is no such thing as a grammatically correct and also almost
literal translation of any interesting text. Every good translation is an
interpretation of the original text; and I would even go so far as to say that
26Aarno, A and Pecznik A, 'On Values: Universal or Relative ?' (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 321 at 323.
27Laing, R D The Politics ofExperience (1967) at p. 42.
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every good translation of a nontrivial text must be a theoretical reconstruction.
Thus it will even incorporate bits of a commentary. " 28
Essentially, Popper places more emphasis on understanding and interpretation than
simplistic linguistic perception. Understanding can, however, be 'doctored'. Language
can not only shape the way in which we see the world but it can also distort our view.
Understanding the socio-political dynamics of the medical research process entails
understanding how it is discussed. This helps us to 'flag' both interests and hidden
agendas. For example, members with expertise may have a certain bias towards
promoting research by virtue of their training instead of having regard to the well-being
of research subjects and the community. Moreover, experts may have an interest in the
outcome of the research insofar as a significant result would most certainly bolster the
reputation of the institution concerned.
Thus, one can say that, on the one hand, experts are needed to lay the foundations of the
decision-making process. On the other hand, however, their role, needs to be defined so
that the possibility of their expertise being used as a manipulative instrument is limited.
The purpose of this next section is to consider how this problem affects the individual
members of research ethics committees.
5.2.1.1. The Role ofMedical Professionals
The presence of the medical profession on RECs is justified because of their expertise
which enables them to understand the substance of research proposals. Even though the
precise nature of the project may beyond their own specialist knowledge, they will be
able to appreciate its concept by way of professional instinct by virtue of their extensive
training. These concepts must, however, be reduced to plain language. A common
criticism which is often levied at ethics committees is that lay members do not always
comprehend the medical issues at stake because the proposals are framed in scientific
terms and concepts which are often complex; this may have the effect of inhibiting and to
28Popper, K Unended Quest: An IntellectualAutobiography (1976) at 23.
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some extent limiting the input of lay members in the decision-making process. Given
these difficulties, it is arguable that a medical professional member should be selected
who is entrusted to 'translate' research proposals for the lay members and any other
interested groups, such as Citizens' Juries.29
The DoH guidelines provide that where a committee is faced with a proposal which it is
not able to assess sufficiently, it may rely on the advice of specialist referees.30 A
committee may invoke this provision if it is of the opinion that a proposal is outside its
ambit of expertise. The guidelines do not, however, contain specific provisions for the
possibility of having an active member of the REC who would be responsible for
'translating' proposals into everyday language so that lay members as well as the
eventual patients or volunteers are able to understand the nature of the research
involved.
The provision of a medical referee is by no means standard practice. Nicholson found
that only one teaching hospital LREC employed a doctor on a sessional basis to clarify
proposals for lay members.31 The membership of the Tayside Committee on Medical
Ethics in Scotland includes a medical adviser who is responsible for helping lay members
to reach opinions based on a solid understanding of the scientific material before them.
The committee's constitution states that,
"In addition it was agreed that the adviser on medical matters to the
Chairman and other lay members should scrutinise each protocol in detail and
report his views in writing to them."32
The role of the medical adviser is to explain the medical terminology. Moreover, he has
to interpret the information, form an understanding of the aims of proposal and pass on
29Citizens' Juries are discussed below at Section 5.6.3. Of course a translator would be unnecessary in
an ideal world.
30See fn 2 above at para 2.10: "LREC members should, on its own initiative seek the advice of specialist
referees or co-opt members to the committee so as to cover any aspect, professional, scientific, or ethical
of a research proposal which lies beyond the expertise of existing members."
31Nicholson, fin 6 above at 24.
32Tayside Committee on Medical Ethics Annual Report (October 1990 to 30th September 1991) at p. 4.
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this understanding to the lay members. Practice may, however, fall short of the ideal if,
as Popper maintains, every translation is an interpretation.33 Not only does a medical
adviser's translation rely on his interpretation, but alot also depends on how his
interpretation is perceived by lay members. One possibility is that their perception may
be based on blind trust. Consider Dorothea's predicament in George Eliot's novel,
Middlemarch,
"Dorothea's faith supplied all that Mr Casaubon's words seemed to leave
unsaid: what believer sees a disturbing omission or infelicity ? The text,
whether of prophet or of poet expands for whatever we can put into it, and
even his bad grammar is sublime." 34
Thus, the possibility of bias in the use of language by a medical adviser or those members
of a REC who undertake to translate research proposals is a real consideration. The
dividing line between explaining a case and assessing it may be blurred. A medical
adviser who extends his role to giving an opinion on the merits of a proposal must surely
be guilty of an unacceptable bias. Thus, even though a medical adviser is an invaluable
asset to committees his role must be limited to the explanation of facts and must not
extend to an evaluation or opinion concerning the ethics of the proposal. The same can
be argued in relation to other members of the committee. Let us turn our attention to
the legal profession.
5.2.1.2. Lawyers
The current trend indicates that lawyers are a popular choice as regards the selection of
lay members for RECs.35 In theory, such people are appointed only in the capacity of a
lay person but, inevitably, they will be used to comment on the legal implications of any
project. There can be no doubt that legal advice regarding research proposals is
invaluable, particularly as to questions of liability. The case ofMrs Margaret Wigley in
33Popper, fn 28 above at 23.
34Harvey, W J (ed) (1985) at 74.
35Fieldresearch revealed that lawyers make up 23% of the lay membership of RECs in Scotland. See
Chart 2 in Appendix E.
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1981 is instructive.36 This woman was entered into a drug trial without her knowledge
and died as a direct result. The clinical trial in which she was involutarily enrolled had
received the approval of no less than eleven research ethics committees which leads one
to question whether RECs and their members ought to be held accountable for their
decisions.37 By having legal representation, RECs would be able to assess research
proposals taking the legal consequences their decisions may have into account.
What, then of the legal members of the REC ? If they are there as lay people, their role
is no more than to comment on the acceptability of a research project to a non-medical
person. Most people would, however, regard this as a waste of expertise - given that
you have a lawyer on your committee, should not he or she be used to assess the legal
consequences of any decision taken ? But, almost before we realise it, we are then
confusing fact with opinion in the same way as we observed in the context of the medical
representatives. Moreover, the committee is, effectively, obtaining a free legal opinion
while, at the same time, anticipating that a duty of care is owed by the legal member of
the committee to the committee as a whole. This is clearly unjust. A committee decision
must be the responsibility of the whole committee. The logical conclusion is that any
legally qualified member of the committee must be there as a lay, non-professional
person.
The difference between the medical member and the legal member of the committee who
is acting in a professional capacity is that the former is concerned with 'what is' while the
latter is looking to 'what might be'. In short, the medical professional is concerned only
with fact while the lawyer's input is bound to be a matter of opinion or conjecture.
There may well be a case for the REC employing a legal adviser. But to recruit that
adviser from its own ranks is unwise and, probably, unethical.
36Editorial comment 'Secret Randomised Clinical Trials' (1982) 2 Lancet 78.
3,See McHale, J 'Guidelines for medical research' (1993) 1 Med L Rev 180.
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5.1.1.3. Religious Advisers
Theologians are also popular choices as lay members of research ethics committees.38
How representative are they of the society in which they live ? The role of religion has
been greatly eroded in Western societies and it is questionable whether the presence of
theologians on RECs would reflect the interests ofmore than a large minority of society.
It might be argued that religious representation would not be necessary and might be
even counterproductive in that a Minister of religion may maintain a view which is based
on principles that are foreign to researchers and research subjects alike. It could well be
argued that organised religion and organised science are incompatibles, the former
representing mere ideology and the latter the path to truth. This, however, sees the
religious adviser as a protagonist of a particular doctrine and, since many of us do not
know whether theistic religion itself, let alone which form of theism, is right, such a role
must be seen as unacceptable within the framework of the research ethics committee.
One might, however, seek to advance the following position. It is self-evident that a
qualified minister of religion has been instructed in moral philosophy irrespective of his
or her denomination. We could, therefore, expect any minister to be able to give a
competent view as to what is right or wrong. We have said that the lawyer is concerned
with 'what might be'; we can say, equally, that the religious adviser is concerned with
'what ought to be'. The question then arises as to whether this is a matter of fact or of
opinion - and the answer is 'a bit of each'. The minister thus takes on part of the mantle
of both doctor and lawyer but his input to the discussion differs from that of the others in
a fundamental way- that is, that his contribution carries with it no connotation of
practical responsibility. Thus, is would not be 'unfair' in asking ministers to ventilate
their expertise freely and, so long as this is confined to moral principles alone, it is
arguable that they should be encouraged to do so as professional rather than lay
members.
38Fieldresearch revealed that the clergy make up 12% of the lay membership of RECs in Scotland. See
Chart 2 in Appendix E.
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This position must, however, be rejected in view of the central argument advanced in this
thesis. Whilst the participation of religious members in the decision-making process is an
invaluable asset to RECs, they should not provide the committees with definitive answers
as to the ethical validity of research proposals. They could, however, inform the
committee regarding the extent to which proposals may affect religious sensibilities.
Whichever attitude is adopted, there is a case for co-opting ministers of religion in much
the same way as has been discussed under the heading 'lawyers'. An experiment which
involved cutting hair of research subjects might be regarded as acceptable by Christians
or Hindus but would, one imagines, cause considerable difficulties for subjects who were
practising Sikhs. On a wider scale, the whole problem of xenotransplantation as
presently conceived must involve some conflict with orthodox Judaism. Were such
examples to arise, it would clearly be proper as well as the negative side. We have seen
already that, say, women and the black community may resent being excluded from
research. The same might well be true of diverse religious groups. RECc concerned
with ethnically dominated areas would do well to take advice as to the likely response to
the 'white male' research subject model to which reference has been made above.
Even so, ministers of religion cannot and should not be denied membership of RECs.
Who, then, should be chosen ? In the absence of some obvious indication as suggested
above, the answer to the question depends, largely, on what is the national policy. In
particular, it depends on whether the national policy exemplifies a melting pot philosophy
of integration, which appears to be the case in the United Kingdom, or whether the
policy is outlined in terms of attempting to accord ethnic traditions with specific
recognition,39 an example ofwhich would be Australia.
It would clearly not be feasible for a variety of faiths to be represented as a routine. The
simple answer is to decide on which is the largest religious constituency in the area and
to have a relgious member representing that constituency. Other members could be co-
opted for specific purposes if the study involved specific religious beliefs. The
39See Habermas, J 'Multiculturalism and the Liberal State (1995) 47 Stan L Rev 849.
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Department ofHealth guidelines allow for this to the extent that they provide that RECs
may obtain the advice of specialist referees or co-opt members to the committee in order
to gain advice on professional, scientific or ethical matters which it feels is beyond their
expertise.40 The guidelines published by the Royal College of Physicians are similar in
nature but are more detailed;
"In areas of particular difficulty or sensitivity, eg. research involving the fetus,
neonates, breast cancer, pregnancy, ethnic minorities, it is useful to co-opt
additional lay or professional advisers for an individual application or
meeting."41
Thus, there can be no doubt as to the REC's power to co-opt as it finds necessary.
5.1.1.4. MedicalEthicists42
The number of philosophers who sit on research ethics committees is high.43 The
justification appears to be based in the notion that it is their role to consider the ethical
implications of research proposals. The danger lies in the real possibility that the
presence of such members might, in effect, confine ethical assessments to those who
claim a grounding in moral philosophy. The same argument which was advanced in
Chapter Four in relation to the role ofmoral philosophers in the medical research debate
is posited here. Moral philosophers can facilitate discussions but they are not there to
provide answers.44
40See fin 2 above.
4'Royal College of Physicians, fh 24 above at 8.
42By 'medical ethicist', I am referring to an individual who specialises in medical ethics as a branch of
philosophy. American commentators would refer to such an individual as a bioethicist.
43Fieldresearch revealed that medical ethicists make up 15% of the lay membership of RECs in
Scotland. See Chart 2 in Appendix E.
44Habermas, J Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990 Lenhardt, C and Nicholson, S W
(tr)) at 211 and McCall Smith, R A 'Committee Ethics ? Clinical Ethics Committees and their
Introduction in the United Kingdom'(1990) 17 J Law & Soc 124.
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5.1.1.5. Lay Representation
The Department of Health Circular does not define 'lay representation' nor does it
specify how lay members should be chosen. The lay members who are recruited do not,
in general, represent a cross-section of the community; as likely as not they are self
proposed and self selected. How real is the concern that RECs like other minor
'Quangos' are plagued by 'professional committee people' ?45
The criteria for the selection of lay members are linked to a professional benchmark. The
Federal Regulations for Institutional Review Boards in the United States, for example,
define 'non-scientific' in professional terms.46 It has been said in relation to the
composition of research ethics committees that,
"...despite the fact that we would all doubtless like to see ourselves as persons of
"sound judgement" some individuals, because of their background, merely
continue to serve the role which they do professionally."47
Most members of RECs are chosen from a section of the community which is quite
specific, one which is derived from the educated bourgeoisie, most of whom have been
to university or have received higher education. A hidden assumption exists that this is
the correct constituency because the decision-making process within a REC requires a
certain level of understanding of science with which they have to come to grips in order
to assess the acceptability of research proposals. The implication here is in favour of a
particular kind of common sense.
45A term used by Brian Sewell, among others; "...and the committee men and women who can point to
inches in Who's Who listing their much boasted service to the public [?]" in 'The peer pressure that
works for Britain' The Evening StandardMarch 4, 1997 at p. 11.
4645 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46: Protection of Human Subjects (Revised as of October 1, 1989)
as reproduced in Dael, van den W and Muller-Salomon, H Die Kontrolle der Forschung am Menschen
durch Ethikkommissionen (1990) at 140. See § 46. 107 IRB Membership (c) Each IRB shall include at
least one member whose primary concerns are in nonscientific areas; for example: lawyers, ethicists,
members of the clergy. This definition involves an unreasonably limited concept ofwhat is science.
47Lecture given by Professor SAM McLean at the Scottish Office on April 29, 1994, 'Research and
Training - An Overview'.
186
Factors in their social backgrounds conspire in placing non-professionals in a position of
cultural inequality that is marked by a lack of educational attainment. Bisseret Moreau
cites model answers to the question, 'What do those who fail lack culturally ?', which
she poses in her article, 'Education, Ideology, and Class / Sex Identity';48
"A way of expressing themselves," "a critical mind," "openness of mind" "a
taste for nonutilitarian culture," "a theoretical mind," "a conceptual mind,"
"certain values"..."[they] don't feel the need to intellectualize problems."49
The presence of lay members on RECs is necessary and can be invaluable in raising
issues which exemplify lay concerns - including their own concerns, those of the eventual
patients or volunteers and those of the community as a whole. Lay members should,
however, be selected from a wide cross section of the community. They are, afterall,
there to appreciate what is commonly referred to as the 'Yuck factor' - that is,
objections to research proposals which arise from no more that the common man's
intuition.50 The corrollory is that the working methods of the REC should be framed so
as to enable them to contribute their experience, or as Sheila McLean has put it, to
'reinforce their layness'.51 McLean was in fact speaking of Scottish Childrens Panels
which provide a persuasive example of the contribution that can be made by lay
members who have been selected from a wider cross-section of the community to
making communal decisions. This analogy is considered further below.
To summarise: the problems inherent in the use of the expert culture should be addressed
in the light of the following recommendations. First, the role of the medical profession is
there to inform the other members as to the scientific nature of research proposals.
Lawyers should be there as laypeople who should not be prohibited from expressing their
expertise when it is appropriate to do so. However, lawyers who are asked to comment
specifically on the lawfulness or otherwise of a proposed method should be co-opted for
48See Bisseret Moreau N, 'Education, Ideology, and Class / Sex Identity' in Kramarae, C, Schulz,
O'Barr, W M (eds) Language and Power (1984) at 43-61.
49Bisseret Moreau, fn 48 above at 51.
50To put it in a different way, specialist problems are for the specialists which is a further reason why
lawyers should not be on a REC as a laymember but should be there as of right.
51
McLean, fh 47 above.
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that purpose. It is unreasonable to impose legal responsibility for decisions of the
committee as a whole on one or two members who are there to supply only a general
overview. Thirdly, whereas philosophers may facilitate the discussions, their role is not
to provide answers as to the ethics of proposals. Fourthly, including religious advisers as
committee members should be optional, depending on the constitution of the local
society; however, it is suggested, though for different reasons, that they, too, might be
co-opted instead of being included as of right. Lastly, lay members should be selected
from a wide section of the community.52 It may be advisable to include representatives
of research subjects in some cases. What procedures are needed to implement these
proposals ? To address this question, we must now turn our attention to the problems
that research ethics committees face in the decision-making process as a whole.
5.2. The Decision-Making Process
The language used in the DoH 1991 guidelines emphasise very much the concept of
pluralism. However, it regards pluralism in its loosest sense - in the sense of a breadth of
opinion as opposed to multi-culturalism. A good example of this is to be found in the
recommendation that each REC should include nurses as a routine in their professional
capacity;53 nurses have traditionally been invisible as regards the decision-making process
and the recommendation is to be welcomed as an indication of their increasing
importance in the provision of health care. The involvement of nurses in life and death
decisions have also been formally been recognised in the courts.54
52It may be advisable to include representatives of research subjects in some cases. See McNeil, P The
Ethics and Politics ofHuman Experimentation (1993) at p. 241 and also Nicholson, fn 6 above at 24:
"An LREC invited a patient to address it about a trial that was worrying her and found it a very useful
expreience."
53DoH, fn 2 above at para 2.5.
54Re C (a minor) (1989) 2 All ER 782, per Lord Donaldson MR. "The problem of how to treat the
terminally ill is as old as life itself. Doctors and nurses have to confront it frequently, but it is never
easy."
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Accomodating a breadth of opinion depends on structuring the forum in a way which
enables all opinions to be taken into account; this should be based on an equal standing
within the forum. But this, in turn, depends on one's interpretation of equality - whether
it is equality of opportunity to participate or equality of influence. Adherence to the
latter definition might lead to a situation in which decision-making within a REC came to
a stand still. The same argument was raised in chapter four dealing with moral reasoning
in the medical research debate; attention was drawn, in particular, to Project 2000 and
the difficulties which have been experienced in practice since its implementation.
Paradoxically, the same dangers might be foreseen as regards lay members of
committees. The past 20 years have seen a backlash against the 'doctor knows best'
tradition, a result of which has been that the medical profession has been viewed with
increasingly assertive scepticism which, it is suggested, has not always been constructive.
It could well be feared that the classic 'intellectually bigotted' lay committee member
might obstruct decision-making by the committee on ideological grounds rather than
reasonable grounds. That, however, is a recognisable hazard which can be accepted
within a well-structured framework.
Much depends on the model upon which research ethics committees are based. The
danger of an adversarial model is that it can either render the decision-making process
unworkeable through members taking up defensive positions or it can force decisions to
be made at the expense of dissenting opinions. This is a drawback of the climate within
which the 1991 Department of Health guidelines were introduced - that is, a climate of
"control" and "public scrunity".55 It is arguable that the guidelines themselves
unwittingly fostered and nurtured defensiveness and distrust.
In order to fulfill their role effectively, lay members must be critical, they must question
but not, however, to the extent of paralysing the decision-making process altogether. To
avoid this, lay members as well as the other members ought to receive training which not
only clarifies their role but also enables them to fulfil this role with the degree of
55See fn 3 above.
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flexibility which is required for a REC to work effectively. In essense, research ethics
committees ought to be based on a model of mediation. This entails developing the
procedures within which committees work so that, for example, decisions as to weight of
opinion as well as measures for conflict resolution are devised.
5.2.1. Voting Procedures
The Department of Health guidelines do not include any provisions concerning voting
procedures; this is considered to be a matter for the committees' discretion. Some
committees reach their decisions by unanimity which, effectively gives every member a
veto. Others employ majority voting which raises the question of what size must be the
majority in order to carry the vote - a point on which there is no unanimity.56
It is arguable that unanimous voting represents the highest ethical ideal. It can, however,
act in such a way so as to force out a high proportion of proposals. This would
undoubtedly inhibit the development of research which would affect patients to the
extent that they might be deprived of the best quality of care. Furthermore, society
might also be deprived of the possible benefits of medical progress. In effect, unanimity
brings decisions down to the lowest common denominator of the sort of research to be
approved. As a result, it is the members who like a protocol least who are accomodated.
Hence, it is arguable that overall progress is minimal and the process may eventually be
non-viable.
By contrast, majority voting ensures that some forms of research would be approved
which would fail in the event of a member exercising his or her veto under the unanimity
principle. However, it might be argued that such a system of voting is unethical in that a
56Fieldresearch revealed that four committees used majority voting whilst three used unanimous voting.
See Appendix E.
valid objection to a protocol can be overriden by a majority of members who may adopt
equally inflexible positions.57
A shortfall of the current system for regulating research is that RECs are not under the
aegis of any higher organisation as regards their practices. What if, for instance, a REC
or one of its members was particularly uneasy about a research protocol and feared that
it might be offered elsewhere, especially if the protocol formed part of a multi-centre trial
?58 It is arguable that there would be a moral imperative to register its concern with a
higher organisation.59 Whether one believes that the route to further consideration
would be to the Department of Health, the Scottish Office or to the General Medical
Council, the fact remains that such a practice ought to become accepted as standard.
This question was put to a selection of research ethics committees in Scotland by way of
a questionnaire. None of the respondent committees had any procedure in place
whereby they would contact any of the above mentioned bodies in the event of doubt
concerning a research proposal. Indeed, a member of one committee answered that
whenever a proposal raised issues to which he was opposed - as, for example, in the
case of research involving the use of foetal materials - it was his practice to retreat from
the deliberation process concerning that particular proposal. This is clearly
unsatisfactory - research ethics committees staffed by doubting Pontius Pilates do
nothing to inspire confidence in the efficiency of the review process as a whole.
The arguments in favour of unanimity and majority voting are, perhaps, equally
persuasive. The main result of the discussion, however, is to raise issues concerning lack
of uniformity as regards the practices of research ethics committees. Uniformity is
particularly important in that it would also act as a deterrent to researchers hoping to
57An illustration of this point is to be found in European Community Law. The introduction of qualified
majority voting in the Council for most internal market legislation (see art. 148 (2) of the EC Treaty)
was a measure which was intended to ensure that the provisions for an internal market could be
achieved in time for the 1992 deadline.
58Although it remains to be seen what effect the regional multi-centre RECs will have. Nicholson, fn 6
above at 23.
59This is a real concern given that some committees have reported that they were aware of research
projects being undertaken according to protocols substantially different from those that they had
approved. Nicholson, fn 6 above at 20.
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resort to what has been referred to as 'committee shopping',60 whereby researchers
target RECs with less stringent standards and which are more likely to give their
approval.61 This is a real concern, as a letter which was published in the British Medical
Journal in 1995 indicates.62 Mr Dear, the chairman of a clinical research ethics
committee at St James' University Hospital in Leeds disclosed a letter he had received
from a major pharmaceutical company. The study in question concerned the comparison
of antibiotics in the treatment of otitis media and chest infections in children to which the
committee had refused to give approval on the advice of a consultant microbiologist.
The committee contacted the company in order to outline their concerns.63 The response
they received included the following;
"Fortunately, there are sufficient LRECs [local research ethics committees]
elsewhere in the country for us to be able to proceed with this study without the
participation ofDr- as a trialist."64
One wonders how far such a cavalier attitude extends in the pharmaceutical profession.
5.2.2, Uniformity
The practices of research ethics committees vary from region to region.65 It is, for
example, common practice for research ethics committees to produce annual reports; but
the quality of these varies. Nicholson found that over 45% of reports met DoH
requirements for information contained in annual reports.66 A sample of annual reports
60Originates from the concept of 'forum shopping' in Private International Law.
61This obviously only follows if we accept the premiss that one method of reaching decisions is more
restrictive than the other.
62'Local research ethics committees and multicentre drug trials' (1995) 310 BMJ 735.
"Grounds included the fact that the inclusion criteria were vague, most of the infections would be viral
in origin, neither of the drugs reflected the then recommendation for treatment of such infections, the
methodology which was proposed was poor especially as regards sampling and so on.
"Ibid.
65 See Saunders, J 'LREC problems: a member's perspective' (1995) 112 Bull Med Eth 15.
Nicholson, fh 6 above at p. 15. The test was based on whether annual reports included information
listen in para 2.16 of the DoH guidelines. For example, did they give the names of their committee
members, did they list the number of meetings held and did they give a list of proposals considered with
the outcome of such consideration. As regards composition, he found that, "Most committees, for
instance, provided only the names of their members, and one barely glances at the list. A few
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obtained from research ethics committees in Scotland revealed that their analyses of
patterns of research, summaries of proposals and decisions taken differed markedly; in
some cases it was extremely difficult to obtain an overview of the committee's practices.
A further disparity is that some committees have been known to endorse new research
which was unnecessary and have acquiesced in under-reporting of unsuccessful research
which they had approved.67 In 1981, for example, Baum and his colleagues reported
results of a review of controlled trials assessing the effects of prophylactic antibiotics on
wound infection and mortality after colonic surgery.68 Synthesis of the results revealed
that the effectiveness of antibiotic prophylaxis in reducing morbidity and mortality had
been conclusively ascertained by the mid-1970s. Yet, research continued into the 1980s
despite the fact that these results had already been published. Five out of the seven
RECs who responded to my questionnaires had measures in place for monitoring
research proposals once approval had been given.69 Nicholson found that most RECs do
not have such measures, mainly because of the lack of resources. Of 173 committees
from whom reports were received, 12 provided substantial evidence of knowing what
progress, or lack of it, each approved research project had made.70 There is a strong
case to be made for establishing a body entrusted with auditing the work of research
ethics committees.
5.2.3. Increased Commitments
The number of proposals which RECs are being asked to consider is rising steadily. The
evidence supplied by four committees of their annual workload from 1982-1992 to
committees, however, provided potted biographies of their members, which were well worth reading. If,
in addition, one includes members' ages and terms of office, the list becomes a complete and useful
document." See p. 22.
67Savulescu, J, Chalmers, I, Blunt, J 'Are research ethics committees behaving unethically ? Some
suggestions for improving performance and accountability.' (1996) 313 BMJ 1390.
68Baum, M L, Anish, D S, Chalmers, T C, Sacks, H S, Smith, H, Fagerstrom, R M 'A survey of clinical
trials of antibiotic prophylaxis in colon surgery: evidence against further use of no-treatment controls.'
(1981) 305 N Eng LJ Med 795.
69See Appendix E.
70Nicholson, fn 6 above at 16.
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Nicholson had experienced a four fold rise.71 In the period spanning the 1st October
1991 to 30th September 1992, for example, the Tayside Committee on Medical Ethics72
dealt with a total of 308 research proposals.73 This represented an increase of 31 % over
the previous year.74 Between 1991 and 1995, the number of proposals submitted for
approval rose from 193 to 311.75 To combat this, the said committee considered
doubling the number ofmeetings held per month together with the imposition of charges
for studies sponsored by drug companies.76
An increase in the submission of proposals poses administrative problems.77 RECs sit on
average once a month; it is questionable whether they have a sufficient amount of time or
indeed resources to consider each proposal.78 The larger the workload of the
committees, the more proposals they review at each meetimg.79 How effective, then, are
these committees given the restraints under which they operate ?80
5.3. The Impact of Research Ethics Committees
The effectiveness of the Department of Health guidelines has been questioned. This has
been achieved by assessing the impact of research ethics committees on the regulation of
medical research.
71Nicholson, fh 6 above at p. 17.
72Which is a joint committee of Tayside Health Board and the University ofDundee.
73Tayside Committee on Medical Ethics, Annual Report for 1995 at Appendix I.
74The Ayrshire and Arran research ethics committee has seen an increase in its workload of 100 % since
1991; note, however, that it dealt with a total of only 31 proposals in 1993. See Ayrshire and Arran
Research Ethics CommitteeAnnual Reportfor the Year 1 January 1993-31 December 1993 (1994).
75See Tayside Committee on Medical Ethics, fh 73 above at 5.
76Tayside Committee on Medical Ethics, fh 73 above at p. 2-3. Note that Nicholson found only fifteen
committees which imposed charges on pharmaceutical companies. Nicholson, fn 6 above at 21.
77
While, A E 'Cross district comparison of applications to research ethics committees' (1995) 311 BMJ
661.
78Cookson, J B 'Auditing a research ethics committee' (1992) 26 J R Coll Physicians Lond 181.
79Nicholson, fh 6 above at 18.
80Nicholson found that some committees used a so-called 'chairman's action' which involves the
chairman of an REC approving some categories of research proposal between meetings, with the whole
of the REC having the opportunity to ratify, or not, the chairman's action at a later meeting. See fn 6
above at 18.
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Julia Neuberger stated in a report which she compiled for the King's Institute:
"...But over and above such recommendations is the clear recognition that
there should be legislation on this subject. It is clear that RECs have not
hitherto followed guidelines particularly closely. It is also clear that they lack
power, being advisory to DHAs and other appointing authorities, and have no
policing or monitoring role."81
To some extent, the effectiveness of RECs has been 'neutralised'. An interesting
analogy can be drawn with the evolution of police accountability in the United Kingdom.
The issue, which has generated substantial controversy, is what Reiner has described as,
"...the quasi-legislative and executive functions of determining the priorities
and efficiency of force policy. "82
The duty of a civilian police authority is to 'secure the maintenance of an adequate and
efficient police force for the area.'8' They not only share policing costs with central
government, but they also deal with issues concerning the force's establishment and rank
structure, as well as appointing the Chief Constable. The main thrust of the 1964 Act is
that it defines the responsibility concerning 'operational matters' as a matter for Chief
Constables. In practice, however, a distinction has been maintained between
'operational' and 'policy' matters despite the fact that this distinction has no basis in the
Act. In effect, operational matters are considered to be matters which are wholly matters
for the police whereas policy matters are regarded as being issues to which members of
the public can contribute. In summary, the public's role in the running and accountability
of the police is limited. The same can be said as regards RECs.
The public interest issues with which research ethics committees are faced arise at the
coal face or the micro-level. They include, inter alia, ensuring that adequate
arrangements for obtaining consent from research subjects have been made, financial
81Neuberger, J Ethics and Healthcare; The Role ofResearch Ethics Committees in the United Kingdom
(1992) at 8.
82Reiner, R The Politics of the Police (1991) at 237.
83The Police Act 1964, s 4(1).
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recompense for volunteers and whether the research proposal constitutes unnecessary
research; they also consider whether, for example, children ought to be used as research
subjects. Macro-level issues such as the allocation of finance for research and the
political moves within medical research are outside their remit. This may well be
dictated by the lack of time. The issues which RECs do focus on are predominantly
ethical and legal; scientific politics are not taken into account. This, as we saw in
Chapter One, can be dangerous in view of the influence which governments and industry
have on the pattern of research. One wonders whether this could have been the intention
of the guidelines which, whilst appearing to underpin accountability, ensure that the
'grand design' of research remains relatively unscathed. This interpretation may appear
too Kafkaesque; it does, however, contain a grain of truth. Due to the lack of time and
resources imposed by their workload, RECs are conveniently 'distracted' from
considering the wider issue at stake - they are more or less there to take on the
responsibilities and to administer the general policies of higher authority. Like Charlie
Chaplin in Modern Times, they struggle to turn the screws and cogs of the research
machine whilst being unable to influence the design of the machine itself. This is not to
say that research ethics committees ought not to have an administrative role but it is to
say that they should have a role in policy making. Their experience at the coal face is
invaluable as an indicator for the direction which research ought to take. They have a
role in establishing norms for medical research.
Consider, for example, the Conquest of Cancer Campaign launched by President Nixon
in the United States during the Seventies,84 the aim of which was to find a cure for
cancer.85 The scientific administration which was directly responsible for planning the
campaign - which included drafting the National Cancer Act - consisted of 250 scientists.
84'State of the Union' Message. President Nixon, January 1971. See also Peart, W S 'Medical Research
is too important to be left to the researchers!' (Lecture given at the Royal Institution, Albermarle St,
London on 18 October 1973 to mark the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the Glaxo 1973).
85The kind of scientific political thinking which this statement exemplifies was to some extent mirrored
in the United Kingdom; the then Government, influenced by the apparent success of the Campaign in
the United States, also decided to set up an inquiry of a similar nature, the results of which were
published in the Zuckerman Report on Cancer Research in October 1972. See Zuckerman Cancer
Research: A Report by Lord Zuckerman (HMSO 1972).
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Many members of the scientific community were sceptical about politicians,
administrators and scientists working so closely together. Their scepticism was echoed
by the remarks of Dr O' Connor, the then scientific administrator and head of the
'Molecular Control Programme' of the National Cancer Institute, who said,
"Good science for its own sake, no matter how beautiful it is, will not get funded.
Good research that may lead to cancer control, will."86
The inherent danger which was so neatly summarised by Dr O' Connor is that involving
the political establishment in medical research could, to a certain degree, shift the balance
of availability of research for the worse albeit, supposedly, guided by the best of
intentions.
"Has there ever been a real shortage ofmoney in the field of cancer research, and
are politicians in general and the public fully aware that it has been difficult to
spend the funds available over decades effectively, and equally important, are
they aware that there are cures for various forms of cancer ?"87
Directing vast amounts of research funds to a particular medical field can have the effect
of starving other potentially worthwhile research projects of financial support. The
importance of subjecting medical research to public scrutiny and debate cannot be over-
stressed, particularly in view of the large sums of public money which are spent in the
field.88 For example, in 1992-3, the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom
spent a total sum of £M219.01 on clinically related research from a total budget of
£M253.3.89 Whereas £M13.48 was allocated to cancer research, £M69.65, or 31.8 % of
the total budget was spent on AIDS or AIDS related research.90
86'National Cancer Plan: The Wheel and the Issues Go Round' (1973) 179 Science 1305.
87Peart, fn 84 above at 12.
88See Thompson, I E, French, K, Melia, K M, Boyd, K M, Templeton, A A and Potter, B 'Research
Ethical Committees in Scotland' (1981) 282 BMJ 718.
89Medical Research Council, AnnualReport 1992-93 (1993).
""The Annual Report states that the money was spent on "Molecular Stucture, Metabolism, Cell and
Tissue, Immune System, Skin, Inheritance."
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Is this a just allocation ? It has been said that,
"There are now more AIDS workers than there are patients for them to treat.
We do not feel there will now be a spread to the general community outside the
accepted high-risk groups. We should be putting the money into areas where
there is a true epidemic, such as heart disease and cancer, as well as life-spoiling
diseases like mental illness and multiple sclerosis. There are too many people
with a vested interest in keeping funding at its present unnecessary level...an
AIDS industry has sprung up."91
The AIDS budget of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1995 was around $M70.
The Joint UN Programme on AIDS (UnAIDS) which was set up in January 1996 and
which replaced the WHO AIDS programme is expected to receive approximately the
same amount of funding.92
One result of allocating too much money for AIDS research could be that spurious
research proposals may be promoted in order to ensure the steady supply of research
grants; in other words, unless the funds allocated for AIDS are spent, the same amount
will not be awarded in the future. Is this the sort of factor which RECs ought to take
into account when deliberating whether it will approve research proposals ? The
potential for a government to gain votes by being seen to be doing something about an
illness which finds itself at the forefront of national as well as international consciousness
is considerable. It is doubtful that diseases such arteriorsclerosis or Alzheimers are as
voter friendly.93 RECs ought to be more aware of scientific politics and of the fact that
their decisions have a socio-political impact.
In order to be aware of the public policy issues, members of research ethics committees
must be informed of what the public, and through it the government, think about
research. They must, however, also be able to inform the policy-makers of their own
experiences at the coal face level. How can this be achieved in view of the opacity and
91
Craven, B, The Independent August 8, 1994.
92See The Financial Times May 5, 1995.
93"We have said it before and it remains true today-the aged have few friends and they cast even fewer
votes." Mason, J K and McCall Smith, R A Law andMedical Ethics (4th edn, 1994) at 278.
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of democratic deficit which ails the medical research process ? The next section
addresses this question by considering the accountability of research ethics committees.
5.4. Accountability of Research Ethics Committees
The accountability of RECs has attracted considerable criticism.94 Traditional
criticisms, however, are framed in terms of fault and blame - both of which are inherently
adversarial - rather than of responsibility. Writing about the effectiveness of the DoH
guidelines, for example, Mander uses the terminology of control by referring to "public
watchdog", "police standards" and "protection":
"The question remains whether this definitive standard satisfies the LREC's role
as public watchdog. It is argued that it does not, as the guidelines do not provide
the LRECs with any mechanism to enforce their recommendations and police
standards. LRECs with the will and the resources will without doubt rise to the
challenge and provide an effective service, within these limitations, but LRECs
with lesser drive will not, without breaking their duty of care. The British public
is therefore given a very unequal protection, which is arguably unethical in
itself."95
Control, is, however, articulated through the tort of negligence which, as was argued in
Chapter Three, provides a limited model of accountability. According to the tort of
negligence, for example, each individual member of a REC could be held liable in tort for
approving a trial in which a research subject took part and was damaged.96 Mrs Wigley
was just such a case. There is no evidence of the case having been taken to court but the
inference of negligence is so strong that one feels that a case must have been settled out
of court.
94In particular see McHale, fh 37 above at 180 et seq.
95Mander, T 'The Legal Standing of Local Research Ethics Committees' (1996) 2 Medical Law
International 149 at 150. Note that the definitive standard to which Mander refers is one which is
provided by the DoH guidelines and those provided by the European Union.
^Brazier, M 'Liability of Ethics Committees and their Members' (1990) 6 PN 186. Note that the 1991
guidelines stipulate that members of research ethics committees who are NHS employees are covered by
the NHS indemnity scheme. It further provides that other members, who are not NHS employees, ought
to be covered by the district health authority unless the member concerned is, "guilty of misconduct of
gross lack of care". See fh 2 above at para 2.11.
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As we saw in Chapter Three, however, the negligence model is too retrospective; it is an
after the fact approach which relies on applying principles after the damage has been
done. Principles governing medical research should be prospective. This demands an
extension of the definition of accountability;
"It may be accountability to the committee, to the research subjects or to the law.
Whilst these are by no means mutually exclusive, manifestly it is accountability to
actual and future subjects which is critical."97
Thus, accountability not only concerns individual or collective legal liability to research
subjects but also to the community in general. In a research ethics committee, a plethora
of skills are united in one fairly democratic forum.98 This calls for supervision,
coordination and command at a number of levels; transparency is vital.99 Possible ways
in which this could be achieved are discussed in the next sections.
5.4.1. Judicial Review
The judicial review process provides a way of holding the executive to account. Its aim
is to provide a remedy as well as improving the quality of public decision-making100 and
to ensure that such decisions are within the law.101
It is also educative insofar as it provides public authorities with principles and standards
on which to base their own procedures.102 Judicial review may also be regarded as a tool
of democracy. It has been used in cases brought against health authorities with reference
9,McClean, fn 47 above at 4.
98See Galbraith, fn 9 above at 65.
"Ibid.
100See Lord Irvine of Lairg QC 'Judges and Decision-Makers: The Theory and Practice of Wednesbury
Review' [1996] PL 59.
101For example, has the Secretary of State acted contrary to his statutory duty if an individual is deprived
of medical treatment ? R v. Secretary ofState for Social Services, ex parte Hincks (1980) 1 BMLR 93.
102Richardson, G and Sunkin, M 'Judicial Review: Questions of Impact' [1996] PL 79 at p. 103.
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to decisions made as to the prioritisation of resources.103 It has also been used as a
lobbying tactic.104 The law relating to judicial review in England must be distinguished
from the position in Scots law notwithstanding that the grounds of review are the same
in the two jurisdictions.105 Thus, whereas the name of the procedure ofjudicial review is
shared in both jurisdictions, the origin and content are not identical; there is no common
system ofjudicial review in the United Kingdom.106
An application for review can be made in relation to decisions of central government or
any public authority or official.107 It is not an appellate procedure but is a review of the
legality of the decision. The grounds of challenge are those of illegality, irrationality and
procedural impropriety.108 If, for example, a researcher believed that his research
proposal was dealt with in an unlawful or unfair manner of if a patient wished to
challenge a decision taken by a REC to approve a research project, either could seek to
hold a REC accountable for its decision by applying for judicial review on the grounds
that the REC's decision was ultra vires.
There are, however, some formidable hurdles for an applicant to overcome. The first is
the concept of Wednesbury reasonableness as defined in Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation, where it was held that;
"The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a
view to seeing whether it has taken into account matters which it ought not to
103As in R v. Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B (1995) 25 BMLR 5 (QBD); 23 BMLR 1 (CA) for
instance.
,04See R v. Inspectorate of Pollution, ex parte Greenpeace Ltd (No. 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329, R v.
Secretary ofState for Foreign Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386
and also Harlow, C and Rawlings, R Pressure Through Law (1992).
105"There is no difference of substance between the laws of the two countries on this matter." Brown v.
Hamilton District Council 1983 SLT 397 at 414 per Lord Fraser of Tulleybelton.
106See Bradley, A W The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, "Administrative Law" Vol 1
paras 345-400.
107See Halsbury's Laws of England "Administrative Law" Vol 1(1) at para 60 and also Wade, W and
Forsyth, C Administrative Law (7th edn, 1994) at 668 et seq.
108As set out by Lord Diplock in Council ofCivil Service Unions v. Ministerfor the Civil Service [1984]
3 WLR 1174 and recently followed in R v. HM Coronerfor South Yorkshire ex parte Stringer (1993) 17
BMLR 92 at 114-115 where Turner J stated that, "It is of importance for all to understand that the relief
which can be provided in this court is tightly circumscribed by the law which we have to apply. We can
only interfere in cases of procedural irregularity, legal error or unreasonable decision."
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take into account, or conversely, has refused to take into account matters
which it ought to take into account. . .once the question is answered in favour
of the local authority, it may well be possible to say that, although the local
authority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to
consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have come to it, and in such a case the court
can interfere." 109
It has been argued that decisions by public authorities are rarely overturned because their
unreasonableness seldom achieves the Wednesbury standard.110 However, this argument
may be misleading. Successful challenges concerning unreasonableness in the sense of
irrationality are rare. Many decisions are, however, struck down on 'lesser grounds'.
Be that as it may, the second - and, perhaps, fundamental - problem lies in the standing
of the researcher or a research subject in respect of an application for review. Under
English law, no application for review can be made unless leave of the court has been
obtained.111 The most important pre-condition is proof of "sufficient interest" in the
matter on the part of the applicant.112 There can be little doubt of this in the
circumstances envisaged - the position is covered by statute.11"' This is not merely a
preliminary issue but is a matter to be resolved having regard to the merits of the case.114
Thus, standing is a necessary condition for a successful application - it is a 'threshold
question'.115 It will not, however, be sufficient of itself.
109[1947] 2 All ER 680 per Lord Greene MR. This principle has also been accepted into the law of
Scotland. See Brown v. Hamilton District Council 1983 SLT 397. See also Himsworth, C M G
'Judicial Review in Scotland' in Supperstone, M and Goudie, J (eds) Judicial Review (1992) 401 and
also the The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encylopaedia, fh 106 above .
110See Lairg, fn 98 above at 100.
"'Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 31 (3) andRSC Ord. 53, r.3 (1).
112See s 31 (3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 which provides that, "the court shall not grant leave to
make such an application unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to
which the application relates".
113Supreme Court Act 1981, s 31(3).
114r v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of Self-employed and Small
Businesses [1982] AC 617.
"5Wade and Forsyth, fn 107 above at 708.
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Generally speaking, the rules concerning standing have been progressively liberalised in
England; the same may also be true in Scotland.116 For example, applications have been
allowed by pressure groups when conventional tactics of political persuasion have failed.
R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World
Development Movement Ltd117 concerned an application by a non-partisan pressure
group for a declaration that what they saw as a misapplication of public money was ultra
vires. Neither the applicants nor its individual members had any direct personal interest
of potential recipients of overseas aid. It was held, however, that they had sufficient
interest given the importance of the matter and the prominent role of the applicants in
giving advice, guidance and assistance.118 They were held to be acting in the public and
parliamentary interest and were not, in the words of the court, "busy bodies, cranks or
mischief-makers".119 A clearer definition of a mischief maker was not offered by the
court. Quite what the judges would have made of Henry Beecher, Jay Katz or Mr
Hyman120 is a matter for conjecture only. These individuals were not - as far as we know
- cranks. Being a 'busy body' may well be part of the job description for being proactive
in ensuring high standards of research practices.
Under English law, the applicant must show some substantial default or abuse. The
position as regards locus standi differs in Scotland where the leave of the court is not
required.121 The Scottish courts treat standing as a separate and preliminary issue122 but
may, as in England, reject an application on its merits alone. It has been noted that there
is less emphasis on a 'private rights' model and a movement towards an 'affected
116See Wade and Forsyth, fn 107 above at 711 et seq, Munro, C R 'Standing in Judicial Review' SLT
1995 (News) 279 and also Mullen, T, Pick, K and Prosser, T Judicial Review in Scotland (1996) at p.
53. See also Lakin Ltd v. Secretary ofState for Scotland 1988 SLT 780 (HL).
U7[1995] 1 WLR386.
118[1995] 1 WLR 386 at 393 F.
U9[1995] 1 WLR 386 at 393 F.
120See Chapter One, Section 1.5.1. et seq.
121An applicant must quality title and interest to sue. See The Laws of Scotland: Stair Encylopaedia, fn
106 above at para 308-232 and also D and J Nichol v. Dundee Harbour Trustees 1915 SC 7 (HL) as
approved in Air 2000 Ltd v. Secretary ofState for Transport (No2) 1990 SLT 335.
122It is treated in most cases as "logically prior to and conceptually distinct from the merits". See
Scottish OldPeople's Welfare Council Petrs 1987 SLT 179 at p. 184.
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persons' approach.123 It has, however, been argued that the law is potentially highly
restrictive in relation to petitions by certain parties such as business competitors124 and
pressure groups.125
The standing of the applicant is to be distinguished from a third hurdle - that is, the
susceptibility of the REC to review. Much depends on the interpretation of the role of
the REC. Research ethics committees are regulatory bodies but they derive their powers
neither from statute nor from contract. Judicial review proceedings are appropriate -
under English law - if RECs can be described as performing a public duty as this would
make them subject to public law.126 Research ethics committees act for and on behalf of
the health authority and are, thereby, responsible for the regulation of all medical
research involving human subjects within the NHS. As regards the duties of RECs, it
has been stated that they,
"...derive from the central purposes of the Committee: to protect research
subjects and maintain proper standards of practice in research, while
ensuring that valid and worthwhile research is carried out."127
The REC has a duty to be properly constituted with specific rules governing its
administration, which include the method of selection of members, maintainance of
proper working practices, respect for confidentiality and the keeping of records of the
decisions of the committee.128 Much, however, depends on how 'correct procedure' is
I23Indeed, it was held in Scottish Old People's Welfare Council Petrs 1987 SLT 179 an interest to sue
need not always be pecuniary. See also Munro, fn 116 above at 281.
124SeeMatchett v. Dunfermline District Council 1993 SLT 537 and also Hollywood Bowl (Scotland) Ltd
v. Horsburgh 1993 SLT 241.
125It has been argued that litigation such as the World Development litigation in England has not been
used in Scotland. See Mullen, Pick and Prosser, fn 116 above at p. 54. Note that the so-called actio
popularis which exists in Scots law refers only to a person who is within a class of those entitled to
enjoy a public right such as public rights to a pasturage, public rights to use of land for recreation or
public rights ofway. See The Laws of Scotland: Stair Encylopaedia, fn 106 above at para 309.
126See R v. Panel on Take-overs andMergers ex p Datafin pic [1987] QB 815 where it was held that the
duty owed by a body of persons must be a public duty if it is to be subject to public law. Hence, despite
the City Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers having no formal legal status, it was held to be subject to
judicial review because its functions accord with the nature and spirit of public powers and are indirectly
maintained by statutory sanctions. See Halsbury's Laws of England, fn 107 above at para 64.
127Kennedy, I 'Research Committees and the Law' in Kennedy, I (ed) The Manual for Research Ethics
Committees (1992) at 5. (Own emphasis added).
128McHale, fn 37 above at 180.
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defined. The difficulty lies in the fact that no precise procedures are laid down. It is
virtually impossible to make a direct comparison between RECs whose practices differ
widely; there is no irregularity in this - it is a direct consequence of the flexible nature of
the DoH guidelines which inherently allow for a diversity in working methods. Thus, the
Wednesbury test as applied to the REC's decision would read as follows-was the
decision so unreasonable that no other committee would have come to the same
conclusion had it been acting reasonably ?
The procedure for judicial review in Scotland is provided by an Act of Sederunt (Rules
of the Court of Session 1994).129 The grounds for review are identical to those which
exist under English law; Scots law has, however, distinctive features.130 This is
particularly apposite in relation to the accountability of the decisions ofRECs. Different
answers arise under Scots law due, particularly, to the flexible interpretation of the
supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session.1"'1
It was argued earlier that judicial review proceedings would be appropriate in relation to
a decision by a REC in England in view of the element of public duty which attaches to
its role and which is essential to a successful application. Thus, under English law, an
applicant may only apply for judicial review providing the issue raised is one of public
law. This position is not replicated under current Scots law. The so-called 'public /
private divide' in Scots administrative law has been the focus of considerable judicial132
and extra-judicial133 discussion. Scots law appeared to follow the English position until
1992,134 This was, however, firmly rejected in West v. Secretary ofState for Scotland,135
129SI 1994 / 1443, Chapter 58 replacing Rule 260B SI 1985 / 500.
130"...[B]ecause the reviewing powers of the court in the two jurisdictions are built on different
foundations, it is by no means inevitable that the same answers will be reached." See Himsworth, fn
109 at 405.
131Which is the forum for judicial review applications in Scotland. See fn 129 above. See Lord Kame's
maxim in Historical Law Tracts (4th edn, 1778) at pp. 228-229 which states that it is the province of the
Court of Session to redress all wrongsfor which no other remedy is provided, [own emphasis].
132See for example Lord Weirs's dictum in Tehrani v. Argyll and Clyde Health Board 1989 SC 342 at p.
350.
133Lord Clyde 'The Nature of the Supervisory Jurisdiction and the Public/Private Distinction in Scots
Administrative Law' in Finnie, W, Himsworth, CMG and Walker, N (eds) Edinburgh Essays in Public
Law (1991) at 281.
134See for example Tehrani v. Argyll and Clyde Health Board 1989 SC 342.
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Mr West, a prison officer, sought to challenge by judicial review the refusal by the
Scottish Prison Service to grant him removal expenses when he was transferred from one
establishment to another. The court held that the issue between the parties was no more
than a private dispute between an employee and an employer about the terms of his
service. The challenge to the Prison Service's decision by judicial review on grounds of
unreasonableness was held incompetent. In so doing, however, the court explicitly
rejected the "public / private" distinction made under English law and substituted what
has become known as the "tripartite test":
"The importance of this case for the present purposes is that it shows that the
principle upon which the supervisory jurisdiction is exercised is not affected by
distinctions which may exist for other purposes between public bodies and those
who exercise a jurisdiction under a private contract. The public or private nature
of the inferior body or tribunal is not decisive, nor is it necessary to inquire
whether the decision of the inferior body or tribunal is administrative in
character. The essential point is that a decision-making function has been
entrusted to that body or tribunal which it can be compelled by the court to
perform. As counsel for the respondent pointed out, the tri-partite relationship
in these arrangements is significant."136
Thus, the tripartite test dictates delegation of responsibility from one body to another.
This would include, for example, a situation in which an employer delegates the power to
decide to another body and the decision affects the employee;137 the relationship between
Mr West and his employer was, however, direct and therefore did not qualify. The
tripartite test could be applied to RECs to the extent that Health Authorities delegate the
power to decide to research ethics committees whose decisions affect researchers. As a
consequence, researchers would have the power to challenge RECs. One is reminded of
the case of St Johnstone Football Club v. Scottish Football Association138 in which
jurisdiction was extended beyond public officers or public bodies.139 In this case, a
football club brought an action against the Scottish Football Association Ltd in which a
1992 SC 385.
1361992 SC 385 at 399-400.
137"The common characteristic is not the nature of the tribunal or body as such but the entrusting to it of
a decision-making power or duty which must be exercised within the jurisdiction conferred upon it and
is accordingly subject to supervision by the court. West v. Secretary ofState for Scotland 1992 SC 385 at
400.
1381965 SLT 171.
139And which was reaffirmed in West. See 1992 SC 385 at 390.
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declarator was sought that a censure and fine imposed on them by the Executive and
General Purposes Committee appointed by the association was illegal, ultra vires invalid
and of no force and effect. The court upheld the challenge on the grounds that,
"...when a ^i/osi-judicial tribunal is set up, albeit by a contract between private
persons voluntarily entered into, with private jurisdiction, then since that
tribunal must accept the obligation of conducting its proceedings in accordance
with the rules of natural justice, the privative nature of the jurisdiction cannot be
permitted to prevent the Court from stepping in to enforce those rules."140
It has been argued that local authorities accord well with the tripartite model141 in view
of their practice of delegating much of their administrative work to committees and
officers.142 A tripartite relationship was held to exist in JDP Investments Ltd v.
Strathclyde Regional Council.143 This case concerned a circular issued by the Secretary
of State for Scotland to local authorities setting out non-statutory arrangements ("the
Crichel Down Rules") for offering back to the former owners surplus government land
that had been acquired by or under threat of compulsion. Thus,
"The disposals to which the circular may apply include disposals of land
previously acquired by the actual exercise of compulsory powers. Those powers
of acquisition are ultimately derived from Parliament, their exercise in the case
of local authorities ordinarily being authorised by the Secretary of State. At least
in some circumstances the exercise of such powers will be amenable to judicial
review. The 1992 circular and its predecessors issued by the Secretary of State
do not impose statutory obligations but set, or in the case of local authorities
commend, certain criteria for the disposal of surplus land. At least in
circumstances where a local authority adopts the principles reflected in the
circular, its purported application of them in a particular case falling within its
terms may arguably, in my view, be the exercise of jurisdiction within the
meaning of tFest."144
The case is particularly apt vis a vis the accountability of RECs insofar as the 1991
Department ofHealth guidelines - a circular - are the basis from which RECs derive their
legitimacy. It appears, then, that the position under Scots law is clearer than that in
1401965 SLT 171 at 175.
141See Finnie, W 'Triangles as Touchstones of Review' 1993 SLT (News) 51 at p. 54. The article also
provides an insightful critique of the tripartite rule.
l42This is recognised by statute. See Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, s 56.
1431997 SLT 408.
1441997 SLT 408 per Lord Hamilton at 413.
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England; this must raise concern, if it is accepted that accountability of RECs should be
uniform across the whole of the United Kingdom.
There are, however, difficulties with the tripartite test. It is not clear whether every
decision involving the delegation by a party to a third party is reviewable. Moreover, it
is unclear how the test is supposed to work beyond employment cases.145 There are
exceptions to the tripartite relationship. Thus, in Watt v. Strathclyde Regional
Council146 judicial review was held to be appropriate given the universal application of a
decision reached by an Education Sub-Committee of the Strathclyde Regional Council to
introduce revised arrangements for cover by teaching staff for absent colleagues.147 The
number of people directly affected by the authority's decision made the procedure
appropriate - to paraphrase West, "the decision cut across statute".148
The main anomaly which arises as a consequence of West must, however, be that the
decisions of a health board can not be reviewed (as in the case of Tehrani)U9 but that
decisions of a committee appointed by the health board to inquire into the petitioner's
case would be reviewable because a jurisdiction had been delegated to it .150
145See Himsworth, C M G 'Public Employment, the Supervisory Jurisdiction and Points West' 1992 SLT
(News) 257 at p. 261. Note that some judges have called for a guiding principle as opposed to the
development of the tripartite relationship on a case by case basis. See Blair v. Lochaber District
Council SLT 1995 406 per Lord Clyde at 410 L. In some cases, the third party has been held to be
Parliament as the body which has conferred powers. See Joobeen v. University of Stirling 1995 SLT
120, per Lord Prosser at 122 G-H: "If the tripartite test is to mean anything, it cannot cover eveiy case
where one party has been created by another party. On the other hand, I think it must be acknowledged
that sometimes a contract creates a new legal relationship, different from that of mere contracting
parties. That is perhaps more likely where one of the parties has been created, with special powers, by
Parliament or royal charter. The creation of a university, with members, seems to me to be an example
of this." (Although in this case, it was held that the issue raised was one of contract and was not
suitable for judicial review).
1461992 SLT 324.
147The teachers claimed that this contravened terms statutorily included in all their contracts following a
national settlement agreed in 1987 under the auspices of the Scottish Joint Negotiating Committee for
Teaching Staff in School Education.
1481992 SC 385 at 411.
149The case concerned a consultant surgeon employed by the NHS who had been suspended from duty
following a complaint arising from his treatment of a patient. The health board investigated the
allegations made against him and set up a committee of inquiry to investigate the allegations and report
to the board.
150If it is an employment issue. Himsworth, C M G 'Further West ? More Geometry of Judicial Review'
1995 SLT (News) 127.
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There are no reports in the United Kingdom of any challenges having been made by way
of judicial review concerning the decisions of research ethics committees. There is,
however, an English precedent in which a decision by a hospital ethics committee
concerning access to in vitro fertilisation (IVF) was questioned. The case, as the next
section will show, illustrates the limitations of judicial review as an effective method of
maintaining accountability of research ethics committees.
5.4.1.1. Rv. Ethical CommitteeofStMary'sHospital (Manchester), expH151
It must be reiterated that ex parte H must be taken as illustrative only because there are
no comparable cases involving a REC.152 Moreover, the establishment, composition and
remit of a REC are clearly different from those of a hospital ethics committee. Thus,
while the result might well have been different in the case of a REC, ex parte H is
introduced here as doing no more than indicate some of the inherent shortcomings of
committee control of medical practice. Looked at this way, it is highly relevant to the
main thrust of this thesis.
In R v. Ethical Committee ofStMary's Hospital (Manchester), ex parte H, the applicant
wished to be considered for IVF treatment under the National Health Service. The
Infertility Service Ethical Committee advised that it was up to the consultant whether the
treatment should be given. The committee ultimately decided that the applicant would
not be eligible for IVF treatment, due mainly to the fact that several adoption agencies
had previously refused to consider placing children with her in view of her criminal




152See also R v. Sheffield Health Authority, ex p. Seale (1994) 25 BMLR 1. See McHale, J, Fox, M and
Murphy, J Health Care Law: Text, Cases andMaterials (1997) at p. 672 et seq for discussion.
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In seeking judicial review of the committee's decision, the applicant maintained that the
decision was reached by the wrong body and that in the alternative, she was not given
adequate opportunity to make representations to the decision-maker before the decision
was taken. It was suggested that, once the committee had been asked for advice on
whether a treatment should be given to a particular individual, it was obliged to
investigate the matter and to give advice in pursuance to their deliberations. In refusing
the application, however, Schiemann J held that the committee was entitled not to give
advice, its main function being to provide a forum for professionals to talk things over
and to provide general guidelines.
Two significant deductions may be drawn from the judgment. The first issue relates to
the role of the committee. In the opinion of the judge, the role of the committee was
advisory and it was not a decision making body. Schiemann J chose to rely on the
committee's terms of reference which provided that,
"An Infertility Services Committee exists within the hospital. The committee
was established in the spirit of the Warnock Report on Human Fertilization
and Embryology. The Committee provides a forum for those who provide
infertility services to discuss issues of concern an seek advice and guidance."
There is, therefore, a distinction to be made between the hospital ethics committee and
the REC. Applying Schiemann J's reasoning in the case the REC, having more than an
advisory status, would be susceptible to judicial review.
We should also note briefly Ms H's contention that she was unable to make
representations to the committee. The administrative load on a REC is considerable and
nearly always exceeds the capacity of the clerical support available. This, combined with
the absence of any directive on the subject means that the minutes of meetings with
explanations of the decisions reached can be delayed almost indefinitely.
In the case of ex parte H, the committee met for the first time on March 15th. They met
again on September 16th. The applicant's case was not cited in the minutes of the first
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meeting,153 despite the fact that there was evidence that it was discussed which was
substantiated by an affidavit by a member of the committee. Without this affidavit, the
applicant would most certainly not have had sufficient reason for bringing the case.
The applicant and her husband were eventually informed of the reason for the refusal of
IVF treatment on September 20th, 1985 despite the fact that the decision not to treat the
applicant had already been taken by the consultant in December 1984; Schiemann J
criticised this as amounting to 'shadow boxing' in that the applicant was misled for a
considerable length of time as to whether she would be treated or not. In effect, the
odds were firmly stacked against her from the start. One can visualise the same process
operating within a REC.
5.4.1.2. Improving Accountability Through Judicial Review
R v. Ethical Committee ofStMary's Hospital (Manchester), ex parte H is an illustration
of the ethical control of medicine at its worst. An Infertility Services Committee is,
admittedly, not a research ethics committee but it is one set up to achieve the same ends
- to ensure that the public is treated fairly and with due respect in circumstances where
the patient is vulnerable to arbitrary decision-making. The case ofMs H exemplifies the
working of a committee that is established on uncertain ground and which works under
an uncertain remit. The difference between the Infertility Service Committee and a REC
is, essentially, no more than one of administrative level. The lack of accountability which
was so apparent in ex parte H exists also in the REC; it is because of the latter's wider
range and standing that it is so important to learn the lessons provided by the former and
to apply them throughout the committee system before a paternalistic and undemocratic
system is accepted as the norm. What are clearly needed are laid-down procedures
which clarify the hierarchy of accountability of ethics committees in general and research
ethics committees in particular.
153The entry in the minutes of the meeting was that, "...advice from the committee regarding individual
patients was given, but is not minuted due to patient confidentiality" and further, "...it was emphasized
that clinicians retained the right to decide upon treatment vis-a-vis their clinical judgment". [1988] 1
flr 512 at 517.
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The foundations of enhanced accountability ought to be the basic concept of democracy
tempered by the principles of openness, transparency and reasonableness - which in the
context of judicial review, can be seen as procedural fairness154 - and demonstrated
rationality or the obligation of a body to give reasons for its decision. The accountability
of decision-making is to be achieved, in the words used in West, by upholding standards
of rationality and fairness of procedures.155
The discipline of a requirement for RECs to give reasons for their decisions is a good
one as it ensures that standards according to which researchers are judged are exposed
to public debate and scrutiny. The difficulty with which we are faced is the tradition in
the United Kingdom of the professions being largely self-regulating. In the English case
ofR v. Higher Education Funding Council,156 for example, it was held that a panel of
academic specialists, whose appointed role was to assess and rate the quality of
universities and other research institutions, did not have to give reasons for their decision
to give the applicant institution a lower research rating. The emphasis in the judgment is
very much in favour of peer review. Thus,
"We lack precisely the expertise which would permit us to judge whether it is
extraordinary or not."
And further;
"It is of course not for the court to advise an independent body on how to arrange
and conduct its procedures."157
The court accepted, however, that there are classes of case where there is a duty to give
reasons, namely, where interests are at stake which are highly regarded by the law such
as personal liberty.
154See Tehrani v. Argyll and Clyde Health Board 1989 SC 342 per Lord Weir at 351: "...there may be
essential procedural requirements to be observed, and failure to observe them may result in a dismissal
being declared to be void."
155West v. Sectretary ofState for Scotland 1992 SC 385 at 402.
1S6[1994] 1 All ER651.
157
[1994] 1 All ER at 670-671.
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Be that as it may, the principles of rationality and accountability of decision-making are
inherent in the remedy of judicial review which ought to provide the route to ensuring
the legality of decisions taken. Indeed, these are the features, or desiderata, of
accountability upon which the review process for medical research involving human
subjects ought to be based. The conceptual flaw in judicial review lies, however, in the
fact that the decisions are made by a person or persons who are unelected - namely,
judges - and this applies throughout the process, from the original decision to allow or
disallow an application to the final decisions as to the reasonableness of the
administrative action. This may be unexceptional in, say, the commercial or political
worlds but it is less than certain that it is desirable in such intimate matters as patient
care. As I have argued in Chapter Three, judges are inappropriate as the final arbiters in
respect ofmedical research.
Judical review provides a potential procedure whereby researchers and their subjects can
obtain satisfaction; but it is not necessarily the best procedure and I will offer alternatives
in the following sections.
5.6. Proposals forReform
5.6.1. A National Research Ethics Committee
Proposals for reform in relation to medical research have been made in the form of
establishing a national committee 158 It is arguable that the arguments in favour of a
committee of this nature159 have been taken up by the government in relation to multi-
158Warnock. M 'A National Ethics Committee' (1988) 279 BMJ 1626. See also Alderson, P 'A national
ethics committee ?' (1995) 107 Bull Med Eth 13 and Scot Law Com No 151 at paras 5.70 -5.71.
159Garfield, P 'Cross district comparison of applications to research ethics committees' (1995) 311 BMJ
661.
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centre trials in Scotland which now has a national committee for multi-centre research.160
A researcher must now submit a multi-centre research proposal to this committee which
advises as to the science and general ethics of the proposal. It then forwards the
proposal to the local research ethics committee for consideration of the issues which
arise locally. England and Wales, however, have multi-centre research ethics committees
in each region - there are no plans to establish a national ethics committee.161
Multicentre research projects have provided RECs with several administrative problems.
First, they generate a substantial increase in workload because of the duplication of
work; this affects RECs all over the country. Secondly, it affects the researchers insofar
as each constituent REC will have different requirements; separate protocols may
therefore be necessary with the added disadvantage that the researcher is unaware of the
specifics outside his own area. Thirdly, if these trials were to be discussed in detail in
every REC concerned, considerable delay may be caused with potential disadvantage to
the subjects who would benefit from the research.162
Aside from this, there is as yet no official move towards a National Research Ethics
Committee which would have similar functions to local RECs but at a national level.
Indeed, those who advocate a National Ethics Committee do not, in general, have this in
mind. Rather, the intention appears to be to establish a body which would identify
specific medical issues with major ethical implications and would elaborate a national
policy on such issues.
There are many objections to such an organisation the most obvious of which is that it
could not be responsible for national policy. A more likely solution is that parliament
could be persuaded to continue in its present rather piecemeal approach of defining a
problem and appointing a group to consider that particular controversial area. Such a
group can then make recommendations which the government may or may not accept. If
160'Multi-Centre Research Ethics Committee for Scotland' NHS Mel (1997) 8.
161'Ethics Committee Review of Multi-Centre Research' HSG (1997) 23. Note that Northern Ireland
does not have any provisions concerning multi-centre research ethic committees.
162See Montgomery, J 'Improving Review ofMulti-Centre Trials' (1994) 95 Bull Med Eth at pp. 19-22.
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it does, the next step is to legislate and to appoint an authority or committee to oversee
the operation of the legislation. Thus, we have the Warnock Committee followed by the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and the corresponding authority; we have
had the Kennedy Group on the Ethics of Xenotransplantation followed by the
Xenotransplantation Regulatory Authority and, no doubt in good time, an Act of
Parliament.163 The process continues with increasing specificity - among others,
Professor McLean's committee is considering post-mortem donation of genetic material
and Professor Brazier's is looking at the aspects of surrogate motherhood. For my part,
I would advocate a similar advisory group to study the implications ofmedical research.
This method has its advantages. The establishment of authorities provides an
institutional framework which consolidates differing ethical positions into what was
previously a purely medical forum. The aim of the authority is not only to monitor
professional practice and to make the medical profession responsive to lay concerns but
also, where appropriate, to achieve a consensus which provides clear and coherent
principles for researchers. Secondly, it, so to speak, spreads the intellectual load among
a wide cross-section of experts. Very few working academics can afford the time for
membership of more than one committee; the more committees there are, the wider is
the spread of the net that gathers in opinion.
Contrast this with the type ofNational Ethics Committee that has been advocated. Such
a reform would, first, perpetuate the over reliance on the 'great and the good' but, this
time in a centralised fashion. Effectively, such a Committee would be limited to
relatively few people who might not even be representative of the academic field as a
whole. There would be no justification for allowing such a group to speak ex cathedra.
Secondly, we have to ask whether we want an increase in the number of QUANGOS
(Quasi-Autonomous National Governmental Organisation) to which we are subjected ?
Their formation has been widely criticised on the grounds that there is no democratic
163The Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 was enacted too fast for an investigative committee to
precede the establishment of the Unrelated Live Transplant Regulatory Authority.
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accountability in the sense of democratic theory reflecting the collective will164 - and that
there is no public approval of their membership.
In point of fact, such has been the clamour for such an organisation that one has, already,
been set up - albeit unofficially but with powerful backing. The Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, established in 1991, is funded jointly by the Medical Research Council, the
Nuffield Foundation and the Wellcome Trust. It is a non-governmental body whose
terms of reference include identifying and defining ethical questions raised by recent
advances in biological and medical research in order to respond to, and to anticipate,
public concern. It took on this role after it became increasingly apparent that there was
no prospect of a similar governmental body being established. Thus, the Nuffield
Council on Bioethics is essentially advisory rather than supervisory. It will give powerful
advice but cannot command. As such it is a thoroughly useful body but in no way attains
the stature envisaged by those seeking a national ethics committee.
What we are looking for in this thesis is the establishment of a regulatory body made on
egalitarian grounds which is advanced as the correct rationale for the regulation for
medical research. The next sections look upon this possibility by extrapolating from the
concepts of Childrens Panels and Citizens' Juries.
5.6.2. Childrens Panels
When the Children's Hearing System was brought into force in April 1971,165 it was
commonly regarded as a major innovation due mainly to its central feature - involving
164"Quangos can now levy taxes; they can direct and take over industrial companies; and in some cases
they can even interpret and enforce the law itself. Many of them are not answerable to Parliament for
their activities, and many are not required to open their books to the Comptroller and Auditor General.
Yet they disburse billions of pounds of public money." Holland, P Quango, Quango, Quango: The Full
Dossier on Patronage in Britain (1981). For a general discussion concerning Quangos see Craig, P
Administrative Law (1989), Chapter Three Part 3, Lewis, N 'Regulating Non-Government Bodies:
Privatization, Accountability, and the Public-Private Divide' in Jowell, J and Oliver, D (eds) The
Changing Constitution (3rd edn, 1994) and Baldwin, G R and McCrudden, C (eds) Regulation and
Public Law (1987), Chapter One.
165Scottish Office Factsheet No 7 'Going to a Children's Hearing'.
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members of the Scottish public in the decision making process within the juvenile justice
system. 166 Each of the 32 local authorities in Scotland must establish a Childrens Panel
167 which deal with most cases of juvenile delinquency. The structure and operation of
the Children's Hearing System was founded upon Part III of the Social Work (Scotland)
Act 1968 and is now to be found in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.168 The system is
centred on the welfare of the child, which is paramount; moreover, it is accepted that
children should be treated in an equal manner whether they have committed an offence
or whether they require care and protection.169 Several groups are charged with the
administration and the operation of the system - the Reporter to the Children's Panel, the
Children's Panel Advisory Committee, and the social work department. The Children's
Panel offers a model in several respects on which to found reformation of medical
research ethics committees.
First, local authorities in Scotland are required by law to form a children's panel.170 This
is in direct contrast to the position of local health authorities vis a vis their obligation to
establish research ethics committees, which is based on guidelines issued by the
Department of Health. Secondly, local authorities in Scotland are obliged to publish a
list of the names of addresses of members of the children's panel for their area; the list
must be open for public inspection at all reasonable times.171 No such explicit provision
exists in relation to research ethics committees.
Thirdly, the composition of these panels serves as an illustration of how broadly "lay
member" can be defined. Generally speaking, Childrens Panels should comprise at least
166"Members of the community are directly involved, not only those who serve as members of children's
panels but also those who recruit and select them, and second, the fact that hearings deal with children
from the standpoint of their needs." George Younger, the then Secretary of State for Scotland in October
1982 in Martin, F M & Murray, K The Scottish Juvenile Justice System (1982) in the Foreward.
167Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s 39 (1). See also McK. Norrie, K Childrens' Hearings in Scotland
(1997) at p. 7 et seq.
1 ^Chapter Two.
169Rose, J The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, "Children's Panels" Vol 3 para 1281.
170Children (Scotland) Act 1995 Schedule 1 Para 1.
I71Children (Scotland) Act 1995 Schedule 1 Para 12.
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three members - at least one woman and one man.172 In particular, panel members
should,
"have knowledge and experience in dealing with children and families and they
should be drawn from a wide range of neighbourhood, age group and income
group. They require the right personal qualities, including absence of bias and
prejudice and genuine interest in the needs of children in trouble and their
relationship with the community".173
They are not, generally speaking, selected from the professions. A study of the
children's panel membership in Scotland was commissioned by the Children's Panel
Chairmans' Group in 1992.174 It found that, in general, panel members were above
average in terms of education and upward social mobility. Eighty five percent were or
had been married and 86% were parents.175 There has been a significant fall in the
number of high professionals and an increase in clerical and skilled manual workers.176
About 45 % of panel members are classified as junior professionals (teachers, nurses and
other welfare workers who work with children or disadvantaged families). There has
been an adjustment down the social class scale, based on occupation, which makes the
childrens' panel representative of the communities they serve.177 A wide age,
occupational, social and cultural mix has been discovered to be a realistic aim.
The aim of this section has not been to suggest that Children's Panels should in any way
replace or, even, run parallel with research ethics committees. They do, however,
indicate how RECs might be composed and the advantages of having this systemised.
1 "Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s 39 (5).
173Social Work Services Group Circular SW7/1969/App A, para 1.
174Lockyer, A and Wilkinson, D Citizens Serving Children: A Study of Children's Panel members in
Scotland on behalfof the Children's Panel Chairman's Group (1992) at 10.
175Lockyer and Wilkinson, fn 174 above at 11.
176Ibid.
175Lockyer and Wilkinson, fn 174 above at 10.




We have seen that the Children's Panel provides a model which will do little more than
exemplify some changes which might well improve the function of the REC; the
Citizens' Jury, by contrast, is built on a format which may well be developing as a
popular forum in its own right and one which could be harnessed to the REC with
considerable public advantage.
The idea behind citizens' juries is for an appropriate authority178 to select small groups of
citizens from the general public to deliberate questions on a range of policies - which
could include planning, health care provision, education and the like.179 They are based
on the concept of participatory democracy which is defined as including suitable
representatives of the general public.180
It is not envisaged that they would provide decisions. Rather, they would lay the
foundations for a consensus by constituting a network of communicating information and
points of view which would could be filtered and synthesised so as to represent specified
public opinion. It is important to grasp the role of experts is not overridden or
undermined; rather, it is qualified. Thus, planning and decision-making is shaped by
deliberative politics, that is:
"shaped by the publicly organized contest of opinions between experts and
counterexperts and monitored public opinion."181
178ln the United Kingdom this may well be the local authority.
179The idea was developed by Professor Peter Dienel of the University of Wuppertal in Germany and
Ned Crosby of the Jefferson Center in Minneapolis, USA. See Stewart, J, Kendall, E, Coote, A Citizens'
Juries (1994).
180This is of course an innovation. Currently "There is no accepted place for active citizenship within
Britain's system of government. Passive citizenship is assumed and thereby encouraged." Stewart et al,
fn 179 above at 3.
181Habermas, J Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory ofLaw and Democracy
(1996) at 351.
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The emphasis is on local knowledge182 and the aim is to foster and build a new habit of
citizenship. There is a great emphasis on juries being unbiased whilst bringing their
experience and understanding which is not "...otherwise available to government
'experts'".183 The model allows for deliberation of a wide spectrum of opinion.184
In Germany, citizens' juries have developed as planning cells (Plannungszellen) and are
commissioned by Professor Dienel's research institute on behalf of local or national
government bodies. The Institute works within the federal state system. The sponsoring
organization funds the project and contracts to undertake to take the juries' conclusions
into account. Indeed, proposals suggested by planning cells are frequently
implemented.185
In the United States, Citizens' Juries are organised by the Jefferson Centre and have been
used in a variety of contexts including President Clinton's health care reforms, at national
level, and welfare policy and teenage crime at state level. In direct contrast to the
position in Germany, the Centre is an independent organisation, paid for and run by
Crosby.186 It is of interest to note that the original idea resulted from his Ph.D. at the
University of Minnesota where he saw the Citizens' Jury as a solution to fundamental
problems of democracy - indeed, to the manipulation of the public by political parties,
182As opposed to misconceived government initiatives; "...university campuses on bleak parklands miles
from city life, designed with little practical knowledge of students' needs and desires; medical training
and hospital organisations developed with little knowledge of the particular concerns of women;
transport systems worked out as if children did not exist; employment legislation passed as if the passing
was enough, and the implementation could be left to the courts, without thought that the knowledge of
the workers affected should be built in;" See Wainwright, H Arguments for a New Left (1993) at 279-
280 cited in Stewart et al, fn 179 above at 3-4.
183Stewart et al, fn 179 above at 6.
1 ^"Deliberation is the process by which different views are tested and arguments are advanced to
persuade. It involves discourse about an issue and reflection on what is said. Through deliberation new
possibilities can be opened up and differences reconciled. If one seeks to persuade then one has to take
account of views other than one's own. Representative democracy can be enhanced by deliberation
amongst citizens." Stewart et al, fn 179 above at 6.
185Stewart et al, fh 179 above at 1.
186See fn 179 above.
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the corruption of government decision-making by special interests and the failure of
voting to ensure real democracy.187
The introduction of Citizens' Juries in the United Kingdom has received support from
several quarters188 including the Institute for Public Policy Research (BPPR). In its
report, "Citizens' Juries", the IPPR suggested that juries could deliberate on issues
which include inter alia transport, childcare, community service, health care spending
and education at both local and national level. Funding could be provided from a
number of sources including public governmental bodies, political parties, the media or
voluntary organisations. Indeed, the Labour Party has promised to consider the
possibility of their introduction.189 The south London borough of Lewisham spent £23,
000 assembling 16 locals to debate drug education and treatment options. The criteria
for selection included gender, housing, work, ethnicity and class. The results showed
that the jury was representative of people in the borough. In another case, Walsall
Health Authority used a citizens' jury to deliberate on the issue as to whether they
should open a hospice.190 Citizens Juries have also been used to consider questions such
as the legalisation of cannabis.191
Enthusiasm for the prospect must, however, be qualified. In both the United States and
Germany, the sponsoring body decides the issue to be addressed, defines the question
and briefs the jury. It provides the jury with the information, selects witnesses and
provides a moderator who acts as a time keeper and a referee.192 It is the moderator's
responsibility to prepare the final report. Jurors may comment on the report and make
recommendations and are allowed, in some instances, to amend their brief; they can also
call on new sources of information. Thus while opinion making is very much a matter
for the juries, power is nevertheless vested in the sponsors rather than in public bodies.
187Stewart et al, fn 179 above at 1.
188Lenaghan, J, New, B, Mitchell, E 'Setting priorities: is there a role for citizens' juries ?' (1996) 312
BMJ 1591.
189See The Guardian October 16th, 1996 at p. 11.
190See fn 191 below.
]9lThe Times November 11, 1996.
192Stewart et al, fh 179 above at v.
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In addition, in both Germany and the United States, the organisers and the sponsors hold
the purse strings which increases their control. There is a very definite danger that so
called Citizens' Juries become the mouthpieces of the sponsors rather than of the public.
A further problem concerns responsibility for provision of information to the jurors.
Which party or individual should have this basic control ? Limiting the provision of
information to one party may give rise to selective presentation. The media have played
a crucial role in the medico / legal debate. There is nothing wrong with this so long as
the media, themselves, represent a fair cross section of public opinion. It is, however,
doubtful whether this ideal is reached in relation to medico / legal problems which are
highly emotional in character and tend to be reported uniformly. Whether this is a
healthy method of informing the public deserves a short discussion.
5.7. Informing the Public: the Role of the Media
5.7.1. Selective Presentation
The medical profession and the legal profession are not the only people who tailor
information to suit certain ends. The coverage of the Child B case193 can be used to
illustrate the way in which public perception can be shaped when provided with limited
and partial information.194 The case concerned the father of a girl with leukaemia who
took Cambridge Health Authority to court for refusing to fund chemotherapy and a
second bone marrow transplant for her in the public sector. Universally, the media gave
minimum consideration to the clinical circumstances and the case was presented simply
as an example of rationing based on financial considerations. Only five out of sixteen
editorial articles mentioned the possibility that the proposed treatment might cause more
193This has been officially reported in R v. Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B (1995) 25 BMLR 5
(QBD); 23 BMLR 1 (CA).
194Entwistle, V A, Watt, I S, Bradbury, R, Pehl Lesley, J 'Media coverage of the Child B case' (1966)
312 BMJ 1588.
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harm than good and few emphasised that most medical experts felt that it was not the
best course of action.195 Reports of the chances of success varied; palliative care was
mentioned sparingly, thereby reinforcing the belief that the alternative to the treatment
sought was no care at all.
Further bias was shown by the way in which the experimental status of the treatment was
examined. Whereas the Court of Appeal referred to the case as being at the "frontiers of
medical science",196 the Daily Mirror devoted an article which attributed the current
leukaemia cure rate to "brilliant research"; only through further research, impliedly by
treating Child B, would better combinations of drugs and ways to reduce the side effects
be found.197 It cited the UK Children's Cancer Study Group and the 20 major centres
treating childhood cancer in Britain and stressed the need for "coordinated research"
whilst failing to mention that the group, itself, had advised against the proposed
treatment of Child B.
Several conclusions may be drawn. First, whilst the importance ofmedical expertise was
acknowledged on the one hand, and the views of the family in respect of individual
treatment decisions were focussed upon on the other, very little was written which
would explain the basis of disagreements which must inevitably occur from time to time.
Secondly, the coverage gave the impression that doctor's decisions are always
dominated by cost considerations. Thirdly, the coverage of the case was emotive,
referring to the child as "Little B" or "Little Miss B", displaying a tendency to seek
preferential treatment for children on the basis of little more than sympathy .198
195Enwistle et al, fh 194 above at 1588; "The basic positions adopted in leader articles were generally
reflected in the news reporting of each paper. Opposing viewpoints were included but tended to be
marginalised , appearing on letters pages , in columns, or as other first person opinion pieces".
196R v. Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B 23 BMLR 1 at 8.
197Entwistle et al, fh 194 above at 1589.
198Entwistle et al, fh 194 above at 1590.
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The coverage of the Child B case raised three further issues. First, an interesting parallel
was drawn in the News of the World with another case of parents whose child died of
leukaemia and who were tortured with guilt after reading about Child B:
"I keep asking myself if they let Sharon die because of the money as well. Child
B's father had the guts to find out why they were stopping her treatment. I didn't.
I never questioned it. I accepted it. But it makes me feel now that if I'd done
what he's done would I have got the same answer, 'We can't afford it ? It's really
bugging me. Did I let my daughter die without at least finding out what chance
she had and what I could do about it ?...You accept what doctors tell you because
they are the experts and you trust them. Now I can't help asking if I did the right
tU ■ ,,199thing.
This is a point of fundamental importance as it touches upon why people take doctors to
court. In the culture of blame, it is a way whereby people can obtain catharsis of a
complex mixture of feelings of powerlessness, grief and pain; this is truly aposite to the
workings ofRECs insofar as experimental cases such as that ofB will come increasingly
within their remit. Are they to cover themselves legally by agreeing to experimental
treatment which they know, in their hearts, to be inappropriate ?
Secondly, the case highlighted the fact that we are living in an age of soundbites which
tend to be focussed on the least admirable aspects of decision-making. The headlines in
the Child B case included "Condemned by bank balance" (Sun, 11 March 1995), "A
Price too high to pay" (Daily Mirror, 11 March, 1995) and "The idea that the medical
judgement of a health authority can be clouded by financial considerations is distasteful
and obscene" (Sun 11 March, 1995).200 This is coupled with the phenomenon of
tabloidisation or the disappearing frontier between the 'quality' and the popular press
and where foreign news, parliamentary reporting and investigative journalism is replaced
by "what happened on the way to Sainsbury's".201
There is a hidden assumption, however, that the quality broadsheets are intended to deal
with different matters than do the tabloids or, if they cover the same subjects, they
'"Entwistle et al, ffi 194 above at 1590.
200Entwistle et al, fn 194 above at 1588.
201 See The Guardian, G2 section, October 3, 1996 at 2 - 3.
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should do so on a higher plane.202 The erosion of considered media opinion is such that
the public is nowadays presented with few alternative views and circulation figures are a
poor basis on which to inform the public on questions ofmedical research.
5.9. Conclusion
It is a reasonable assumption that research ethics committees are desirable - or possibly
essential - for the control of research and the protection of research subjects. What we
have seen is that the model as has evolved in the United Kingdom fullfills its purpose less
than ideally. We have discussed the reasons for this which include, inter alia, an ad hoc
approach by individual committees to their role and practice and a general over-reliance
on the expert culture. An essential tenet of this thesis is that public participation should
be more widespread in what is a matter of public interest. This, however, implies that
the public must be better informed. We have looked at some possibilities along these
lines but it is now necessary to consider actual alternatives which are already in place
elsewhere. The next section addresses this with reference to Germany.
202"Most of our readers have the capacity to think more broadly than that. They want to know about the
single currency and they would be cheated if the Guardian didn't give that. But they also want to know
about Liam Gallagher and Patsy Kensit." See fh 201 above at 3.
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Chapter Six
Research Ethics Committees in Germany
"Dennoch ist die Differenzierung zwischen Experten und Laien unhintergehbar, und im Hinblick aud
die dominanten Muster der gesellschaftlichen Produktion und Verteilung von Wissen sowie der




The German Drugs Code (AMG), as amended in 1994, provides that research proposals
must be submitted to research ethics committees, or Ethik-Kommissionen (EK), which
are established at a regional level.2 The committees are set up according to state law as
opposed to federal law. Placing Ethik-Kommissionen on a statutory footing has
ensured that their role has developed beyond being purely advisory. Prior to the 1994
amendment, questions had arisen regarding the nature of their function. Opinion was
divided; some maintained that committees should be concerned only with the ethical
implications of research proposals whilst others argued that they be also concerned with
the legality of proposals.3 Moreover, they were fiercely criticised for being "alibi
institutions" meaning that, whilst appearing to regulate medical research involving human
subjects they were, infact, ineffectual.4
'The difference between experts and lay people is undeceiving with regard to the dominant model of the
societal production and distribution of knowledge as well as the generation of societal problem-solving;
it is legitimate to speak of an «expert culture»." Hennen, L 'Experten, Laien und Politik' in Kolb, S
(ed) Fursorge oder Vorsorge ? (1996) at p. 158.
2According to the fifth amended version of the Arzneimittelgesetz (AMG) from 19. 10. 1994, BGB1.
1994 I. 3018 which has been in force since August 17, 1995. See § 40 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 6 AMG.
3Sobota. K 'Die Ethik-Kommission-Ein Institut des Verwaltungsrechts?' AoR 1996, 229 at 234 et seq.
4See Daele, van den W and Muller-Salomon, H Die Kontrolle der Forschung am Menschen durch
Ethikkommissionen (1990) at 75-83.
The practice ofEthik-Kommissionen has provided mixed results. Despite, for example,
the existence of detailed regulations concerning their establishment,5 there is little
guidance as regards questions of procedure. Mirroring the position in the United
Kingdom, the composition of research ethics committees is inherently professional with
lay members being selected with reference to a professional benchmark; this has raised
some concern.6
So too have the cases of unethical research which have arisen despite the presence of
strict controls. A case which arose in 1990 and which was publicised in the Suddeutsche
Zeitung is a prominent example.7 In this instance, a criminal charge was brought by the
Humanistic Union against the director of a Psychiatric Hospital of the Ludwig-
Maximilians University for experiments which were carried out at the clinic and which
had received the approval of the University's research ethics committee. These involved
subjecting in-patients to videos which contained frightening scenes in order to test the
possible side effects of a particular medication which was reputed to cause panic attacks.
The patients were unaware that they were research subjects.8 A further example is that
of the "crash-test corpses" case which arose in Heidelberg in 1994. In this case, corpses
which had been donated to the university clinic for research purposes were used in crash-
tests of cars in lieu of dummies. Although this is logically an acceptable protocol - given
that consent had been obtained - there was a public outcry once the details came to
light.9 The trial had recieved the assent of the local research ethics committee which
clearly did not represent local opinion.
5See Nordrhein -Westfalen (§ 6a HeilBerG) and Baden-Wiirttemberg (§ 4a KammerG). The regulations
empower the state physicians' chambers, the universities in particular, to establish the committees, to
determine its duties, its composition and its rules of procedure. See Deutsch, E 'Die Bildung von Ethik-
Kommissionen nach § 40 AMG' VersR 1995, 121 at 123 et seq.
6Hennen, fh 1 above at 158 et seq and also Daele, van den and Midler-Salomon, fh 4 above at 19-23.
723.1.90 at p. 13, "Strafanzeige...gegen die Mitglieder der Ethik-Kommission."
sThe state prosecutor (Staatsanwaltschaft), decided there were insufficient grounds to prosecute.
9'Bald Crash -Tests mit Leichen' Der Tagesspiegel October 18, 1994. See also Sobota, fh 3 above at
237.
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History plays its part in ensuring that there is a heightened sensitivity regarding questions
of medical research in Germany. The awareness of the past ensures the issues raised are
often the subject of public debate. This is, perhaps, a reflection ofGermany's great post¬
war democratic tradition. Indeed, Citizens' Juries or Plannungszellen, for example,
were not only partly devised by a German academic10 but have been operational in
Germany for many years allowing for the realistaion of participatory democracy.11
It is arguable that medical research in Germany is over-regulated. This criticism, as this
next section will show, is not entirely justified - indeed, the AMG has been described by
some as being too soft.12 For example, whilst EK have the power to turn down a
proposal, a trial may still go ahead if it receives the approval of the federal supervisory
body, the Bundesinstitut fur Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte (BfArM) which is
responsible for supervising the distribution of new medications onto the market.13
The position in practice is that a trial is unlikely to go ahead if it does not receive the
approval of a research ethics committee as journals will not accept the results for
publication.14 This is also the position in the United Kingdom; what, then, are the
advantages, if any, of the German model ?
10Dienel. P Die Plannungszelle (1991) and also Stewart, J, Kendall, E, Coote, A Citizens' Juries (1994).
1 Plannungszellen have not, however, been used in relation to medical research.
12See below.
13See § 21 Abs. 1 S. 1 AMG which corresponds to medicines which are ready for distribution. Note that
the BfArM is responsible for the general distribution of medical products. See the
Medizinproduktgesetzes (MPG) of 12. 8. 1994 BGB1. I, 1963 and also Lippert, H-D and Strobel, E-S
'Die Uberwachung klinischer Prufungen nach dem AMG' VersR 95, 637.
14Sobota, fn 3 above at 236.
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6.1. Research Ethics Committees (Ethik- Kommissionen)
6.1.1. Regulatory Framework
The concept of the research ethics committee was directly transplanted from the United
States into the German system.15 In effect, research involving human subjects is
conducted in clinics and hospitals under the auspices of the Arztekammern.16 These
Arztekammern have a duty to protect the public and to maintain the quality of medical
standards.17 As in the United Kingdom, Ethik-Kommissionen exist both in the public and
private sector.
6.1.1.1. Research in the Public Sector
The responsibility to set up Ethik-Kommissionen at a regional level is that of universities
and the Arztekammern; these are public research ethic committees and act on behalf of
the State.18 University committees are established and run by the senate, the faculty or
the director of the clinic.19 Arztekammer20 may set up a sub-committee or a regional
(.Land) committee.21 Their regulatory framework is to be found in codes which are
drawn up by each Kammer, or chamber.22
I5Pichlmayer, R and Nagel, E 'Aus der Arbeit der Ethik-Kommission der Medizinischen Hochschule
Hannover' in Benzenhofer, U (ed) Herausforderung Ethik in der Medizin: Beitrdge aus der
Medizinischen Hochschule Hannover (1994) at 36. In direct contrast to its anglo-saxon counterparts,
however, Germany did not transplant hospital ethics committees into its health service.
16The term Arztekammer translates literally as State Physicians Chamber and is used to refer to public
bodies which are to be found at state and at a Land level. The Kammer produce professsional codes of
conduct which are recommendations only; these are not law although they are legally enforceable.
Analogous bodies would be the General Medical Council (GMC) in the United Kingdom and the State
Medical Boards in the United States. See Rieger, H-J Lexikon des Arztrechts (1988) at 1.
17See VGH Mannheim 6.6.1991 NJW 91 2368 at p. 2369.
18See the professional code of conduct for doctors § 1 (4) Berufsordnung fur Arzte (BOA).
1'Their legal framework is to to be found in the Hochschulgesetze of the individual Bundeslander. See
for example the Hochschulgesteze fur Niedersachsen § 115 (2) Nr . 1 i. V. m. § 95 (6) NHG.
20Laufs, A Arztrecht (5th edn, 1993) at 7.
21Deutsch, E Arzt und Arzneimittelrecht. Eine zusammenfassende Darstellung mit Fallspielen und
Texten (2nd edn. 1991) at 302-303.
22See for example the Statute of the Saarland Arztekammer v. 27. 4. 1983, Saarl. AH!. 1983, 334.
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6.1.1.2. Research in thePrivate Sector
So-called 'free' Ethik-Kommissionen (Freie Kommissionen) evolved owing to the delay
which often affected state committees in dealing with a proposal.23 These committees
are commonly found in private hospitals24 or under the auspices of pharmaceutical
companies.25 They are not governed directly by the professional code of conduct drawn
up by the State Medical Council (BAK). Their practices are greatly influenced by the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidelines which provide that a new medicinal
product may only be released onto the American market if it receives the approval of an
institutional review board (IRB) at the clinical trial stage.
Free committees are supervised at an international level. A European Ethical Review
Committee is based in Rotterdam and there is also an International Ethik-Kommission in
Freiburg which was established in 1980 and which is made up of various pharmaceutical
companies.26 The Freiburg Committee operates within the parameters set by the Basic
Law as well as the professional codes of conduct, the Declaration of Helsinki, the
German Drugs Code (AMG) and the FDA guidelines.27
Freie Kommissionen are based on the Institutional Review Board (IRB) model;
however, they differ greatly in terms of substance and procedure. Whereas free
committees may be called upon to give their opinion as to the ethical validity of a
proposal, their opinions are informal. They are advisory as opposed to supervisory; the
status of advice is that which is to be expected from any private individual.28
Consequently, they must not be confused with the public Ethik-Kommissionen.
23Free committees, for example, traditionally reached decisions by members ticking one of three boxes
on a printed approval form. This included the option of adding a few perfunctory remarks. See (1994)
344 Lancet 398.
24An example ofwhich would be the Stadtische Kliniken, Miinchen.
25For example Schering AG Berlin or Ciba Geigy GmbH, Tubingen.
26This also includes British and French members.
27See Laufs, A and Reiling, E Ethik Kommissionen-Vorrecht derArztekammern ? (1991) at 18-19.
28Deutsch E 'Die rechtlichen Grundlagen und die Funktionen der Ethik-Kommissionen' VersR 89, 429
at 431.
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The independence of such committees has caused much controversy in view of what
some see as the commercial hidden agenda. After all, the main interest of a
pharmaceutical company is to ensure that it can compete in a market tailored by highly
competitive forces. Thus, a company may attempt to cut corners in seeking the approval
of a free committee; indeed, they have been criticised as being no more than a form of
consultancy service.29
We will confine discussion to the public sector in view of the fact that the operation of
the free committees is scarcely discussed in the relevant literature.
6.2. The Practices of Ethik-Kommissionen
6.2.1. Role
The role of the public Ethik-Kommissionen is to assess the ethical and the legal
implications of research proposals with the collateral aim of protecting the subjects and
the researchers. The committee must have regard to the general principles of
constitutional law, in addition to the particular legal provisions and the codes of conduct
of the professions concerned. The guidelines drawn up by the German Medical
Association (BAK)30 provide that a committee must take the reputation of the institution
under whose auspices the research is carried out into account and the effect which
dubious research would have on the direction of research as a whole/1
In practice, the role ofEthik-Kommissionen is non-specific; it is a matter of opinion as to
whether they are purely advisory, supervisory or possibly managerial.32 Academic
29See Deutsch, fh 21 above at 299.
30Bundesarztekammer Empfehlung zur Errichting von Ethik-Kommissionen 1979 in Deutsch, fin 21
above at 298.
31 See Deutsch, fn 21 above at 301.
32Academic opinion in in favour of dropping the name "ethik" altogether in view of the fact that their
role is supervisory rather than advisory. See Sobota, fh 3 above at 229.
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opinion takes the view that they are supervisory in view of the provision as contained in
the German Drugs Code (AMG) which stipulates that a researcher must submit a
research proposal to an Ethik-Kommission.33 This is clearly the correct interpretation;
Accordingly, the uncertainty surrounding the role of these committees is less than in the
United Kingdom in view of the statute which specifically establishes a duty to submit
research proposals. However, the role of the committees is not as fixed as those
established by the statutes regulating research involving animals and genetic
engineering.34
6.2.2. The Decision-Making Process
Ethik-Kommission in Germany reach decisions by majority voting. The committee must
communicate its decision to the researcher in writing.35 If the committee refuses to give
its approval, it must state its reasons for so doing. The process of decision-making in the
commitee meetings is, however, subject to the rules of confidentiality.
6.2.3. Composition
Whereas the role of the committee is clearly designated, the AMG does not stipulate
what its composition should be, an issue which has been the subject of controversy. The
German Medical Association drew up guidelines concerning the composition of Ethik-
Kommissionen in 1979. They provided that Ethik-Kommissionen should include at least
four doctors, one of whom would be designated as the chairman. However, in direct
contrast, to both the Department of Health (DoH) guidelines and those issued by the
33§ 40 (1) Nr 7a AMG and further Laufs A, fn 20 above at pp. 20-21.
34See Tierschutzgesetz of 18. 8. 1986 I, BGB1. 1319 and also Gen Technikgesetz of 20. 6. 1990 I, BGB1.
1080.
35This is a clear implementation of the EC Good Clinical Practice Guidelines which provide that, "The
Ethics Committee should be asked to give its opinion and advice in writing." 1.5 Good Clinical Practice
for trials on medicinal products in the European Community. See Notes for Guidance on Good Clinical
Practice for Trials on Medicinal Products in The European Community (EC) 1990 III / 3976 / 88 - EN.
[Approved July 1990; effective July 1991]. Also published in Pharmacology & Toxicology (1990) 67 at
pp. 361-372.
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Royal College of Physicians in the United Kingdom, the role of committee members is
precisely defined, leaving little room for discretion. Two of the medical practitioners
must be in clinical practice and at least one must be an experienced researcher. The
doctors are entrusted to advise on the medical viability of the proposal. The guidelines
further provide that a lawyer should be among the members of the committee whose role
it is to advise on the legal implications of a research proposal. The principle is that
doctors must rely on the lawyer's opinion concerning the legal aspects of the proposal.36
Each member should serve a term of four years.37 As in the United Kingdom, the
composition of committees is inherently professional.
In 1985, the BAK set up a working party whose remit was to update the 1979
guidelines. It concluded that Ethik-Kommissionen ought to include scientists as well as
doctors. It further stipulated that additional membership ought to include at least one or
more lay people together with one lawyer. Moreover, the proportion ofmen and women
ought to be as near equal as possible. There are as yet no provisions for patient
representatives to sit on committees despite the fact that substantial opinion favours such
a provision/8 It was proposed that the total number of members of the committee
should range between seven and nine.
6.2.4. Ethik-Kommissionen in Practice
Research has shown that the practices ofEthik-Kommissionen differ widely. Moreover,
like their British counterparts, Ethik-Kommissionen have experienced a rise in the
number of research proposals they are being asked to consider.39 Sixty five meetings of
the Ethik-Kommission were held at the University clinic in Hannover between 1984-
1993; 1260 proposals were reviewed which amounts to approximately 19 per sitting.
Amendments had to be made in 422 cases (approximately 6 per meeting). Six proposals
36However, the lawyer will vote on the medical merits of the proposal.
37See Bork, R Das Verfahren vor den Ethik-Kommissionen der medizinischen Fachbereiche (1984) at
168 for commentary.
38See Der Tagesspiegel June 25, 1995 at p. 9.
39Pichlmayer et al, fn 15 above at 35.
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were refused outright. A third of proposals were sent back to the researchers for
amendment.
The results of empirical research undertaken by Joachim Czwalinna40 were published in
1986. This concentrated on the composition and the practices of Ethik-Kommissionen
and was comparable to the Neuberger Report in the United Kingdom.41 The findings can
be summarised;
1.
The number of members of Ethik-Kommissionen usually varied between three
to nineteen members ofwhich five to seven are actively involved. Most of the
members were medical professionals, some of whom were trained as
pharmacologists whilst others had purely academic roles. Nursing staff and
medical students were very rarely included.42 The committees seldom had
statisticians amongst their members, despite their possible input as regards the
assessment of biomedical factors, the most important of which lay in the risk /
benefit equation.43
Czwalinna maintained that the doctors should not be selected from the same
institution in which the research is being carried out. This, he pointed out,
avoids the possibility of the medical members of the committee reviewing the
work of their colleagues and more importantly, the possibility of the doctors




Two thirds of the committees had a lawyer among their members who was
usually an academic with the occasional judge and a member of a university's
legal advisory service.45
40Czwalinna, J 'Ethik-Kommissionen fur die medizinischer Forschung am Menschen-Bestand, Struktur
und Vorgehensweise' MedR 86, 305.
41
Neuberger, J Ethics and Healthcare; The Role ofResearch Ethics Committees in the United Kingdom
(1992).
42In Continental Europe, medical students must fulfill certain tasks as part of their vocational training of
which membership of a REC could be a part. This would not apply in the United Kingdom.
43See Deutsch at fn 21 above at 306.
44This is also a relevant consideration in the United Kingdom, especially as regards research carried out
at universities, where, in view of the continuous bidding for funding, they are having to compete to
attract greater public spending.
45The lawyer's position in 1985 was the same as it is in the United Kingdom at the present time to the
extent that lawyers are not there as of right. This is also a relevant consideration in the United
Kingdom, especially as regards research carried out at universities, where, in view of the continuous bid
for funding, they are having to compete to attract greater public spending. Note that Czwalinna's
research predated the 1985 recommendations. (April 1984 - October 1985).
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Czwalinna accepted that this might have something to do with the role of
Ethik-Kommissionen in that they are advisory and not, what he refers to as,
supervisory bodies. However, he refuted this by arguing that these committees
are entrusted with assessing the moral and the legal viability of research
projects. Hence, a lawyer with the necessary background in medical
negligence ought to sit on a committee as of right.46
3.
Seven out of the thirty-three committees examined had a theologian and/or a
philosopher as a member.47 Czwalinna pointed out that it is doubtful whether
people trained at such a high theoretical level could be effective in view of the
practical discipline required of committee members. He further pointed out
that the development of 'Bioethicists' in the United States has not been
followed in Germany. However, the potential input of such members in
relation to specific questions, for example, embryo research, would be
advisable. It was not considered whether such members ought to be full time
committee members.48
Czwalinna's results indicate that Ethik-Kommissionen are strongly influenced by the
professional elite. As in the United Kingdom, for example, lay members are selected
with reference to professional benchmarks; this can occur because neither the AMG or
the BAK guidelines specify how members should be chosen.
As further examples, the research ethics committee at the University clinic Rudolf
Virchow in Berlin includes seven medical professionals.49 The other ten members are lay
members and are from the legal profession, theology, psychology, mathematics and
biology. Patient and student representatives also sit on the committee.50 Members of the
committee at the Max Delbrtick centre in Buch, include a nurse and a theologian as well
as six professors from the disciplines of law, molecular biology and medicine.
46See Czwalinna, fn 40 above at 307. The insistence on negligence emphasizes the concern for the legal
position of the committee and the for the researcher.
47See Czwalinna, fn 40 above at 307.
48I believe that such members should be co-opted. This is discussed in further depth in the chapter
dealing with research ethics committees in the United Kingdom.
49Trained in paedriatrics, psychiatry, anastheasia and pharmacology.
50See Der TagesspiegelMay 29, 1995 at p. 21.
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The members of the Ethik-kommssion in Hannover included a surgeon, an internist, a
pharmacologist, an expert in legal medicine (Rechtsmediziner), a statistician, a retired
doctor and a lawyer. There were no patient representatives although this is currently
under review.51
The rules in relation to composition of Ethik-Kommissionen for research involving
human subjects leave a lot to be desired. Indeed, it might well be argued that the ffamers
of the AMG should have included provisions relating to composition when they amended
the code in 1994. The codes governing biotechnology and the protection of animals go
into far greater detail regarding the composition of these supervisory committees. There
is no limit as to who may participate in the decision-making process; no categories of
person are excluded from membership.
6.2.1. Specialised Ethics Committees - The Gentechnikgesetz and the
Tberschutzgesetz
The statute regulating biotechnology (Gentechnikgesetz (GenT)) 1990 applies to all
genetic engineering other than that relating to human embryos. It was introduced at the
same time as the statute regulating embryology although it is not as strict as the latter.
The Gentechnikgesetz represents the middle road and was introduced as a way of
ensuring that Germany does not fall behind in matters of research and development.52
Very much in the way of the AMG, the statute arose through the pressure of industry.53
The emphasis of the Act provides a legal framework for genetic research. For example,
section 1 states that,
51Pichlmayer and Nagel, fn 15 above at 35-36.
52See Riedel, E 'The Constitution and Scientific and Technical Progress' in Starck, R (ed) New
Challenges to the German Basic Law (1991) at 68.
53This has been referred to as the 'brain drain' of researchers who leave Germany in order to conduct
research in countries which allows research which is banned in Germany to be undertaken. See Riedel,
fn 52 above at 68 and also Hiigel H, Fischer J, Kohm, B Pharmazeutische Gesetzeskunde (28th edn,
1990) at 175. Note that the Gentechnikgesetz implemented an EC directive 90/219 on the contained use
of genetically modified micro-organisms. This directive was implemented in the United Kingdom
through SI 1992/3217 The Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 1992 and SI
1996/967 The Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 1996.
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It is the purpose of the Act
1. to protect life and wealth of human beings, animals, plants and commodities
as well as the entire environment in its interrelationships (die Umwelt in ihrem
Wirkungsgejiige) from possible dangers emanating from gene technology,
procedures and products, and to prevent the occurrence of such dangers;
2. to create the legal framework for research, development and utilization of
scientific and technical possibilities (potentials) of gene technology.54
All genetic engineering is thereby placed under the aegis of preventive state control. The
statute creates a licensing authority which deals with the registration of licensing
applications and which must decide whether an intended project is free from dangers to
human beings and to the environment.55
Provisions regarding the composition of genetic research committees go into
considerable detail.56 The committee is made up of experts which should include, inter
alia, experts in microbiology, cellular biology, virology, genetics and ecology as well as
representatives from unions, industry and environmental and research organisations.57
The Gentechnikgesetz emphasises the need to involve representatives from the public
and also provides for public hearings which may not exceed a period of three months.58
As regards its role, the committee, must test and judge issues of biotechnology with the
aim of advising the government and the regions. Moreover, the committee must publish
a yearly report as a summary of its practices.
The sanctions which the statute imposes are relatively mild compared to those laid down
by the code governing the protection of embryos (Embryonenschutzgesetz) which
provides, for example, that any artificial alteration of genetic information of a human
54Translation by Riedel, fn 52 above at 68.
55See §§ 7-13 and 14-16 of the GenT of 20. 6. 1990 I, BGB1. 1080.
56See §§ 4 and 5 of the GenT, fn 55 above at 1082.
57§ 4 (1) Nr. 1 and 2 GenT, fn 55 above.
58In the event of deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the environment, a prior
assessment must be made by a Federal Gene Technology Commission (Zentrale Kommission fur
Biologische Sicherheit - ZKBS). See §§ 4, 5 GenT, fii 55 above at 1080.
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germinal cell will be punishable by up to five years' imprisonment.59 By contrast, the
Gentechnikgesetz invokes criminal liability only in the event of breaches of duty have led
to the endangerment of life or health of human beings.60 Otherwise, it imposes
administrative summary fines (Bufigeld) or in some instances criminal fines.61 The
difference in style of the legislation is well summarised;
"To speak simply of legal prohibitions would be misleading, for a legal order can
function primarily to facilitate (as in the law of contracts or wills) rather than to
limit (as in the law of crimes). Of course, it is a matter of emphasis: To facilitate
requires rules of order, and to impose controls will serve to facilitate; but the
difference in priorities is significant for the choice, or the admixture of legal
patterns of order. Two such patterns seem particularly relevant to medical
experimentation with human beings. One is the model of the voluntary
association or community. The other is the imposition of extrinsic standards and
sanctions for their break."62
The same precision as regards composition of committees applies to the code regulating
research including animals (Tierschutzgesetz) which provides that a third of committee
members must be vets, medical professionals or those with a background in the natural
sciences. It is of interest to note that the provisions also include the right for lobbying
groups to be included; members of the committee should also be selected from societies
for the protection of animals.6"'
59§ 5 Embryonenschutzgesetz (ESchG) of 13. 12. 1990 I, BGB1. 2746. Imprisonment of up to three
years or the imposition of fines may ensue where, for example, an unfertilised ovum has been
transplanted or in the event of artificial insemination of an ovum for other purposes than to bring about
pregnancy of the woman from whom the ovum stems. See § 1. For a general summary of the German
position see Goldbeck-Wood, S 'Europe is divided on embryo regulations' (1996) 313 BMJ 512.
60And to significant commodities or to natural resources of ecological importance.
61 See §§ 38 and 39 of the GenT, fh 55 above at 1082.
62See Freund in Daedalus 98 (1969) at 315 et seq cited in Deutsch, E Das Recht der Klirtischen
Forschung am Menschen (1979) at 35.
63§ 15 (1) Nr. 2. Tierschutzgesetz 1986 I, BGB1. 1319 which provides that, "Die Mehrheit der
Kommissionsmitglieder mull die fur die Beurteilung von Tierversuchen erforderlichen Fachkenntnisse
der Vetinarmedizin, der Medizin oder einer naturwissenschaftlichen Fachrichtung haben. In die
Kommission sind auch Mitglieder zu berufen, die aus Vorschlagslisten der Tierschutzorganisationen
ausgewahlt worden sind und auf Grund ihrer Erfahrung zur Beurteilung von Tierschutzfragen geeignet
sind; die Zahl dieser Mitglieder muB ein Drittel der kommissionsmitglieder betragen.",or, "The majority
of the committee's members entrusted to supervise animal experiments must have the requisite
professional knowledge of vetinary science, medicine or the natural sciences. Members of the
committee must also be selected from lists put forward by animal welfare groups; these members must
account for a third of the total committee's membership."
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Ethik-Kommissionen are not as strictly regulated as are those concerned with animals
and embryos which is why the amendent to the AMG as been referred to as "soft law".64
In particular, the amendment of the AMG does not go far enough in relation to the
composition of committees entrusted to supervise genetic and animal research. The
rationale upon which both committees are based is inherently inclusive. However, the
procedures according to which the committees established by the Tierschutzgesetz and
the Embryonenschutzgesetz operate is prescribed; there is little room for disunity as
regards practices. Hence, there is little likelihood of "forum shopping" between different
regions within Germany. To this extent, the legal framework provided by both the
Gentechnikgesetz and the Tierschutzgesetz has much to offer as regards the regulation of
medical research involving human subjects in both Germany and the United Kingdom.
6.3. Accountability of Ethik Kommissionen
Questions as to accountability have also been raised in relation to research ethics
committees in Germany, with an emphasis on the overall lack of transparency.65 It is
commonly felt that they practice behind closed doors.66 Legal accountability of research
ethics committees in Germany is centred on fault. Liability towards research subjects,
for example, may be contractual, delictual and in some cases even criminal.67
The institution responsible for setting up the committee exercises a supervisory role.
Control may be administered at a primary level by the president or the minister of a
medical faculty or by the department (Ministerium) of an Arztekammer. These
supervisory bodies may annul a decision of an Ethik-Kommission or they may advise the
committee to reach a decision. However, they are not allowed to consider the validity of
a research proposal.
64See Sobota, fn 3 above at 234.
65See Der Tagesspiegel May, 29, 1995 at p. 21.
^osse, H 'Aufgaben und Probleme medizinischer Ethikkommissionen' in Schlaudraff, U (ed) Ethik in
der Medizin (1987) at p. 13.
67Criminal liability is discussed below.
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Whereas the position in the United Kingdom is that legal accountability is provided by
redress to the administrative law remedy ofjudicial review and by the tort of negligence,
in Germany, legal accountability of Ethik-Kommissionen is ensured by further recourse
to remedies contained in the civil and the criminal law.68 Each will be examined.
6.3.1. Administrative Law (Verwal tungsrecht)
Historically speaking, German administrative law was influenced by the French legal
tradition of placing a strong emphasis on the legal control of administrative decisions.
Gradually, this emphasis shifted to the protection of individual rights through recourse to
the courts.69 The historical development of administrative law in the United Kingdom
was markedly different in view of the reluctance to accept it as a subject in its own
right.70 Both systems however, share a common theme which underlies the concept of
administrative law namely, the legal control of governmental powers.71 At a fundamental
level, administrative law regulates the relationship between the administration and the
citizen.72
In order for a challenge of the decision taken by an Ethik-Kommission to be allowed, it
must be shown that the decision amounts to an administrative act which has been defined
as,
68In the United States, IRBs have already been charged by research subjects. 'The Tort Liability of
Hospital Ethics Committees' (1987) 60 Southern California Law Rev 1239.
69See p. xiii of the introduction by Conrad, D in Singh, M P German Administrative Law (1985).
70Notably due to the views of the British constitutional lawyer A V Dicey in his book Introduction to the
Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, 1959) at p. 183 et seq. and also at p. 330 who, in
analysing the French legal system, came to the conclusion that it was not advisable to transpose the
concept of droit administratif into the English legal system. However, despite his later revocation of
this view, which is reproduced in the above mentioned work at p. 493, it has since been noted that this
conclusion was based on a misinterpretation of the status of the Rule of Law in the French legal
framework which he equated with the all-comprehensive jurisdiction of ordinary courts and the absence
of any specific body of administrative law. See Singh, fn 69 above at ix.
71
Singh, fn 69 above at 1.
72Singh, fn 69 above at 2.
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"every order, decision or other sovereign measure taken by an authority for
the regulation of a particular case in the sphere of public law and directed at
immediate external legal consequences."73
'Sovereignty' refers to measures which are only sovereign if they pertain to public law.74
Hence, the act must come under the heading of administrative law.75
Ethik-Kommissionen are not public bodies per se, but their practices must meet the
standards which are applied to public bodies.76 Hence, like his counterpart in the United
Kingdom, a researcher seeking a remedy against the decision of an Ethik-Kommission
could rely on administrative law by applying for judicial review. According to principles
of German administrative law, an individual may seek a remedy by judicial review in the
administrative courts if he is of the opinion that his rights have been breached.
6.3.1.1. Judicial Review
The protection of individual rights lies at the heart of the Basic Law. According to
article 19 (4) GG, recourse to the courts is guaranteed where basic rights have been
violated by a public authority.77 It provides that,
"Where rights are violated by public authority the person affected shall have
recourse to law. In so far as no other jurisdiction has been established such
recourse shall be to the ordinary courts."78
73See the Law of Administrative Procedure (Verwaltungsverfahrengesetz) May 25, 1976 § 35, 1976
BGB1. I 1253, 1263 and more recently cited by Tyler T J 'Legal Update' (1994) 29 Texas International
Law Journal 467 at p. 500.
74For this section see Tyler, fn 73 above at 500.
75An authority is public if it performs public functions which includes administering institutions and
public authorities. A regulation is an act which creates legal consequences which must satisfy the direct
legal effects test; the act must create legal effects on the individual which are immediate as opposed to
attenuated. Finally, the phrase 'particular case' relies on the distinction between administrative acts and
legislative acts. An act is regarded as being administrative if it seeks to govern a definite numbers of
persons and in relation to definite facts as opposed to a legislative act which is general in nature.
76Deutsch fn 28 above at 432.
77See generally Starck, C Praxis der Verfassungsauslegung: Studien und Materialen zur
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (1994) at 16 and also Von Munch, I / Kunig, P Grundgesetz-Kommentar
(4th edn. 1992) Rn. 48 zu Art. 19 (4) GG.
78Article 19 (4) of the Basic Law. See The Basic Lawfor the Federal Republic ofGermany (Translation
by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government Bonn 1994).
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The state is thereby obliged to provide an institutional guarantee of jurisdiction
(Gerichtsbarkeit), ensuring that rights of individuals are safeguarded as against
emanations of the state.79 The Basic Law thereby ensures the protection of individual
rights, referred to as the subjektives Recht which is founded on the notion of personal
interest.80 Article 19 (4)'s remit is wide to the extent that it protects the whole sphere of
the individual dealings with the state.81 It serves both individual protection and
administrative control.82
A direct application for judicial review is available only to a plaintiff who alleges the
violation of a legally protected right.83 Essentially, the right must derive from a rule of
law or statute which typifies the individual's interest. The legality of a decision can be
challenged on grounds of competence, procedure and substance.84
In contrast to the position in the United Kingdom, Germany has separate administrative
courts which exercise a broad jurisdiction.85 These courts deal with purely public
matters and, in particular, consider disputes between the public authorities and
individuals resulting from the actions of those in authority.86 A researcher could make an
application for judicial review by virtue of his subjective right (subjektives Recht). He
79See Von Munch / Kunig, fn 77 above at Rn. 49 zu Art. 19 (4) GG and also Diirig, G in Glaeser, W S
and Haberle, P (eds) Gesammelte Schriften 1952-1983 (1984) at p. 198.
80The legal doctrines of Abwehr and Leistung which exist in the Basic Law are defined as follows.
Abwehr refers to those acts which are prohibited. Leistung however, refers to what may be literally
translated as performance. Hence, it provides a special right which an individual may invoke if he
wishes the court to determine whether he may be allowed to engage in certain behaviour. See Von
Munch / Kunig, fh 77 above at Rn. 47 and 59 and also Starck, fn 77 above at 46-47.
81Diirig and Glaeser, fn 79 above at 198.
82Diirig and Glaeser, fh 79 above at 203. And also Hesse, K Grundziige des Verfassungsrecht der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (18th edn, 1991) at § 6 at p. 83.
83§ 42 VwGO. See Maunz, T and Zippelius, R Deutsches Staatsrecht (28th edn, 1991) at § 21 I at p.
167.
84§ 44 VwVfG. Nigel Foster provides a concise outline of the rules of procedure in his book German
Law and Legal System (1993) at p. 133.
85Although see de Smith, S A Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action (4th edn, 1980) at p. 3 and in
particular for a brief discussion on the Scotland Bill and the attempt to establish a Constitutional
Council which would be entrusted of reviewing the legality of assembly measures.
86The procedure of the courts is regulated by the rules of procedure
(Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung: VwGO).
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would do this by recourse to the procedural rules as contained in the Administrative
Courts Act (§40 VwGO) alleging that the method in which the Ethik-Kommission
reached its decision was unreasonable.
The nature of the claim would be that of a Leistungs-Klagesl and would only be
admissible if the individual could produce a prima facie case that his rights had been
breached.88 He would need to show that he had sufficient interest in the outcome of the
deliberations of the committee.89 The outcome of the Leistungs-Klage is to bring about
a new consideration of the case. This gives a committee considerable leeway insofar as a
challenge could only be brought if the grounds were sufficiently serious.90
6.3.1.2. The Effectiveness of a Remedy under Administrative Law
There are no recorded instances where the decision of an Ethik-Kommission has been
challenged. Thus, we can only hypothesise as to its effectiveness as a method of defining
the accountability of research ethics committees. Consideration of the general criticisms
have been raised in relation to judicial review; these may provide us with an insight into
the particular conditions under review.
It has been argued that Art. 19 (4) is not only a formal right or a theoretical possibility of
involving the administrative courts, but also aims to ensure the effective protection of
rights so that an individual may be able to bring the control mechanism into force.91
Effectiveness is a relative concept but has been interpreted as being constituted of the
principles of workability, worth and enforceability.92 All of these can be questioned in
respect of judicial review to the extent that it is not a realistic option in view of the high
costs of bringing an action and the inherent delays involved.93
87Roughly interference with an inherent right. See Deutsch, fn 21 above at 432.
88See § 2 VwGO.
89§ 43 (1).
^'Deutsch. fn 21 above at 309.
91 See Lorenz, D 'Das Gebot effektiven Rechtsschutzes des Art. 19 Abs 4 GG' Jura 1983 at 393.
92Lorenz, fn 91 above at 394.
93Stein, E Staatsrecht (14th edn, 1993) § 53 II at p. 429.
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6.3.2. Civil Law: § 839 of the Civil Code (BGB)
A duty of care owed by the Ethik-Kommissionen derives from the liability of the State as
provided in the Basic Law (Art 34 GG):
"If any person, in the exercise of a public office entrusted to him, violates his
official obligations to a third party, liability shall rest in principle on the state
or the public body which employs him. In the event of wilful intent or gross
negligence the right or recourse shall be reserved. In respect of the claim for
compensation or the right of recourse, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
must not be excluded."
However, the claim which may be brought under this section is a private claim and can
be brought under § 839 of the Civil Code (BGB) which provides that,
(1) If an official wilfully or negligently commits a breach of official duty
incumbent upon him towards a third party, he shall compensate the third
party for any damage arising therefrom. If only negligence is imputable to the
official, he may be held liable only if the injured party is unable to obtain
compensation. [«'c].
(2) If an official commits a breach of his official duty in giving judgment in
an action, he is not responsible for any damage arising therefrom, unless the
breach of duty is subject to a public penalty to be enforced by criminal
proceedings. This provision does not apply to a breach of duty consisting of
refusal or delay in the exercise of the office.
(3) The duty to make compensation does not arise if the injured party has
wilfully or negligently omitted to avert the injury by making use of a legal
remedy. 94
In essence, the paragraph upholds the personal liability of a state official which may be
invoked for any damage arising from the unlawful conduct on his part. Much, however,
depends on the nature of the act of an official as he may be exercising a sovereign act
(iure imperii) or he may be exercising an act which is contained in private law on behalf
of the state.95
94Translation by Forrester, I S and Ilgen, H M The German Civil Code in Markesinis, B S An
Introduction to the German Law ofTorts (3rd edn, 1994) at 12.
95This is particularly relevant where pharmaceutical companies are the sponsors of a research project.
The distinction illustrates the public / private divide must be questioned in view of the increasingly
active role of the State in the market place.
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The essence of the claim is that it is pursued before the civil courts despite its public law
nature. Administrative courts do not have jurisdiction if a civil claim can be brought.
The duty of care is based on liability for omissions which is based on the idea that a
potential or preceeding danger gives rise to a duty of care. This duty, which was
developed by the German courts, is referred as Verkehrssicherung, if a person creates a
source of potential danger which is likely to affect the interests and rights of others, he is
obliged both to ensure and insure their protection against the risks which he has
created.96
In the event of the committee having negligently approved a proposal from which harm
ensued, liability may be invoked not only against the committee itself but also against any
supervisory body.97
6.3.2.1.(a). The Supervisory Body
Whoever is responsible for the establishment of an Ethik-Kommission takes on the role
of a supervisory body. This supervisory body is in breach of its duty of care if it fails to
set up an Ethik-Kommission, if it fails to organise it in a proper manner or if it fails to
maintain an effective degree of supervision. A researcher may bring an action against an
Ethik-Kommission in the civil courts on the basis of the rejection of his proposal or if he
is of the opinion that the proposal was not scrutinised in a fair manner or where the
committee delayed in giving a response. The legal basis of bringing such an action is to
be found in Article 5 (3) of the basic law which upholds a researcher's subjective right to
research freedom; this is a personal right which is established by his interest in the
research proposal.98
96Markesinis, fn 94 above at 75 .
97See further.
98Article 5 (3) GG provides that "Art and scholarship, research and teaching shall be free. Freedom of
teaching shall not absolve anybody from loyalty to the constitution." See The Basic Law, fh 78 above
and also Chapter One. Free in this context relates both to academic freedom and freedom from financial
constraints.
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6.3.2.1. (b) . The Ethik-Kommission
A committee will be liable if it negligently approves a trial which results in harm to the
research subjects. Doctors would also incur liability in view of their position as state
officials." The Basic Law provides the legal basis for the proposition that individual
members of an Ethik-Kommission may be held personally liable in an action in
negligence.
In practice, a plaintiff would seek to bring an action against the state body rather than the
individual physician or the Ethik-Kommission ,100 There is nothing to suggest, however,
that it would be impossible to bring an action against the committee itself or even against
individual members101 - it is simply that it would be less likely to succeed.
The basis of a civil claim rests on the allegation of serious misconduct. The remedies
sought would be limited to compensation (Geldersatz) which is awarded on the basis of
'natural restitution' for the damage which ensued.102 However, the burden of proof
which would need to be discharged is sufficiently stringent to raise doubts as to whether
such a claim would ever succeed against a committee. Indeed, this is the reason why
such claims are seldom brought - and in fact would appear to have never been brought.
This argument, however, seriously reduces the strength of civil action as a way of
enforcing accountability.
99§ 839 BGB Art 34 GG See also Giesen. D Civil Liability ofphysicians with regard to new methods of
treatment and experiments (1976) p. 48.
100Even though a supervisory body could raise the issue of the liability of both a doctor and an Ethik-
Kommission.
101Deutsch, fn 28 above at 432.
102Palandt, O Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, (54 edn, 1995) at 989.
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6.3.2.1.2. § 823 (1) of the Civil Code (BGB).
Ail action could be brought under the Civil Code by the sponsors of a research project
(Auftraggebers) against the committee for an infringement of their right to commercial
enterprise (Gewerbebetrieb) which is laid down by § 823 Abs. 1 BGB which protects
against commercial interference.103 This is a protective law (Schutzgesetz) which has
been described104 as being so narrow that the paragraph only applies where specific
stated interests have been violated.105 However, the requirements of the paragraph are
also fairly wide in that it covers intention as well as negligence. Early cases brought
under the paragraph concerned conduct which hindered the business activities of a
competing enterprise. Hence, the right could only be invoked by businesses or
commercial enterprises. Decisions related to trials sponsored by drug companies under
the auspices of the public Ethik-Kommissionen or by companies whose trials are
approved by free Ethik-Kommissionen would obviously come under this heading.
The clause is the product of continuous judicial activity which has emphasized that the
right be kept within reasonable bounds.106 Accordingly, the interference with the
business interests must be 'direct' before it can become actionable. The test adopted by
the Supreme Court seeks to determine whether the conduct of the defendant will
constitute an invasion of the plaintiffs right if it is 'business connected' i.e. "...in some
way directed against the business as such...and must not simply affect rights and interests
which are separable from the business as a functioning unit".
103"A Person who wilfully or negligently injures the life, body, health, freedom, property, or other right
of another contrary to law is bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom.
The same obligation attaches to a person who infringes a statutory provision intended for the protection
of others. If according to the purview of the statute infringement is possible even without fault, the duty
to make compensation arises only if some fault can be imputed to the wrongdoer." § 823 BGB. See
Forrester and Ilgen, in Markesinis, fh 94 above at 12.
104Markesinis, fn 94 above at 35 et seq.
105These would include life and bodily health. There must be a causal link between the defendant's
conduct (act or omission) and the plaintiff's harm as defined by this paragraph. The kind of harm which
is not protected is economic loss unless it is the result of physical damage. Economic loss claims are
usually brought under § 826 BGB.
106See Deutsch E JZ 1984, 308.
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6.3.2.2. Criminal Law: § 226 a St Gb
Discussion of the role of criminal law in relation to accountability of research ethics
committees is justified in view of the criminal sanctions which the AMG provides.107 It
is difficult to conceive of any Ethik-Kommission offending in a manifestly criminal way
although criminal recklessness might be inferred were a dangerous proposal passed with
an inexcusable lack of consideration and harm ensued.108 A less unlikely application of
the Criminal Code to the work of research ethics committees is to be found in the
concept of consent. Put at its simplest, consent to a 'touching' elides the prospect of an
action for assault; it is at least possible that a {Commission which authorised research to
which the subjects had not consented would be as subject to criminal - and indeed to
civil - sanctions as would the researchers themselves.
A more specific and interesting consideration lies in the legality of consent to risk.
Bearing in mind that consent to severe injury is invalid, can it be that consent to risk
which might result in severe injury is equally invaild ? And to what extent would a
Kommission that approved such a dangerous project be responsible for any resultant
damage ?109 Paragraph 226 of the German Criminal Code (StGB) provides that consent
to being harmed is invalid if it contravenes public policy (guten Sitten)110 Criminality
and public policy are, therefore, intimately bound in this context and it may be that the
latter is the more important in enforcing accountability ofKommissionen.
107§ 38 AMG. See Chapter One at Section 1.7.4.3.
108Recklessness in relation to bodily harm (Fahrlassigkeit) is dealt with in § 230 of the Criminal Code.
109"...there may be those who would accept risks of a very high order for admirable altruistic reasons and
it is questionable whether they should be prevented from so doing. There are legal limits to the extent
to which consent decriminalises the infliction of harm and it is interesting to speculate whether the
consent of a volunteer to a dangerous medical experiment would serve as a defence to a charge of
assault or homicide." See Mason, J K and McCall-Smith, R A Law andMedical Ethics (4th edn, 1994)
at 352 where they cite A-G's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715, [1981] 2 All ER 1057, CA;
Smart v. HMAdvocate 1975 SLT 65 as authorities. See also Williams, G 'Consent and Public Policy'
[1962] CrimLR74, 154.
110See § 226a St GB which provides that, "Einwilligung des Verlezten. Wer eine Korperverletzung mit
Einwilligung des Verlezten vornimmt, handelt nur dann rechtswidrig, wenn die Tat trotz der
Einwilligung gegen die guten Sitten verstofit." Which translates as: "Consent of the Injured Person.
He who injurs an individual with his consent is liable only if the act is contrary to public policy". See §
96 Nr. 10 AMG i. V. m and § 40, 41 AMG.
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6.3.2.3. Public Policy (guteSitten); a legal overview
The concept ofgute Sitten derives from the Roman law principle of contra bonos mores
which was traditionally applied to contracts which were held to be invalid if they
contravened public morality.111 The German courts developed the concept of
Rechtsmoral which is a way of adapting the law to encompass moral considerations.
The concept is founded on the distinction between Sitte, Moral und Recht, with Sitten
providing concrete principles on which to base the law.112 As with its common law
counterpart, the difficulty with this concept is that it is vague and it is consequently
difficult to lay down precise guidelines.11''
It is generally held that if an act contravenes the common principles of justice and
decency, it goes against public policy. The question to be decided is whether and to
what extent the decency of the act can be isolated from its purpose; this involves an
exercise in the balance of interests (Interessenabwagung) which provides that if an
individual is following a positive purpose - an example ofwhich is obtaining organs from
living donors for transplantation - the balance of interests will tip in his favour. Thus, the
decisive factor is the extent of the danger to bodily harm in relation to its purpose. The
greater the danger and the lesser the value / merit which accompanies this purpose, the
more likely the act will contravene public policy.
"'This contractual principle is still to be found in the German Civil Code. See § 138 (1) BGB.
112Singh. fn 69 above at 3-6. Although it has been questioned whether these concepts can be
distinguished quite so clearly. The word Sitte ordinarily refers to custom or usage but in its legal sense,
can be translated as public morality or policy. Indeed, public policy is the common law equivalant to
guten Sitten. See Dietl, C-E Dictionary of Legal, Commercial and Political Terms (1983) and also
Simitis, K Gute Sitten und Ordre Public (1960) at 112.
ll3Indeed. it has been argued that the 'gute Sitten' concept as contained in § 226a may not be in
accordance with Art. 103 (2) of the Basic Law due to its lack of legal clarity and certainty. A particular




It follows that, despite consent having been obtained, the researcher incurs the possibility
of being held criminally liable in the event of the research subject suffering serious harm
during the course of an experiment which is particularly dangerous or reprehensible.114
Going one step further, can one justifiably maintain that the researchers' responsibility is
discharged once the subjects have been informed of, and fully understand, the risks when
they consent ? The concept ofgute Sitten is the deciding factor in this respect.
Under paragraph 226a, consent to injury is valid unless it contravenes morality. This
applies to all forms of bodily harm and includes reckless bodily harm.115 Furthermore,
paragraph 226a applies to bodily harm once it has occurred and also to possible bodily
harm. In the case Celle MDR 69, 69, it was held that consent must be based on a clear
understanding of the risks involved.116 Thus, an individual must comprehend the extent
of the risks but engage in the act nevertheless.
It is likely that in Germany, in view of its strict controls on human experimentation, a
case of unethical research would satisfy the criteria of social unacceptability
(Sozialethisches Unwerturteil) which is an element in the concept ofgute Sitten. This is
based on the examples of Sittemvidrigkeit which include injuries sustained through
sadomasochistic injuries which are so serious as to involve danger to the body of the life
of an individual. It is suggested that injuries sustained during the course of medical
research which does not have a recognised purpose (anerkennswerten Zweck) is an
example ofSittemvidrigkeit.
114The practical implications of this principle as regards medical interventions has come up under
procedures for sterilisation and castration procedures.
See Schonke / Schroder, Strafgesetzbuch (1995), Rn. 14.
U5Rut NJW 63 165.
U6Celle MDR 69 at 70.
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6.3.2.5. Bodily Harm to the Individual (§223 StGB : KOrperverletzung)
Paragraph 226a is founded on the provisions in the Criminal Code relating to harm to the
individual. Paragraph 223 StGB aims to protect the bodily integrity and the health of the
individual. The law distinguishes between bodily harm and injury to health; these two
forms may coexist but they are independent of each other. Possible forms of injury
include those suffered by research subjects during the course of human research.117 The
harm which ensues may be defined as grievous bodily harm (schwere
Korperverletzungen)118 and actual bodily harm (leichte Korperverletzungen) 119 The
importance of maintaining the distinction lies in the possible sentences which may be
imposed under each paragraph.
6.4. Proposals for Reform
6.4.1. A Case for a National Ethics Commmitee ?
As in the United Kingdom, arguments have been raised in favour of a national committee
responsible for investigating the wider implications of public interest issues - such as the
allocation of resources in research, and gender issues - for example, the possibility of
including women of childbearing potential in clinical trials.120 Such committees already
exist as regards research involving animals121 and genetic research.122 It has been
suggested that the committee would be established by the BAK and would coordinate
discussion of cases which raise sufficient doubt as to their ethical propriety, examples of
which would include research involving embryos and other forms of biotechnology.12-1 A
U7Schronke / Schroder, fh 114 at Rn. 50a zu § 223 StGB.
118§ 224 StGB.
119§ 223 St GB.
120Kleinsorge H 'Spezielle Probleme der Ethik-Kommissionen im Zusammenhang mit der
Arzneimittelprufung' Med R 1987, 140.
121§ 15 Abs. 1 Satz 2 TierSchG of 18. 8. 1986 I, BGB1. 1319.
122See § 4 GenT of 20. 6. 1990 I, BGB1. 1080.
123See Kleinsorge, fh 120 above at 141.
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committee of this nature would be responsible for public Ethik-Kommissionen, free
committees would not, however, come under the remit of the national committees.
The possibility of establishing an ethics committee at Federal level (Bundes-Ethik-
Kommission) has also been raised particularly with reference to the human genome
project. The main political parties, the CDU and the SPD, are in favour of setting up a
committee of this kind and have already established a working party to investigate
proposals for reform.124
The rationale for reform is, however, inherently elitist to the extent that the public remain
excluded from the decision-making process;
"Institutionelle Innovationen, die in der Lage waren, die Diskurse kritischer
Initiativen, staatlicher Instanzen, der Wissenschaft und der allgemeinen
Ofifentlichkeit aufeinander zu beziehen, sind in Deutsehland bisher rar."125
Indeed, the drive to set up such a national committtee is comparable with the
'QUANGO trend' in the United Kingdom which allows the state to abdicate its
responsibility to experts whilst, at the same time, being seen to be doing something
about the need to regulate. To this extent, the shoe of an 'alibi institution' fits the
Ethik-Kommissionen. A typical German illustration would be the Treuhandgesellshaft
GmbH, an agency established in 1990126 entrusted with the privatisation of property after
the fall of the Berlin wall.127 The abdication of responsibility is a universal government
ploy.128
124See Das Parlament 30. 9. 1994 No. 39 p. 11 which reports the arguments of a CDU member of
Parliament who stated that such a committee would have to be independent to the extent that it would be
immune from the effects of electioneering. The SPD have come up with a proposal that the committee
ought to have 21 members and have further stated that the committee would have an advisory role in
passing on recommendation to the Parliament.
'^"Institutional innovation which would be in the position to relate critical discourses of initiatives,
public authorities, science and the general public are rare in Germany." Hennen, fn 1 above at 173.
126Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Vermogens (Treuhandgesetz) of 17.
6.1990,1 BGB1 300.
127For an informative analysis of the role of the Treuhand see Southern, D B 'Restitution or
Compensation; the Land Question in East Germany' (1993) 42 ICLQ 690.
128"The creation of the Treuhand was one of the clever things the politicians did...It got blamed for
everything that went wrong in the eastern German economy. And when it goes, it will take the blame
with it." Wolf Schode in the Independent on Sunday January 8, 1995.
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6.5. Conclusion
The German Drugs Code is not as strict as its regulatory nature might imply. It is, for
example, far more pragmatic than is the regulation of animal experimentation129 or
embryo research.130 It is arguable that animals are afforded greater protection than are
human beings. Be that as it may, it is equally arguable that medical research in Germany
is over-regulated and that, as a consequence, some forms of research are slowed down,
and in some areas even paralysed.1"1 The type of research which the Drugs Code
classifies as dubious, may be driven underground. The strict nature of the code might
also encourage those who finance research to indulge in forum shopping in seeking
locations for research where the regulations are more flexible.132 It has already been
noted that Germany has experienced a 'brain drain' of medical researchers who have
found alternative environments in which to conduct the type of research which is
disallowed in Germany. Thus, it is in Germany's interest to ensure that its regulations
are not self-defeating. This also applies to the other members states of the European
Union. A uniform policy as regards the regulation of medical research is called for. The
position in which the regulation of medical research is more stringent in some member
states than in others is incompatible with a single market. It is not suggested, however,
that the member state with the most flexible regulations should set the standard for such
a regulation. A European consensus is needed - that is, a consensus of the citizens of
Europe. It is questionable, however, whether 'citizens' will, in practice, be defined
129See the Tierschutzgesetz of 18. 8. 1986 BGB1.1, 1319.
130Embryonenschutzgesetz of 13. 12. 1990, BGB1. I, 2746.
131As in the case of research involving children and the incompetent.
132Concept derived from Private International Law. See North, P M and Fawcett, J J Cheshire and
North: Private International Law (11th edn, 1987).
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widely as opposed to being umbilically fed by the professions - given the democratic




The prevalence of unethical research knows no national boundaries - it is not exclusively
a German phenomenon. In direct contrast to the United States, however, Germany is
still trying to make amends and is trying to show that the history of the Third Reich will
not repeat itself. This explains the exagerated response to issues such as embryo
research or to cloning.1 The United States, however, affects a stance of selective
amnesia concerning its role in unethical research. Quite how the American public can
rationalise Tuskegee, or Hyman, or its involvement in cases of dubious research which
was carried out in Japanese prisoner of war camps,2 is an enigma which merits more
scrutiny than it has hitherto been granted.'" This comment is made in the light of the
recent public apologies by President Clinton to survivors of the Tuskegee experiments,
some 65 years after their commencement and to the survivors of the Cold War
experiments in 1995.4 It is also made in the light of the move by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to allow informed consent to be waived in an emergency when a
patient, unrepresented by a legal guardian, is unconscious and critically ill with a
condition that is unlikely to be improved by conventional means and which could
reasonably be expected to benefit from experimental therapy.5
'See 'Vernichtung von Embryonen in GroBbritannien' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung August 2, 1996
and also Kirschbaum, E 'Germans on their high horse over cloned sheep' The Guardian March 6, 1997
at p. 11.
2Capron, A M 'Human Experimentation' in Veatch, R (ed) Medical Ethics (1989) at p. 137 et seq.
3See The Economist May 17, 1997 at p. 53.
4See The Washington Post April 9, 1997 at pp 1, 9.
'Editorial (1996) 348 Lancet.
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7.1. Societal Responsibility
Medical research has traditionally been discussed in terms of fault, most of which has
been placed on the shoulders of the medical profession. According to tradition, the
question is posed in terms of why did the doctors engage in research which is clearly
unethical ? This is an important question and should continue to be asked by succeeding
generations. Perhaps the physicians who engaged in research of a most abhorrent nature
during the Third Reich were 'unthinking'. Evidence which came to light during the
Nuremberg Trial, however, indicated that the physicians believed that their actions were
justified. Indeed, the American Cold War 'regime' encouraged medical researchers to
conduct their experiments as part of the 'war effort' and to rationalise them as being in
the national interest.
An analysis of the phenomenon of unethical research cannot be limited to the notion of
the unreflective physician alone. The role and conduct of society should also be
questioned, as a recent controversial book dealing with the Holocaust illustrates. In
Hitler's Willing Executioners, Daniel Goldhagen writes persuasively of the overall
involvement of the public in following the tenets of national socialism to their logical
conclusions.6 We can apply Goldhagen's thinking to the responsibility of unethical
research. The professional elite in both Germany and the United States, played a vital
role in justifying the conduct of research which would now be seen as being
unacceptable. The German legal system, for example, was not a victim of national
socialism but was an accomplice in that lawyers actively promoted its ideology.7 The
same can be said of some American judges at the height of the Cold War.8 But if the
professions have traditionally been accomplices in the history of unethical research, so
6(1996).
7
See Miiller, I Furchtbare Juristen (1989) and also Rottleuthner, H 'Substantieller Dezisionismus zur
Funktion der Rechtsphilosophie im Nationalsozialismus' (1983) Arch Rechts-und Sozialph/Beiheft 18,
20.
8United States v. Stanley 483 U.S. 669, 798 (1987) also in Annas, G J 'The Nuremberg Code in U.S.
Courts: Ethics Versus Expediency' in Annas, G J and Grodin, M A (eds) The Nazi Doctors and the
Nuremberg Code (1992) at 201 and 214.
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too have the general public. Its existence is matter for societal consciousness and
conscience.9 The regulation of medical research should not be framed in terms of fault
or blame as this allows the individual to stand back and abdicate responsibility for
something which affects us collectively. Although they are not necessarily self exclusive,
responsibility, not blame, should be the rationale for the regulation ofmedical research.
7.2. TheMedical Research Debate
Those who participate in the medical research debate are not, in general, elected
representatives of the people. They are largely self-appointed and as a result the
principles on which research is based are not the product of lull and open debate. On the
contrary, the medical research process is pervaded by a lack of transparency and it is
inherently undemocratic.
Scientists have taken charge of defining risks and will accept criticism of their methods
only from other scientists. At the end of the day, lawyers are in charge of the legality of
the process because it is seen as being umbilically linked to medical negligence. Moral
philosophers or professional 'bioethicists' have commandeered the infrastructure of
research ethics. The general public are excluded from the process of establishing the
normative principles. Dialogue between the professions and the rest of society is
essential.
9As was stated at the time of the 50th anniversary of the Dresden bombing; ""Wenn ich mich an den
Ersten Weltkrieg oder an den Zweiten Weltkrieg erinnere, dann ist damit zunachst einmal einfach das
Entsetzen dariiber verbunden was Menschen sich gegenseitig angetan haben. Man miisse sich immer
wieder an die Vergangenheit erinnern. Man muB daran denken, erstens um zu wissen, in welcher
relativ gliicklichen Welt wir leben, und auch um zu wissen was der Mensch, wenn er nicht aufpafit,
anstellen kann. Das es der Sinn der Erinnerns". Or "When I remember the first or the second World
War, at first I feel shocked at what people did to eachother. One must always remember the past. One
must think about the relatively lucky world we live in and also what man, if he is not careful, is capable
of doing." See Der Tagesspiegel February 12, 1995 at p. 1.
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We need the professions. We depend on them to understand the complexities which
arise in the medical research process. The professions, however, should not monopolise
rationality. Several observations follow.
7.2.1. Scientific Reasoning: The Need forDialogue
Objective experimentation, as formally introduced by Claude Bernard,10 was never
qualified in the context of medical research involving human beings. It is a regrettable
consequence that the reasoning behind standard scientific enquiry has been extrapolated
to human research. This is inappropriate and explains why medical researchers have
failed to see the need for dialogue between themselves and their research subjects.
Objective statements used in medical research are impersonal. Language used in an
impersonal context reduces individuals to objects rather than rational human beings who
are capable of making choices. The choices available to an individual used in research
are translated into matters of function and manipulation instead of identity and
relationship.11
Dialogue is a two way process. If society is to play a role in ascertaining the principles
for research, it must learn to accept scientific premises behind medical research.12 At the
same time, however, scientific reasoning must also learn to come to terms with the
attitudes of society. Symbiosis must be an integral characteristic of the relationship.
7.2.2. Legal Reasoning: the Role of the Law
In essence, the current regulatory framework for medical research involving human
subjects is steeped in liberal individualism. Rights are rooted in medical negligence
10
Bernard, C An Introduction to the Study ofExperimental Medicine (Copley Green, H(tr) 1957).
"Alderson, P 'Did Children Change, or did the guidelines ?' (1992) 80 Bull Med Eth 22
12This has been also argued by Professsor Sheila McLean in relation to the Human Genome Project. See
McLean. SAM 'Law, Ethics and the Human Genome Project' (1994, Edinburgh: Society of Solicitors
in the Supreme Courts of Scotland Biennial Lecture) at p. 7.
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which is in itself atomistic. This is not to say that individualism is wrong. The concept
of individualism in medical research, must, however, be qualified by an acknowledgment
of the role of other interested parties.
Common law sets standards - albeit retrospectively - on a case by case basis as opposed
to an approach which is principled. The legal framework as exemplified in medical
negligence should not be the exclusive model for the regulation ofmedical research. The
legal reasoning which lies behind the control of medical treatment and which has been
extrapolated to medical research involving human subjects is inappropriate given that the
former is based on an "after the fact" approach.
Procedural guidelines should be established which safeguard the public interest and
which enable questions of medical research to be based on deontological grounds
approved within a democratic framework. A concept of rights is needed which is both
realistic and sensitive to the context in which they operate. It is suggested that, as
regards the medical research process, the rights of the vulnerable are better viewed in
terms of the obligations of the powerful. Moreover, obligations should spread to all
those in the position of fulfilling them. Thus, there should be an obligation to provide
information, there should be an obligation to define the risks of a procedure and an
obligation to provide an insurance scheme whereby research subjects can be
compensated in the event of harm or death. Among these, the priority must be access to
information because the current opacity of the medical research process must be
illuminated. In particular, the ethical track record of pharmaceutical companies must be
available for public scrutiny, as the Upjohn case and the Bayer case testify.13
The public should take part in ascertaining principles as of right and not by favour of the
'great and the good'. In short, the research debate ought to be more egalitarian and the
basis for inclusion within it should be inclusionary rather than exclusionary.
13Brahams, D 'Upjohn (Halcion) and libel actions' (1994) Lancet 1422 and Teff, H 'The Law and Ethics
of Medical Experimentation' (1987) PN 184 and also Wise, J 'Research suppressed for seven years by
drug company (1997) 314 BMJ 1145.
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7.2.3. Moral Reasoning:Universalism and its Facilitators
Moral philosophers or 'bioethicists' are essential as facilitators in the decision-making
process concerning principles for medical research. This, however, is some way from
accepting that they should bear the sole responsibility for ascertaining ethical norms of
medical research. It is essential that a universal position is adopted - but the abolition of
privilege and discrimination in medical research can only be achieved if the consequences
of universalisation satisfy the interests of all those affected.14 Habermas' theory of
debate ethics serves as an appropriate model upon which to achieve societal
responsibility when ascertaining the principles of medical research. Moral reasoning
must, therefore, be concerned with procedure rather than with substance.15 The role of
philosophers in the research debate is not to provide the public with answers but, rather,
to develop a method whereby questions raised by research can be addressed by
disclosing the underlying principles.
7.3. Research Ethics Committees
7.3.1. Research Ethics Committees in the United Kingdom
Several measures are suggested in order to redress the democratic deficit which pervades
the regulation of medical research. First, a statute should be enacted which places
research ethics committees on a proper legal footing. Establishing research ethics
committees by force of law recognises their importance as the main model of
accountability for research. Guidelines established by Act of Parliament are bound to be
14See Habermas, J Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (1996) at 12.
15Whilst procedure is a universal, substance is subject to modification at a grass roots level.
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more detailed and authoritative than are those dependent on no more than a
departmental circular.16
Measures should be introduced whereby certain provisions, such as data bases for both
researchers and research subjects at a national and European level - which is especially
important in the case of multicentre trials - are formalised. Moreover, there should be a
right to information based on an obligation to provide information concerning the
research. Examination of the Child B case indicates that the responsibility to provide
information must not be in the hands of one party, given the likelihood of selective
presentation by those involved.17 In general, medical information should be made
available only on a "need to know" basis but, in the particular case of research it is the
public as a whole who "need to know".18 The bill of rights for research which exists in
California19 provides an appropriate base for the enactment of such measures. It is
suggested, however, that guidelines operating in the United Kingdom should be for the
benefit not only of research subjects but also of medical researchers and other interested
parties.
Lay members for RECs must include a wider cross - section of the community, as is the
case in Childrens Panel in Scotland where the experience of laypersons is emphasised as
opposed to linking membership to a professional benchmark.
Closer co-operation with the Department ofHealth as a supervisory and advisory service
which could be contacted in the event of unease on the part of a committee or an
16See the disparate Police and Criminal Act 1984 and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990.
'
Entwistle, V A, Watt, I S, Bradbury, R, Pehl Lesley, J 'Media coverage of the Child B case' (1966)
312 BMJ 1588.
18Nicholson makes this point in relation to research ethics committees and members of the public:
"Members of the public may wish to know who are the people with the responsibility to protect their
interests but may also be more likely to want to know what research is being undertaken on people with
their particular medical problem - either because they wish to become altruistically involved, or because
they want to know whether they might have been unwitting "guinea pigs" on their last trip to hospital."
See Nicholson. R 'What do they get up to ? LREC annual reports' (1997) 129 Bull Med Eth 13 at 21.
1'Myers, D The Human Body and the Law (2nd edn, 1990) at 247.
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individual committee member is called for. The former could arise in the context of a
multicentre project; the latter might result from approval by way ofmajority voting.
As regards accountability of research ethics committees, the principles of openness,
transparency and reasonableness may be found in the context of judicial review. This,
with its concentration on procedural fairness and demonstrated rationality, provides a
route towards ensuring legality of the decisions taken. Creating an obligation for a body
to give reasons for its decisions is beneficial as it ensures that the standards according to
which researchers are judged are exposed to public debate and scrutiny.
Models such as a national research ethics committee, as well as a national independent
review committee for medical research, must be considered in the light of the apparent
success of statutory bodies such as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.
Many such suggestions for reform have been made including the creation of a national
commission20 responsible for monitoring the entire field ofmedicine, law and ethics; the
remit of the commission could be to identify specific medical issues with major ethical
implications and to elaborate a national policy on such issues whether they arise in a
hospital or in a commercial context. Nonetheless, there is a distinct difference between
such a group and an authority established by Act of Parliament and as I have argued in
Chapter Six the former should be advisory only and should not arrogate to itself the
supervisory powers of the latter.
It has been argued that the professions are invaluable assets in the decision-making
process of medical research. However, the division of labour inherent in ascertaining
norms for medical research must be restructured. Equivalent precedence must be given
to the contribution that public understanding has to make to structures such as research
ethics committees and a national research ethics committee - should one ever be
established. Thus, a national committee should also co-operate with parallel structures
20TefF, H 'The Law and Ethics of Medical Experimentation' (1987) PN 184.
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such as Citizens' Juries so that committees can be informed of public opinion regarding
the questions raised by medical research.
7.3.2. ResearchEthics Committees in Germany
Most - if not all - of the conclusions drawn above also apply to the regulation ofmedical
research in Germany. However, several more observations arise. Whereas Ethik-
Kommissionen are established by law, the regulation can still be described as "soft law"
to the extent that it leaves matters concerning practice up to the discretion of the
committees. The statutes regulating genetic engineering21 (Gentechnikgesetz) and the
protection of animals22 (Tierschutzgesetz) give research ethics committees less
discretion. It is suggested that the existing regulatory position in both the United
Kingdom and in Germany could be reformed using the structures provided by the
Gentechnikgesetz and the Tierschutzgesetz as lines of departure given the far greater
detail as regards the composition and practices for research ethics committees that is
provided by these regulations.
We can go one stage further and call for uniformity as regards the regulation of medical
research within the European Union. It has been suggested that Germany's high
regulatory standards might be undermined by other Member States adopting measures
which are less stringent - it would then become progressively more difficult for the
member states with strict regulations to maintain their standards particularly in the
commercial field. Standards should not, however, be evaded. An invitation is hereby
extended to the Council of Ministers to adopt a legislative response to the issues which
are raised by the regulation of medical research conducted within the European Union.
21 See Riedel E, 'The Constitution and Scientific and Technical Progress' (1991) in Starck, C (ed) New
Challenges to the German Basic Law (1991) at p. 68.
22Tierschutzgesetz of 18. 8. 1986 BGB1. I, 1319.
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7.4. Coda
In conclusion, the regulation of medical research involving human subjects must be
restructured along procedural lines. To this extent, this thesis is one based on process.
It is firmly believed that process will enable the substantive principles for medical
research to be the product of democratic consensus. The rationale for the regulation of
medical research involving human subjects should be based on the adage that: principles




German Sources of Law1
The Constitution
The 1949 Bonn constitution or the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) is very much a product of
the era after the second World War. This explains the paramouncy of human rights and
human dignity which lie at the heart of the provisions of the basic law; it also explains the
stringent protection afforded individuals involved in medical research.
The constitution is at the apex of the hierarchy of the German sources of law. An
emphasis of the Basic Law is the protection of human and civil rights (Grundrechte).
This protection is furthered by the Federal Constitutional Court
{Bundesverfassungsgericht) which is empowered, inter alia, to review the
constitutionality of Federal law and the laws of the individual states {Lander) in the light
of the Grundrechte.
The constitution includes specific provisions which emphasise social justice in the sense
of social equality and the realisation of freedom under the rule of law. Article 20 (1) of
the basic law provides that the Federal Republic is a state based on the rule of law
{Rechtsstaat) which is to be exercised within the parameters of the welfare state
(Sozialstaat)2
The concept of the Rechtsstaat demands that all state activities are based on laws as
contained in the constitution. The legal basis for the Sozialstaat is set out in Arts. 20 (1)
and 79 (3) of the Basic Law. The provisions include, inter alia, that the Federation and
the Lander must take the overall economic equilibrium into account as part of their fiscal
'The major source for this section is Foster, N German Law and Legal System (1993). See p. 46.
2 See Stein, E Staatsrecht (14 edn, 1993) at § 24 IV at p. 204 et seq.
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administration. This includes all the basic rights to human dignity, free development of
personality and equality before the law.
The Codes
The German legal system is further governed by a constitutional ranking of norms which
has constitutional law as its apex with the codes (Gesetz), directly beneath. The codes
referred to throughout this work3 provide the legal framework in which the control of
medical research involving human subjects in Germany must be viewed. The codes
provide definitive answers to specific legal problems; consultation of the commentaries
(Kommentar) is a legal imperative.
The Kommentar
The commentaries explain and interpret the codes.4 They are written by leading
academics and judges and are cited as legal authorites in court.5 In contrast to their
English counterparts, writers such as Bracton and Blackstone notwithstanding, Scottish
lawyers would have no difficulty in placing this practice into legal context in view of the
tradition of institutional writing in Scotland; this is because of the influence of Roman
law, by which the common law in England remained largely unaffected.6 Thus, mirroring
3For example the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the Drugs Code (.Arzneimittelgesetz), the Civil Code
(Burgerliches Gesetz Buch) and the Criminal Code (StrafGesetz Buch).
4For example see the commentary by von Munch, I and Kunig, P Grundgesetz Kommentar (4th edn,
1992).
5A comparable example in England & Wales would be the annoted statute collections of Halsbury or
Statutes in force although the German versions go into far greater detail and analysis which is more
comparable to Stairs Encyclopaedia in Scotland.
6Although see Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 at p. 747 et seq which illustrates the application in
English law of a Roman law principle, debitor speciei liberator casuali interitus rei (the debtor is
relieved of his duty to deliver the object if it has been destroyed through no fault of his own. During the
nineteenth century, English judges began to interpret this rule as forming part of parties' agreements.
See also Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826. A further example is the doctrine of frustration which
corresponds to clausula rebus sic stantibus. See Zimmerman, R The Law of Obligations; Roman
Foundations ofthe Civilian Tradition (1990) at p. 579 el seq.
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the position in Germany, much of Scots law is based on the institutional writers.7 Lord
Stair's Institutions is cited as persuasive authority to this day and can be described as
forming part of the law of Scotland.
Academic Legal Opinion
Historically, universities played an important role in the development and the
systemisation of German law which is reflected by the influential role of German legal
literature. Academic opinion, outlined in periodicals is regarded as persuasive authority.
This is in direct contrast to the position in common law jurisdictions.8 The position in
Scotland can be distinguished on the grounds that it is more common to cite the opinions
of academics, which may influence the outcome of litigation.
Case Law
Strictly speaking, case law is not a formal source of law; it is interpretative only.9 The
guiding principle is that judges should simply apply the law and should not create it;10
needless to say this involves a considerable degree of interpretation. The German legal
system, as opposed to its common law counterpart, does not rely on the doctrine of
precedent (Prajudizien); court decisions apply to that case only and have no general
binding effect in other cases.11
'influences of Roman law, however, varied. See for example the distinction drawn by Zweigert and
Kotz between Germanic and Romanistic legal families. Zweigert, K and Kotz, H Introduction to
Comparative Law (1992, Weir, T (tr)) at p. 63.
8See however Lord Goff in SpiliardaMaritime v. Consulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460 at p. 488.
Although academics have recently been cited in some recent House of Lords decisions (notably by Lord
Goff). Furthermore, the situation in Scotland differs in that academic legal opinion is being relied upon
more and more and references are commonly made to Stairs Encylopaedia which is for the most part,
written by academics.
9The importance of case law must not, however, be overlooked. See Zimmerman, R 'An Introduction to
German Legal Culture' in Ebke, W and Finkin, M W (eds) Introduction to German Law (1996) at pp
27 et seq.
10 Marsh N 'Some aspects of the German legal system under National Socialism' (1946) 62 LQR, pp.
366-74.
"See however article 94 Abs. 2 of the Basic Law which relates to decisions of the Constitutional Court
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The Nuremberg Code (1947)
Permissible medical experiments
The great weight of the evidence before us is to the effect that certain types of medical experiments on
human beings, when kept within reasonably well-defined bounds, conform to the ethics of the medical
profession generally. The protagonists of the practice of human experimentation justify their view on
the basis that such experiments yield results for the good of society that are unprocurable by other
methods or means of study. All agree, however, that certain basic principles must be observed in order
to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the
person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be
able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force,
fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter
involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter
element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental
subject there should be known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment;
the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected; and all the effects upon his health or person which may possibly
come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each
individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and
responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in
nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem
under study that the anticipated results justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental
suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that
death or disabling injury will occur; except perhaps, in those experiments where the
experimental physicians also serve as the subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian
importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made, and adequate facilities provided to protect the
experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability or death.
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8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The
highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of
those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the
experiment to an end if he had reached the physical or mental state where continuation of
the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to
terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of
the good faith, superior skill, and careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of
the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
vi
Appendix C
Declaration of Helsinki (Revised 1975)
Recommendations guiding medical doctors in biomedical research involving
human subjects
Introduction
It is the mission of the medical doctor to safeguard the health of the people. His or her knowledge and
conscience are dedicated to the fulfilment of this mission.
The Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Association binds the doctor with the words: 'The
health of my patient will be my first consideration,' and the International Code of Medical Ethics
declares that, 'Any act or advice which could weaken physical or mental resistance of a human being
may be used only in his interest.'
The purpose of biomedical research involving human subjects must be to improve diagnostic,
therapeutic and prophylactic procedures and the understanding of the aetiology and pathogenesis of
disease.
In current medical practice most diagnostic, therapeutic or prophylactic procedures involve hazards.
This applies a fortiori to biomedical research.
Medical progress is based on research which ultimately must rest in part on experimentation involving
human subjects. In the field of biomedical research a fundamental distinction must be recognised
between medical research in which the aim is essentially diagnostic or therapeutic for a patient, and
medical research the essential object of which is purely scientific and without direct diagnostic or
therapeutic value to the person subjected to the research.
Special caution must be exercised in the conduct of research which may affect the environment, and the
welfare of animals used for research must be respected.
Because it is essential that the results of laboratory experiments be applied to human beings to further
scientific knowledge and to help suffering humanity, the World Medical Association has prepared the
following recommendations as a guide to every doctor in biomedical research involving human subjects.
They should be kept under review in the future. It must be stressed that the standards as drafted are only
a guide to physicians all over the world. Doctors are not relieved from criminal, civil and ethical
responsibilities under the laws of their own countries.
I.Basic Principles
1.Biomedical research involving human subjects must conform to generally accepted scientific
principles and should be based on adequately performed laboratory and animal experimentation and on
a thorough knowledge of the scientific tradition.
2.The design and performance of each experimental procedure involving human subjects should be
clearly formulated in an experimental protocol which should be transmitted to a specially appointed
independent committee for consideration, comment and guidance.
3.Biomedical research involving human subjects should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons and under supervision of a clinically competent medical person. The responsibility for the
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human subject must always rest with a medically qualified person and never rest on the subject of the
research, even though the subject has given her consent.
4.Biomedical research involving human subjects cannot legitimately be carried out unless the
importance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent risk to the subject.
5.Every biomedical research project involving human subjects should be preceded by careful assessment
of predictable risks in comparison with foreseeable benefits to the subject or to others. Concern for the
interests of the subject must always prevail over the interest of science and society.
6.The right of the research subject to safeguard his or her integrity must always be respected. Every
precaution should be taken to respect the privacy of the subject and to minimize the impact of the study
on the subject's physical and mental integrity and on the personality of the subject.
7.Doctors should abstain from engaging in research projects involving human subjects unless they are
satisfied that the hazards involved are believed to be predictable. Doctors should cease any investigation
if the hazards are found to outweigh the potential benefits.
8. In publication of the results of his or her research, the doctor is obliged to preserve the accuracy of the
results. Reports of experimentation not in accordance with the principles laid down in this Declaration
should not be accepted for publication.
9.In any research in human beings, each potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims,
methods, anticipated benefits and potential hazards of the study and the discomfort it may entail. He or
she should be informed that he or she is at liberty to abstain from participation in the study and that he
or she is free to withdraw his or her consent to participation at any time. The doctor should then obtain
the subject's freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing.
10.When obtaining consent for the research project the doctor should be particularly cautious if the
subject is in a dependent relationship to him or her or may consent under duress. In that case the
informed consent should be obtained by a doctor who is not engaged in the investigation and who is
completely independent of this official relationship.
11. In case of legal incompetence, informed consent should be obtained from the legal guardian in
accordance with national legislation. Where physical or mental incapacity makes it impossible to obtain
informed consent, or when the subject is a minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces that
of the subject in accordance with national legislation.
12.The research protocol should always contain a statement of the ethical considerations involved and
should indicate that the principles enunciated in the present Declaration are complied with.
II. Medical Research Combined with Professional Care (Clinical Research)
l.In the treatment of the sick person, the doctor must be free to use a new diagnostic and therapeutic
measure, if in his or her judgment it offers hope of saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating
suffering.
2.The potential benefits, hazards and discomfort of a new method should be weighed against the
advantages of the best current diagnostic and therapeutic methods.
3.In any medical study, every patient - including those of a control group, if any - should be assured of
the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method.
4.The refusal of the patient to participate in a study must never interfere with the doctor-patient
relationship.
5.If the doctor considers it essential not to obtain informed consent, the specific reasons for this proposal
should be stated in the experimental protocol for transmission to the independent committee.
6.The doctor can combine medical research with professional care, the objective being the acquisition of
new medical knowledge, only to the extent that medical research is justified by its potential diagnostic or
therapeutic value for the patient.
III.Non-therapeutic Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (Non-clinical biomedical research)
l.In the purely scientific application of medical research carried out on a human being, it is the duty of
the doctor to remain the protector of the life and health of that person on whom biomedical research is
carried out.
2.The subjects should be volunteers - either healthy persons or patients for whom the experimental
design is not related to the patient's illness.
3.The investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the research if in his / her judgment it
may, if continued, be harmful to the individual.
4.In research on man, the interest of science and society should never take precedence over
considerations related to the wellbeing of the subject.
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Appendix D §§ 40 and 41 of the arzneimittelgesetz (AMG)
3040 Bundesgesetzbiatt, Jahrgang 1994, Teil I
3. das Arzneimittel nicht die nach den anerkannten phar-
mazeutischen Regeln angemessene Qualitat auf-
weist,
4. bei dem Aizneimittel der begriindete Verdacht
besteht, daJ3 es bei bestimmungsgemafiem Gebrauch
schadliche Wirkungen hat, die uber ein nach den
Erkenntnissen der medizinischen Wissenschaft ver-
tretbares MaB hinausgehen,
4a. das Arzneimittel zur Anwendung bei Tieren bestimmt
ist, die der Gewinnung von Lebensmittein dienen,
5. die angegebene Wartezeit nicht ausreicht,
5a. das Arzneimittel, sofem es zur Anwendung bei Men-
schen bestimmt ist, nicht zur Einnahme und nicht zur
auBeriichen Anwendung bestimmt ist
6. das Arzneimittel der Verschreibungspfiicht unteriiegt,
7. das Arzneimittel nicht nach einer im Homoopathi-
schen Teil des Arzneibuches beschriebenen Verfah-
renstechnik hergesiellt ist
7a. wenn die Anwendung als homoopathisches oder
anthroposophisches Arzneimittel nicht allgemein be-
kanntist
8. fur das Arzneimittel eine Zulassung erteilt ist
9. das Inverkehrbringen des Aizneimittels gegen gesetz-
liche Vorschrrften verstoBen wurde.
(2a) Ist das Arzneimittel bereits in einem ahderen Mit-
gliedstaat der Europaischen Gemeinschaften oder in
einem anderen Vertragsstaat des Abkommens uber den
Europaischen Wirtschaftsraum registriert worden, ist die
Registrierung auf der Grundlage dieser Errtscheidung zu
erteilen, es sei denn, daB ein Versagungsgrund nach
Absatz 2 vorliegt - —
(2b) Die Registrierung eriischt nach Ablaut von funf
Jahren seit ihrer Erteiiung, es sei denn, daB drei bis sechs
Monate vor Ablauf der Fnst ein Arrtrac auf Veriangerurtg
gestellt wird. Fur die Veriangerung aer Registrierung gilt
§ 31 Abs. 2 bis 4 entsDrechend mit der MaBgabe, dafl die
Versagungsgrunde nach Absatz 2 Nr. 3 bis 9 Anwendung
finden.
(3) Das Bundesministerium wird ermachtigt, durch
Rechtsverordnung mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates Vor-
schriften uber die Anzeigeoflicht, die Neuregistrierung, die
Loschung, die Kosten. die Bekanntmachung una die Frei-
stellung von der Registrierung homoopathischer Arznei¬
mittel entsprechend den Vorschriften uber die Zulassung
zu eriassen. Die Rechtsverordnung ergeht im Einvemeh-
men mit dem Bundesministerium fur Emahrung, Land-
wirtschaft und Forsten, soweit es sich um Arzneimittei
handelt, die zur Anwendung bei Tieren bestimmt sind.
SechsterAbschnitt
Schutz des Menschen
bei der kiinischen Prufung
§40
Ailgemeine Voraussetzungen
(1)") Die klinische Prufung eines Arzneimittels darf bei
Menschen nur durchgefuhrt werden, wenn und solange
1. die Risiken, die mit ihr fur die Person verbunden sind,
bei der sie durchgefuhrt werden soil, gemessen an
der voraussichtlichen Bedeutung des Arzneimittels
fur die Heilkunde, arztlich vertretbar sind,
2. die Person, bei der sie durchgefuhrt werden soil, ihre
Einwilligung hierzu erteilt hat nachdem sie durch
einen Arzt uberWesen, Bedeutung und Tragweite der
kiinischen Prufung aufgeklart worden ist,
3. die Person, bei der sie durchgefuhrt werden soil, nicht
auf gerichtliche oder behordliche Anordnung in einer
Anstalt verwahrt ist,
4. sie von einem Arzt geleitet wird, der mindestens eine
zweijahrige Erfahrung in der kiinischen Prufung von
Arzneimitteln nachweisen kann, : ;'
5. eine dem jeweiiigen Stand der wissenschaftlichen
Erkenntnisse entsprechende pharmakoiogiscn-toxi-
kologische Prufung durchgefuhrt worden ist
6. die Unteriagen uber die pharmakologisch-toxikologi-
scne Prufung bei der zustandigen Bundesober-
behorde hinteriegt sind, -
") GemdB Artflcel 1 Nr. 25 Buchstabe a in Verdtndung mrt ArtikBf 6 Ate. 2
Nr. 1 des FOrrtten Gesetres zur Anderung des Ai^i wiiimie*gr.iHti>v
vom 3. August 1994 (BGBL I a 2071) wird § 40 Abs. 1 nut VVrkLng
vom 17.August 1995 wie folgt gefaflt ; J; .
J1) Die Idlntsche PrOfung eines A/zneimrttets darf bei Mensdwn riur
durchgefflhrtwerden, wenn und sotange ' Ff
1. die Risiken, die mit 9tr fQr die Person verftunden sind. bei dersie
durchgefflhrt werden soil, gemessen an der voraussiJitJkJjai
Bedeutung des Arzneimitlets fur die Heiikunde amflcn vertrettar
sind.
2. die Person, bei der sie durchgefuhrt werden soli, ihre EnvrflBging -
hierzu erteilt hat nacnoem sie durcn eioen Arzt Ober Wesen. BedeiA
tung und Tragweite der kimschen Prufung aufgeklart woroen ist irt
mit aieser Brtwiliigung zvgleicti erkiart daB sie mrt dar im Rahmen
der kiinischen Prufung erfolgenden Aufzeichnung von Kiankhefta-
daten und ihrerWertergabe zur UberorOfung an den Auftraggeoer.'an
die zusfflndige Uberwacnungsoehdrde Oder die zustancfige Bundes-
ooeroehdrde einverstariden st
2. die Person. Dei der sie durchgefuhrt werden soli, nicht auf genchtfi-
cne ocar Denordlicne Anordnung in einer Anstait untergeoracnt st
4. sie von einem Arzt geleitet wird. der mindestens eine zweijahnge
Erfanrung in der kiiniscnen Prufung von Arzneimrtteln rtacnwesen
kann,
5. eine dem jeweiiigen Stand der wissenschaftlicnen Erkenntnisse ent-
Sbrechende pnarmakologisch-toxikologische Prufung durcngefuhrt
worden ist
6. die Unteriagen uber die pnarmakologisch-toxikologische Prufung.
der dem jeweiiigen Stand aer wissenscnaftlichen Erkenmntsse ent-
sprechende Prufplan mit Angaoe von Prufem und Pruforten und cia
■Voten der Ethik-Kommissionen bei der zustandigen Bundesober-
benorde vorgelegt worden sind.
7. der Letter der kiinischen Prufung durch einen fur die pharmakolo-
gisch-toxikologische Prufung verarrtwortlichen Wissenschaftler uPer
die Ergebnisse der pharmakologisch-toxikologiscnen Prufung uhd
die voraussichtlicn mit der kiinischen Prufung verbundenen Risik®1
irrformiert worden ist und
8. fur den Fall. daB bei der Durchfuhrung der kiinischen Prufung e"1
Menscn getbtet Oder der Kflrper Oder die Gesundheit eines Men-
schen vertetzt wird, eine Versicherung nacn MaBgabe des Ab-
satzes 3 besteht. die auch Leistungen gewahrt, wenn kein anderer
fur den Schaden haftet
Die klinische Prufung eines Arzneimittels darf bei Menschen vorbehalt-
lich des Satzes 3 nur begonnen werden. wenn diese zuvor von emer
nach Landesrecht gebildeten unabhangigen Ethik-Kommission zusCTf~
mend bewertet worden ist Voraussetzung einer zustimmenden Bewer-
tung ist die Einhaitung der Bedingungen in Satz 1. Soweit keine
mende Bewertung der Ethik-Kommission vorliegt darf mit der
schen Prufung erst begonnen werden, wenn die zustflndlge Bund®
oberbehdrde innerhalb von 60 Tagen nach Eingang der Unteriagen nac"
Satz 1 Nr. 6 nicht widersprochen hat Uber alle schwerwiegenden
unerwarteten unerwunschten Ereignisse, die wShrend der Studie
ten und die Sicherheit der Studierrteilnehmer oder die Durchfuhnx^^^
Studie beeintrachtigen kdnnten, muB die Ethik-Kommission iner**"
werden."
X
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7. der Leiter der klinischen Priifung dutch einen fur die
pharrnakologisch-foxikologische Prufung verantwort-
lichen Wissenscbafller iiber die Ergebnisse der pliar-
makologisch-toxikologisctien Prufung und die vor-
aussichtlich mit der klinischen Prufung verbundenen
Risiken inforniiert worden ist,
7a. ein dem jeweiligen Stand der wissenschaftlichen
Erkenntnisse entsprechender Prijfplan vorlianden ist
und
8. fur den Fall, daf3 bei der Durchfiiluung der klinisclien
Prufung ein Mensch getotet Oder der Korper oder die
Gesundheit eines Menschen verletzt wird, eine Ver-
sicherung nach MaBgabe des Absatzes 3 bestetit, die
auch Leistungen gewahrt, wenn kein anderer fur den
Schaden haftet.
(2) Eine Einwilligung nacli Absatz 1 Nr. 2 ist nur wirksarn,
wenn die Person, die sie abgibt
1. geschaftsfahig und in der Lage ist, Wesen, Bedeutung
und Tragweite der klinischen Prufung einzusehen und
ittren Willen hiernach zu bestimmen und
2. die Einwilligung selbst und schrifllich erteilt fiat.
Eine Einwilligung kann jederzeit widerrufen werden.
(3) Die Versicherung nach Absatz 1 Nr. 8 muf3 zugunsten
der von der klinischen Prufung betroffenen Person bei
einern irn Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes zum Ge-
schaftsbetrieb zugelassenen Versicherer genommen wer¬
den. Ihr Umfang muB in einem angemessenen VerhSltnis
zit den mit der klinischen Prufung verbundenen Risiken
stehen und fur den Fall des Todes oder der dauernden
ErwerbsunfShigkeit mindestens eine Million Deutsche
Mark betragen. Soweit aus der Versicherung geleistet
wird, edischt ein Anspruch auf Schadensersatz.
»*
(4) Auf eine klinische Prufung bei Minderjahrigen finden
die Absatze 1 bis 3 mit folgender MaBgabe Anwendung:
1. Das Arzneirnittel muB zum Erkennen oder zum Verhu-
ten von Krankheiten bei Minderjahrigen bestimmt sein.
2. Die Anwendung des Arzneimittels muB nach den
Erkenntnissen der medizinischen Wissenschaft ange-
zeigt sein, urn bei dem Minderjahrigen Krankheiten zu
erkennen oder Bin vor Krankheiten zu schutzen.
3. Die klinische PrOfung an Erwaclisenen darf nach den
, Erkenntnissen der medizinischen Wissenschaft keine
ausreichenden Prufergebnisse erwarten lassen.
4. Die Einwilligung wird durch den gesetzliciien Vertreter
oder Pfleger abgegeben. Sie ist nurwirksam, wenn die-
ser durcli einen Arzt iiberWesen, Bedeutung und Trag¬
weite der klinischen Prufung aufgeklart worden ist. Ist
der Minderjahrige in der Lage, Wesen, Bedeutung und
Tragweite der klinischen Prufung einzusehen und sel-
nen Willen hiemach zu bestirnmen, so ist auch seine
schriftliche Einwilligung erforderlich.
■ (5) Das Bundesministerium wird ermachtigt, durch
Hechtsverordnung mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates
.'.Regelungen zur Gewatirleistung der ordnungsgemaBen
... Burchfuhrung der klinisciien Prufung und der Erzielung
dern wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisstand entsprecliender
• -"'Unterlagen zu treffen. In der Reclitsverordnung konnen
insbesondere die Aufgaben und Verantwortungsbereiclie
der Personen, die die klinische Prufung veranlassen,
durchfuhren oder kontrollieren, naher bestimmt und




Auf eine klinische Prufung bei einer Person, die an einer
Krankheit leidet, zu deren Behebung das zu prufende Arz-
neimittel angewendet werden soli, findet § 40 Abs. 1 bis 3
mit folgender MaBgabe Anwendung:
1. Die klinische Prufung darf nur durchgefuhrt werden,
wenn die Anwendung des zu prufenden Arzneimittels
nach den Erkenntnissen der medizinischen Wissen¬
schaft angezeigt ist, um das Leben des Kranken zu
retten, seine Gesundheit wiederherzustellen oder sein
Leiden zu erleichtern.
2. Die klinische Prufung dad auch bei einer Person, die
geschaftsunfahig oder in der Geschattsfahigkeit be-
schrankt ist, durchgefuhrt werden.
3. Ist eine geschaftsunfahige oder in der Geschaftsfahig-
keit beschrankte Person in der Lage, Wesen, Bedeu¬
tung und Tragweite der klinischen Prufung einzusehen
und ihren Willen hiemach zu bestimmen, so bedad die
klinische Prufung neben einer edorderlichen Einwilli¬
gung dieser Person der Einwilligung ihres gesetz-
lichen Vedreters.
4. Ist der Kranke nicht fahig, Wesen, Bedeutung und
Tragweite der klinischen Prufung einzusehen und sei-
nen Willen hiemach zu bestimmen, so genugt die
Einwilligung seines gesetzlichen Vedreters.
5. Die Einwilligung des gesetzlichen Vedreters ist nur
wirksam, wenn dieser durch einen Arzt fiber Wesen,
Bedeutung und Tragweite der klinischen Prufung auf-
geklart worden ist. Auf den Widemrf findet § 40 Abs. 2
Satz 2 Anwendung. Der Einwilligung des gesetzlichen
Vedreters bedad es solange nicht, als eine Behandlung
ohne Aufschub edorderlich ist, um das Leben des
Kranken zu retten, seine Gesundheit wiedertierzu-
stellen oder sein Leiden zu erieichtem, und eine Er-
klarung fiber die Einwilligung nichl herbeigefiihd
werden kann.
6. Die Einwilligung des Kranken, des gesetzlichen Vedre¬
ters ist auch wirksam, wenn sie miindlich gegenuber
dem behandelnden Arzt in Gegenwad eines Zeugen
abgegeben wird.
7. Die Aufklarung und die Einwilligung des Kranken kon¬
nen in besonders schweren Fallen entfallen, wenn
durch die Aufklarung der Behandlungsedolg nach der
Nummer 1 gefaiirdet wiirde und ein entgegenstehen-
der Wille des Kranken nicht erkennbar ist.
§42
Ausnafimen
Die §§ 40 und 41 finden keine Anwendung bei Arznei-
mitteln im Sinne des § 2 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 a, 3 und 4. § 40 Abs. 1
Nr. 5 und 6 findet keine Anwendung auf klinische Priifun-
gen mit zugelassenen oder von der Zulassungspflicht frel-
gestellten Arzneimitteln.
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§§ 40 AND 41 OF THE ARZNEIMITTELGESETZ (AMG)13
§ 40 General Provisions
(1) The clinical trial of a medicine may only be conducted providing
1.the risks which are connected to the individual upon whom the trial will be carried out are justifiable
in relation to the foreseeable impact of the medicine on medical science,
2.the person upon whom the trial will be carried out has given his consent after having been informed of
the nature, meaning and consequences of the clinical trial,
3.the person upon whom the trial will be carried out is not legally committed by a court or an authority
to an institution,
4.the supervisor of the clinical trial has at least two years experience in clinial trials of medicines,
5.corresponding pharmacological-toxicological tests have been conducted in accordance with current
scientific knowledge,
6.the documents pertaining to the results of the pharmacological-toxicological tests, which are in
accordance with current scientific knowledge, and the research proposal which includes information
pertaining to the identity of the researcher(s), the place of the research project as well as the decision of
the Ethik-Kommission, have been lodged with the appropriate authority,
7.the supervisor of the clinial trial has been informed by the scientists conducting the tests as to the
foreseeable risks which arise in relation to the pharmacological-toxicological tests and their possible
bearing on the clinical-toxicological tests,
7a.a research protocol exists which is of the standard of current scientific practice,
8.an insurance scheme has been set up according to subsection (3) which is invoked in the event of
bodily harm or death and when no other party will pay.
A clinical trial of a new medication may only commence once it has received the approval, in pursuance
to paragraph 3, of an Ethik-Kommission established at regional level; a positive approval is likely to
ensue if the conditions contained in paragraph 1 are complied with. If approval is not given, a clinical
trial may only commence once it has received the approval of the appropriate national authority which
has 60 days to consider the proposal (according to paragraph 1 Nr. 6). The Ethik-Kommission must be
informed of all unexpected difficulties or side effects which arise during the trial.
(2)Consent according to subsections 1 Nr. 2 is only effective if the person who gives it is
1.capable of forming an understanding of the nature, meaning and consequences of the clinical trial,
2.personal written consent is given. Consent can be withdrawn at any time.
13Arzneimittelgesetz of 19. 10. 1994 BGB1. I, 3018 at 3040. Please note that this has been translated by
the author and should not be regarded as authoritative.
(3)An insurance scheme which is recognised by insurance companies must be set up according to
subsection 1 Nr. 8 for all those affected. It applies to the reasonable relationship between the risks of the
clinical trial and in the event of death or permanent disability to the sum of 50, 000 DM. A right to
damages is negated to this extent.
(4)Subsections 1-3 apply to clinical trials involving minors as follows:
1.The medicine must be designated for illnesses affecting minors.
2.The use of the medicine as regards diagnosis or treatment of illnesses affecting minors must be
reported according to medical scientific knowledge.
3.Clinical trials involving adults are unable to give sufficient test results according to current medical
scientific knowledge.
4.Consent is given through a legal guardian or care assistant. It is only effective when this individual
has been informed as to the nature, meaning and consequences of the clinical trial. Written consent
must be given by the minor if he is capabable of understanding the nature, meaning and consequences of
the clinical trial.
§ 41 Specific Provisions
In clinical trials involving patients, § 40 subsections 1-3 apply accordingly;
1.The clinical trial may only be conducted once the application of the medicine under examination has
been registered in accordance with medical science as being able to save the life of the patient, restore
his health or alleviate his suffering.
2.The clinical trial may involve those affected by mental incapacity.
3.A clinical trial may include them [those affected by mental incapacity] providing they are able to
understand the nature, meaning and consequences of the clinical trial and can make their will be known
and the consent of their legal guardian or care assistant is obtained.
4.The consent of the legal guardian or care assistant is sufficient if the patient is unable to form an
understanding of the nature, meaning and consequences of the clinical trial.
5.Consent of the legal guardian or care assistant is only effective if they have been informed by the
doctor as to the nature, meaning and consequences of the clinical trial. Regarding retraction [of
consent] § 40 (2) sentence 2 applies. The requirement for consent by a third party may be waived if the
explanation as to consent is impossible.
6.Oral consent of the patient, the legal guardian or care assistant is only effective if it is obtained in the
presence of a witness.
7.Explanation and consent of the patient may be waived in certain difficult cases, if it will jeapordise the
success of the treatment and the will of the patient is not discernible.
Appendix E
Research Ethics Committees in Scotland
ResultsObtained from Questionnaires Submitted in 1994
Despite every effort made, only 12 Committees Responded Out of a Total of 21 as regards Composition




• Unanimous Voting 3
• Majority Voting 4
Measures forMonitoring Progress of Proposals
• 5 out of 7 Committees had implemented measures for monitoring the progress of
research proposals
Research Proposals
• Approved Without Comment






Female Members of Research Ethics Committees (See Chart One)
• Total of Committee Members 95 ofwhich,
• Female Members 20 ofwhich,
• Medical Profession 14
• Lay Members 6





• Justices of the Peace 4
• Local Councillors 6
• Other 4
Medical Professionals (See Chart Three)
• Doctors 74
• Paramedics (inc. nurses) 22
• Other 8
xv






















Questionnaire for Research Ethics Committees (Sample)
Composition
1. Under what authority is the committee established ?
1.1. How is the committee composed ? Please list the number of,
medical doctors [ ]
paramedics (inc. nurses) [ ]
lay members [ ]
1.2. Please list the lay members on the committee by occupation.
1.3. How are the committee members chosen and what is the basis for their
selection ?
1.4. How many women sit on the committee ? Please list the number ofwomen
who are,
medical professionals [ ]
lay members [ ]
Medical Advice
2. Is there a formal provision for a medical adviser whose task it is to translate the
broad nature of the proposal for research ?
Practice
3. How many research protocols are dealt with,
3.1. at each sitting of the committee and (on average),
3.2. each year; please state whether these proposals were,
NHS [ ]
Non-NHS [ ]
3.3. Please list the number of proposals that were,
(a) approved without comment,
(b) approved after amendment, and
(c) refused
3.4. How often does the committee meet each year ?
once a month [ ]
quarterly [ ]
other [ ]
3.5. Does the committee publish an Annual Report ?
Yes [ ]
No [ ]
3.6. How are the decisions reached ?
majority voting [ ]
unanimity [ ]
other [ ]
3.7. Is the Proposer,
required to attend [ ]
allowed to attend [ ]
the meeting ?




If the answer to this question is 'yes', please state whether this is done by the Chairman
of the committee as a whole.
If the answer to this question is 'no', please state whether this is a measure which the
committee would consider implementing.
3 .9. If the committee refused to give its approval to a multi-centre trial, which had
received the approval of other research ethics committees, would it consider
bringing its uneasiness concerning the trial to the attention of a higher body e.g.
the Scottish Office, the General Medical Council or the NHS management ?
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